

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HISTORY

OF THE

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

SS d. 1

BY

M. A. THIERS,

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&c., &c., &c.

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some days beyond the Guadarrama for the purpose of delaying the progress of Lord Wellington and relieving the army of Portugal, vigorously pursued by him—By virtue of his presence, and the vigour of General Clausel the wrecks of the army of Portugal are saved—Moral and material state of this army—Great distress felt by Joseph, now threatened with the immediate entrance of the English into his capital—Having no other resource, he orders, in conformity with the advice of Marshal Jourdan, the evacuation of Andalusia—His imperative orders to Marshal Soult—After having pursued the army of Portugal during some days, Lord Wellington, yielding to his desire to make a triumphal entry into Madrid, enters this city on the 12th of August—Joseph, compelled to evacuate his capital, retires towards La Mancha, and, despairing of being joined in time by the army of Andalusia, flies to Valencia—Horrible sufferings of the army of the centre and the fugitive families which followed in its rear—It is well received and abundantly supplied by Marshal Suchet—Marshal Soult, informed by Joseph of his retreat upon Valencia, determines to evacuate Andalusia, and takes the Murcian route for the purpose of reaching Valencia—Despatches sent by him to Napoleon in explanation of his conduct—These despatches accidentally fall into Joseph's hands—Irritation of the latter—His interview with Marshal Soult at Fuente de Higuera on the 3rd of October—Conference with the three Marshals, Jourdan, Soult, and Suchet, with regard to the plan to be pursued for the purpose of regaining possession of Madrid and driving back the English into Portugal—Advice given by the three Marshals—Wisdom of the plan proposed by Marshal Jourdan, and adoption of this plan—The two armies of Andalusia and of the centre march upon Madrid towards the end of October—Time lost by Lord Wellington at Madrid; his tardy appearance before Burgos—Noble resistance made by the garrison of Burgos—The army of Portugal, reinforced, compels Lord Wellington to raise the siege of Burgos—Alarmed at the concentration of forces by which he is threatened, Lord Wellington again retires under the walls of Salamanca and takes up his position there—In the meantime, Joseph having arrived on the Tagus with the united armies of the centre and of Andalusia, drives before him General Hill, expels him from Madrid, re-enters this capital on the 2nd November, and immediately departs from it for the purpose of pursuing the English—Arrives on the 6th of November on the other side of the Guadarrama, and is joined there by the armies of Portugal—The presence of forty-four thousand French troops, the best soldiers in Europe, before Lord Wellington at Salamanca, affords a favourable opportunity of avenging our reverses—The plan of attack proposed by Marshal Jourdan is approved of by all the Generals but rejected by Marshal Soult—Joseph, fearing that a plan disapproved of by the General of the principal army would be ill executed, renounces the plan proposed by Marshal Jourdan, and leaves to Marshal Soult the responsibility of selecting the course to be pursued—Marshal Soult passes the Tormès at a point other than that pointed out by Marshal Jourdan, and sees the English army escape—Lord Wellington, having at his disposal only forty thousand English and, at the most, twelve thousand Portuguese and Spaniards, and, being surrounded by more than eighty thousand French troops, succeeds in withdrawing safely into Portugal—The three French armies, justly discontented with their chiefs, enter into cantonments—Return of Joseph to Madrid—Disastrous consequences of this campaign to France, and delight experienced throughout Europe, and especially in Germany, at the sight of the misfortunes so unexpectedly suffered by Napoleon.

HISTORY
OF
THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE
UNDER
NAPOLEON.

BOOK XLVI.

WASHINGTON AND SALAMANCA.

WHILST the unexampled catastrophe which we have been describing was taking place in the north of Europe, the distant shores of the Atlantic and the burning plains of Spain were the theatre of events which, although doubtless less extraordinary, were still extremely serious; resembling, in this respect, all the results of Napoleon's exorbitant policy, and thus proving the ill-advisedness of the principles on which it was conducted. We may herein perceive a clear manifestation of the truth which we have already enunciated. And if, instead of attempting to vanquish Europe at the bottom of Russia, Napoleon had persevered in combatting it on the theatre, difficult, indeed, but selected by himself on the Peninsula and the Atlantic, he would probably have compelled England to yield, and at the same time have disarmed the whole of Europe, at least for many years, and would thus have obtained time, more judicious views having taken possession of his mind, to make such sacrifices as his greatness would have allowed him to make with the utmost safety, and would have rendered his government endurable by rendering it supportable. It is necessary then, that before entering upon the consideration of the consequences of the fatal Russian expedition we should retrace the course of events in Spain and America during the year 1812;—some of them disastrous, and some fruitlessly fortunate, since they were the results of the rash and careless will of a great but undisciplined genius.

When Napoleon, disgusted with the Spanish war, at the moment when perseverance might have rendered it successful, resolved to carry his forces to the north, England was, as we have already seen, in a position of extreme difficulty. The success which the errors committed on our part had enabled Lord Wellington to obtain, had, doubtless, in some degree tranquillized the public mind in Great Britain, but it was still overwhelmed by the constant fear that Napoleon might direct against it some decisive effort, and the painful position of its commerce was in no degree ameliorated. Enormous quantities of colonial produce, sugars, coffees, cottons, accumulated in the docks, or in the vessels which blocked up the Thames, and a no less considerable quantity of unsaleable manufactures caused the emission of an immense number of bills, which the Bank discounted, giving in exchange paper money which was depreciated 20 or 25 per cent. At the same time the national expenses began to rise to a hundred millions sterling a year against a revenue of ninety millions, of which twenty millions were the produce of an annual loan; and dearth of provisions, which during the year had fallen upon France, had been so severe in England, that bands of workmen, bursting into the shops and sometimes plundering the manufactories, demanded bread with clamorous cries which would have terrified any government less accustomed to the clamours of a free people, but could not fail to distress every government which was wise and humane.

It is true, that a hundred vessels of war, and two hundred frigates, bearing her victorious flag over every sea, an army, small in numbers, indeed, but valiantly and skilfully conducted, and finally, a cabinet which was the only one in Europe which had refused to be dictated to by Napoleon's despotic will, recompensed, in some degree, glorious England for her sufferings; but every thoughtful mind perceived that her existing position was one which concealed great perils, and that should the terrible genius with which she was contending, carry out his designs with prudence and forethought, he might reduce the commerce and finances of England to the last extremity, and even terminate the interminable war in Spain, driving Lord Wellington and his brave army into the sea. One hundred thousand of the six hundred thousand men lost in Russia, and his own presence in the Peninsula, would have sufficed to have obtained this result. This was everywhere the general opinion, and everywhere found expression in words coloured by the peculiar opinions of the various speakers. The opposition in the British Parliament expressed it in the language of party; the populace vociferated it in the streets in popular fashion, and the enlightened members of the government whispered it in the recesses of the cabinet, from which the Marquis of Wellesley, brother of the celebrated Lord Wellington, and sharing the opinion above alluded to, had withdrawn on account of his antipathy for the character and inflexible policy of Mr. Percival. But a state of warfare may become as much a habit as one of peace, and after having been long accustomed to such a state it was found as difficult to escape from it in England as in France. Great Britain had become used to being at war and at war it remained; the actual result being such as to testify to the good judgment of those who persisted in maintaining the war policy; but yet, the exercise of a little wisdom on the part of Napoleon might have produced a result of a very different nature.

A sentiment, partly honourable and partly interested, had gained possession of the minds of the bulk of the nation, consisting partly of sympathy for the Spanish insurgents and partly of anxiety to prevent Napoleon from establishing his influence over the Peninsula. Had Napoleon made some sacrifice in this respect, or by a prodigious victory set England free from the obligations in which she felt bound in honour towards Spain, peace would have been immediately accepted, leaving France in possession of immense aggrandizements. Two men alone in England displayed invincible resolution, and those were Mr. Percival and Lord Wellington. The former, a most able advocate, of an upright heart, and so strict and resolute as to be much disliked by his colleagues on account of his obstinacy, had obtained by this characteristic the chief place in the cabinet, and his resolution not to make peace was simply one of its manifestations; whilst the latter, partly because the conduct of the war in the Peninsula raised his glory every day to a greater height, and partly because his extraordinary sagacity enabled him to perceive the commencement of some confusion in the management of affairs in

Spain, on our part, was anxious that the war should be continued, declaring, that although he could not be quite certain of being always able to maintain his footing in the Peninsula, that he could, nevertheless, see that ruin was about to overwhelm Napoleon's vast empire. The Prince Regent who, a year since, had obtained the reins of government, hesitated between the heads of the opposition, his old friends, and the ministers, who were the old confidential advisers of his father. He had gradually become accustomed to the latter and alienated from the former; but he perceived the danger of persisting in a system of unlimited war; and was, at the same time equally conscious of the danger of suddenly placing the power of the nation in the hands of men who had never conducted this war, and who even condemned it, at the very moment when its successful conclusion, perhaps, could only be accomplished by a skilful perseverance in it for some time longer. In the midst of these perplexities, he had attempted at the commencement of the year 1812, to effect a reconciliation between the ministers and Lords Grey and Grenville; but failed, notwithstanding his strenuous endeavours to effect his object; when suddenly an unexpected event which, under any other circumstances, would certainly have caused some change in the English government, removed the principal minister from the scene. A man named Bellingham, a sort of madman, who believed that he had rendered his country good services in Russia, and who continually demanded some reward for them of the Ambassador, Lord Gower, and of the various members of the cabinet, daily frequenting the lobbies of the Houses of Parliament with the purpose of interesting powerful patrons in his favour, at length determined to kill one of the persons whom he had vainly solicited, and wished that this object of his vengeance should be Lord Gower, but meeting Mr. Percival, shot him instead. He surrendered himself, acknowledged his crime, and died with the tranquillity of a madman. An opinion at first prevailed that this crime had some political cause, and although this was soon found to be erroneous, it became evident that it had a political significance, when the ferocious cries of the populace exasperated by suffering, arose in favour of the wretched being who had struck down a man who was amenable to history but not to the assassin.

Had this event taken place before the Russian war had become probable, it would have changed, there is good reason to suppose, the system of English policy. But Mr. Percival was killed on the 11th of May, at the moment when Napoleon was marching towards the Niemen; and this war between

France and Russia opened to it such new perspectives, that when entrusting the ministry of foreign affairs to Lord Castlereagh, the Prince Regent intimated his determination to persevere in the policy of Pitt and Percival.

Thus was a first fortunate chance snatched from Napoleon by the Russian war, and he was soon to lose another not less to be regretted, being that which might have arisen from the war which had just been declared between England and America.

As Napoleon was obliged to oppress the nations of Europe by the measures he was forced to adopt for the purpose of compelling them to submit to the rigours of the continental blockade, so was England forced to oppress even more cruelly the maritime nations in the exercise of her supremacy on the seas. To compel, indeed, all the commercial nations to send their vessels to London or Malta for the purpose of receiving permission to sail, to pay tribute, and to receive cargoes of English merchandise; and to compel them to regard as blockaded ports those which had never really been so, required the exercise of an insupportable tyranny on the ocean which was as odious as that of Napoleon on land.

This was one of the circumstances from which Napoleon might have reaped great advantage, and by which he might have gained allies in exchange for those whom he had given to England by the rigours of the continental blockade, had he known how to await the benefits of patience.

The greater number of the maritime powers of the old world had disappeared, absorbed in his immense empire; but beyond the Atlantic existed one which, inaccessible to European armies, silently increased, day by day acquiring a strength which was suspected but not thoroughly understood. This power was America, a real Hercules in the cradle, and destined to astonish the world as soon as it should begin to exert its natural vigour; and with respect to this country, on the subject of maritime rights, both France and England committed the gravest errors, at the very moment when to each of these countries friendship was of the utmost importance. As, however, the British government had committed these errors to a greater extent than Napoleon, the balance of American good-will turned in favour of the latter, and its hostility became directed solely against England.

We have already seen how America, irritated by the *Orders in Council*, which declared it necessary that all vessels should touch at London or Malta for the purpose of obtaining a license to navigate the ocean, and also declared a vast extent of coast to be blockaded when no semblance of an actual blockade existed there, had been almost immediately afterwards equally disgusted by the decrees of Berlin and Milan, which declared denationalized every vessel which had submitted to these orders of the British council, and had responded to these two acts of tyranny, of which the second was the necessary consequence of the first, by a measure of a very similar nature, the law of *Non-Intercourse*. It will be remembered that this law prohibited American vessels from frequenting the European seas, and that many American ship owners, attracted by the chances of obtaining enormous profits, had disregarded its provisions; and submitting, on the contrary, to those of the English *Orders in Council*, had thus formed that race of *pretended neutrals* of whom Napoleon had made such large captures, and of whom he had desired all the other European states, including Russia, to make seizures. It will be remembered also that when this state of things had lasted somewhat less than two years, the American states, weary of injuring themselves for the purpose of causing injury to others, declared that it would abandon the system it had adopted in favour of that one of the two powers, France and England, which should renounce all pretensions of controlling the navigation of the oceans. Napoleon had cleverly taken advantage of this circumstance, and declared that from the 1st November 1810 the decrees of Berlin and Milan should be annulled in respect to the United States, provided that the Americans on their part, should either obtain of England the revocation of the *Orders* in Council, or compel her to respect their rights. On this occasion Napoleon displayed unusual consideration for the rights of others, refraining from dictating too openly to America the course which she should pursue, by actually demanding that she should declare war against England; whilst nevertheless his meaning was sufficiently manifest under the formula in which he clothed it.

America, eagerly responding to this overture, had declared by an act of the 2nd of March 1811 its maritime relations re-established with France, and the law of *Non-Intercourse* maintained with respect to England until she should revoke her *Orders in Council*; and in answer to this act the British cabinet, which clung to the *Orders* in Council more from a feeling of vanity than on account of any advantage to be derived from them, had modified certain of their details whilst it still maintained their principle intact. It annulled the obligation which had been laid upon merchant vessels to visit the ports of London or Malta, and restricted its paper blockade to the coasts of the French Empire, from the Elba to the Saint Sebastian in the ocean, and from Port-Vendre to Cattaro in the Mediterranean and Adriatic, but at the same time persisted in its resolution to confiscate enemy's goods in neutral vessels ; and thus maintained almost in its entirety the maritime tyranny which Great Britain had arrogated to itself, and those usurpations which had called forth in reply the decrees of Berlin and Milan. And if this system, and if these orders in council were contrary to every principle of right, in a still greater degree were they productive of actual inconvenience to the citizens of the United States, for the English not only made them the pretext for seizing silks and wines belonging to Americans on the ground that they were enemy's goods, but at the same time pressed into their service American sailors, on the pretence that as they spoke English they were deserters from the British navy. Every vessel freighted with a cargo of French merchandise was pillaged, every sailor speaking the English language was arrested as a deserter, and many English frigates pursued this system even on the very shores of America, in the sight of indignant populations. Doubtless there were at this time a certain number of deserters from the English naval service in America, for it usually happens that when a country is engaged in warfare some of its sailors emigrate for the purpose of avoiding being forced to exchange the commercial service for the governmental, which is far less lucrative. Fortunately, however, for the honour of nations those who act in this manner are always but few in proportion to the whole number ; and whilst the number of men lawfully seized in the manner above mentioned amounted at most to six thousand, there is good reason to believe that at least double that number were seized on board American vessels, on the pretence, only, that they were English sailors. The right of search, therefore, being thus exercised, whilst the coasts of the French empire which comprised the best part of Europe were blockaded, it is evident that, notwithstanding the relaxation which had been made in the Orders in Council, the commercial intercourse of America with England was rendered impossible.

The Americans were too jealous of the right of free navigation of the ocean, and too careful of their own interests not to resist these intolerable pretensions, and to point out the illusory nature of the pretended modifications in the *Orders in Council.* The impressment of their sailors, especially, which was obstinately continued by the English frigates at the mouth of the Chesapeak and Delaware, was the source of unanimous indignation, and in the course of 1811 the dispute between England and America had reached the utmost degree of violence. Lord Castlereagh maintained with incredible arrogance and an obstinate sophistry little worthy of England, that the modifications made in the Orders in Council were more considerable than those made by Napoleon in the decrees of Berlin and Milan; that in reality these decrees had not been revoked, that America could furnish no proof of their revocation, that testimony to the contrary was furnished every day by the seizure of numerous American vessels by the French marine; and that, finally, to claim for neutral vessels the right of freely conveying any species of merchandise, save contraband of war, was to demand in fact the free circulation of French products throughout the whole world; whilst the Americans had not in return obtained an equal freedom of circulation for English products. With regard to the impressment of sailors, Lord Castlereagh displayed inflexible firmness, declaring that with regard to sailors, her most precious species of property, England would take possession of her own wherever she could find them.

The Americans rejoined, with much reason, that the modifications made in the *Orders in Council* were of no effect, since they still maintained the right of searching neutral vessels for enemy's property, and the fictitious blockade; that the revocation of the decrees of Berlin and Milan was a matter which concerned them alone, and of the sincerity of which they alone could be the right judges, since it concerned only their own commerce, and not that of any other nation; that they possessed, moreover, the official declaration of the French minister, ready to be converted into a decree as soon as the concession demanded of America by France should have been fulfilled; that some arbitrary proceedings, indeed, had been taken by the French, but were partly due to the unsettled state in which the affair stood, and partly to the violent course pursued by the English, and that America both could and would prevent their repetition; that the reproach that America had not obtained from France the recognition of her right to traffic freely in English merchandise was puerile and unworthy of a serious discussion; that, in short, America, asserting the right of neutrals to take in whatever freight they might choose on their own coasts, did not claim the right to introduce into England, for example, the wines or silks of France, which would have been an impertinent pretence, but did claim the right to convey such silks and wines to whatever countries might desire to receive them; since it was the undoubted right of every neutral nation not to be injured by the war which might be waged between others; that the right which it claimed for neutrals was, not that they should have liberty to introduce into other countries such merchandise as it might be contrary to their interests to receive, but that they might traffic without restriction with those countries which were willing to receive it; that to complain that America had not demanded of France the privilege of introducing into that country English products was unreasonable even to folly.

With regard to the impressment of sailors, the Americans added, that whilst England had an undoubted right to pursue and punish deserters from her services on her own territory, she had, nevertheless, no right to pursue them on the territories of other nations; that on the seas, which are the common property of all nations, and the exclusive property of none, a ship sailing under its national flag was a portion of the territory of the nation to which it belonged, according to the recognised principles of international law; that for England, therefore, to seize any sailor, whether English or not, on board an American vessel, was as gross a violation of American territory as would be committed, should an English constable seize an English culprit at Washington itself.

The truth of these principles was so evident that Lord Castlereagh and his civilians were wholly unable to answer them, and in the course of the year 1811, war was declared between England and the United States, a circumstance which would doubtless have been very greatly to our advantage had not France, still, unfortunately, executed rigorous measures with respect to the commerce of the latter country which furnished the partisans of British influence in America and the friends of peace at any price with specious arguments against a war between the two countries.

Napoleon had been unwilling to withdraw his decrees immediately, and had limited himself in the first place to a formal promise to revoke them as soon as America should have taken some decided measures against England. As soon, therefore, as the American act of the 2nd March 1811, which re-established commercial relations with France, whilst it left them suspended with regard to England, became known in Europe, Napoleon replied to it by an act passed on the 28th April 1811, which revoked the decrees of Berlin and Milan in respect to America; and thus utterly destroyed the principal of the assertions made by the English. But unfortunately he partly destroyed the good effects thus produced by maintaining certain exceptions to the free right of commerce belonging to neutrals, and subjecting American commerce to certain restrictions of a nature peculiarly inconvenient. In the first place, he was unwilling to restore the celebrated cargoes which had been seized in Holland, not only because they were of great value, but because, also, they belonged to that class of American traders which had more particularly engaged in commercial relations with Great Britian, and for which he had more aversion than even for the English themselves. He excused this rigour by two good reasons, the first of which was, that the proprietors of those cargoes had violated the law of *non-intercourse* by sending them to Europe, and having thus broken the laws of their country had become denationalized; and the second, that the confiscation of these vessels was the natural result of the seizure in America of French vessels, on the ground that they had violated the law of *non-intercourse*. With regard to this latter reason, indeed, it is true that the French vessels seized numbered three or four, whilst the American vessels seized by Napoleon numbered several hundreds; but on the point of honour, Napoleon declared that the mere number could not be held in any account, and that the capture of a thousand American vessels would not compensate in his eyes for any ill treatment of a single French vessel in the ports of the United States. Nevertheless, he had consented to release some of the American vessels seized since the declaration of the 1st November 1810, that is to say, since the date of the offer made to America to revoke the decrees of Berlin and Milan, if America should accept the conditions on which this offer was made.

Whilst re-establishing the rights of neutrals in respect to the Americans, Napoleon still maintained some exceptions to these rights, declaring his intention to seize any American vessel which should be found sailing under an English convoy, as having become an enemy by association, and, in reprisal for the blockade of the shores of France by the English, to prevent any vessel from visiting the shores of England;—directing this interdiction, he said, not against the ships of America, but against the shores of England. And finally, as he had armies before Lisbon and Cadiz, he asserted that to convey provisions to either of those places, would be to violate a real blockade, and therefore forbade it. All these restrictions upon the enjoyment of the simple rights of neutrals were capable of being supported by sound reasons, but this fact in no degree diminished the bad effect produced by them in America.

With regard to commerce, Napoleon, who was always anxious whilst permitting commercial relations between France and America, to keep away from the former country both English ships and English merchandise, had devised the most minute precautions for enforcing his wishes. In the first place, he directed that the ships sailing from America to France, should depart only from New York or New Orleans, and should touch the French shores only at Bordeaux, Nantes, or Havre. In addition to this regulation, he ordered that every cargo before its departure from America should be verified and inventoried by his consuls, for the purpose of preventing any change being made in it *en route*, and that neither sugar nor coffee should form a portion of such cargoes, the origin of those articles being always doubtful. At the same time he endeavoured to compel the American merchants bringing cargoes to France, to take back in return two thirds of the value of such cargoes in French silks and wines; and, finally, he had rendered all goods imported from America subject to the famous tariff of the 5th of August, 1810, which consisted in substituting a tax of 50 per cent. for the absolute prohibition which had been pronounced against the importation of any exotic produce.

As soon as the American merchants found themselves exposed to these restrictions, they uttered bitter complaints against them, which unfortunately caused the most unfavourable impressions in the United States, and the result was, that Napoleon deprived himself for the sake of a slight gain of the immense advantage which he must have derived from a declaration of war between England and America. He was quite right to be unwilling to permit English goods to gain admittance into France by means of neutral vessels, but had war been declared between England and America, the ships of the latter country would have obtained but a small portion of their cargoes from the depôts of the former; and the rule that the vessels trading between France and America should only sail between three ports of the former country and two of the latter, was simply to facilitate the blockade of our coasts by the English, and might well have been exchanged for strict examinations of the cargoes by consuls of integrity. With regard to the prohibition relative to sugars and coffees, a certain portion of those articles was so absolutely necesary to France, that Napoleon had permitted them to be brought even from England by means of licences; and it would have been much simpler to have received them at the hands of the Americans, who might have obtained them from the English colonies. And finally, with respect to the obligation imposed upon American merchants to buy in exchange for their imports a certain portion of the wines and silks of France, it was to be remembered that too much solicitude for the welfare of Bordeaux and Lyons might be rather injurious than beneficial, and, moreover, that the Americans might well be left to select such French products for export as might seem best to themselves.

The great object to be obtained was the creation of a state of war between Great Britain and America, not only because the loss of the trade of the latter country would be one of the greatest blows which could be inflicted on the former, but because, also, from the firing of the first cannon shot in anger between them, the American flag would at once cease to be the secret agent of England; and without the aid of such secret agency it may be well imagined what the effect would have been to her of the continental blockade.

No sacrifice could have been too great on our part for the purpose of obtaining such a result as this, and it was evident that it could only be obtained by removing in the first place all causes of complaint against us on the part of the Americans, that their irritation might be solely directed against England, and in the second place by leading them to hope that an extensive commerce with France would compensate them for that which they were about to lose with England. But unfortunately a spirit of distrust, pride, and obstinacy rendered Napoleon unwilling to grant the concessions demanded of him, and induced him, when he did yield them ungraciously one by one, to destroy their effect by untimely rigour. When therefore the advocates of a war with England cited in the American congress the number of vessels seized by the English or on board of which they had impressed into their service American sailors, those who were opposed to the declaration of war were able to cite in reply the number of American vessels captured by the French ships of war at the mouths of the Thames or the Tagus; and when the former set forth the vastness of the French commerce which America would enjoy in compensation for that of which she would be deprived by a state of war with England, the latter were able to state in reply the restriction which had been imposed on this commerce by its limitations to two ports in America and three in France, and the many inconveniences and excessive taxes to which it was exposed.

The state of public opinion in the United States, and the division of parties in this free country, still more complicated this question.

At the time of which we speak, as well as before and after it, the people of North America were divided into Federalists and Democrats. The former, although formerly eager for war with Great Britain for the sake of severing America from connection with it, had, when this severance was once effected, permitted themselves to entertain a species of predilection for the mother country, which led them to desire both its commerce and alliance. Motives of interest also had considerable influence in strengthening the hold of this feeling upon those minds which entertained it; for, being almost entirely established on the north east coasts of America, at Philadelphia, at New York, at Boston, they had been long engaged in the English trade, and were naturally anxious that America should receive those English products in which they trafficed. This party was composed of wealthy merchants, whose manners, tastes, and ideas were those of that great English commercial class of which they had once formed a portion; and whilst they held the reserved, severe opinions of a commercial aristocracy, they delighted in the wise, cautious conservative policy of Mr. Pitt, and altogether resembled the merchants of the city of London, who had always been the adherents of this illustrious British minister. With regard to America they gave their willing support to the Federal government, and were anxious that it should be at peace with the rest of the world. The France of Louis XVI. was scarcely to their taste, that of the convention not at all, and that of Napoleon but little. They deplored the rigorous measures enforced by England against their commerce, but they were unwilling to make them a cause of war: and they were especially distrustful of the government of Napoleon, whom they regarded as revolutionary, despotic, ambitious, and the general disturber of the world's peace.

The Democrats, or Republicans, as they were called at this period when the republic had not been long proclaimed, were both by feeling and interest precisely opposed to the Federalists. Inhabiting for the most part the interior of the country, and spread over Virginia, Carolina, Ohio, Kentucky, territories rich in cotton, tobacco, sugar, cereals, and woods of all kinds, their interests led them to desire free commercial relations with France, where there was a great demand for their agricultural products; and at the same time not only preferred themselves French goods to English, but also, having both the manners and the opinions of the planters, entertained the most extravagant liberalism. Eager, formerly, in provoking the revolt against England, they had, unlike the Federalists, continued to hate Great Britain even after they had obtained the triumph they sought, and desired to complete their independence by renouncing all connection with the mother country, whether in alliance, trade, or manners, and whilst they thus hated Great Britain, they naturally bestowed upon France an equal degree of good-will, preserving a lively consciousness of the services received at her hands, and readily pardoning her revolutionary excesses, at which they had been less revolted than the Federalists, and, although she had become subject to a temporary despotism, always regarding her as an active, enterprising nation, destined in every age to quicken the development of the human intellect. Irritated in the highest degree by the outrages offered to their flag, they were impatient to avenge them; filled with ambition they longed to effect the conquest of Canada, and excited by these various motives, were eager for war with England. They were anxious, therefore, that France by freely opening her ports to American commerce, and receiving their agricultural products from the south and the west, should furnish them with arguments in support of their vehement and passionate policy.

Whenever news arrived from Europe of some excess committed by England against the honour of the American flag, the Democrats triumphed, but when, on the other hand, information was received of the seizure by the French of some ship belonging to the United States, the Federalists declared that it would be most unjust to make war against England without at the same time commencing hostilities against France, and as it would be mere folly to make war against both these powers, that, therefore, war should be declared against neither of them. The Democrats replied, that only persons void of any sentiment of honour or patriotism could be willing to suffer the impressment of their sailors and the violation of their flag, and that it was evident that the Federalists wished to become once more British colonists; to which the Federalists rejoined that the Democrats were turbulent fellows completely under the sway of French influence.

The head of the executive power of the United States at this moment was Mr. Maddison, the friend and disciple of Jefferson, a moderate Democrat, well informed, keen sighted, thoroughly conversant with the conduct of affairs, and serving by means of his personal intelligence to correct the extravagant opinions of his party. Thoroughly persuaded, as he was, that commercial relations with France were more advantageous to America than those with England, he regarded a war with the latter power as inevitable, although he would have been glad that his country should have remained neutral, and have derived all the advantages which must have accrued to her in a state of neutrality. But whilst he considered that the maintenance of her rights as a neutral power must inevitably lead America into a war with England, he was anxious to be forced into it by public opinion, and that the United States should be supported in it by France, and receive from this power the commercial advantages which should fitly reward the enforcement of the maritime rights of neutrals. Full of wisdom, but loving power, he entertained that ambition which was the only one the presidents of the United States had up to that time permitted themselves to indulge, and was anxious to be elected a second time to the presidency, thus extending his term of power from four years to eight, and obtaining a dignity which had been the glory and recompense of Washington and Jefferson, the full satisfaction of their modest and patriotic desires. But whilst he had before his eyes these two illustrious examples, he had also to remember that of Mr. John Adams, who, desiring in 1798 to provoke a war with France, had failed to obtain his re-election. It behoved him, therefore, to behave with great circumspection, and he had selected as his minister for foreign affairs Mr. Monroe, who entertained democratic views similar to his own, was equally accustomed to the conduct of affairs, had acted as American envoy both in France and England, and hoped to be one day the successor of Mr. Maddison, as Mr. Maddison himself had been that of Jefferson. In order, however, to appoint Mr. Monroe to this post, Mr. Maddison had been compelled to dismiss Mr. Smith, a distinguished and violent democrat, a member of a powerful family, and he now had to meet the opposition not only of the Federalists, but also of the extreme Democrats, who were much discontented with his circumspection and deliberate caution.

All that was requisite to bring the struggle between the two American parties to an end was the arrival of a despatch from Paris containing a complete and definitive acknowledgment of the rights of neutrals, and the concession of valuable commercial advantages. But, unfortunately, it was now the close of the year 1811, when Napoleon was already occupied with his projects against Russia, and his ardent intellect, although immensely great, was not capable of carrying out two projects simultaneously. Passionately desirous in 1810 of enforcing the continental blockade, he had then regarded a war between Great Britain and America as capable of affording a thousand combinations agreeable to his plans, and he had neglected no means which might tend to bring it about. At the close of the year 1811, however, being full of the idea of destroying at one blow all resistance to his power, he had treated Mr. Barlow, the American minister, and an intimate friend of President Maddison, with much neglect, sometimes making him wait for an audience during whole weeks. In addition, moreover, to this characteristic of Napoleon's mind, which led him to devote its attention to any one object to the exclusion of all others, another of its peculiarities consisted in a species of political avarice, which led him to endeavour to obtain as much as possible whilst giving as little as possible in return, and which not unfrequently defeated itself, causing the loss of what a more liberal spirit might have obtained. Still anxious, although less eagerly so, to enforce the continental blockade, fearful that should he change his system in any way he would open paths to English commerce, and fearful also of being deceived by the Americans, he was unwilling to make any concessions to this latter people until they should have declared war against England. He continually said to Mr. Barlow, "Declare yourselves, cease to indulge in these protracted hesitations, and you shall obtain of me all the advantages you can desire.

In the meantime, the French frigates destroyed every American vessel carrying corn to Lisbon or Cadiz, whilst the French corsairs bore down upon all ships that attempted to enter the mouth of the Thames.

It was thus that the war which might have been declared in 1811 was deferred, and that the whole of this year was occupied by violent discussions between the various American parties. On the arrival of any vessel from Europe, application was immediately made to M. Serrurier, the French minister, whom Napoleon had sent to America to induce that country to declare war against England, to know whether he had received any satisfactory information; upon all which occasions this diplomatist, who was as zealous as he was prudent, repeated the lesson which had been sent to him from Paris, and replied, that as soon as the Americans should have abandoned their policy of tergiversation, they would receive the reward due to their assertion of the free navigation of the seas. The American congress had, therefore, been adjourned to 1812 without having taken any decided measures; a circumstance which was most unfortunate for us, since a war between England and America would have rendered the continental blockade so efficacious, and affected Great Britain to such a degree, that the policy of its government would have probably undergone an entire change.

It was impossible, however, that this state of affairs should continue. England persisted in enforcing her *Orders in Council*, and exasperated the American public to the highest pitch of anger, by a declaration which was made by the British cabinet, at the moment when the full exercise of the royal power was committed to the Prince Regent This Prince, as has already been stated, on assuming the regency in 1811, had been obliged to submit to certain restrictions of his prerogative, which, although of slight importance, seemed to be in some degree the adjournment of his definitive installation; and an opinion had universally spread throughout Europe and America, that his real policy would not appear until he had been fully invested with the royal power. The English opposition, therefore, had not despaired of his return to his old friends, and the United States, continually deferring the commencement of a serious war, indulged in the idea that he might yet restrict that naval despotism of Great Britain, which had been one of the characteristics of the policy of Mr. Pitt and his followers. The restrictions, however, upon the Prince's authority, having been removed at the commencement of 1812, and no change having thereupon taken place in the course of British policy, the United States determined at length to offer effectual resistance to the vexations imposed upon her commerce by England, and to await no longer the favours so often promised by Napoleon. And singular was the spectacle now presented by the two great powers France and England, the former enlightened by all the lustre of genius, the latter by all the light of liberty, falling with respect to America, through the blindness of passion, into similar errors, for it must unfortunately be acknowledged that free countries are as subject to the blindness of passion as others, although we may still say that of all safeguards against the blindness of passion, liberty is the most certain and the most ready of effect.

The American government, discontented with France but indignant at the conduct of Great Britain, made preparations for a series of military measures, which manifestly indicated an intention to commence a war, and at the same time took great pains to avoid entering into any communications with the French legation, in order that its resolutions might not be attributed to French influence. It proposed to raise the permanent army to twenty thousand men, to enrol fifty thousand volunteers, to establish a fleet of twelve ships of the line and seventeen frigates, and to borrow eleven millions of dollars (fifty-five millions of francs). These measures were discussed by the American politicians with great ardour, and from the points of view proper to each of the two parties into which they were divided. The Federalists desiring an increase of power for the Central Authority of the State, favoured, since war was inevitable, the augmentation of the permanent army and the navy, but at the same time were opposed to the enrolment of volunteers. The Democrats, on the other hand, having an instinctive distrust of central authority, were opposed to the creation of a permanent army, and were willing that the war against England should be carried out only by throwing a host of volunteer troops upon Canada, for the purpose of snatching that country from England and annexing it to the American Federation. A vote passed the American congress, however, in favour of the measures above detailed, with some modifications in favour o the views of the Federalists, the strength of the permanent army being raised to thirty-five thousand men. To these measures was added another, being the law of *Embargo*, by which all American vessels were prohibited during two months from leaving the American ports, in order that the English might be able to make but few captures. After these two months war itself would be declared.

In the meantime, various incidents furnished arguments both to the Federalists and Democrats in support of their particular views. Certain revelations having been made by an intriguer, which appeared to show that certain Federalist had had culpable communications with the English govern ment of Canada, their party, although unjustly accused, fel for a time into disrepute. Another incident, however speedily altered this state of affairs, for information arriving that the French had sunk in the neighbourhood of Lisbon several American vessels which were conveying corn for the use of the English army, the Federalists once more took a prominent position, asserting that the decrees of Berlin and Milan had not been withdrawn, that the decree of the 28th April, 1811, was but a pretence, and asking how it would be possible to declare war against England for not having revoked the Orders in Council, when France had not on her part revoked the decrees of Berlin and Milan.

It was necessary, however, for the government of President Maddison to determine upon some definite course of conduct, lest the continual tergiversations in which it had hitherto indulged should injure it in public estimation. And accordingly, as the American public began to consider, after some reflection, that it was not unnatural that the French should endeavour to prevent the conveyance of provisions to the English army, and as, moreover, Mr. Barlow's despatches contained assurances of the excellent disposition of France towards the United States, in the middle of June, at the very time when Napoleon was marching from the Niemen upon the Dwina, the question of war with Great Britain was solemnly submitted to the American congress. The discussion which ensued was violent and prolonged. Some Federalists declared that if America were really resolved to enforce respect for her flag, and to play an heroic part, she ought to declare war against both France and England. But slight attention, however, was bestowed upon the sallies of persons who thus attempted to decry a course of policy by carrying it to excess, and by a majority of seventy-nine votes against thirty-seven in the chamber of representatives, and of nineteen against thirteen in the senate, war with England was voted by the American congress. The official declaration was dated the 19th June, 1812.

Whilst the errors committed by Great Britain were leading to this result, which might have had for her such disastrous consequences, the English Cabinet, willing to act with prudence when it was too late, revoked at length the *Orders in Council*. The news of this act reached Mr. Forster at the moment when he was about to take his departure, and he left to a chargé d'affaires the duty of communicating it to President Maddison.

The Democrats, however, were eager for the commencement of hostilities, and two facts occurred in connection with the war to fill the American people, the one with joy, and the other with sadness. General Hull, at the head of three thousand men, hastening imprudently to cross the Canadian frontier near fort *Detroit*, to spread insurrectional proclamations amongst the Canadians, had been surrounded by the English troops between lakes Huron and Erie, and compelled to lay down his arms. But at the same moment the brother of this General Hull, captain of the Constitution frigate, obtained a triumph which exalted in the highest degree the spirit of American patriotism. Several English frigates had for the space of a year insulted the coasts of America, and insolently exercised the assumed right of *impressment* at the mouths of her ports. The frigate La Guerrière, formerly belonging to the French, had especially braved the American Commodore, Rogers, and he sought for an opportunity to punish it. Captain Hull, commanding the *Constitution* frigate, encountered the Guerrière, and having in thirty minutes totally dismasted her, compelled her to surrender with three hundred men, some fifty being killed or wounded. The manœuvres and firing on the part of the American frigate during this engagement had been of the most admirable description, and her officers and sailors had displayed an intrepidity which announced the advent of a new race of heroes on the sea. The enthusiasm excited by the one of these events, and the confusion produced by the other, rendered utterly vain all attempts to bring about a reconciliation with Great Britain.

Such had been the events on the other side of the Atlantic, whilst the tragic catastrophe was overwhelming our army in Russia. And what might not have been the result of these events, of this declaration of war against England, had it been made a year earlier? When England, without allies in Europe, would have beheld a new enemy arising beyond the ocean, when the Americans, the sole violators of the continental blockade, would have become ardent co-operators in its enforcement, when it would have been, consequently, impossible to reproach Russia for her favour for them, and war with her on that account could not have occurred; when twenty thousand men might have been sent under a new La Fayette, in one of the numerous squadrons lying idle in our ports; when finally, our unbroken forces might, by striking a last blow in Spain, have put an end to the maritime war! But after the disaster of Moscow, the occurrence of a war between England and America was no longer an event from which France could derive any real advantage.

In the meantime the course of events in Spain had been equally serious, flowing from the same causes, and almost uninterruptedly unfortunate. It will be remembered that the wise captain who commanded the English armies in the Peninsula, and by remaining there kept alive the Spanish insurrection, had successively recaptured the important fortresses of Cuidad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, and thus annulled all the advantage we had gained by two sanguinary campaigns. Nor will it be forgotten in what manner he had inflicted upon us this double affront. Whilst Napoleon, sending his commands from a distance, giving his attention to the matter one moment, and withdrawing it the next, had abruptly advanced all our corps d'armée upon Valencia, Lord Wellington, always well informed of our movements by the inhabitants of the country, had taken advantage of the occasion to surprise Cuidad-Rodrigo in the face of the army of Portugal, which was much enfeebled by the withdrawal of the detachments which had been marched upon Valencia. And when, in the next place, Valencia having been taken, Napoleon had withdrawn the French forces in all haste towards the north of the Peninsula, for the purpose of securing the communications with France, and driving towards the Niemen the detachments he required, Lord Wellington, always lying in wait for any favourable opportunity, had rapidly advanced towards the south of Portugal, had taken Badajoz by assault, and had thus subjected the army of Andalusia to an affront more bitter even than that to which the army of Portugal had been subject on the occasion of the loss of Cuidad-Rodrigo. It was immediately after having sustained this double check that Napoleon had departed for Russia, leaving Joseph in command of all the French armies in Spain, after having withdrawn from these armies, the Polish troops, the young Guard, a portion of the squadrons of dragoons, and many excellent officers, such as Generals Eblé, Montbrun, and Haxo. The twenty-four millions of francs, which Napoleon had promised to devote annually to the pay of the troops in the Peninsula, had not been paid in 1812 for 1811; and of the million francs a month allowed to Joseph to assist him in creating an administration, there were due two and a half millions on account of 1811, and six millions on account of 1812. The only directions which Napoleon had left with Joseph were, that he should be careful to preserve the communications with France, and to keep the armies of Portugal and Andalusia always ready to unite against that of Lord Wellington. But how was this precaution, on which, in fact, the whole success of the war depended, to be secured? Napoleon flattered himself that with the general command of three hundred thousand excellent troops, Joseph, if indeed he failed to accomplish marvels, would have been able to maintain his ground; for although he held the military talents of his brother in but little account, he relied upon the wisdom and experience of Marshal Jourdan, whom he esteemed at his true value, whilst he regarded him with but little personal favour, and he ceased, therefore, to bestow his attention upon this Peninsular war, at a moment when it had become a matter of the utmost importance. Had Joseph and Jourdan been able to obtain obedience to their commands they would certainly have accomplished all that Napoleon expected of them, and probably more, but we shall presently see how far the state and position in which the French armies were at the time, rendered it probable that this obedience would be accorded to them.

General Dorsenne, at this time, occupied with forty-six thousand men, Navarre, Guipuscoa, Biscaye, Alava, and Old Castille as far as Burgos. About twenty-one thousand of this number formed the garrisons of Bayonne, Saint-Sebastian, Pampeluna, Bilboa, Tolosa, Vittoria, Burgos, and some other intermediate posts, and there remained, therefore, only twenty-five thousand active troops to operate against Mina, who ravaged Navarre, and against Louga, Campilo, Parlier, and Mérino, who overran Guipuscoa, Biscaye, and Alava as far as Burgos, communicating with the English, and intersecting the routes to such a degree, that a despatch was often two months on the road from Paris to Madrid. The twenty-five thousand troops at Dorsenne's disposal, or even a less number, might have sufficed under an active leader to destroy those guerrilla bands, or at least, to have reduced their operations to insignificance; but General Dorsenne, brave as he was, and well-fitted as he was to act in general warfare, under the direction of an able superior, was neither active enough nor keen enough to compete with guerilla warfare. Cold and proud, he acknowledged no chief but Napoleon, and relying on the old instructions furnished by the latter to the commandant of the provinces of the north, directing him to occupy himself exclusively with their pacification, unless the English should place the army of Portugal in danger, General Dorsenne devoted himself too exclusively to the precise duties of his position, to be readily willing to submit to the commands of Joseph. When, therefore, the latter informed his lieutenants of the Emperor's orders, which constituted him commmander in chief of the French armies in Spain, General Dorsenne replied that these orders did not affect him, since he had a particular mission, the extent and objects of which had been determined at Paris, and were quite incompatible with the execution of the orders sent to him from Madrid.

The remainder of Old Castille, the kingdom of Léon, the province of Salamanca as far as the bank of the Tagus, were occupied by the army of Portugal, which had to perform a very extensive task, since the line along which it might have to encounter the enemy extended from Astorga to Badajoz, and was at last a hundred and fifty leagues in length. It had no longer any connection with Portugal save in name, and its sole duty was to make head against the English, especially, should they, advancing, attempt to throw themselves into Old Castille, and threaten our line of communications, as had been formerly done by General Moore. In this case, Marshal Marmont, who commanded the army, was directed to check the English with the utmost resolution, General Dorsenne and Joseph being directed to succour him, the latter by sending from Madrid a portion of the army of the centre, and Marshal Soult having orders to send him by the bridge of Almaraz, a reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand men. If, on the contrary, Lord Wellington should move upon Madrid by the Tagus, as he had formerly attempted at the time of the battle of Talavera, Marshal Marmont was to cross the Guadarrama, to descend upon the Tagus by Avile, and thus to cover Madrid. If, finally, Lord Wellington should threaten anew lower Estremadura, Marshal Marmont was to pass the Tagus at the bridge of Almaraz, and to advance as far as Badajoz itself, accomplishing for this purpose a long march of a hundred leagues, which he had already effected in the course of the previous year, for the purpose of affording succour to Marshal Soult. Having very little fear that this latter supposition would occur, Napoleon had removed Marshal Marmont's ordinary position from the Tagus to the Douro, from Placencia to Salamanca, by which means he had rendered it easy for Lord Wellington to seize Badajoz. Napoleon considered, with good reason, that our position in Spain, could only be effectually maintained by the zealous co-operation of the generals of the various French armies in the Peninsula, and he constantly, therefore, urged upon them the necessity of affording mutual succour; but, unfortunately there could be but little hope that Marshal Soult, who had been always averse to affording assistance to the army of Portugal, would at this time be very willing to aid Marshal Marmont, who had now the utmost need of such support, since it was evident that Lord Wellington, possessed as he was of Cuidad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, the real gates opening from Portugal into Spain, would pass by the former and not by the latter, since the latter led to Andalusia, where he could execute no advantageous operation, whilst the former led into Castille, from whence he might take our armies à revers, and by a single blow snatch Spain from our hands. Lord Wellington, whilst failing to manifest those vast, profound, and daring views, which constitute genius, had, nevertheless, given evidences of a judgment so judicious and firm, that there could be little doubt of the course which he would adopt, and Napoleon showed through all his instructions to his generals that he had divined it.

The British army numbered this year sixty thousand excellent troops, two thirds of whom were English and the remainder Portuguese, and to oppose them, Marshal Marmont had no more than thirty-seven thousand men, for of the fifty-two thousand men who composed his army, seven thousand had been sent, in accordance with Napoleon's directions, under General Bennet into the Asturias to take up a position at Oviédo, whilst some eight thousand more were posted in detachments at Astorga, Zamora, Léon, Valladolid, Salamanca, amongst some lesser posts, such as Benevento, Taro, Polencia Avila, &c., and along the routes. Marshal Marmont had sent, therefore, his aide-de-camp, Jardet, to represent to Napoleon this state of his forces, and to point out to him that whatever might be his danger, General Dorsenne, occupied with the guerilla bands in the north, would find a thousand reasons for declining to come to his assistance; that Joseph would neither be bold nor active enough to send at the critical moment ten thousand, or even six thousand, of the fourteen thousand men who composed the army of the centre; that Marshal Soult would find in the distance which separated him from the army of Portugal more than sufficient reasons for not quitting Andalusia; and that, consequently, the enemy would have time to overwhelm the army of Portugal, and by overwhelming it to uncover the frontier of France, before succour could arrive. This being the state of affairs, therefore, the Marshal declared that unless he were, at least, placed in chief command of the two armies of the north and of Portugal, he could not make head against the English, and would be glad to quit Spain, to accompany the Emperor on his expedition to Russia.

Napoleon had listened to Colonel Jardet, had appeared to be much struck by his representations, and had promised to attend to them, at the same time ridiculing the ambition which led Marshal Marmont to desire a command so superior to his talents. As, however, to satisfy Marshal Marmont's necessities it would have been requisite to have adopted very serious measures, to have recalled such and such of his lieutenants, to have altered the distribution of the French forces in the Peninsula, and perhaps to have evacuated important territories for the purpose of concentrating them, he departed from Paris, leaving unchanged the general arrangement which conferred upon Joseph the command in chief, always hoping that he was about to act in Russia, in a manner which would place on a satisfactory basis the whole system of his affairs.

Notwithstanding his just apprehensions, Marshal Marmont had remained at the head of the army of Portugal, bestowing great solicitude on the requirements of his soldiers, taking pains to place Salamanca in a state of defence by means of large convents converted into citadels, and endeavouring to remount his cavalry, and repair his artillery. In the meantime, Joseph, commanding the army of the centre, had at his disposal thirteen thousand or fourteen thousand troops, with whom, reinforced by about three thousand Spaniards, whom he paid out of his own pocket, and who were faithful as long as they were paid punctually, he had to guard Madrid, together with the province of Toledo on the right, and that of Guadalaxara on the left, to maintain, in the rear, his communications with the army of the north, and to preserve, in front, across La Mancha, some relations with the army of Andalusia. It was even necessary for him to extend one of his wings as far as Cuença for the purpose of communicating with the army of Aragon posted at Valencia. Had one of these points been left unarmed, Joseph would have immediately been cut off from one of the important portions of his kingdom, and lost the slender resources he was still able to obtain, and which consisted in some grain and forage procured at the period of the harvest, and of the taxes levied on the city of Madrid. At this moment, especially, compelled to satisfy the pressing demands of Marshal Marmont, and to send grain to the province of Toledo, from which province he usually obtained supplies of it, he had impoverished Madrid to such a degree in respect to provisions, that the pound of bread cost there from twenty-six to twenty-seven sous; and the consequence was an extreme state of misery which was ill calculated to reconcile the Spaniards to the new dynasty.

Andalusia, invaded so prematurely, was in the hands of

Marshal Soult, who had under his command the best portion of the French forces; and the fifty-eight thousand troops at his disposal were stationed as follows.—Twelve thousand before Cadiz, to continue the semblance of a siege; ten thousand at Grenada for the defence of that province; five thousand at Arcos, to patrol between Seville, Cadiz, and Tarifa; fifteen thousand in Estremadura under the Count d'Erlon, for the purpose of watching General Hill, who was posted at Badajoz; and two or three thousand cavalry in the neighbourhood of Bæza, occupied in scouring the country towards the defiles of the Sierra-Morena; the remaining thirteen thousand or fourteen thousand men being under Soult's immediate command in Seville.

Being posted in so rich a country, Soult was able to procure ample sustenance for his troops, but he entirely neglected to comply with Napoleon's directions to the various Generals, to reserve for the King a portion of the war contributions they might levy, declaring that he could command no more resources than were actually necessary for the supply of his own army and the requirements of the siege of Cadiz. As, moreover, communications had entirely ceased between Soult and the general staff, since the former had drawn in all the posts which had been the means of keeping up any communications with Madrid across La Mancha, asserting that the defence of this province properly devolved on the army of the centre, he had some grounds for declaring that he was ignorant that Joseph had become his commander in chief, for no dispatch containing information of the fact had reached him either from Paris or Madrid.

This state of things proved how great an error Napoleon had committed in prematurely invading Andalusia, the conquest of which procured him none of the results which he had anticipated from it. The siege of Cadiz consisted only in the occupation of some redoubts, from which our artillery directed no cannonade, and to hurling from time to time a few bombs against the town which never reached it, whilst the succour afforded to the army of Portugal had been limited during the march of Masséna upon the Tagus to the capture of Badajoz, which was almost immediately afterwards lost again, and had been reduced, since, to the establishment of Count d'Erlon with fifteen thousand men at Llerena, where he was more than a hundred leagues from Marshal Marmont; whilst, as for the pecuniary resources which Napoleon had hoped to obtain by the occupation of Andalusia, it is sufficient to mention that Marshal Soult was constantly and eagerly demanding his share of the twenty-four millions of francs which Napoleon had determined to devote to the troops in Spain.

Napoleon frequently and bitterly complained that no real advantage was derived from the occupation of Andalusia, or the ninety thousand troops by which it was held; but his reproaches and counsels alike lost their effect in the immense distance through which they had to pass, and the ill consequence of having uselessly and prematurely extended operations to the south, remained.

We must now direct our attention to the kingdom of Valencia, and the vast establishment formed there by Marshal Suchet. Since the capture of Valencia, the great concentration of forces which Napoleon had ordered on this side had broken up, and the various contingents had returned to their several provinces. General Reille had returned to Aragon with fourteen thousand men, for the purpose of guarding Saragossa, Lerida, and Tortosa, assisting the army of the north to repel the incursions of Mina, Villa-Campa, Duran, and l'Empicinado, and affording assistance as occasion might require to the army of Catalonia. General Decaen, who commanded the troops of Catalonia under the superior authority of Marshal Suchet, had twenty-seven thousand men with whom to guard Figuères, Hostalrich, and Barcelona, and to appear from time to time under Tarragone, the most important of the conquests of Marshal Suchet, since it prevented the English from establishing themselves in the north-east of Spain. The latter, knowing that we had great difficulty in provisioning our fortresses, endeavoured to cut off communication by sea, while General Lacy endeavoured to cut off on the land side, and they flattered themselves that they would thus be able to reduce it by means of famine. Should this place be lost by us, and General Lacy established in it with his army, he would become, reinforced and provisioned as he would be by the English, a most dangerous enemy, threatening Tortosa, the route of Valencia, and render the evacuation of this city almost inevitable. Marshal Suchet had in the three provinces of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia, fifty-eight thousand actually under arms at his disposal; of these fourteen thousand were consigned to General Reille, twenty-seven thousand to General Decaen, whilst sixteen or seventeen thousand, under his own immediate personal command, watched the long route which follows the coast of the Mediterranean from Tortosa to Valencia, held a position in front of Alicante, and communicated by Cuença with the troops of the central army; six or seven thousand of them at the most being available as a column mobile, ready to be thrown upon any point which might be more immediately threatened.

Amongst the dangers which threatened the army of Aragon was the appearance of the Anglo-Sicilian army, which had been formed in Sicily by Lord William Bentinck, one of those simple, generous and liberal minded Englishmen who become very grasping when concerned in matters relating to their country. He had made himself the real king of Sicily; for, finding himself much impeded in the promotion of his objects by the Bourbons, who, having been deprived of Naples by the French, found themselves reduced to mere ciphers by the English in Sicily, and naturally neglected no opportunity of relieving themselves from the yoke of their protectors, he had disembarrassed himself of the king and queen by forcing them to consign the royal power to a young prince, who, invested with the regency at an age when he had himself need of the services of a regent, had summoned the Sicilian nation to his aid, by bestowing upon it a constitution similar to that of Great Britain. Freed, then, from the court of Palermo, and being no longer under any apprehension of attempts on the part of Murat, since he had been compelled to take part in the Russian expedition, Lord William had been able to dispose of a corps numbering about twelve thousand men, consisting of an English and a Sicilian division, and from its power to effect rapid movements by means of the English fleet, producing effects superior to its numerical strength. It was carried to the Balearic Isles, which were in the hands of the English, and to the Murcian coast, which was almost equally in their power, and at which places respectively General Wittingham and General Roche organized two Spanish legions intended to be placed under English command; and here the Anglo-Sicilian army, being in a position to move either to Catalonia towards General Lacy, or to the kingdom of Murcia towards General O'Donnell, became a real and most disquieting danger.

Marshal Suchet, very attentive to the dangers of his position, had employed in the most judicious manner the sixteen thousand men reserved to the kingdom of Valencia. Having placed little garrisons well provisioned, in Tortosa, Peniscola, and Saguntum, and having kept at Valencia another little garrison, which by means of the soldiers at the depôts and the invalids might be doubled if there were need, he had left about five thousand men under General Harispe in front of Alicante. Having reserved to himself an active division of six thousand or seven thousand men, he was ready to throw himself either upon Tortosa or upon Alicante, or even to move towards Cuença in the direction of Madrid.

The success which attended Marshal Suchet was chiefly the result of his powers of administration. On the day succeeding the capture of Valencia, that city, trembling at the remembrance of the massacre of the French, feared that it had fallen into the power of a pitiless avenger; but it speedily found, on the contrary, that their vanquisher was a gentle, adroit man, who took pains to re-assure the inhabitants of the conquered city, inviting them to take a share in its government, as he had previously done at Saragossa. Already inspiring confidence by his conduct in Aragon, he had successively brought back the archbishop and the ancient municipal magistrates of the province, had formed a junta, arranged with it the re-partition of the impost, effected several useful reforms, and at the same time, without in any manner oppressing the country, procured for his soldiers the enjoyment of all its abundance. Napoleon desired that Valencia should pay in money for the French blood which had been shed in 1808, and he had demanded a ransom of fifty millions. This was an excessive contribution to be levied upon a country in the midst of the disorders of war, and which, although rich, was of but small extent; but, nevertheless, there was good reason to suppose that the whole of it would be obtained, should the French troops occupy Valencia for the space of twelve months. Already had Suchet clothed, paid, and armed every one of his soldiers, filled his magazines, prepared a reserve, and sent to Joseph an instalment of three millions, with the promise of a speedy remittance of a sum of much larger amount. No other army in Spain was in such a good state as Suchet's; it served its General well, for it loved him, and it was ready to accomplish at his bidding even greater achievements than those which it had already accomplished.

Information of the new authority which had been bestowed upon Joseph had speedily reached Valencia, the communication with that city being well maintained, and had somewhat displeased Marshal Suchet, who, although of a most amicable disposition, was vexed at any interference with his just and tranquil reign. He was able and even ready to afford Joseph money, but he was quite unable to spare a single soldier, for the provinces which he guarded were the sole resource of the French armies, if, by any misadventure in Castille or Estremadura, they lost their communications with Bayonne. He was supported, moreover, in his refusal to relinquish any of his troops, by the instructions which had been secretly sent to him by Napoleon, in authorising him to regard the staff at Madrid with a deference which should be simply formal; nevertheless, always moderate, and ever refraining from complicating existing difficulties by adding to them those arising from personal temper, he took care to render to Joseph all the services which were in his power, displaying towards him the most complete apparent deference, and resolving to refer to the secret instructions only in case the new commander in chief should require of him the performance of something which might be injurious to the provinces which he had been commanded to preserve for the empire.

The command in chief which had been conferred upon Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, his major-general, was in fact, it must be confessed, a very singular one. Of the five armies occupying Spain, that of the north refused to obey him; that of Portugal obeyed him that it might obtain the support of the army of the centre, which obeyed him absolutely and directly, but was of very insignificant strength; that of Andalusia, the most considerable of all and the least prevented by circumstances from yielding him obedience, was resolutely determined to withhold it, even ignoring his authority, and for a considerable time feigning to be ignorant of its existence; whilst, finally, that of Aragon, testifying towards him much respect and placing at his disposal sums of money, was yet prevented by circumstances from affording him any further services. Marshal Jourdan's keen judgment and profound experience soon pointed out to him the vice of the position, and he pointed it out to Joseph in a complete and startling report. But what could be done? To send a despatch to Paris would be a means of obtaining nothing but a reply, after a lapse of two months, from the Duke de Feltre, as long as insignificant; nevertheless, Marshal Jourdan sent to the minister of war a circumstantial account of the position of the staff at Madrid, that the responsibility attaching to it might be reduced to just limits.

The only enemy to be feared was the English army, which, having taken Cuidad-Rodrigo in January, and Badajoz in March, and reposed during April and May, was ready to act in June. As there were no more fortresses for it to besiege, it became a question what would now be its course, and there existed certain indications which rendered this question a matter of easy solution to a man of Marshal Jourdan's discernment.

In fact, Badajoz having been captured, Lord Wellington had advanced to the north of Portugal with the bulk of his troops, and had taken up a position at Fuente-Guinaldo, at some leagues from Almeida and Cuidad-Rodrigo, thus threatening old Castille and the army of Portugal, to which was entrusted its defence. In addition, moreover, to the presence of Lord Wellington at Fuente-Guinaldo there were several very striking secondary indications of what were his real projects, such as the movements of troops in Le Beira, Tras-os-Montès and Léon, of immense magazines in Corogne, and numerous mule trains in Galicia. These various preparations were manifest indications of projects directed against Old Castille. But there was one great general reason, which, independently of those several details, sufficiently proved what Lord Wellington's intentions really were, and it consisted in the fact, that by advancing northwards he placed himself in a position to cut off our communications, and to overthrow by a single success the whole of our military system in the Peninsula, whilst, by advancing southwards he could obtain no other result than to disquiet the army of Andalusia, to compel it perhaps to abandon the pretended siege of Cadiz, each of which objects might be obtained, moreover, with much more certainty by operations in the north, since the menace of any serious result in Castille would force the French to evacuate Andalusia, La Mancha, and perhaps Madrid. Neither Joseph nor Marshal Jourdan failed to perceive their true position, and had they not done so, Marshal Marmont, whom the impending danger more immediately threatened, would not have left them in any doubt respecting it. He hastened, at the commencement of May, to announce to them that the English were in motion towards him, and earnestly demanded succour, at the same time making preparations to concentrate his forces. Both Joseph and Marshal Jourdan immediately perceived the course which should be adopted, and displayed on the occasion a keenness of judgment which was natural to the Marshal, who had been engaged in the profession of arms from his youth, but was highly creditable to Joseph who was a stranger to the art of war. Had their authority at this moment been respected nothing would have been easier than to have frustrated Lord Wellington's project, and not only to have frustrated it but even to have made it the means of procuring for us a brilliant triumph, which would have placed our affairs in Spain on a surer footing, and probably have counteracted in a certain degree the ill consequences resulting from the Russian expedition, for a great reverse in the Peninsula would have had a very important effect upon the English, and by England in reality was the whole of Europe influenced.

To meet the danger which had become so imminent, it was only necessary to concentrate for the common defence the available forces, which were far more than sufficient both as respected number and quality. The army of the north, although no longer numbering the forty-six thousand men with whom it had commenced the campaign, still consisted of twenty thousand active troops, and could well have spared ten thousand of them for some weeks, as was proved by the fact that it eventually did so, but in an inopportune manner, for although our communications would have been thus rendered more difficult, they were already so much obstructed that the evil could scarcely have been increased. Joseph, who had at his disposal thirteen thousand or fourteen thousand active troops, and three thousand Spaniards, might have afforded ten thousand of them, and a total reinforcement would thus have been provided of twenty thousand men. Finally, there was no reason why the army of Andalusia should not contribute the whole of Count d'Erlon's corps, or at least ten thousand of the sixteen thousand men of whom it consisted. Five or six thousand men would have sufficed to watch General Hill at Llerina, and had this General, as was very improbable, committed the imprudence of marching upon Andalusia, Marshal Soult, with the six thousand men of Llerena, would have been able to meet him at the head of about twenty-five thousand men ; General Hill's numbering no more than about half that number. By moderate contributions of troops, therefore, from the armies of the north, the centre, and Andalusia, a reinforcement of thirty thousand men might have been afforded to Marshal Marmont, whose army would thus have been raised to seventy thousand, and have become sufficiently powerful completely to overthrow the army under Lord Wellington, or at least to force it to retire into Portugal.

The necessary resources existed, then, and Jourdan and Joseph lost no time, it must be acknowledged, in endeavouring to utilise them, as soon as they were convinced that Lord Wellington was about to march upon Old Castille, and, consequently, to threaten the army of Portugal, they wrote to the two Generals who were alone able to succour it, and who were General Caffarelli, the successor of General Dorsenne in the command of the army of the north, and Marshal Soult, at the head of the army of Andalusia. Pointing out to each of these commanders the danger which manifestly threatened Marshal Marmont, they enjoined General Caffarelli to move a detachment of twelve thousand men upon Salamanca, and urged Marshal Soult to furnish Count d'Erlon with considerable reinforcements, to order him to watch the movements of General Hill with the utmost vigilance, and, should the latter proceed by the interior routes to reinforce Lord Wellington towards Old Castille, to follow him, crossing the Tagus by the bridge of Almaraz, and thus carrying to Marshal Marmont a reinforcement equal to that which would be supplied by General Hill to Lord Wellington.

This order was, unfortunately, not the best which might have been given, and had it not been subsequently modified the proposed movement would have been an absolute nullity as far as regarded the army of Portugal. It was planned in fact on the supposition that General Hill had in advance of Badajoz considerable forces, that his position there was only a temporary one, and that he would be recalled towards Fuente-Guinaldo as soon as Lord Wellington should be ready to commence operations. But every portion of this supposition was erroneous; instead of thirty thousand men, General Hill had under his command no more than fifteen thousand, amongst whom there was scarcely an English division, and his position was a stationary one, intended to mask the designs of his chief, and occupy Marshal Soult until Lord Wellington, having assembled seven English and several Portuguese divisions at Fuente-Guinaldo, should march upon Salamanca; Count d'Erlon, therefore, however much he might have been reinforced, must necessarily, if under orders to remain stationary before General Hill's position, have left Marshal Marmont to perish unaided. It is only the very highest ardour of genius which can foresee completely and immediately an enemy's designs, and Marshal Jourdan, whose judgment was very sure but somewhat slow in its operations, required time to develope the resources of his military skill. Had he visited the scene of operations, he would doubtless have very speedily discerned the true position of affairs; but sick, disgusted, and in personal attendance upon a King who, although brave, was unwilling to quit Madrid, he had remained in the palace, and, judging of the state of affairs from afar, had not succeeded in forming an exactly true opinion respecting them. He was speedily undeceived, however, and in the meantime the first orders were sufficient for the occasion, since they enjoined each of those who were in a position to be of any assistance, to prepare to give it. Marshal Suchet being at too great a distance, and too poor in troops to send contributions of men, was directed to render to the common cause a species of service which he could afford without any difficulty, and which was to move up the forces under General Reille de la Navarra, in order that it might be easier for the army of the north to furnish the contingent which had been demanded of it, and to relieve at Cuenca the troops of the army of the centre, that the latter were the most concentrated and the most readily available.

We may easily imagine what was the reception accorded to Joseph's orders, which were given with much firmness but without that air of authority which was peculiar to Napoleon. General Caffarelli, who commanded the army of the north, was upright, devoted, and brave, as were all the Caffarelli, but endowed with a quiet obstinacy of disposition, and although personally courageous, somewhat timid in action and very inferior in intelligence to the illustrious officer who had made the fortune of this distinguished family. Of the forty-six thousand men who had composed his army, ten thousand had been withdrawn for the Russian expedition, and, moreover, the indefatigable Guerilla bands of the Basque Provinces kept him in continual apprehension with respect to the safety of the posts of the interior and on the coast. Persisting, as General Dorsenne had persisted, in considering himself independent of the commander in chief, he did not actually refuse to afford assistance to Marshal Marmont, but refrained from stating any precise method in which he would succour him, and confined himself to promises which, although made in good faith, the exercise of a little foresight might well have estimated at their true value.

In Andalusia Joseph's orders were received in a manner still less satisfactory. Marshal Soult, since he had become re-assured with respect to the consequences of his campaign of Oporto, had always hoped that he would have been appointed King Joseph's major general: and when Napoleon, who was not only very dissatisfied with the operations in Andalusia, but was also unwilling to force upon his brother a major general who, he knew, would be displeasing to him, appointed Marshal Jourdan to this post, the discontent of Soult had been extreme, and there was small probability, therefore, that he would pay much attention to a demand of succour for the army of Portugal, with which he had been in continual contention. He had formed, moreover, an opinion respecting the projects of Lord Wellington which was entirely different from that entertained by the staff at Madrid, believing that the English General instead of directing his operations towards Castille, was intending to carry on the campaign in Andalusia. He replied, therefore, to Joseph's orders that the army of Portugal and its General were mistaken, that Lord Wellington was not preparing to march upon Salamanca and Marshal Marmont but upon Andalusia, and that it was necessary to succour the army of Andalusia rather than that of Portugal, since General Hill was but the head of the great British army which was ready to advance in its entire strength upon Seville for the purpose of relieving Cadiz; that the language held at Cadiz in the insurrectionist journals proved that this was the case; and that there could be no doubt that it was necessary to reinforce Count d'Erlon, but for the purpose of affording assistance, not to the army of Portugal which was in no danger, but to that of Andalusia.

To attribute to Lord Wellington an intention of acting in Andalusia for the purpose of relieving Cadiz which was in no danger; and to judge of the enemy's projects by the statements of the insurrectionist journals, was in itself unreasonable; but the real reason which proved the improbability that any attempt would be made by the English against Andalusia, consisted in the fact that Lord Wellington had no object to attain there, whilst a single success in Castille would enable him to take all our armies in the rear. Marshal Soult, however, was not of this opinion, for he remained persuaded that General Hill was at the head of thirty thousand men, that Lord Wellington was about to join him with forty thousand more, and that he, Soult, alone required succour.

In the meantime Marshal Suchet desired to do nothing which could endanger the safety of the provinces entrusted to his care, and being very unwilling to enter into a conflict with the authorities at Madrid, had complied with the orders which had been sent to him, making General Reille's Italian division replace at Cuenca the troops of the army of the centre, although there was considerable inconvenience in its being moved to so great a distance.

The danger, however, became at each instant more pressing and more apparent, and it became impossible any longer to entertain any doubt with respect to the direction in which Lord Wellington intended to execute his attack. Joseph, acting as usual under Marshal Jourdan's advice, wrote to General Caffarelli to the effect, that however independent he might consider himself of the staff at Madrid, he ought not to forget that military duty bade him hasten to the succour of a comrade in peril; that his former instructions expressly directed him to succour the army of Portugal against the English; and concluding by formally demanding of him the assistance rendered necessary by the fact that Lord Wellington was actually marching upon Salamanca and the army of Portugal. With respect to the army of Portugal, Joseph for a moment entertained a resolution which, carried into effect, might have saved Spain, and with Spain the whole French empire; and this was, to order the evacuation of Andalusia, the occupation of which procured for us but slight advantages, and which absorbed ninety thousand men, sixty thousand of them being active troops and sufficient to overwhelm the English army. To have carried out this idea it would have been necessary to have deprived of his command Marshal Soult, who would probably have refused to consent to the evacuation, or at least have failed to effect it sufficiently soon to have been of use to the army of Portugal. But to abandon a vast province, to make a decidedly retrograde movement, and to deprive an illustrious Marshal of his command, were resolutions which Joseph was sufficiently talented to conceive, but not sufficiently firm to put into execution, and the course which he really adopted was, to send Colonel Desprez, an officer who was in his confidence and possessed of considerable talent, to watch all that took place in the army of Andalusia, to point out to Soult the error of the opinion which he entertained with respect to the projects of the English, to make him understand that it was towards Salamanca and not towards Seville that Lord Wellington was marching, to renew, on the ground of this fact, the imperative order that he should move General Drouet d'Erlon to the Tagus, without waiting for any movement on the part of General Hill, and to declare to him, as he had threatened to resign his command should unpleasing orders be sent to him, that his resignation, should he make it, would be immediately accepted. At the same time he sent dispatches to Clarke, the minister of war, in which he pointed out in detail all the dangers, we might almost say all the absurdities, attending the position of a royal commander in chief disobeyed by all his generals and unable to induce them, either on the grounds of duty or interest, to assist that one of their number who was in the most imminent danger.

In the meantime Joseph himself sent a first reinforcement to Marshal Marmont. When this Marshal, in accordance with the Emperor's orders, quitted the valley of the Tagus for the purpose of taking up a position in the valley of the Douro, he left one of his divisions, that of General Foy, on the Tagus at the bridge of Almaraz; attaching, with good reason, much importance to this bridge, and the numerous works with which it was surrounded. A faulty arrangement having divided our active forces into two parts, one in Andalusia the other in Castille, very complete means of communication were necessary to enable our troops to move from the one province to the other. The Tagus being the chief obstacle to such facility of communications, Marmont had constructed a bridge across it with fortified works and magazines. It would have been unpardonable, in fact, not to have taken advantage of the example presented to us by the English, whose single army under a single general, advanced alternately northwards and southwards by means of a fine road well maintained, furnished with bridges and magazines, and affording every facility for the rapid movements of troops.

This instructive example it was which rendered Marmont very unwilling when he advanced from the Tagus to the Douro, to abandon the works of Almaraz, and induced him to leave there the division Foy. But as five or six days must elapse before this division could be brought back, on any emergency, to the main body of troops, the Marshal now requested Joseph to undertake the defence of the bridge of Almaraz, and Joseph hastened to comply, sending to the required position the division d'Armagnac.

And now a rash attempt, little in conformity with the character of the English army, indicated the great projects with which Lord Wellington commenced this campaign and how important he considered it to prevent the army of Andalusia from proceeding to the aid of that of Portugal.

General Hill having, by command of his chief, secretly advanced upon and ascended the Tagus, presented himself before the bridge of Almaraz on the 18th of May. This bridge was situated at the very foot of the mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from that of the Guadiana, and after having crossed it the great Estremadura road arose and passed over the mountains a col de mirabète. Marshal Marmont had constructed on the summit of the hill a strong work, which would prevent the passage of the cannon of an enemy coming from Estremadura; and at the foot of the height, on the bank of the stream, had established two lesser works, forming têtes de pont on the left and right bank. A bridge of boats, which was not always in position, afforded a passage between the two banks.

General Hill, who had already two years before surprised General Girard in the neighbourhood, at Arroyo del Molinos, and who was accustomed to this species of expedition, having arrived almost without having been perceived, at the foot of the Mirabète work, perceived that it was too strong to be taken by assault, and devised the plan of sending by a cross road a column of infantry to endeavour to escalade the têtes de pont, whilst the remainder of the English troops feigned an attack on Mirabète on the height. This bold plan met with perfect success; the works on the left and right banks were almost immediately taken, the troops who defended them, composed of men of all nations, at once giving way, and being either captured or drowned. Having destroyed the works and burned the boats the English retired, very proud of an expedition which had gained them more honour than profit, since at the best they had only temporarily interrupted our means of crossing the river. As soon as he heard of this exploit General Foy, who was marching with his divisions towards Castille, immediately retraced his steps and hastened after the English, but failed, however, to overtake them.

This misadventure, although in itself far from irreparable, caused great excitement in Madrid, for it revealed Lord Wellington's intention to separate the armies of Andalusia and Portugal; and it was, in fact, an indication which should have had great weight with that one of the two armies which was summoned to the aid of the other; but although Joseph renewed his entreaties to this effect they were in vain, as we shall speedily see.

Marshal Soult had received Colonel Desprez, had intimated to him his extreme displeasure at not having been appointed Joseph's Major-General, had scrupulously refrained from renewing his offer to resign his command, and persisted in maintaining that the impending danger threatened Andalusia and not Castille. Finding it impossible to alter the Marshal's opinion on this point, Colonel Desprez had endeavoured to obtain from him some explanation with respect to his execution of the orders relative to the corps of Count d'Erlon, which Soult had reinforced in accordance with Joseph's orders, but which he had absolutely declined to send to Castille to the aid of the army of Portugal. To all the representations of Desprez the Marshal replied, that if he were deprived of any portion of his forces he could no longer guard Andalusia, and that the only order, therefore, he could obey, would be one directing him to evacuate this province.

These messages and replies, this obstinate resistance, caused the loss of valuable time during which Lord Wellington hastened to march upon the army of Portugal. In fact, information was received during the first days of June, that he had raised his cantonments and was about to cross the Agueda for the purpose of proceeding to the province of Salamanca by the Cuidad-Rodrigo route; and upon learning these facts General Caffarelli, whose disobedience to the orders which had been sent him arose rather from a want of the power of energetic action in the midst of difficulties than from a desire to dispute Joseph's authority, informed Marshals Marmont and Jourdan that he was on the point of marching to the aid of the army of Portugal with ten thousand men. In the meantime Joseph sent to Soult the order which he should have given to him at first, namely, to march a detachment of ten thousand men upon the Tagus immediately, to evacuate so much territory as would be necessary for the purpose of rendering this measure possible, and, finally, if he were disinclined to obey this order, to resign at once his command into the hands of Count d'Erlon.

Trusting to the execution of an order so precise, to the promises of General Caffarelli, and to the power he himself had of sending some thousands of men to Marshal Marmont, Joseph flattered himself that the arrangements he had made would raise the army of Portugal to seventy thousand men, and felt at ease with respect to events in Castille; felt at ease because, although endowed with good sense, military skill, and courage, he was not endowed with that quenchless ardour and sleepless vigilance which permit the man of action to believe only that which he has seen, to trust to those promises only which have been performed, and to give no order without carrying it himself into execution. These were the qualities which Napoleon possessed in the highest degree, and to which he chiefly owed his success.

Whilst the most valuable time was thus being lost on our side Lord Wellington had put his troops in motion towards Castille, the only portion of Spain in which, for reasons which we have already mentioned, he could act advantageously. Although in undivided command of the English forces, and employed by the richest nation in Europe, he was far from satisfied with his situation, especially as regarded matériel. The pay of his troops was very much in arrear, for the English government had some difficulty in providing it, since they had for this purpose to convert the paper money into coin at a loss of at least twenty-five per cent.; and in fact the six thousand muleteers, who transported the provisions of the English army, had not been paid for six months and complained bitterly. Had these men refused to continue their services for only a single day the British army must have been lost, for had not its troops been supplied every evening with provisions at their bivouacs, and allowed time to cook and eat them, they would no longer have remained in their ranks. Lord Wellington never ceased, therefore, to write to his government, that if he were at the head of those admirable French soldiers, as he called them, who could dispense with regular rations, could run here and there to procure food for themselves, and then returning to their quarters cook with the utmost expedition what they might have been able to procure, he, Lord Wellington, might be able to carry on the war without money, but that to expose the troops actually under his command to the same system would be to leave him within a few days without a soldier. At the same time he complained that his army was not sufficiently numerous, especially as regarded the Spanish troops, who might have been furnished to him he said, to the number of thirty or forty thousand, instead of the ten thousand ill-disciplined and ill-officered men who were at his disposal, and of so little real service.

The forces assembled on the Agueda under Lord Wellington's command at the commencement of June were as follows:—seven divisions of English infantry, numbering altogether thirty-five or thirty-six thousand men of tried courage, (an eighth division under General Hill at Estremadura) five or six thousand excellent English and German cavalry, two brigades of Portuguese infantry, and a Spanish division under General Don Carlos d'Espagne. Reckoning these latter auxiliary troops as amounting to fourteen or fifteen thousand men, Lord Wellington's whole army numbered about fifty five thousand men, being strengthened, although it is impossible to judge in what exact degree, by the assistance of the Guerilla bands. It is evident, therefore, that had our Generals acted together with cordiality, they might have easily overwhelmed with the two hundred and thirty thousand active troops of the three hundred thousand French soldiers in the Peninsula, the handful of English which, although certainly of good courage and well led, owed its chief strength to the wisdom of its chief and the disunion of our Generals.

Lord Wellington was so conscious of the true state of affairs that it was not without trembling, if we may use such a word in speaking of such a man, that he advanced into Castille. The conquest of Cuidad-Rodrigo and Badajoz having been accomplished it was necessary that he should undertake some measure, and the only one open to him was, as we have before said, a march on the offensive in Castille. But whilst his clear judgment pointed out to him the course which he ought to pursue, it could not fail at the same time to render him somewhat apprehensive of the danger he was about to incur by throwing himself upon the rear of the French between the armies of the north and of Portugal on the one side, and of the centre and of Andalusia on the other. The chief considerations which could induce him to enter into the midst of such perils were, in the first place, that it was necessary to attempt to accomplish something at the favourable moment of Napoleon's absence, and secondly, that the wretched dissensions between our Generals, of which he was well informed, would prevent them from overwhelming him by the union of their forces.

Although fully resolved to advance, the English General had nevertheless written to his government, that they must not indulge in hopes of any great results from the approaching movement, since the French Generals had only to combine against him to throw him back into Portugal. He demanded, therefore, in the most express terms, that the Anglo-Sicilians should attempt a descent upon the province of Murcia, or on that of Catalonia for the purpose of preventing the army of Aragon from sending detachments to the aid of the army of the centre; and at the same time required of the English ships which cruised in the Bay of Biscay and communicated with the leaders of the Guerilla bands, that they should feign a disembarcation for the purpose of preventing General Caffarelli from proceeding to the assistance of Marshal Marmont. Having taken these precautions, he passed the Agueda at the commencement of June, and marched towards Salamanca. Knowing by means of very accurate reports with which he was furnished through the zeal of the Spaniards, that Marshal Marmont had been compelled to scatter his divisions, for the purpose of enabling them to procure the means of subsistence, and that he had received as yet no reinforcement, he hoped to be able to compel him to evacuate Salamanca and to fall back behind the Douro; and proposed, should he effect this success at the commencement of the campaign, to act afterwards as might be suggested by the course of events.

Marshal Marmont, although ill served by his ships, speedily became aware of the approach of the English army, and took measures to guard against a surprise. Having had time to assemble four or five divisions by reason of the return of the division Foy, he was at the head of a body of troops of considerable strength, and such as could not fail to force the enemy to act with considerable caution. He had profited by the lessons he had received from the administrative measures of Napoleon, whose aide-de-camp he had been, and had employed the winter in taking care of his men, in repairing his artillery, in renewing as far as possible his *attelages* and in placing his fortified posts in a good state of defence. In the absence of great magazines, which he had no longer the means of forming, he had established with each division a little store of biscuit, which permitted him to engage in manœuvres of a fortnight's duration, without incurring any anxiety with respect to his soldiers' subsistence. He had fortified three convents which commanded Salamanca, and the passage of the Tormès, and having placed there a garrison of a thousand of men, could leave them without fear of their falling into the hands of the enemy. The line of the Douro which was in the rear of Salamanca, and which, with its tributary the Esla, covered both Old Castille and the kingdom of Léon, was furnished throughout with well garrisoned posts, Toro, Zamora, Beneventé, and Astorga, promised to offer a certain amount of resistance, and there was every probability, the enemy acting with great caution, that the French troops would be able, by means of well considered manœuvres, to carry on the campaign for some time without a decisive action.

Marshal Marmont, having made the arrangements above enumerated, broke up his camp at Salamanca, and established it at some distance from that city, that he might be able to devote his whole attention to the concentration of his divisions, and watching the operations of the enemy. He refrained from hastening to retreat behind the Douro, because his position was already covered by the Tormès, and he wished to remain in sight of Salamanca for the purpose of affording moral support to the little garrison left in the three convents.

On the 16th of June, Lord Wellington appeared before Salamanca, where he was received by the inhabitants, with that enthusiasm which always burst forth at the departure of the French and the arrival of the English, and devoted a day or two to reflection and the enjoyment of the honour he had obtained of acting on the offensive without having incurred its dangers. The inhabitants desired him to relieve them from the hostile occupation of the three convents which commanded their city, and as, upon inspection, he considered that it would be necessary to attack them by regular siege operations, he determined to devote ten or fifteen days to this purpose, being in no way displeased at having such an opportunity of delay in a country when each step in advance might be one step nearer to some overwhelming catastrophe. As he had brought with him some pieces of heavy artillery, he commenced the siege immediately, sending to Cuidad-Rodrigo, in the meantime, for additional supplies of ammunition.

Of the three convents, the principal and largest was that of Saint Vincent, a great building resembling a fortress, on one side commanding the Tormès, which flowed at the foot of Salamanca, and on the other Salamanca itself. The two other convents, named respectively San-Gaetano, and de la Merced, were situated a little below, and towards the city, and completed our command of it.

Lord Wellington opened trenches in front of the Saint Vincent convent, but determined to take the two others by an assault, which he ordered to take place immediately. The troops which garrisoned these two posts, however, aided by the fire of the St. Vincent convent, succeeded in repelling the attack of the English, and compelling them to retreat with a loss of several hundreds of men; and Lord Wellington determined to await the arrival of the siege matériel, which he expected from Cuidad-Rodrigo.

On the 28th of June, the siege train having reached the English camp and been directed against them, the French troops after a most valiant defence, were compelled to yield the improvised citadels, by means of which Marmont had hoped to preserve Salamanca, or at least to have been enabled to repossess it at will; the result of the affair being, that we had lost a thousand men in slain and prisoners, whilst the English had lost at least as many, and, in addition, twelve days, which were a gain to us as advantageous as the loss of them was the contrary to the English.

Salamanca having been taken, it would not have been wise of Marshal Marmont to have retained a position so close to the English army as the one he held then was, and he passed the Douro at Tordesilles, determined to dispute his line within it. Lord Wellington followed him to the bank of the Douro, which at this season was somewhat shallow, but still unfordable save in very few places. The line of the Douro was protected, as we have already stated, by various strong posts, and of these, if we regard the Esla and Orbigo as a prolongation of the line of the Douro, that of Astorga was one of the most considerable, being well fortified and containing a garrison of one thousand five hundred resolute troops, and forming a strong support to our right. Lord Wellington, therefore, arriving on the bank of the Douro on the 1st of July, paused there to allow time to the Spanish army of Gallicia to sieze Astorga, thus giving to the French some fifteen days, during which, had they not been blinded by extraordinary passion, they might have concentrated seventy thousand men against the English army. And so conscious, indeed, was Lord Wellington of this fact, that as long as he remained on the bank of the Douro, he never ceased to urge, on the one side the Anglo Sicilian army to give the utmost possible occupation to Marshal Suchet, and on the other, the English naval forces cruising in the Bay of Biscay to keep General Caffarelli in continual dread of a great disembarkation of forces on the Austrian coasts.

In the meantime, Marshal Marmont, established behind the Douro, had employed himself in the concentration of the eight divisions which formed the army of Portugal, and as, after he had recovered the first of these divisions, that of General Foy, there remained to be recovered the eighth, that of General Bonnet, he sent an order to this division to evacuate the Asturias, which it occupied, and his message found General Bonnet en route, for this officer, as intelligent as he was brave, perceiving what so many men of higher rank than himself failed to perceive, had rightly judged that every other consideration ought to be sacrificed to the necessity of repelling the English. The reinforcement of this division, which consisted of six thousand excellent troops, inspired Marshal Marmont with a great increase of confidence, and raised the number of his infantry to thirty-six or thirty-seven thousand men. The arm in which he was most deficient was that of cavalry, his troopers having been exhausted in pursuit of the Guerilla bands, but nevertheless, he had been able, by seizing all the available riding horses of the country, to raise the number of his cavalry to three thousand well mounted horsemen, and with his artillery, which was well served and numbered one hundred pieces, his forces numbered altogether forty-two thousand men. By the addition of a reinforcement of ten thousand, they would have been very superior in strength to the English; and even without they might have made head against them, had they been wisely and fortunately led.

Marshal Marmont was endowed with many of the qualities of a good General, but was far from possessing all of them, and in addition to this want, was far from being a favourite to fortune. He was not clothed with the indefinable attribute which, whether it exist merely in human superstition or be a reality, brings to one opportunely and to another inopportunely, cold and heat, rain and sunshine, unexpected arrivals, all those various circumstances which so often enable inferior combinations to succeed and frustrate those of real merit. And after all, may not this attribute, we may ask, be simply the result of that just proportion of qualities in a man's mind, which enables him, even without the possession of superior genius, to form those simple and decided resolutions which save armies and empires?

Ought Marshal Marmont, sheltered as he was by the Douro, to have remained immoveable? Doubtless it would have been his better course to have left the initiative in the enemy's hands, to have disputed with him the passage of the Douro as long as possible, and then to have fallen back methodically upon the army of the north, which must necessarily, when the enemy was at hand, have united with his own. But he was young, vain, and was at the head of an army of proved courage, over which the English had obtained no ascendant, and which retreated before them with great unwillingness; besides which he received news which entirely put an end to all his hopes of succour. On the one side General Caffarelli, after having announced the approach of a reinforcement of ten thousand men, now sent to inform him of the appearance of the English fleets between Saint-Ander and Saint-Sebastian, and the probability of an immediate disembarkation of the enemy, thus intimating that Marmont should no longer expect the promised reinforcement. At the same moment, Joseph, by a letter written on the 30th of June, and which reached the head quarters of the army of Portugal on the 12th of July, informed its chief of the exertions he had made to induce the army of the north and of Andalusia to aid him, and of the little expectation he had of prevailing upon them to do so; at the same time refraining, either because he was not prepared, or because he considered that the right moment had not yet come, from expressing any intention of depriving himself in Marmont's favour of one of the divisions of the army of the centre.

Compelled thus to rely on the forces actually under his command, Marshal Marmont, comparing his army with that of Lord Wellington, which, taking into account only the English troops, was not more numerous than his own, and remembering that the battles gained by the former had only been so gained, because the French had injudiciously attacked them in positions where their manner of fighting rendered them invincible, he considered that he might be able so to manœuvre around them without compromising himself, as to force them to abandon the line of the Douro, and fall back upon the frontier of Portugal without giving them battle ; and also that, whilst endeavouring to force the enemy to retreat, he might be able to establish his own army on one of those defensive positions, the advantages of which had always hitherto been left to the enemy. The French, who scaled so well almost inaccessible positions, such as those of Talavera and Busaco, would be almost certain of victory, if instead of having to carry, they had to defend such. To these reasons for an immediate active movement, was added another of great weight, consisting in the fact that the Spanish army of Gallicia was besieging Astorga, which contained no more than fifteen days' provisions, and that whilst on the one hand the army of Portugal could not proceed to its relief without danger, its loss on the other hand, would expose this army to be turned on its right and forced into an indefinite retreat.

Such were the ideas which induced Marshal Marmont to leave the asylum which he had found behind the Douro ; and his first step, which was to repass this river in the presence of the English army, was effected with as much skill as good fortune. The banks of the Douro were of such a conformation, that all that took place on the one could be seen on the other ; and Marshal Marmont, under cover of a pretended descent of troops on his right towards Toro, prepared on his left, in the environs of Tordesilles, the means of really crossing the river by several ponts de chevalets. During the night of the 16th, the left and centre of his army successfully accomplished the passage, and on the following day the right also, taking advantage of the surprise and confusion of the English.

Lord Wellington was no more anxious than was Marshal Marmont to risk a battle, but he was resolved not to permit himself to be cut off from Cuidad-Rodrigo, which contained his provisions and war matériel, and was at the same time an excellent plan of entrance into Portugal. He now hastened, therefore, to break up his camp and to retreat towards Salamanca, by the road which he had already followed, and thus rendered Marshal Marmont successful in his project of making a retrograde movement.

As it fell back towards Salamanca the English army encountered several tributaries of the Douro, first the Guarena, and then the Tormès, on which is situate Salamanca itself; and behind each of these in turn Lord Wellington withdrew with as much prudence as deliberation. Each army passed the evening of the 19th on the banks of the Guarena, the troops on each side braving the enemy's cannon for the purpose of bathing in its waters, the heat of the weather being extremely oppressive.

During the night, Marshal Marmont ascended the Guarena by his left, and crossing it at a point where it was a torrent of insignificant size, suddenly found himself in the presence of the English, who were not a little surprised that they were separated from us by no intervening obstacle, and immediately began to retreat with admirable order and steadiness, along a rather extensive plain, whilst our army followed them along a plateau parallel to the one they occupied with equal steadiness and greater confidence, its light artillery frequently stopping to cannonade the retreating enemy. On the evening of the 20th the English repassed the Tormès, and our troops bivouacked on its bank.

On the 21st the French army crossed this river at a point a league and a half above Salamanca, and took up a position opposite the Arapiles heights, on which the English forces were established, and where it was not easy to attack them; and accordingly, Marshal Marmont, almost elated by the success which had attended his movements in the face of the enemy, resolved not to imitate the errors of his predecessors, of attacking the English in positions where there could be no chance of vanquishing them, and took up a position opposite the enemy but separated from them by a valley, and supported on the right by the village Calvarossa de Ariba, and on the left by woods of which he had hastened to take possession.

On the following morning, the 22nd July, Marshal Marmont mounted his horse at an early hour for the purpose of endeavouring to find out by personal examination what might be the designs of the enemy, and what course, consequently, he should himself pursue. No movement, however, on the part of the English had yet taken place which could throw any light on Lord Wellington's projects, with the exception that he had somewhat altered his position and fallen back a little more thoroughly on Salamanca and the Cuidad-Rodrigo route. A species of valley which, although not very deep, was of some extent, separated the two armies, and rendered the position of each equally secure. The village of Calvarossa de Ariba, occupied by the division Foy, served as a pivot for our right, whilst our centre and left rested on the woods. Each of the armies might have remained in their positions without fear of the enemy encamped in front of it, and each was equally unwilling to engage, except under the most advantageous circumstances, but, nevertheless, Marshal Marmont devised a movement on his left for the purpose of outflanking to some extent the English right, threatening, consequently, their communications with Cuidad-Rodrigo, and placing the French army in a position, when the English should leave their present position either for the purpose of rejoining Cuidad-Rodrigo, or approaching Salamanca, which would enable it to attack, and even to seize a portion of their rear guard. The plan was feasible but far too ambitious, and it would have been wiser to have afforded the enemy a bridge of gold than to have entered upon movements which might force us into engaging him in battle. At the same time it must be acknowledged that, by the exercise of great prudence in their execution these movements might have been effected without any very disastrous consequences.

Leaving his right under General Foy at the village of Calvarossa de Aribi, and strengthening it by the addition of the divisions of General Ferry, Marshal Marmont made his centre and left defile behind this position along the woods by which it was adossé, and following the line of the heights on which he had encamped. Between the English and French troops towards the right of the latter, arose two mamelons, named the Arapiles, the one of which nearest to us was also the loftiest, and commanded, consequently, the lesser one, of which the English had taken possession. He carried forward his divisions, the left being in front, defiling opposite the English, and keeping the valley beneath them and his own troops. The division Thormières, forming his extreme left, advanced a little en flèche; the division Sarrut and Maucune being in the centre, the division Clausel in reserve, and the division Bremier in the rear with the baggage and artillery.

Whilst Marshal Marmont was executing these movements, Lord Wellington, perceiving that they were directed against his communications, immediately ordered the execution of an exactly similar movement by his own troops, so that his right might be as much advanced as our left, and have the road before it open and unclosed by our forces. Leaving, therefore, his left stationary before our right which was also stationary, and leaving his centre (which was formed vis-á-vis with ours, between the Lesser Arapile and the village of the same name was formed of four English divisions, numbering altogether more than twenty thousand excellent infantry. In the first line, having their left resting on the Little Arapile, were the fourth division under General Cole and the fifth under General Leith; in a second line being the fifth under General Clinton and the seventh under General Hope) Lord Wellington carried his right, which was composed of the Portuguese brigade, Bradford, and the Spanish division Don Carlos, the third English division, and the remainder of his cavalry, to the village of Les Torres opposite our left.

It was now noon, and there was every probability that the day would have been passed by the two armies in mere manœuvres, without the occurrence of any great loss on either side, and that Lord Wellington would have retreated before night-fall towards Cuidad-Rodrigo, resigning Salamanca to us without a struggle, when, unfortunately, a fatal spirit of impatience induced Marshal Marmont to attempt to seize the enemy's rear guard. With this end in view he moved forward his left, which was already so far advanced that it now began to descend the heights before the 3rd English division which, with a large body of cavalry, was intended to hold it in check. At the same time he carried his centre still closer to the side of the valley which separated us from the English, ordering General Clausel to support it, and advanced also the division Bremier. He gave no orders for an attack on the English lines, for, as we have already said, his object was simply to cut off their rear guard when they should be in retreat, but the execution of such manœuvres as these requires the possession of extreme skill, and of an authority sufficiently powerful to have its orders obeyed with precision, and it unfortunately happened that Marshal Marmont was in niether of these respects qualified to contend with so bold an adversary as Lord Wellington. General Maucune, commanding the division of the centre which was most in advance on the left, was an officer of tried courage and of extreme boldness on the field of battle, and now, believing that the English were in full retreat, he thought that it was the right moment to attack them; sending, therefore, to ask permission to attack the enemy, but failing to await its arrival, he drove back the enemy's skirmishers, descended into the hollow which separated the two armies, engaged the divisions forming the English centre, being those of Cole and

Leith. Perceiving this, Lord Wellington, who was willing to retreat but not to fly, accepted the challenge to battle which appeared to be offered to him, and ordered his centre to receive and repulse the attack of ours.

Whilst General Maucune was committing this rashness, General Thormières, on the left, continuing to advance, descended also into the plain without being supported, and exposed himself to be attacked in front by Picton's infantry, and on his flanks by a cloud of cavalry. And thus, therefore, the two armies were engaged throughout their entire length contrary to the intentions of the two leaders.

Unfortunately, the division of General Clausel, which was strong and well commanded, was still behind and unable to afford that support of which the divisions which had imprudently engaged the enemy had so much need.

Marshal Marmont perceiving with his glass from the top of the Greater Arapile, on which he had taken up his position for the purpose of directing the various movements, the faults which had been committed, hastened to mount his horse and to proceed himself to restrain the impatience of his lieutenants, but was scarcely in his saddle when he was struck by a shot which broke his arm and opened his side. The unhappy Marshal fell covered with blood, and only just able to name General Bonnet as his successor in the chief command.

Whilst news of this event was being sent to General Bonnet on the right, the battle raged with the utmost fury, and on our side without the direction of a commander in chief. General Maucune, supported by General Sarrat, commander of one of the divisions of the centre, attacked the English vigorously, drove them back upon the village of Arapiles, but then, suffering great losses from the fire of the enemy, who were more numerous and individually stronger than our own troops, he was forced to fall back. General Clausel however, coming up and taking the place of the division Maucune, again forced the English to retreat; upon which, Marshal Beresford, who was present at this part of the battle field, ordered the second line to form en potence upon the first in such a manner as to take the division Clausel in flank. At the same time, Lord Wellington attacked on his left the Greater Arapile with General Packenham's Portuguese, and, towards his right, threw upon the divisions Thormières, which had very imprudently descended into the plain, the infantry of the division Picton and the whole mass of his cavalry. Still, in spite of the redoubled efforts of the enemy our troops remained firm and held their ground. The division Bonnet, although deprived of its general, who had hastened towards the centre to assume the command in chief, checked the advance of Packenham's Portuguese, and remained in possession of the greater Arapile. General Clausel supported with great firmness the attack in front made by the division Clinton, but suffered cruelly from the flank fire of the division Leith. The two armies encountered each other at such close quarters that the Generals on each side were wounded; on that of ours, Generals Bonnet and Clausel receiving severe injuries; whilst on the side of the English, Marshal Beresford and Generals Cole and Leith were wounded more or less dangerously.

On our left, the English right, the combat was no less violent. The division Thormières was attacked in the midst of the plain by the enemy's cavalry, lost its leader, who fell dead upon the field, and fell back in confusion. The division Bremier hastened to its aid, but became so involved in the retrograde movement that General Clausel, who, although wounded himself, remained on the field of battle and replaced General Bonnet in the command in chief, ordered a retreat, and directed it very judiciously towards the plateau which we ought not to have quitted. Summoning thither the division Ferry, which had remained behind the division Foy, on the extreme right, and the division Sarrut, which had remained behind the division Foy, which had been less engaged than the divisions of the centre, he successfully rallied behind them the divisions Thormières and Bremier, Maucune and Clausel; the division Bonnet which, posted at the greater Arapile, had covered the foot of the mamelon with the bodies of the foe, at the same time retreating in the most regular order. An attempt on the part of the English to climb the heights to which we had retired having been repulsed with the loss on our part, however, of General Ferry, who was mortally wounded, our divisions defiled in succession behind the divisions Sarrut and Ferry, passed behind the division Foy which had remained stationary at Calvarossa de Aribi, and returned by the road which they had followed in the morning. The division Foy which, not having as yet been engaged, was ordered to cover the retreat, was charged by the whole of the English cavalry, but received it in square, and inflicting considerable loss upon it, retreated in good order. Towards night our troops reached the river Tormès and effected its passage without being pursued.

Such was this unfortunate and involuntary battle, known as the battle of Salamanca or Arapiles, the result of which was to the English army an unhoped-for victory in the place of an inevitable retreat, and to us the commencement of the ruin of our affairs in Spain. And this result, without attempting to deny the merits of Lord Wellington, we must certainly attribute in great part to his good fortune, for it was out of all proportion to the merits of the English General or the errors of our own. To be unexpectedly engaged in a battle, to have three commanders in chief wounded in succession, and to be involved in extraordinary confusion, after a march which had been continued for many days with the greatest success, and in the best order, were severe, and we may say undeserved blows. But this battle is an eminent proof that the moral effect of events in war is generally far superior to their material effect; for if we had generals killed and wounded in this engagement, the English on their side suffered a similar loss; if the number of our killed and wounded amounted to five or six thousand, almost as many had fallen on the side of the enemy; and, in short, although we had certainly lost nine pieces of cannon, which, having been drawn from the heights down into the plain, had there lost their horses and could not be carried off, the difference between the material results of the battle to either side was very inconsiderable. By its moral effects, however, the position of the two forces was completely changed. We had no longer any chance of being able to force the English to retreat, and were, on the contrary, ourselves compelled to make a retrograde movement, with an army in the highest degree irritated by its long series of misfortunes, from which neither its incomparable bravery, nor resignation to the cruelest sufferings had preserved it. And now, whilst Marmont was compelled to withdraw behind the Douro, or even to a greater distance, as one of the first steps necessary in attempting to restore confidence to his army, Lord Wellington, on the contrary, was henceforth able to carry on the campaign in Castille, and on the French rear, for there was nowhere any force capable of making head against him. The army of Portugal would be compelled to fall back before him till it came up with the army of the north; the army of the centre was far too feeble to dare to approach him; the army of Andalusia was at a distance; and he was, therefore, at liberty to determine whether he should pursue General Clausel, or throw himself upon Madrid and enter it as a conqueror. Such were the ill consequences resulting from the want of good will on the part of those who had neglected to reinforce the army of Portugal in time, and of the imprudence of those who had engaged in a useless battle.

Fortunately for the army of Portugal it had now become commanded, too late, but still in time to be of great advantage to it, by a chief worthy of leading it. General Clausel was young, vigorous both in mind and body, without much experience, it is true, and frequently careless, but imperturbably self-possessed, by turns cool and impetuous, keen-sighted on the battle field, and, although he had never hitherto commanded in chief, as well fitted to bear the anxieties of such a position as the most experienced officer; esteemed by the soldiers on account of his valour, and loved by them on account of his bonhommie, he was the only one of their officers qualified to retain their obedience, and preserve their discipline by severity, without causing them to revolt.

The calmness with which Clausel, wounded as he was, assumed the command in chief in the midst of a route, speedily restored calm to his troops, and with calm discipline. On the 23rd of July he retreated behind the Douro, receiving the English cavalry which pursued him in square, and repulsing them with considerable loss, the only casualty being in a square of the 6th Leger, which, having failed to form in time, suffered some damage. Behind the Douro Clausel found himself free from any attacks on the part of the English, but exposed to a swarm of Guerilla bands, which, unable to inflict any serious damage, destroyed our wounded, stragglers, and foragers; and our troops, irritated by the cruelties to which they saw their comrades thus exposed under their very eyes, and being in want of provisions, having exhausted during their late manœuvres all the resources with which Marmont had provided them, began on their side to pillage, not only greedily but even barbarously, an inhospitable country which they could not preserve, and which they expected never to revisit. General Clausel made great but fruitless endeavours to restrain these excesses.

At this moment arrived at length a portion of the reinforcements so earnestly demanded, so vainly awaited. On the first day of the retreat, General Clausel came up with a thousand men sent by General Caffarelli, consisting of two regiments of cavalry and a detachment of artillery attélée; a reinforcement so absurdly small that it might have been just cause for anger, had not General Caffarelli had for his excuse, his good faith and the anxiety which was caused to him by the appearance of the English fleets on the coast of Biscay. Another reinforcement, which must have had a decisive effect on the course of the late events, had it arrived in time, was announced by a despatch from Joseph, which arrived at the moment when the army of Portugal had repassed the Douro, and consisted of about thirteen thousand men, comprising almost the whole of the army of the centre, which Joseph, in a species of despair, had determined to lead in person to Salamanca. He had set out from Madrid on the 21st, and this would not have been too late, had he only sent word of his intention to Marmont three or four days before, for in that case the Marshal would doubtless have awaited his arrival, and the reinforcement he brought would probably have induced Lord Wellington to make an immediate retreat, or have given rise to different manœuvres. In any case it could scarcely have happened that fifty-five thousand Frenchmen such as would have formed the army of Portugal, would have been vanquished by an army of forty thousand English and fifteen thousand Spaniards and Portuguese.

We must now turn our attention to the circumstances attending the arrival of the reinforcement which Joseph now brought to the army of Portugal, and more especially to those which had prevented that arrival from being more opportune. When Joseph had sent orders to Marshal Soult directing him to send ten thousand men immediately to the assistance of the army of Portugal, or to resign his command, at the same time authorizing him to cease to occupy a portion of Andalusia should he find himself too much enfeebled by the withdrawal of those ten thousand men to continue to do so, it seemed that such orders admitted neither of tergiversation nor refusal, and they certainly could not have met with either had they emanated from a power so capable of making itself respected as Napoleon's. But as it was, Marshal Soult, repeating an argument already employed, declared that he was quite willing to obey, but on condition only that he might at once and completely evacuate Andalusia, since the withdrawal of ten thousand men would leave him utterly incapable of continuing to occupy it—an assertion very open to dispute; for the army of Andalusia, numbering as it did sixty thousand active troops, would have been quite sufficient to have guarded this province for some time even after the withdrawal of ten thousand of them. Together with this species of disguised refusal Marshal Soult submitted his views on the best method in which to conduct the campaign against the English, to the effect that the object in view being to turn the English from the north of the Peninsula, it was necessary, so far from diminishing the army of Andalusia, to reinforce it, joining with it the army of the centre and even that of Portugal, so that Lord Wellington, becoming fearful for the safety of Lisbon, might feel compelled to withdraw from the north to the south.

In the first place this plan was precisely opposed to the instructions of Napoleon, who had ordered that everything should be sacrificed to the maintenance of the communications with France by the provinces of the north, and in the next place, independently of Napoleon's orders, what would have happened in Spain, if, the north and interior of the Peninsula being given up to the English, and Lord Wellington ruling from Vittoria to Baylen, rousing the whole population to insurrection by his presence, our armies had been confined in Andalusia?

What Joseph required of Marshal Soult, however, was not advice, but reinforcements for the army of Portugal, and finding that he could not obtain them of him, and that Marshal Marmont's danger increased every moment, he at length determined to proceed himself to his assistance. He might have been ready by the 17th of July, and had he set out at that date, would have arrived before Salamanca in time. But Marshal Suchet having placed Polombini's Italian division at his disposal, and it being possible to march this division upon Madrid, Joseph thought that it would be better to wait till the 21st of July, when he could set out with thirteen thousand men, than to depart immediately with ten thousand. Reinforced by three thousand Italians, he would have eighteen thousand men at his disposal, and of these he determined to leave five thousand at Madrid, marching to Salamanca with the remainder. And even now this measure would have been effectual had he written to Marshal Marmont immediately, informing him of his intended movement; but he delayed to send information of it until the very moment of his departure. Arriving at Villa-Castin on the 23rd, he received on the 24th vague rumours of the terrible battle of Salamanca. Unwilling to come into too close contiguity with the English, but at the same time equally unwilling to retrace his steps without being of some service to the army of Portugal, he entered into communication with General Clausel, and learning that the latter was anxious that he should remain within sight of the English for the purpose of somewhat distracting their attention, he remained upon the farther side of the Guadarrama, only departing when the army of Portugal had peaceably retreated upon Burgos, and that the danger of his own position compelled him to fall back upon Madrid, which he re-entered on the 9th of August, profoundly dispirited.

The course which had now to be taken by the French, was, unfortunately, but too plainly pointed out by circumstances. Since they had been vanquished, by not uniting in time against the common enemy, it had become still more evident that it was now necessary to unite as soon as possible, for the purpose of expiating the reverse suffered at Salamanca, by a great battle fought on the part of the French by an army composed of all their available troops then present in the Peninsula. But this concentration of troops could only have been obtained by means of the immediate evacuation of Andalusia, a measure much to be regretted, since its moral effect could not but be most injurious to our cause, as a source of great encouragement to the government at Cadiz, and as a means of interrupting or even breaking off the intrigues which were being carried on there in our interest with great probability of gaining over important persons to our side. Nevertheless, the sacrifice of this province had become absolutely necessary, its complete and immediate evacuation being the only means of avoiding the greatest disasters. Joseph wrote, therefore, a severe letter to Soult, in which he peremptorily ordered him (directing him to resign his command to Count d'Erlon, should he be unwilling to obey) to evacuate the lines of Cadiz, Grenada, and Seville, and to fall back upon La Mancha. The annexation of the army of the centre to the sixty thousand troops of Marshal Soult, would form a force sufficient for the defence of Madrid, and by the further addition of the army of Portugal, the means would be provided of proceeding to meet Lord Wellington, wherever he might be, and to offer him battle with such a superiority of force, that the issue could not be doubtful. On these conditions Madrid might well be abandoned; and if Lord Wellington, who was now able to choose whether he would pursue the vanquished army, or enter the capital in triumph, should determine to march upon Madrid, it was evident that it would be necessary to evacuate it, since Marshal Soult could not arrive in time to save it.

Lord Wellington's movements shortly put an end to these sad doubts, for after having pursued the army of Portugal, during some days, he paused in the environs of Valladolid, and retraced the road towards Madrid. Had he continued to pursue the army of Portugal, it is very doubtful whether General Clausel would have been able to preserve it from total destruction. And as, in that case, the army of the north would but have arrived to be vanquished in turn, the illustrious English captain would have had an open road before him, for it is very improbable that the armies which occupied the south of the Peninsula, would have assembled in sufficient time to check his progress. Had Napoleon found himself in a similar position, he would have freed Spain from the enemy within the space of two months—Such is the difference between genius and simple good sense. But good sense is attended by so many other advantages, that we should pause before we accuse its possessor of an error; and with respect to the present case, moreover, we must pardon the weaknesses which are associated with even the most solid character. Lord Wellington, clear-headed as he was, concealed under an air of calm reserve, an inordinate vanity. The idea of making a triumphant entry into Madrid, was one which had for him an irresistible attraction, and on the 10th of August accordingly, he directed his march upon the Spanish capital. As soon as information of this movement of the British army reached Joseph, he was profoundly affected by it, and it was natural that he should be, for no course was open to him which was not attended by serious disadvantages. The only feasible plan was to march to join either Marshal Soult at Seville or Marshal Suchet at Valencia; and the choice between these two measures could not be very doubtful. In addition to the fact that Seville was the most distant of the Spanish provinces, it was also deprived of all means of communication with France, whilst Valentia had easy communication through Tortosa, Tarragona, Lerida, and Saragossa, with the Pyrenees. Another inducement for adopting the latter course was, that at Valencia Joseph would find himself in the midst of a rich, submissive, and well administered country, and would also meet with a cordial reception, the relations between Joseph and Marshal Suchet having been always friendly. But a conclusive reason for marching to Valencia instead of Seville was, that whilst it was quite possible to carry the army of Andalusia to Valencia, it would have been in the highest degree unwise to attempt to march the army of Aragon to Seville, since independently of the loss of Aragon and Catalonia, which must have been the result of such a movement, all communication with France would at once have been closed against our troops.

Directing his march, therefore, upon the Tagus, in the direction of Valencia, Joseph rescinded the orders he had previously sent to Marshal Soult, and ordered him to effect his retreat by Murcia upon Valencia. But Joseph had now to take leave of Madrid, and his leave taking was a sad one. In the midst of this Spain, which was now being torn from his grasp, he had met with a certain number of Spaniards, some of them men of high birth and considerable fortune, who partly, perhaps, from affection for his own gentle and affectionate disposition, partly because they were anxious to spare their country from the horrors of a desolating war, and partly because convinced that Spain had derived all its civilization from foreign dynasties, had rallied round him. There were many persons also filling the inferior public offices, who had remained in his service simply in accordance with their habits of obedience, and who, known by the name of *afrancesados*, and most numerous at Madrid, amounted to some ten thousand. To leave these persons exposed to the ferocity of the Spaniards was equivalent to condemning them to death; to lead them in the month of August across the plains of La Mancha and the sterile mountains of Cuenca was to lead them to perish of want and exposure. The alternative was sad, but as human nature generally seeks to avoid the evil which is most imminent, the afrancesados were all eager, at the first rumour of the evacuation of the city, to depart; and on the 10th of August at least two thousand carriages set out from the gates of Madrid escorted by the army of the centre; the fugitives and troops together forming a mass of some twenty-four thousand individuals, of whom only one half were provided with arms and a scanty supply of provisions. When he had arrived on the banks of the Tagus, in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez, Joseph was anxious to know whether the whole Anglo-Portuguese army was marching upon the capital or only a simple detachment of one or two divisions, for in this latter case he might have disputed possession of the capital with the enemy, or at least have refrained from removing to any great distance, awaiting in its neighbourhood the arrival of the army of Andalusia.

In the meantime, General Treilhorn, who commanded an excellent division of Dragoons, was directed to reconnoitre the English army, and executed this order in the environs of Majadahonda, on the banks of the Guadarrama torrent, with so much skill and vigour, that he surprised the English advanced guard, and took four hundred men, with three pieces of cannon. The report of the English officers leaving no doubt that Lord Wellington with his whole army were at the gates of Madrid, it was at length definitively settled to set out for Valencia by way of Orcana, Albacete, and Chinchilla. The sick and wounded whom it would be necessary to leave behind, were placed in the Retiro, which had long since been fortified against the Guerillas and the people of Madrid, but not in such a manner as to resist the attacks of a regular army, and was now furnished with a garrison of twelve thousand men under Colonel Laffond.

The departure from the Tagus took place about the 15th of August, in the midst of a stifling heat and with very slender resources, and hundreds of the fugitive families speedily encumbered the roads in badly horsed vehicles, entreating the soldiers for some portion of their plunder. The inhabitants were everywhere in flight, the granaries burnt or empty, and no one was to be found of whom could be purchased any kind of food. In the place of inhabitants, pitiless Guerilla bands hovered around the retreating column, and worn out with fatigue, sick and famished, it had to pursue its way, or stay to be slaughtered, under the very eyes of the French rear guard. And this was all that remained of Joseph's government, which it had appeared so easy to substitute for that of Charles, and the attempt to establish which had already carried six hundred thousand Frenchmen into Spain, of whom scarcely three hundred thousand survived.

After the continuance of the retreat for some days, many of the unhappy fugitives perished, whilst others, unable to proceed any further, withdrew into the villages for concealment, and to implore a pity which they seldom found. A portion of Joseph's Spanish Guard deserted, and, altogether, the mass of persons which had retreated from Madrid had much diminished when it arrived before Chinchilla.

On the confines of Valencia were encountered Marshal Suchet's advanced posts, and those who had had strength to continue this difficult journey had the satisfaction of finding themselves at length in a country which was tranquil, inhabited, rich, and friendly, whilst Marshal Suchet, to whom this visit was a heavy charge, received his royal visitor with the utmost respect, and with thorough cordiality the fugitives by whom he was accompanied. The Marshal accompanied Joseph into Valencia, procured him a much better reception there than he had ever obtained at Madrid, and liberally bestowed upon his followers the abundance of his magazines. The entrance into Valencia was made on the 1st of September, and it was resolved to await there the arrival of the army of Andalusia.

Although Marshal Soult was very unwilling to quit Andalusia, he could no longer refuse to evacuate it, for, having refused to weaken his army, he had lost the only means of maintaining his position there. To have remained there any longer would have been to expose himself to the fate of General Dupont. It was more advisable for him to retreat upon Valencia than to retreat upon La Mancha, for he thus avoided the English army, of whose march and strength he was ignorant, and went, moreover, to a friendly district which was tranquil and provided with all kinds of resources. When, therefore, he received Joseph's new orders, he was ready to obey them, for he had already determined to take the route which they pointed out; but at the same time it was not without some anxiety that he prepared to present himself before Joseph and two Marshals who were perfectly capable of judging how far his own conduct had led to the late misfortunes. It was no doubt quite true that General Caffarelli had allowed himself to be too much alarmed by the appearance of the English ships; that Joseph had committed a fault in setting out from Madrid too late, and a still greater fault in so tardily announcing his departure; and that Marshal Marmont had imprudently manœuvred in the presence of a skilful and resolute enemy;—but yet to how great an extent were these misfortunes caused by Marshal Soult, who, in spite of repeated advice and evidences of the most striking nature to the contrary, had obstinately persisted in believing that Lord Wellington was marching upon Andalusia and not upon Castille, had refused any succour to the army of Portugal, from which he had received so many services, and had not only refused to succour it, but in so doing had disobeyed the king, who was his military chief, without that excuse of having reason on his side which may in some rare instances justify disobedience. To justify all these acts to Joseph and his Marshals, who were completely acquainted with the whole of the circumstances, would be sufficiently embarrassing; but a tribunal of a still more formidable nature awaited Soult at Valencia, the judgment of Napoleon, who had remained silent respecting the affair of Oporto, but who could scarcely be so respecting the events which had lately taken place in Castille. The excuse which the Marshal devised for the purpose of excusing his disobedience was a singular one, being founded on an assumption that the orders which Joseph had given him, and which he had refused to execute, were given in accordance with a secret understanding between himself, Bernadotte, England, and the Russians. The reasons upon which this asserted supposition was founded was that, according to the English journals, Bernadotte had taken many hundred Spaniards into his service, that Joseph's ambassador had remained in Russia, that Moreau had arrived from America to Sweden, &c. By adding to these facts the fact that Joseph was Bernadotte's beau-frère, he considered himself authorized to believe that Joseph had entered into a conspiracy against France, of which the first act was to be the abandonment of Spain, and that the order to evacuate Andalusia was the first step towards the execution of this criminal design. Entertaining, therefore, this strange idea, he believed it necessary to send information of the supposed plot to Napoleon, and accordingly wrote a despatch on the subject, which for greater safety he consigned to the charge of a captain of a merchant vessel, directing him to convey it to one of the French ports in the Mediterranean.

Having sent his despatch to the Emperor, Soult in the next place replied to Joseph's orders, reiterating his opinion respecting the plan on which the campaign ought to be conducted, but adding, that in accordance with the Royal command, he would concentrate his scattered troops and proceed to the kingdom of Valencia by Murcia; and in fact, after having destroyed or thrown into the sea the immense war matériel which had been collected with so much toil in the lines of Cadiz, and formed a great convoy of munitions, provisions, and baggage, the Marshal commenced his retreat on the 25th of August by the Murcian route. That portion of his troops which was at Grenada would naturally join the bulk of the army on the road; whilst that which, under the command of Count d'Erlon, uselessly occupied Estremadura, was to descend to the banks of the Guadalquiver, ascend it by Cordova as far as Beaza, and join the main column at Huescar. Towards the end of September, Soult's advanced guard perceived in the environs of Almaraz that of Marshal Suchet, experiencing the greatest delight at meeting them once more; for in those dangerous and distant regions, the French soldiers, always regarding themselves as destined to perish to the last man, seldom met without throwing themselves into each others' arms, and manifesting the deepest emotion.

During the month of September, vague rumours had reached Joseph of the approach of Marshal Soult, and he had impatiently awaited the details of his march, and the explanation of his projects. Suddenly he learnt that the captain of a merchant vessel, the bearer of French despatches, had touched at Grao, (the port of Valencia,) and desired to resign his charge, being hotly pursued by the English; and having, therefore, hastened to receive and open the despatches in question, eager to learn what information they might contain respecting Andalusia, Joseph was filled with surprise on reading them to find himself denounced in them by Marshal Soult as a traitor towards his family and country. The sentiments with which he perused this accusation may be easily imagined; convinced as he was of his devotion to his brother, and also to the fact that Napoleon's brothers owed their whole fortunes, however dearly they might pay for them, to Napoleon himself, and that by the preservation of his, theirs could alone be preserved, he was indignant of being accused of treason which, if it had entered into Bonaparte's family, had certainly not done so through him, and immediately sent off Colonel Desprez to Moscow to carry to the Emperor this tissue of strange ideas, and to demand both the removal and the punishment of the General of Andalusia.

Impatient to meet Soult, and to have the army of Andalusia under his own control, Joseph hastened to meet him, and appointed a rendezvous with him on the Murcian frontier, at Fuente de Higuera. Joseph was accompanied by

Marshals Jourdan and Suchet, but at their request, as they were unwilling to be present at what would most probably be a very painful interview, he met Soult alone, and very unpleasantly surprised him, by the information that the subject of his late despatches to Napoleon was known. The incident produced this advantage, that Soult was eager to atone for his offence by zealous obedience, which was all, at that moment, that Joseph desired to obtain, and after an angry interview, therefore, with the commander of the Andalusian army, Joseph endeavoured to form in concert with the three Marshals a plan of campaign which, the whole of the French forces being concentrated to execute it, might make the English expiate their recent triumph by an overwhelming defeat. The chief part which Soult took in the conference was to intimate that he considered, not that his army was annexed to the others, but that the others were annexed to his; whilst Marshal Suchet seemed to be almost solely desirous for the preservation of Valencia, and Marshal Jourdan's good sense and want of any decided views on the subject, led him to hold a middle course. At length it was arranged that in the course of the following day each of the Marshals should submit to the King a written opinion respecting the course which it would be most advisable to pursue.

Marshal Soult proposed that an army composed of the army of Andalusia, the army of the centre, and a portion of the army of Aragon, should be marched across la Mancha upon the Tagus and Madrid. To this plan Marshal Suchet's memoir offered great objections, on the ground that, as the number of active troops at his disposal only amounted to thirteen or fourteen thousand, of whom six thousand were absolutely necessary for the defence of Valencia, and the principal posts of San Felipe and Saguntum, he could only contribute to an army intended to march upon Madrid some eight thousand men, and that for the sake of so small a reinforcement would probably be lost Valencia with all its abundance of resources, the advantage of keeping at a distance from Catalonia and Aragon the armies of Murcia and Sicily, and finally the only certain means of communicating with France. And in addition to these objections to the proposed movement was the consideration that, should it take place, and result in an encounter with the French and English armies behind the Tagus to the disadvantage of the latter, the French troops would find themselves in a cul-de-sac, the Tagus being closed against them in front and the kingdom of Valencia in the rear. It was in the highest degree important, therefore, Suchet's memoir proceeded to declare, that Valencia should be well guarded, and for this purpose the whole of Marshal Suchet's troops were not only not too numerous but on the contrary scarcely sufficient, for rumours were everywhere current that the Anglo-Sicilian army was of very considerable strength, and fourteen thousand men, therefore, were by no means too many to make head against that army and the army of Catalonia, especially as it would be necessary to march them from San-Felippe to Tarragone, a distance of a hundred leagues. Marshal Suchet's plan, for the conduct of the campaign, therefore, being entirely founded on the idea of the importance of defending Valencia, consisted in marching the armies of Andalusia and the centre into the province of Guadalaxara, forcibly effecting the passage of the Tagus there, then marching the army of the centre upon Cuenca, where it would always be ready to afford support to the army of Aragon on the frontier of the kingdom of Valencia, and establishing the army of Andalusia in the province of Guadalaxara, its base resting on Calatayud, its head on Madrid, and its right in constant communication with the army of Portugal. Thus, according to this plan, the four principal armies, those of Aragon, the centre, Andalusia, and Portugal, supported by each other and resting on the Pyrenees, would be always able to meet the enemy with a force composed of two of their number at any time that he might march against one of them; and at the same time, having secure possession of Valencia, Tortosa, Tarragona, Barcelona, Lerida, Saragossa, Burgos, and Valladolid, provinces from which a good system of administration would be able to procure an ample supply of resources, they would be firmly established in their positions, and be capable of preserving, uninterrupted, their communications with France.

According to Marshal Jourdan's plan, it was above all things necessary to ascend towards Madrid by the upper Tagus, for the purpose of joining the army of Portugal, and then, with the three united armies of Portugal, the centre, and Andalusia, to march upon the English at the head of eighty thousand or ninety thousand men and a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. Admitting, that were there any great danger of encountering Lord Wellington, established with all his forces on the Tagus, before the army of Portugal had been joined with the other two, it would be advisable to proceed by Valencia, Teruel, and Calatayud, and from thence to Aranda, where, without having incurred any risk, the union with the army of Portugal might be effected, he nevertheless declared against the adoption of this route, which was both long and badly supplied with resources, on the ground that the chance of encountering Lord Wellington on the upper Tagus was a very improbable one, and that it was far more likely that the British General would be found with two or three divisions guarding Madrid, the remainder of his army being engaged in Castille against General Clausel. Should this latter supposition be the case there would be but slight difficulty in forcing the line of the Tagus, which in this part was by no means a serious obstacle, and the army of Portugal having been rallied, the united French force would enter Madrid with a decisive superiority of strength. At the same time, as it was possible that this supposition might be erroneous, and the Tagus in fact strongly guarded, it was necessary to retain the power of returning upon Valencia, and for that end to leave to Marshal Suchet his army undiminished by the withdrawal of a single battalion. Marshal Jourdan was of opinion, therefore, that the two armies of the south and centre alone being united, and thus forming a force of about fifty-six thousand men, should be marched in two columns, the one, consisting of the army of Andalusia, by the la Mancha route which passes Chinchilla, San-Clemente, Ocana, and Aranjuez; the other, consisting of the army of the centre, by the Cüenca route which passes Reguena, Cuenca, Fuenti-Duena, both being ready at any time to support each other, and equally proceeding towards the point of the Tagus at which they were to effect the passage. At the same time, as the right column (the army of the centre) would, Jourdan considered, be too feeble, he proposed to add to it six thousand or seven thousand men of the army of Andalusia, and to place it under the command of Count d'Erlon.

This plan was so wise and so appropriate to the situation, that Joseph, who placed habitual confidence in Marshal Jourdan's advice, immediately adopted it, and immediately ordered Soult to prepare to march from Almaraz, where he was encamped, upon Chinchilla, San-Clemente, and Aranjuez, whilst the army of the centre marching from La-Huerta de Valencia, by the Las-Cabrillas defile, should reach the Tagus at Fuenti-Duena, at which place it would be sufficiently near Aranjuez to support the army of Andalusia. He also ordered Marshal Soult to give up to the army of the centre Count d'Erlon, with six thousand men, at the same time informing him that Marshal Suchet would supply him with such quantities of rice and biscuit and eau-de-vie, as his troops might require.

These measures were particularly disagreeable to Marshal Soult, for they brought him under the direct orders of the

King, and deprived him of a portion of his forces; and he accordingly began to raise new objections, declaring that Joseph had no right to withdraw from his command any portion of the troops with which he had been entrusted by the Emperor. But as Joseph assumed at length the tone of a master, and intimated that he must either obey or resign his command to Count d'Erlon, he submitted, and during the 18th, 19th, and 20th of October, the united armies, well provided with munitions and provisions, set out in two columns, numbering altogether about fifty-six thousand men, leaving with Marshal Suchet the embarrassing retinues which had accompanied the two armies on their departure from Madrid and Seville, and leaving with him also the whole of his army.

On the 27th and 28th of October, the two columns reached the banks of the Tagus, between Fuente-Duena and Aranjuez, without having been stopped by any serious obstacle, and it then became an important matter of consideration, whether they were about to encounter Lord Wellington in front of Madrid, resolved to defend his conquest—this being very probable, since the entry into the Spanish capital had created a great sensation throughout Europe, and it was natural that he should be unwilling to relinquish his prize. But fortunately, all the rumours which reached the French head quarters were of a reassuring nature, generally concurring in leading Joseph and Marshal Jourdan to hope that the two or three divisions under General Hill were the only hostile force between themselves and Madrid. It is now time that we should turn our attention to the movements of the English and the army of Portugal since Joseph's march to Valencia and the union of his army with that of Andalusia.

On the 12th of August Lord Wellington had entered Madrid surrounded by all the Spanish chiefs, who were eager to share his triumph; and when we consider that it had but lately required the exercise of their atmost strength to prevent us from driving them from the small portion of the Peninsula which they still occupied into the sea, we may well understand that their joy and surprise on this occasion almost amounted to madness; Lord Wellington himself aggravating the barbarous or indiscreet conduct of his auxiliaries by the ostentation with which he exercised his authority. The first care should have been to have reassured the inhabitants of Madrid, to have forgotten some things, and to have tolerated, or even adopted others.

Don Carlos d'Espana, and l'Empecinado, who had now become to a certain extent the masters of Madrid, as the first exercise of their authority made the inhabitants swear fealty to the constitution of Cadiz, which was far from being agreeable to many Spaniards, who were but little prepared to receive the institutions which were being thus forced upon them, and did this, not so much with the intention of binding their countrymen to the constitution, as of forcing them to submit to the insurrectional government of Cadiz. Their next proceedings were to express themselves in the harshest manner with respect to the *afrancesados*, and to withdraw from circulation and destroy at a loss all the coin bearing Joseph's effigy. Then, neglecting to procure the arrival of provisions at Madrid, they gave themselves up to extravagances of faction which were as dangerous as foolish, whilst the extremest misery prevailed around them. In the meantime, Lord Wellington added to these errors those resulting from British pride, wounding the haughty spirit of the Spanish nation by lodging in the palace of their kings; having already destroyed in capturing the Retiro, which Colonel Laffond had been compelled to give up for the want of water, the china manufactory, which answered to that of Sevres in France and that of Meissen in Saxony.

In the meantime, General Clausel had rallied, reorganised and reinstated the army of Portugal, and boldly marched it upon the Douro, although now reduced to only twenty-five thousand men, in the presence of the English army, of which the principal portion was posted on the banks of that river. He had, moreover, driven back the enemy's advanced posts, and sent General Foy with a division to collect the garrisons of Astorga, Benevento, Zamora, and Toro, which were uselessly dispersed along a line which could no longer be defended. General Foy had arrived too late to save the garrison of Astorga, which had been forced to surrender to the Spanish army of Gallicia, but he had been in time to succour its sick and wounded, and he had gathered together the troops occupying the other little posts on the Douro and the Esla.

Lord Wellington finding himself thus braved had been obliged to quit Madrid for the purpose of marching against the young adversary who, with the wrecks of a recently vanquished army, had so daringly posted himself before him: and accordingly, after having established General Hill at Madrid, he had departed for Old Castille, and having joined with his own troops the army of Gallicia had marched upon Burgos with fifty thousand men.

Compelled once more to retreat, General Clausel had fallen back successively upon Valladolid, Burgos, Briviesca, and the Ebro; Lord Wellington, pausing in his pursuit when he had reached Burgos, for the purpose of taking the castle by which this city was commanded, and without the possession of which, that of the town could not be considered secure. The siege was commenced towards the close of September, almost at the same time that Joseph was preparing to march upon Madrid.

The fortress of Burgos was an ancient edifice, erected during the period of the supremacy of the Moors in Spain, and crowned a height, at the foot of which lay the city of the same name. Two strong entrenched lines had been constructed around its Gothic walls, and armed by numerous and heavy cannon. A horn-work had been constructed on the height called St. Michel, which commanded the position of the castle. General Dubreton occupied this improvised fortress with two thousand men, and being provided with provisions and munitions, resolved to make a vigorous defence.

Lord Wellington, disdaining to attack such a place by a regular siege, resolved to attempt to carry the work on the St. Michel height by assault; and on the night of the 19th of September he succeeded in effecting this object with the loss of four hundred men, the loss on the side of the French being no more than a hundred and fifty.

As soon as the English had gained possession of the St. Michel position, they established a battery there and opened fire upon the fortress, but as their artillery was of less calibre than ours, it was soon dismounted and reduced to silence. The difficulties attending the transport service had rendered it impossible for them to bring up great cannon under the walls of Burgos, and the only available cannon were some sixteen-pounders which the Guerilla bands of Avala and Biscaye had received from the English squadron, and had laboriously conveyed to Burgos.

Perceiving at length that it would be almost impossible to breach the walls of the fortress with his cannon, Lord Wellington resolved to have recourse once more to an assault, and, accordingly, on the night of the 22nd of September, his columns planted ladders against the first *enceinte*, but were driven back by our troops with great loss, one of them, composed of Portuguese troops, being partly destroyed before it had even approached the foot of the enceinte.

It was necessary once more to have recourse to regular approaches, and to undermine the works in the absence of the artillery necessary to breach them. Two mines were accordingly prepared, and one of them having been exploded on the 29th of September, a column of the enemy rushed to the assault, but were repulsed, as were those which had already made similar attempts. On the 4th of October the second mine was fired, causing an extensive breach, whilst that which had been the effect of the first was considerably enlarged by the fire of the enemy's artillery; and the besiegers, throwing themselves upon these two breaches with the utmost fury, succeeded in carrying and effecting a secure lodgment in one of them. Having thus gained a footing on the first enceinte, the English began to open approaches towards the second in the hope of gaining possession of that also, but on the 8th of October, the garrison, executing a general sortie, overthrew their works, and driving them beyond the first enceinte regained possession of all that had been lost, with the exception of the work on the St. Michel height.

Having thus lost twenty days and two thousand five hundred men without having made any advance towards the capture of the fortress, the English General determined to make a last attempt, and after some preliminary works on the 19th of October the besiegers threw themselves once more on the outer line of works, and having succeeded in gaining possession of them hastened towards the second; but the brave garrison rushing forth en masse, charged them at the bayonet's point, and a third time drove them back with great slaughter beyond the enceinte of which they had for a moment obtained possession. And thus during thirty or forty days two thousand men, now reduced by the enemy's fire and fatigue to fifteen hundred, entrenched behind some ill-constructed works, had held in check fifty thousand of the enemy. Eternal honour to those brave heroes and their commander, General Dubreton! Their heroic resistance proved of what service in certain decisive circumstances may be well defended fortresses, for it afforded time to the army of Portugal to place itself once more in line, to the armies of the centre and Andalusia to advance upon the Tagus, and to all to concentrate for the purpose of overwhelming Lord Wellington.

In fact, General Clausel, who was now posted on the Ebro, had received the depôts established along the Pyrenees as well as the little garrisons on the frontier, together with horses for his cavalry and artillery, and had already thus become possessed of thirty-five thousand available troops. General Caffarelli, who, as we have already seen, being held in constant fear by the English fleets, had neglected the principal danger for one which was merely accessary, had at length pursued a better course, and reinforced the army of Portugal with ten thousand men. Unfortunately, just as General Clausel was about to march at the head of forty-five thousand men who now composed his army, the effects of his recent wound compelled him to resign his command to General Souham, an old officer of the republic, who was as brave as he was experienced, and who now advanced to the succour of the intrepid garrison which had defended during thirty-four days the paltry fortifications of Burgos.

Lord Wellington, situated between the army of Portugal which marched northwards and the armies of the centre and Andalusia which marched southwards, was in one of those difficult and critical positions from which General Bonaparte had always extricated himself by some wonderful triumph. Had he been less circumspect and more active, the English General might, probably, by concentrating the army of Italy with his own at the right moment, have vanquished in turn each of the armies which threatened him, and remained definitively master of Spain. But Lord Wellington was not formed by nature for wresting Spain from our hands in a single campaign; and it was sufficient for the triumph of the English policy, and for our misfortune, that he was endowed with the qualities calculated to enable him to effect its conquest in several.

Finding that the army of Portugal was approaching him greatly reinforced, the English General abandoned the wall of Burgos, before which he had lost three thousand men and the prestige of victory, and which would probably be the means of his losing Madrid; and after encountering our troops in several rear-guard combats withdrew in his turn behind the Douro, sending orders to General Hill to join him at Salamanca, if Madrid should appear to him to be untenable in the presence of the armies which were now marching upon it.

Such were the events of which Joseph and Marshal Jourdan received information on their arrival upon the Tagus, and on the 30th of October, the armies of the centre and of Andalusia, forcing the line of the Tagus, passed sur le corps of General Hill's rear-guard, and on the 2nd of November entered the Spanish capital, astonished at the sudden changes of fortune. Joseph was well received in Madrid, for its inhabitants, disgusted by the violence of the Guerillas and the pride of the English, began to think that the new dynasty, represented by so gentle and wise a prince, would be as beneficial to them as that of the degenerate Bourbons under the sway of factious chiefs.

With a very unusual display of activity Joseph set out from Madrid, after a sojourn there of no more than forty-eight hours, for the purpose of effecting the junction with the army of Portugal, and pursuing Lord Wellington at the head of eighty thousand men, by which means he hoped, and with good reason, that he would be able to drive the English back into Portugal, and re-establish himself, in spite of the evacuation of Andalusia, in his former position. Some anxiety, doubtless, began to be experienced respecting the Russian expedition, the silence of the *Moniteur*, which ceased to publish any bulletins from the grand army, being considered very ill-omened; but no idea was entertained of the extent of the disasters which had fallen upon us, and Joseph, therefore, expecting no ill news from Paris, hoped to find a recompense for the misfortunes which had befallen him at Salamanca in the environs of Salamanca itself.

Arriving on the 6th of November beyond the Guadarrama with his faithful major-general, he was in a position to turn to the left towards Penaranda, by taking which direction he would have come upon Lord Wellington's traces, but he preferred to turn to the right towards Arevolo, for the purpose of effecting his junction with the army of Portugal, being unwilling to attack the English until he had concentrated the whole of his forces; nor was it long before this object of his desire was effected, for Lord Wellington, eager to fall back upon Salamanca, made no attempt to prevent even the junction of the armies of the north and the south; and the rear-guards meeting almost in the environs of the Douro, Joseph had under his command, by the junction of the three armies of Andalusia, the centre, and Portugal, ninety thousand men, and one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon; a force which would have been still larger had not General Caffarelli hastened to recall the ten thousand men he had furnished, that they might again take part in the struggle with the bands under Mina, de Longa, Merino, and Porlier.

The army of Portugal, which had numbered thirty-five thousand men, had lost a certain number during the pursuit of Lord Wellington; and the armies of the centre and Andalusia, which on their departure from Valencia had numbered fifty-six thousand men, had left some on the road and had furnished, moreover, a detachment for the garrison of Madrid; but the force now under Joseph's command still numbered eighty-eight thousand of the best troops in the world, men who were as full of indignation at the successes which the English had been permitted to obtain, as they were rejoiced at the approach of an opportunity to avenge them.

Lord Wellington, separated from the Spanish army of Gallicia but reinforced by Hill's corps, was at this period at the head of no more than sixty thousand men, of whom forty thousand were English, who were far less self-confident than on the morrow of the victory of Salamanca; and how could such a force as this make head against eighty-five thousand Frenchmen even tolerably commanded? That it could do so, was believed neither by French nor English.

Our three armies advanced, therefore, upon the Tormès by precisely the same route as that which had been followed by Marshal Marmont, when about to fight the battle of Salamanca; marching so as to turn the Salamanca position and to place themselves upon Lord Welllington's line of communications.

On the 11th November they found themselves in a line at some distance from the Tormès, the army of Andalusia on the left, that of the centre, in the centre, that of Portugal on the right; Lord Wellington tranquilly awaiting their approach at the Arapiles, since, trusting in a position, the strength of which had already been proved, and, having his line of retreat secure towards Cuidad-Rodrigo, he believed that he should always be able to fall back in time. But he had committed a fault which might have cost him dear, and which Marshal Jourdan's keen glance immediately discerned.

The Tormès which, although of considerable size in winter, was at this time fordable in several places, flowed in front of us across the little city of Alba de Tormès, situated on our left, and then describing a semicircle proceeded to our right towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington had left General Hill at Alba de Tormès, and with the bulk of his army occupied Salamanca; the three leagues which intervened between himself and Hill being occupied only by a feeble detachment posted at the position of Calvarossa de Ariba; and the idea which now presented itself to Jourdan was, to advance between the English generals, and at least cut off the fifteen thousand men under General Hill.

This project, the details of which were explained to Joseph in the presence of his generals, on the very ground on which it was to be executed, was regarded as one which could not fail of success, by all except Soult, who considered that it would be better to cross the Tormès above Alba for the purpose of turning the Salamanca position, and thus compelling the English to resign it. To this it was replied that this movement would have the effect of forcing General Hill to quit Alba, to fall back in succession upon Calvarossa de Ariba and Salamanca, and would thus be the means of pointing out to the English the error which they had committed, and of causing the concentration of all their forces in the neighbourhood of Salamanca. The too modest Marshal Jourdan and all the Generals present were firm supporters of this latter view, but it was determined, out of respect to Marshal Soult's rank and position, to defer the final decision on the subject until after a fresh reconnaisance should have been made of the upper course of the Tormès.

On the following day Marshal Soult again brought forward his project of passing the Tormès on the left above Alba, the river having been found to be fordable there, and insisted so strongly on the advantageousness of this plan, that Marshal Jourdan, when consulted by Joseph on the subject, advised him to submit to Soult's opinion; alleging that it would be dangerous to attempt the execution of the plan he had himself proposed in opposition to the wishes of the General of the principal army; and that although the temptation to strike the English a decisive blow in the manner pointed out in his own plan, was very great, still the adoption of the course proposed by Marshal Soult would be less hazardous.

That the whole responsibility of the adoption of the measure proposed by Marshal Soult might be thrown upon him, and that he might be compelled, at least, to carry it into execution, in the best manner he was able, the army of the centre was placed under his orders, and that of Portugal entrusted to Count d'Erlon. On the 13th, the French crossed the Tormès above Alba, and advanced as far as Nuestra Senora de Retiro. Marshal Soult had already fifty thousand men under his command, including the whole of the cavalry, and on the following day he would be able to pursue the forward movement uninterruptedly. On this day, however, the weather became very unfavourable, and when Joseph and Jourdan insisted upon the advisability of throwing the French cavalry upon the English army, which was visible through the mist defiling from our right to our left, Marshal Soult, become circumspect at the last moment, objected to the measure on account of the obscurity of the atmosphere, being in truth unwilling to advance until he should have been joined by the whole army of Portugal; and the result was, that when the eighty-five thousand French troops were assembled, the English were already out of their reach, and in full retreat upon the Cuidad-Rodrigo route.

The confusion and irritation which now arose in the three armies was extreme The pursuit of the English was continued for a day or two, and then, having obtained by this formidable concentration of force only the capture of some three thousand stragglers, Joseph re-entered Madrid, and placed his three armies in cantonments, the army of Portugal in Castille, that of the centre in the environs of Madrid, and that of Andalusia on the Tagus, between Aranjuez and Talavera.

Such was the disastrous Spanish campaign of 1812, which after having begun by the loss of Cuidad-Rodrigo and

Badajoz, was signalized by the loss of the battle of Salamanca, and ended with the retreat from Madrid, the evacuation from Andalusia, and the disgrace of permitting forty thousand English to escape from eighty-five thousand French troops, posted on their line of communication. The English had, in fact, in this year of 1812, not only taken from us the two important fortresses of Cuidad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, gained a decisive battle, deprived us, for a moment, of Madrid, and forced us to evacuate Andalusia, but had also braved us by advancing as far as Burgos, and by returning uninjured from so bold a proceeding, had exposed all the weakness of our position in Spain, a weakness attributable to many immediate deplorable causes, but to be traced eventually—to the negligence of Napoleon, who, great as he was, being unendowed with the power of ubiquity, was unable to direct judiciously the course of affairs in Spain whilst in Paris, and still less whilst in Moscow,—to that spirit of distrust which prevented him, whilst delegating his authority to his brother, from bestowing it upon him in full confidence,—and, finally, by that eagerness of mind which impelled him to carry on every measure simultaneously, to endeavour to exercise his authority everywhere at the same time, and to regard as executed what circumstances had rendered it necessary to neglect— Such had been, and such was still, the secret of our disasters during this terrible Spanish war.

In the meantime, the occurrence of events so disastrous to us in the north, and so unfavourable in the south, produced, as might have been expected, an immense sensation throughout Europe. How great was the surprise, how intense the satisfaction which now spread amongst the innumerable enemies whom we had raised up against us on every side! England, especially, surrendered itself to what was almost the delirium of joy, whilst, in spite of the credulity of hatred, it scarcely dared to credit the news of our disasters, which began to spread throughout Europe. Germany, stupified by the spectacle which was presented under its very eyes, began to believe that we had been vanquished, but was slow to believe that we had been destroyed, and long awaited the arrival of the skeleton of the grand army before it could credit the declarations of the Russians, and comprehend that no skeleton even of it existed. Day by day, during the month of December, hope began to revive in the breast of the German nation; with hope, courage, and with courage a species of furious rage. All the secret societies which were in existence amongst its populations began to ferment and to prepare for a general rising, and through the midst of this excitement of popular feeling, Napoleon pursued his clandestine journey towards Paris, where he was to find the adversaries of his government filled with ill-omened joy, his flatterers overwhelmed with despair, honest men struck with grief and surprise, and clear-sighted men regretting what it had been impossible for them not to foresee. But even at this time neither our vanquished in their pride, nor our enemies in their hatred, nor our faithful citizens in the depth of their affliction, were capable of imagining the whole extent of our misfortunes. Yet the moment was but too close at hand, alas! when they were to be known universally.

BOOK XLVII.

THE COHORTS.

NAPOLEON'S rapid journey—Lays aside his incognito only at Warsaw and Dresden, and then to none but the French ministers—His sudden arrival in Paris at midnight on the 18th of December—Reception on the 19th of the ministers and great personages of the empire—Napoleon assumes the air of an offended sovereign who has cause to utter reproaches rather than to receive them, and affects to attach great importance to the conspiracy of General Malet—Solemn reception of the Senate and Council of State—Violent invective against the ideology—For the purpose of directing public attention to the Malet conspiracy and turning it from the Russian campaign, M. Frochot, prefect of the Seine, is accused before the council of state of having failed to display presence of mind on the day of the conspiracy—M. Frochot is condemned and deprived of his office—Napoleon impressed by the danger which would be incurred by his dynasty in case of his own death, takes care to make arrangements for the assumption of the regency by Maria Louisa—The Arch-chancellor Cambacérès is directed to prepare a senatus consultum for this purpose—The more important cares which absorb Napoleon's attention—Activity and administrative ability displayed by him in re-organizing his military forces—His projects for the levy of men, troops, and the re-organization of the corps which had been almost entirely destroyed during the Russian campaign—He receives news from the banks of the Vistula which convinces him that the state of the grand army is utterly hopeless—Joy of the Prussians upon receiving information of our disasters—This joy succeeded by an extraordinary outburst of hatred against us—Arrival of the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, and his project of presenting himself as the liberator of Germany—Active plotting of the German refugees collected around his person—The Prussian auxiliary corps abandons Marshal Macdonald and joins the Russians—Dangerous position of Marshal Macdonald at the head of some thousands of Polish troops in the midst of armed enemies—He succeeds in retreating in safety upon Tilsit and Labiau—The French head quarters are withdrawn from the Niemen to the Vistula—There remain at head quarters only nine or ten thousand troops of various nations and of all armies to resist the pursuit of the Russians—Murat quits the army, resigning the command to Prince Eugene—Effect produced throughout the whole of Germany by the defection of the Prussian auxiliary corps—Immense popularity of the Emperor Alexander—Embarrassment of the King of Prussia between the engagements contracted towards France, and the constraint exercised upon him by the public opinion of Germany—He withdraws into Silesia, and takes a species of neutral position, from which he offers to Napoleon certain proposals—Influence in Vienna of the general tending of public feeling—Position of the Emperor Francis, who had married his daughter to Napoleon, and of M. de Metternich who had advised the marriage—Their desire to modify the policy adopted by them of alliance with France, to bring about peace between France and Russia, and to take advantage of the state of affairs, to re-establish the independence of Germany—Their judicious advice to the Emperor of the French, and offers of Austrian mediation—The manner in which Napoleon receives the news of the disasters which had fallen upon him—He gives a new development to his plans for the reorganization of the French forces—Employment of the Cohorts—Levy of five hundred thousand men—Napoleon convokes a council for the purpose of submitting these measures to its consideration, and consulting with it respecting the position which it would be advisable to take with respect to Europe—He is unwilling to make peace until victory should have returned to him the position which he had lost—The majority of the council pronounces in favour of great armaments, and at the same time advises that negotiations should be immediately entered upon through the mediation of Austria—Napoleon accepts the mediation of Austria, but such bases of the arrangements of a peace as were little likely to conciliate this power—A response of a discouraging nature addressed to Prussia—Immense administrative activity displayed during these negotiations—State of public feeling in France—It deplores Napoleon's errors but is anxious that a great effort should be made to repulse the enemy, and that then peace should be immediately made—Manner in which Napoleon employs the five hundred thousand men placed at his disposal—Re-organization of the corps of the old army under Marshals Davoust and Victor—Creation by means of cohorts and provisional regiments, of four new corps, one upon the Elbe, under General Lauriston, two upon the Rhine, under Marshals Ney and Marmont, and one in Italy, under General Bertrand—Re-organization of the artillery and cavalry—Financial methods devised for supplying the expenses of these immense armaments—Napoleon, whilst occupied with these military preparations, is anxious to do something towards restoring public confidence, and proceeds to put an end to his quarrel with the pope—Removal of the pope from Savoy to Fontainbleau—Napoleon sends there the cardinals of Bazane and Maury, the archbishop of Tours, and the bishop of Nantes, for the purpose of preparing Pius VII. for an arrangement—The pope, already agreed with Napoleon with respect to the canonical institution, is disposed to accept an establishment at Avignon, provided he be not compelled to reside at Paris—When the preliminary arrangements are completed, Napoleon proceeds in person to Fontainbleau, and by the influence of his presence induces the pope to sign the concordat of Fontainbleau, which contains the resignation of the temporal power of the Holy See—Fêtes of Fontainbleau—Favours granted to the clergy—Recall of the exiled cardinals—The cardinals once more surrounding the pope, inspire him with regret for what he has done, and render him inclined to refuse to execute the concordat of Fontainbleau—Napoleon pretends not to observe this inclination—Content with what he has obtained, he convokes the legislative corps, and announces to it his resolutions—Progress of events in Germany—Increasing enthusiasm of the Germans—The King of Prussia, under the influence of his subjects, displays extreme irritation at Napoleon's refusals, and alienates himself more and more from our alliances—The Russians determine upon a forward march, for the purpose of compelling the King of Prussia to adopt decided measures against us—They advance upon the Oder, and compel Prince Eugene to evacuate successively Posen and Berlin—New retrograde movement of the French armies, and their definitive establishment on the line of the Elbe—The King of Prussia, separated from the French and surrounded by the Russians, joins them, and withdraws from his alliance with France—Treaty of Kalisch—Arrival of Alexander at Breslau, and his interview with Frederick William—Effect produced in Germany by the defection of Prussia—Insurrection of Hamburg—Partial defection of the court of Saxony, and withdrawal of this court to Ratisbon—Effect of the news of these events in Vienna—The people of Austria, strongly excited, begin to demand the declaration of war against France—The Austrian court, firmly resolved to regain its lost position and that of Germany, without the risk of a war, resists the excitement of popular feeling, and endeavours to bring France to some arrangement—Counsels of M. de Metternich—Napoleon, little troubled by these events, makes them the reason for demanding fresh levies—The manner in which he responds to the views of Austria—Proposes to this nation to destroy and take possession of Prussia—M. de Narbonne chosen to replace M. Otto at Vienna, and to render that capital favourable to Napoleon's policy—Napoleon before quitting Paris, determines to confer the regency upon Maria Louisa, and to delegate to her the interior government of France—His interview with the arch-chancellor Cambacérès upon this subject, and his ideas with respect to his family and the prospects of his son—Solemn ceremonial of the investment of Maria Louisa with the title of regent—Before his departure Napoleon has time to see the Prince of Schwarzenberg, to whose communications he scarcely listens—His perfect confidence—Chagrin of the empress—Departure for the army.

BOOK XLVII.

Whilst Europe, agitated by hope, fear, and hatred, asked what had become of Napoleon,—doubting whether he had perished or were still alive,—he was traversing in a sledge, in company with the Duke of Vicentia, the Grand Marshal Duroc, the Count Lobau, General Lefèvre-Desnoettes, and the mameluke Rustan, the vast plains of Lithuania, Poland, and Saxony, keeping himself completely hidden under thick wrappings of fur, since the slightest breach of his *incognito* might have drawn upon him some immediate and tragic catastrophe. The man who had so greatly excited the admiration of the populations of the countries which he now traversed, who had, in fact, been but lately the object of their superstitious submission, would at this moment have scarcely been able to escape destruction at their hands. In two places alone, Warsaw and Dresden, did he make himself known. At Warsaw, he paused to address the Poles yet once more, and to endeavour to induce them to make one great and final effort. The Duke of Vicentia, hurrying in his travelling costume to the Archbishop of Malines, who was greatly affected by the news of Krasnoé and the Berezina, and but little qualified to inspire the Poles with a courage to which he was himself a stranger, and having almost forced the door of his residence, being very unwilling to be recognised by the Archbishop's servants, appeared before him with an unexpectedness which was almost spectral, and filled him with astonishment, by declaring who he was, with whom he had come, and by conducting him to the modest hotel at which Napoleon had secretly alighted. M. de Pradt found Napoleon in a wretched dwelling, where he had difficulty in procuring even a fire, and attempting to conceal, beneath an affectation of mirth, the immense humiliation suffered by his pride. And how great, indeed, was the difference between his position at this moment and that which he had held six months before, when he had coolly issued instructions for the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, and the rearrangement of the European territory! But, nevertheless, Napoleon, strong in the firmness of his will, affected to be neither overwhelmed nor surprised, nor even seriously affected, by his misfortunes. "From the sublime to the ridiculous there is but a step," he said to the prelate-ambassador, with a forced smile. "Who has not suffered reverses?" he added. "It is true, that none have hitherto endured so great ones; but it is fit that my misfortunes should be in proportion to my fortunes, and for the rest, they will speedily be repaired." Then he went on to boast of the good state of his health, of his personal strength, and to repeat that he was formed to encounter extraordinary adventures; that a world in ruins was his natural abode, but that at the same time it was his province to restore it to order, and that he would speedily return to the Vistula, with three hundred thousand men, and exact vengeance from the Russians, for a victory which had been not the triumph of their arms but the work of nature. He then had the principal Polish ministers summoned to his presence, and, recommending them to observe the utmost secrecy with respect to his presence in Warsaw, endeavoured to inspire them with fresh courage, declaring that Poland should not be abandoned by him, and that he would speedily reappear in the midst of them at the head of a powerful army; adding, that the losses on the side of the Russians had been greater than those on his own, and that the essential difference between the power of France and Russia would be displayed within three months, in such a manner as to restore all that might have been lost.

After having thus attempted to restore some feeling of confidence to the Polish ministers, Napoleon resumed his journey across the snow, and having arrived in Dresden, alighted at the residence of his minister, M. de Serra, and having summoned thither the poor King of Saxony, who was filled with terror by the Emperor's strange reverse of fortune, assured him that he need suffer no alarm on account of the recent events, since they were but to be reckoned amongst the ordinary accidents of war, and that he would return within a few weeks, more powerful than ever, to secure for him, the King of Saxony, that kingdom of Poland which had ever been for the Saxon princes an old and cherished dream. Having succeeded in almost reassuring the King of Saxony, and desiring him to keep the secret, the preservation of which would be still necessary for forty-eight hours longer, he wrote to his father-in-law, informing him that he had returned safe and well, and full of hope and confidence; that the state of affairs was as had been described in the 29th bulletin; that he was about to assemble a formidable army on the

Vistula; that he continued to rely on the cordial alliance of Austria; that he was anxious that the Austrian corps should be promptly recruited, and that he wished that an Austrian diplomatist, of some consideration, should be immediately sent to Paris (the presence of the Prince of Schwarzenberg being necessary in Gallicia), since it would be necessary to enter upon the discussion of affairs of importance.

As the sledge would be of no further service in the country he had now to traverse, Napoleon borrowed the carriage of his minister, M. de Saint Aignan, and posted on to Paris. When he had reached the banks of the Rhine, he had no longer any reason to preserve his *incognito*, for if he was for France an absolute, an exacting, and even a tyrannical master, he was at the same time its general and defender, and could with perfect safety present himself before her. That his arrival might not cause too great a surprise, he sent forward an officer bearing a few lines, which were to be printed in the *Moniteur*, to the effect, that on the 3rd of December, he had assembled his generals at Smorgoni, conferred the command-in-chief on King Murat, for so long, only, as the cold should render military operations impossible; that he had passed through Warsaw and Dresden, and that he was about to return to Paris for the purpose of bestowing his attention on the affairs of the empire.

Napoleon followed very closely the bearer of the announcement of his arrival, and on the 18th December, at half-past eleven o'clock, he entered the Tuileries, to the surprise of his wife, who was by no means alienated by, but, nevertheless, was perfectly astonished at, the change in his fortunes, since, in uniting herself to him, she had believed that she was not only espousing a favourite of Fortune, but even, so to speak, Fortune itself. Napoleon tenderly embraced the Empress, and keeping up with her the comedy which he had played with every one else, repeated that the cold, and the cold alone, had been the cause of his extraordinary misadventure, and that it could be easily repaired, as would soon be seen.

On the morning of the following day, the 19th, he awaited his ministers, and the great personages of his court, the first interview with whom, under existing circumstances, could not but be a painful trial. But Malet's conspiracy, in conjunction with the baseness of the greater number of these persons, had provided him with a resource at this moment; for having freely denounced each other with respect to the errors committed in this affair, and being full of anxiety with regard to the manner in which Napoleon might now receive them, they scarcely thought of the five hundred thousand men who had perished, or the change in the fortunes of their country; and the effect was that Napoleon, who had, in justice, a heavy account to render, was able to assume the position of one who had only explanations to demand. He received, therefore, the persons composing his court and government with extreme hauteur—assuming a manner which was at once tranquil and severe; appearing to await explanations rather than to be under the necessity of affording them; treating the external affairs of the empire as of but little importance, in comparison with those of its internal administration; and, in a word, taking care, to question so that he might not be questioned. Certainly, he said, now addressing one group and now another of those present, certainly, the French army had met with misfortunes, and had even suffered to a considerable extent, but not more than the Russian army. That it should have done so, he contended, was only amongst those ordinary chances of war which should cause no astonishment, and which were for finely tempered spirits but opportunities for the display of the grandest qualities of the soul. Only those men, he said, who were capable of triumphing over all trials, whatever they might be, were worthy of esteem; and he then proceeded to pay a deserved tribute of praise to Marshal Ney, but in such a manner as to direct his observations towards the men who had neither the courage nor the health of this marshal, rather than to the circumstances of the late campaign. In the next place, treating the Russian war as a matter of quite secondary importance, he demanded of those around him, how it was that they had permitted themselves to be surprised, and, especially, how it was that when they supposed him to be dead, they had permitted themselves to believe so readily that the existing order of things was abolished, and had failed to resort immediately to the empress and the King of Rome?

To these well founded but imprudent questions, for it was quite certain that every one had regarded his death as the most natural of events, and the fall of his throne, after his death, as the most natural of revolutions, to these questions none of the persons interrogated knew how to answer,—save by assuming an humble appearance of acknowledgment that there was something inexplicable in the whole affair. No one dared to give the true answer—to declare that his empire was not established, and that although his genius had been able to endow it with an appearance of stability, such as is rarely possessed by new establishments, it could not be supposed that it would last longer than his own life, even if so long.

Whilst Napoleon was uttering these momentous questions, each seemed to signify by his eyes that the Minister of Police was the real culprit, the man who ought properly to expiate not only the conspiracy of Malet, but even, perhaps, the Russian campaign also. But when Napoleon, after the general and formal reception, conversed with each of those present in turn, he listened, both long and patiently, to the observations of the Duke of Rovigo, for whose courage, spirit, and sincerity, he had a certain sort of esteem; and the duke, whose manner had something of that hardy familiarity peculiar to old servants, who are accustomed to tell their masters what they may dislike to hear, but what it is good that they should know, entering thoroughly into the details of the transaction in question, succeeded in perfectly justifying himself in the eyes of his master, whose talent always enabled him to be just, when anger or calculation failed to render him the contrary. He acknowledged to the Duke of Rovigo that he alone had seen the real nature of the affair; and whilst adding that his arrest was a matter to be regretted, taking place, as it did, in the midst of a people given to raillery, he at the same time plainly showed that he was far from having any intention of disgracing him; and at the conclusion of the audience astonished every one, by bestowing the most evident marks of favour upon a minister, whom he could not but with great difficulty have replaced, and whom he certainly would not have replaced by M. Fouché, at a moment when fidelity in his servants would be their most precious quality.

Remaining alone with the Prince Cambacérès, and feeling some embarrassment in the presence of a man of such great good sense, he demanded of him what he thought of the terrible disasters of the Russian campaign, and whether they had not astonished him. The arch-chancellor acknowledged that he had been extremely surprised, but at the same time declared that he had long since began to believe, that so many wars must have some calamitous issue. Napoleon then proceeded to attribute all that had occurred to the sudden and extraordinary cold which had smitten his army, at a period so unusually early; as if a genius such as his own might not have anticipated the possibility of such an event as this, and as if, moreover, his enterprise were not, without any reference to the cold, entirely unfeasible by reason of the enormous distance which had to be traversed in its execution. He also attributed this tragic misadventure partly to the barbarous folly of Alexander, who, he declared, had done himself more injury by burning his own cities, than he, Napoleon, had any intention of causing him, since his only object had been to impose very acceptable conditions of peace; as if Alexander could be expected to manage the war so as to suit the calculations of his adversary, and as though he had reason to regret a course of conduct which had overthrown the man who wielded the destinies of Europe, and substituted himself in his place. Having discussed this subject, Napoleon reverted to the matter which he wished to make the great event of the day—Malet's conspiracy; declaring, and the observation became a sentiment in the mouths of all the high functionaries of the state, that he needed not only brave soldiers but also firm magistrates, as capable of dying for the defence of the throne as soldiers in defence of their country. He then spoke of the personal dangers he had run, of those which he would still have to incur in the course of re-establishing his affairs, of the necessity, therefore, of securing the succession to his son in the case of his own death, pointing out that the best means of attaining this end would be by crowning him as heir presumptive, a ceremony which often took place in the Western Empire, which would advantageously strike the popular imagination at the present time, and be a means of teaching the civil magistrates the language of duty.

The latter of these observations implied a threat directed against M. Frochot, the prefect of the Seine, who had certainly displayed, with respect to the Malet conspiracy, a credulity which had caused as much amusement as the arrést of the Duke of Rovigo, and whom, although he respected him, and was far from regarding him with any animosity, Napoleon was resolved to make one of the objects towards which he intended to draw public attention, that it might not brood too intently on the events of the Russian campaign. He determined, therefore, that M. Frochot should be tried by the council of state, and that all the great public bodies should visit the Tuileries for the purpose of presenting to him solemn addresses on his return, and the affairs of the moment. And, accordingly, on the 20th of December, the day following the morrow of his arrival, Napoleon received the senate, the council of state, and the great administrative bodies; the arch-chancellor Cambacérès having previously suggested to their several heads what should be the general terms of their addresses.

M. de Lacépède, president of the senate, who was one of those writers who are ever willing to devote their pens to the service of any one capable of liberally rewarding them, knew very well how to clothe the ideas suggested to him by the Prince Cambacérès, in that affected rhetoric of which he had learnt the usage in the school of the mediocre imitators of

Buffon. Commencing his address by congratulating Napoleon on his propitious return, and congratulating France on the occasion, because, in the absence of her Emperor, the beneficent influence of his genius on her fortunes became relaxed, he then proceeded to speak of the subject of the day, which was not the Russian campaign, but the Malet conspiracy. The men, he said, to whom the Emperor had pardoned their past crimes, had attempted to throw back the empire into the midst of that anarchy from which his genius had rescued it; but their chastisement had been prompt, and France, warned by their past attempt, had had fresh occasion for considering what it owed to the Napoleon dynasty, and had promised to remain unvaryingly faithful to it; whilst the senate, established to preserve it, was resolved to die in its defence. One passage of the president's address deserves some particular attention, and is as follows:—"At the commencement of our old dynasties, the monarch, more than once, ordered that every Frenchman, of whatever rank, should bind himself by a solemn oath to observe fealty to the heir to the throne; and sometimes, when the age of the young prince permitted it, a crown was placed upon his head as the pledge of his authority, and the symbol of the perpetuity of the supremacy of his family." The address concluded with a few words respecting the Russian expedition, alluding to the sole source of our misfortunes, the barbarous conduct of the Russians, who had burned their towns rather than permit them to fall into our hands; to the chagrin of Napoleon at the character which the war had borne, since his only object had been to obtain an equitable arrangement; and finally, to the courage of the French troops, who were ever ready to rally round their flags to conquer for their Emperor a glorious peace.

Napoleon, seated upon the throne, replied with a few words, which were of a totally different character to those of his wretched flatterers.

He certainly had very much at heart, he said, the glory and grandeur of France, but he considered it his duty, before all things, to secure her domestic tranquillity and happiness. To save her from the desolation of anarchy had ever been, and would ever be, the constant object of his efforts. He asked of heaven, therefore, the gift of courageous magistrates as earnestly as of heroic soldiers. The noblest form of death, he said, would be when a soldier falls on the field of honour, if the death of a magistrate, perishing in defence of his sovereign, the throne and the law, were not more glorious still. Our fathers had for a rallying cry, "*Le roi est mort—vive le roi!*" and in these few words are intimated all the principal advantages of the monarchy . . . . . Alluding to the wish which had been expressed by the senate, Napoleon said; "I have studied the disposition manifested by my people in various ages, I have reflected on what has taken place at various epochs of our history, and I continue to do so."

That portion of the imperial reply which referred to the Russian expedition was evidently carefully worded, so as not to aggravate the quarrel with the Russian Emperor. "The war which I wage with Russia," said Napoleon, "is a political war. I undertook it without animosity, and should gladly have spared her the evils which she has drawn upon herself. I might have armed against her a portion of her own population, by proclaiming the freedom of the serfs. This measure was frequently demanded of me, but I refused to adopt a course which would lead to the destruction of thousands of families." Having repeated his allegations that the catastrophe which had overwhelmed his army was solely attributable to the weather, and thanked the senate for their address, with considerable hauteur, he received the council of state, which, after referring to the Malet conspiracy, in terms very similar to those employed by the senate, proceeded to speak more freely than the senate on the subject of the late misfortunes, declaring that they had discovered in them something which filled them with confidence and admiration, since they had been the means of developing to the utmost an august genius, which had never appeared grander than when in the midst of these misadventures! . . . And, with respect to these misadventures, they were but a passing trial, for France was arming *en masse*; and, as the enemy could not fail to compare his forces with ours, a peace would speedily ensue. . . . The address concluded with the usual highly laudatory remarks. The reply given by Napoleon to this address has become celebrated. He was touched, he said, by the sentiments displayed in it. If France displayed so much affection for her son, it was because she was convinced of the benefits of monarchy . . . He then added these famous words:—"It is to that ideology, to these gloomy metaphysics, which, endeavouring to prosecute subtle investigations into first causes, are eager to make themselves the foundation of the national legislation, to which we ought to attribute all the misfortunes of France . . . From hence arises the regime of those men of blood who proclaimed the principle of the insurrection as a duty, who paid court to the people by inviting it to assume a sovereignty for the exercise of which it was unfitted; who destroyed the sanctity of the laws, and the respect due to them, by making them depend, not on the sacred principles of justice, but simply on the will of an assembly, composed of men entirely ignorant of the first principles of legislation, or administration of politics, or the art of war . . . Those who are summoned to the task of regenerating a state, should follow an entirely different order of principles, and be at all times ready to perish in defence of the sovereign, the throne, and the laws."

What a spectacle was this exhibition of hatred to philosophy; what a spectacle to display before the eyes of the most intelligent people of Europe! Because, forsooth, the French army had been foolishly compromised in Russia; with the French army, the imperial throne; and, what was far worse, the greatness of the French nation—philosophy was to bear the blame! Was it philosophy, also, which, at that very moment, held the unfortunate Pius VII. captive at Savoy, and, day after day, plunged hundreds of priests into dungeons? And it was a man of prodigious intellect who could say these things in the face of France and the world, in the very presence of events most calculated to contradict him. Such is the effect of faults, and especially of great faults! Beside the direct evil which they cause, they also have a tendency to weaken the judgment of those who commit them, to such a degree, that genius itself wears the undignified aspect of angry infancy.

The real object, however, of these proceedings was to cover, as far as possible, the immense echo of the catastrophe of the Russian campaign, and to prepare for the immolation of an honest man, the sacrifice of whom was intended as a means of attracting public attention from events of more importance. The council of state was, in fact, assembled on the very day after the occurrence of the puerile solemnities above described, and charged with the examination of the conduct of M. Frochot. Of the result of such a proceeding there could be little doubt; and M. Frochot was convicted by each section of the council, not of treason, of which he was declared incapable, but of a want of presence of mind: and, on this ground, Napoleon was requested to remove him from his office. And there can be no doubt that this was a proper measure; for M. Frochat had certainly failed to act judiciously on the occasion of the Malet conspiracy; but, under any other circumstances, the government, without consulting the council of state, would simply have pronounced his deprivation on its own authority, and without adding the humiliation of a solemn judgment.

Leaving these sad scenes, we must now follow Napoleon to other occupations more worthy his genius, and better calculated to repair his faults. And, indeed, whilst he had appeared to be entirely employed with the matters described above, he had been in reality occupied incessantly in a more noble work, and had never before displayed so eminently his grand qualities as an intelligent and active administrator. On quitting the army at Smorgoni, he had failed to imagine the true extent of the loss which it had suffered, supposing, in fact, that it only amonnted to two-fifths, and that although all the cavalry horses were destroyed, there still remained from twenty-five to thirty thousand troopers, whom it would be easy to supply with chargers, purchased in Poland, Germany, and France. He knew that the artillery was almost wholly destroyed, both as respected men and matériel, but he knew that he could procure abundant supplies of the latter from his arsenals, and France herself would afford him sufficient numbers of excellent draught horses. Before marching for Moscow, he had ordered the levy of the conscription of 1813, which had arrived in October with remarkable exactness, and filled the depôts with one hundred and forty thousand troops, who had already received three months' drilling, and were quite ready to recruit the battalions which were about to re-enter France. Napoleon had a year since formed a hundred cohorts of national guards, which, by the very nature of their constitution, consisted of the most vigorous persons of the population; and now, by contriving that some of these should demand the honour of being permitted to join the grand army (for by the laws of their institution they were not compelled to serve beyond the frontiers), and by having this wish consecrated by a decree of the senate, he procured an addition to his army of a hundred thousand men in the prime of life. He had, therefore, already two hundred and forty thousand men at his disposal, who might be marched in one month on the Rhine, in two months on the Oder, and in three months on the Vistula; and if, as Napoleon at this time believed, there should remain at the worst only two hundred thousand troops, of the six hundred thousand which had composed the grand army, he would have at his command four hundred and fifty thousand men already in line, a force that would be raised to five hundred thousand by the addition of the contingents due from the allies, and would be very sufficient to overwhelm the Russians, who had suffered almost as greatly as ourselves from the severity of the weather, and who were less able than ourselves to repair their losses. In the meantime, his foresight had already provided the means of checking the advance of the enemy, during the three months which would be required for the completion of his arrangements. On his march from Smolensk to Moscow, he had ordered an excellent corps of from fifteen to eighteen thousand men, taken from the old regiments of the army of Italy, to proceed from Verona to Berlin, and it was now there under General Grenier. He had also formed, under Marshal Augereau, a corps charged with the occupation of the line of the Elbe. Of this corps, a division, that of General Durutte, had been sent to General Reynier on the Bug, and had half perished; another, under General Loison, had been sent to Wilna to meet the grand army, and still existed when Napoleon quitted Smorgoni. Its two other divisions, those of Heudelet and Lagrange, remained intact, and had proceeded to Dantzic. By joining these troops with those which had come from Italy, a total force of forty-five thousand fresh troops would be formed, and would constitute an effective support for the retreating army. When Napoleon had quitted Smorgoni, the guard still numbered seven or eight thousand men, Victor's corps was still in existence, Loison's divison had not been engaged, and forty thousand men returned from Moscow, of whom the number would be daily increased by the addition of disbanded soldiers. He had, moreover, on the left, Macdonald's corps, consisting of seven or eight thousand Poles, and fifteen thousand Prussians; and on the right Reynier's fifteen thousand Saxon and French troops, and Schwarzenberg's twenty-five thousand Austrians. Finally, he had at his disposal Poniatowski's corps, which had been sent into cantonments for the purpose of recruiting. M. de Bassano, who had been directed on his return from Wilna to proceed to Warsaw and Berlin, brought assurances that Poland was about to rise en masse, and that Prussia swore to remain faithful, and was even disposed, if assisted with certain supplies of money, to increase the contingent; and that Prince Schwarzenberg, as well as all the other Austrians with whom he had come in contact, whilst full of eagerness for an immediate peace, had nevertheless promised to remain faithful to the French alliance. Supposing, therefore, that only forty thousand men should return to Wilna of those who had penetrated into the interior of Russia, by adding to them the forty-five thousand fresh troops which, under Augereau and Grenier, guarded the Elbe, the twenty thousand which would return from Riga under Macdonald, and the forty thousand which, under Reynier and Schwarzenberg, would return from the environs of Minsk, Napoleon might hope to assemble one hundred and fifty thousand men at least, who would probably be increased to the number of two hundred thousand by the successive arrival of stragglers, and be enabled, therefore, successfully to oppose the march of the Russians, of whom certainly no more than one hundred and fifty thousand could have escaped the rigours of the winter. By adding to these the two hundred thousand troops, the two hundred and forty thousand who would proceed to the depôts on the Rhine within the next two or three months, together with the fresh levies which France could not fail to furnish in the presence of danger, Napoleon might reasonably hope to be able to retain the Prussians and Austrians in his alliance, to drive back the Russians beyond the Niemen, recover continental peace without too great sacrifices, and even, perhaps, render it complete by a maritime peace also.

But, unfortunately, from the 5th of December to the beginning of January, a change had taken place in everything, both military and political. From the moment of Napoleon's departure, the army, as has been previously described, fell into a state of the most frightful dissolution. The same fate had overwhelmed the detachments which formed the garrison of Wilna. The Saxons under Reynier, and the Austrians under Schwarzenberg, having remained in the environs of Minsk, in the want of any precise orders, Wilna had been completely uncovered, and it had been found necessary to evacuate in disorder, and in such haste as compelled the abandonment even of the clothing and provisions with which its magazines abounded. Murat, being no longer obeyed or capable of commanding, had fled from Wilna in the middle of the night, and had lost the army treasury at the foot of the mountain which had to be traversed on first setting out from the town. At Kowno, collecting a few officers, and a marshal, and a thousand soldiers, he had directed Ney and Gérard to dispute for a moment the enemy's passage at the Niemen; but these two heroic men, having been left almost by themselves, had been compelled to fly to Kœnigsberg.

Other misfortunes awaited us at Kœnigsberg: for the inhabitants of this city cherishing against us, in common with all Prussians, a violent hatred, had no sooner seen Murat arriving alone, the guard reduced to some hundreds of men, and the wreck of our army to consist only of a few wretched fugitives, flying over the ice of the Niemen before the pursuit of the Cossacks, than they displayed the utmost joy and exultation, and would doubtless have risen in insurrection, had they not been held in check by one of Augereau's four divisions, the division Heudelet, which, consisting of seven or eight thousand serviceable troops, was very capable of enforcing respect, and protected the twelve thousand sick and wounded who filled the hospitals, and the multitude of generals and other officers who had come, as had Generals

Lariboisière and Eblé, to Kœnigsberg, to die of the fever *de congelation.* The inhabitants of this city were unable as yet, therefore, to rise against us; but resolving to do so at the first approach of the Russians, they employed themselves in the meantime in extorting fr mour unfortunate troops all the money they possessed, in return for the most scanty supplies of provisions or clothing. At the same time, nevertheless, there were amongst the inhabitants of Old Prussia, men of the greatest humanity, who, notwithstanding their severe patriotism, respected our troops as brave men in misfortune, and soothed the miseries of their oppressors.

An event now took place which was of extreme importance, and proved to be a great addition to our reverses. Marshal Macdonald, having with him the Polish division Grandjean, consisting of seven or eight thousand excellent and faithful troops, followed at some distance by the auxiliary Prussian corps, had long awaited in vain at Riga orders to retreat, and at length, on finding the Russians advancing on all sides, had, on his own responsibility, retreated towards Tilsit, still followed by the Prussians, but so slowly, now on this pretext and now on that, that the Marshal had become, with how much reason will presently be seen, very distrustful of their fidelity.

The Russians, after the passage of the Berezina, had continued their movement; Wittgenstein, with the army of the Dwina, advancing upon Kœnigsberg, for the purpose of intercepting if possible the corps under Marshal Macdonald, whilst Tchitchakoff with the army of Moldavia, pursued the wrecks of our army towards Kowno, and Kutusof afforded the principal army some repose at Wilna. The Russians had suffered as much as we had from the cold, but very little from want, and being supported by joy at our misfortunes, and the hope of our total destruction, and being retained in their ranks by regular supplies of rations, had reached their present positions in a good state of discipline and full of ardour, although numbering only one hundred thousand in place of the three hundred thousand men who had filled their ranks at the commencement of the campaign. The Emperor Alexander, on receiving information of our disasters had hastened to Wilna, and having overwhelmed with well-deserved rewards Marshal Kutusof, had assumed the direction of affairs which would henceforth be as much political as military. Judging from conjectures which he could not fail to form, and some indirect communications received from Prussia, and even from Austria, he was tolerably certain that the adoption of a suitable line of conduct on his part, would result in alienating from the French alliance Prussia, at least, and probably Austria; and he immediately adopted, therefore, the language which was best suited to the existing state of affairs. He had not come, he said, to make conquests in Germany, or even in Poland, but to hold out the hand of friendship to the oppressed inhabitants of Germany, whether people or kings, bourgeois or nobles, Prussians or Austrians, Saxons or Bavarians, to aid them, to relieve them from an intolerable yoke, and to return to each, as soon as this work should have been accomplished, what belonged to each, taking nothing for himself, but what he had been unjustly deprived of. He proclaimed a general amnesty for all the acts committed against the Russian government, and even spread abroad an intimation, that if the Poles were anxious for the restoration of their nationality, he was quite ready to gratify this inclination, by forming Poland into a separate kingdom, of which he would himself be the clement monarch, ever ready to promote liberal and civilizing institutions. Alexander's natural keen-sightedness and benevolence of disposition, sufficiently inclined him to adopt this policy, and had they not, the Germans, who now thronged around him, could scarcely have failed to do so. The Prussian minister Stein, the celebrated author, Kotzebue, and many other Germans, men of letters or military men, constantly uttering the most liberal sentiments, besieged Alexander with entreaties that he would proclaim the independence of Germany, and boldly march forward, since every part of Germany which should be freed from the domination of the French, would instantly become his ardent and enthusiastic ally. This course, however, was opposed by the veteran Kutusof, whose circumspection, justified by events, had become excessive; and by some Russian officers, who, keenly sensible of the exhausted state of their army, feared lest it should fall to pieces in the same manner as the French army, and were eager, therefore, to halt and secure a peace with France, which at this moment might be obtained under very advantageous terms. But Alexander, profoundly wounded by having been the object of Napoleon's contempt, and inordinately elated by having become his vanquisher, now aspired to a still higher rôle, and desired to become his destroyer, and the liberator of Europe. He authorised, therefore, the minister Stein and his compatriots to traverse the reconquered Prussian provinces, spreading abroad his promise, to effect, without delay, the emancipation of Germany.

In the meantime, General Diebitch, chief of Wittgenstein's staff, followed Marshal Macdonald, step by step, in the hope of depriving him of the Prussian contingent; and, at length, after having carefully fomented the dissensions which were continually taking place between its commander, General d'York, and Marshal Macdonald, he proposed to the former to pass over to the Russians, under the pretence of being compelled to capitulate; upon which, General d'York, who was a good patriot, but very fearful of compromising himself with his court, transmitted to it an account of the communications which had taken place between himself and the Russian General. Failing, however, to obtain any reply from his court, which had been thrown into a state of great embarrassment by his communication, he finally adopted a decided course, and, permitting himself to be surrounded by the enemy, on the 30th of December, in accordance, as he said, with circumstances of a military nature, which left him no alternative, he signed a convention of neutrality, on the part of his corps d'armée; which was only to be of force, however, on being ratified by the Prussian monarch. The real meaning of the convention was very apparent; and it was, in fact, an agreement that the Prussian corps should, after the lapse of a few days, be incorporated with the Russian army. A detachment of this corps, which, under General Massenbach, had followed Marshal Macdonald, and proceeded as far as Tilsit, on receiving information of the convention, departed from the place secretly, during the night, and rejoined the main body, by which it was viewed with the greatest enthusiasm.

The writer of these pages, of these sad details, is a Frenchman, and dares declare himself, without fear of contradiction, to be most deeply interested in the greatness of his country; but yet he cannot blame those German patriots, who, serving unwillingly in a cause which was not their own, hastened to aid a cause which they believed to be that of their country, and which had unhappily become so through the errors of the man who was then our ruler.

The effect of the defection of General d'York was instantaneous; and, from the Vistula to the Rhine, he was called the saviour of Germany. The Baron de Stein, and his companions, hastened to offer him their congratulations, and to urge him to march upon Kœnigsberg, to assemble there the states of Old Prussia, proclaim the independence of Prussia, and declare that the king, being under the coercion of the French, should no longer be obeyed. But General d'York was unwilling to take any such precipitate steps; and, although he consented to march to Kœnigsberg, determined to await there the arrival of orders from the Prussian court.

In the meantime, Murat had paused at Kœnigsberg with a crowd of generals and officers without troops, of whom some were dying, and the remainder, exasperated by suffering, indulged in language which was almost seditious. Marshal Ney, in spite of his heroism, and of the caresses lavished upon him by Napoleon, could no longer restrain himself, and openly spoke out against the imprudent chief, who had, he said, precipitated the French army into an abyss of destruction. And Berthier, confined to his bed by sickness, and worn out with chagrin at the absence of Napoleon, knew not what counsel to give with respect to a state of affairs which was perfectly unexampled. When, therefore, news was received of the defection of the Prussian corps, and the hostile demonstrations against us, which it excited amongst the inhabitants of Kœnigsberg were perceived, it was resolved to quit Kœnigsberg, and to abandon the line of the Niemen, which being frozen over, had ceased to be a defence. Marshal Ney was still charged with conducting the rear-guard, consisting of the division Heudelet, and the two thousand men which remained of the division Loison; and the march was commenced upon Braunsberg, Elbing, and Thorn. Marshal Macdonald, who was at Tilsit, twenty leagues from Kœnigsberg, surrounded by enemies, earnestly demanded that his arrival should be awaited, as by that means a force would be formed amounting to fifteen or sixteen thousand men, and sufficiently strong to enforce respect. But his letters were disregarded, and the march was continued until the 15th of January; the wrecks of the old army proceeding in detachments of fifty or a hundred men, who compelled the inhabitants of the districts through which they passed, to give them provisions when they were the stronger, but died of hunger or cold when they had neither strength or money sufficient to enable them to procure the necessaries of life. Towards the middle of January they arrived on the banks of the Vistula, and threw themselves into the fortified posts which Napoleon had supplied abundantly with provisions. General Rapp had preceded the army of Dantzic, and was surrounded by a mingled mass of five or six thousand troops of all nations and all arms. Murat sent thither the Polish division Grandjean, that of General Heudelet, and all that remained of the division Loison; and Rapp had thus at his disposal twenty-five thousand men, well provisioned, and he determined to defend with them the fortifications of Dantzic to the last extremity.

On the reiterated advice of Marshal Davoust, places on the Vistula were named as rallying points for the various corps of the old army—and were Dantzic, Thorn, Marienwerder, and Mariebourg. The head-quarters were established at Thorn; but after having been there two or three days, Murat thought that it would be impossible to remain there; for, after the division Heudelet, Loison, and Grandjean, had been thrown into the fortress of Dantzic, there remained only ten thousand men to accompany the staff, and to defend the immense number of flags which had been collected, and were carried along with it for safety: these ten thousand men consisting of eighteen hundred recruits, who had been met en route, and were intended for Davoust's corps; twelve hundred d'élite Neapolitans; four thousand Bavarians, who had recently set out from their country; and, finally, three thousand men of the imperial guard, who had been gradually rallied since the departure from Kœnigsberg. As such a body as this, therefore, could not defend the Vistula, which was now frozen over, as were all the rivers of Poland and Russia, or even defend Murat and his staff, should the Russians, under Tchitchakoff, united with those under Wittgenstein, endeavour to surround them, Murat proceeded to Posen, situated equally distant from the Vistula and the Oder. And thus, the whole of Old Prussia, and the whole of Poland, were evacuated.

A fresh event was now to increase the excitement of the German populations. The mistake had been committed, in spite of the advice to the contrary of Marshal Macdonald, of leaving a garrison, consisting almost entirely of German troops, at Pillau, a little maritime fortress, defending the entrance of the Frische-haff; and it had now declared against us, amidst the vehement applause of the Prussians, and to the great satisfaction of the English, who hastened to penetrate into the Frische-haff with their ships of war, and soon afterwards introduced the merchant convoys, by which means the inhabitants of Old Prussia procured not only the gratification of being freed from their conquerors, but, also, that of being able to engage once more in that traffic in colonial produce from which they had been so long debarred.

Whilst the state of affairs on our left was thus unsatisfactory, the news received from our right, on the upper Vistula, showed that they were in that direction, also, equally disastrous. General Reynier and Prince Schwarzenberg, seeing no advantage in remaining any longer at Minsk, had marched upon Warsaw. General Reynier, indeed, had wished to engage the enemy with the Saxon and French troops under their command; but Prince Schwarzenberg had earnestly dissuaded him from this course, declaring that to attempt to carry on warfare during the winter would simply be the means of suffering useless losses; and that it would be better to await at Warsaw the arrival of the forces which Napoleon could not fail to send there in the spring. Whilst giving this advice, the Prince had fallen back himself; thereby compelling Reynier to do so likewise; and receiving at head-quarters the visits of Russian officers, under the pretence that he could not avoid them, he permitted himself to engage in discussions respecting an armistice; and without precisely betraying Napoleon, whose marriage he had negotiated, and to whom he owed his marshal's baton, he prepared to act in conformity with the change which he foresaw was about to take place in the policy of the Austrian cabinet. At the same time, he constantly advocated the conclusion of a peace; being sincerely anxious for this, both as an Austrian and as a favourite of the French court.

Brave, as was Murat's heart, his feeble head could not long endure such a state of affairs as this. No artillery could daunt him, but he trembled at the idea of losing his crown. A thousand sinister images thronged his excited brain. Sometimes he saw the populations of Italy, excited by the priests and the English, rising up in insurrection, and overthrowing the Bonapartist thrones throughout the country; sometimes he saw himself abandoned by Napoleon, whose affection for him was but cold—abandoned, as the sacrifice by which he might obtain peace. From the moment that these images obtained possession of his brain, he lost his *sang-froid*, and was only anxious to depart for the purpose of endeavouring to save that crown, which had been the object of such eager desire, and the reward of so much heroism. His distrust had become so great, that he had begun to fear that even his wife was implicated in Napoleon's supposed designs against him; and this was a new motive for his anxiety to return to Naples. Tormented by these suspicions, and overwhelmed by the disastrous news which continued to arrive, hour after hour, of the retreat of the army, he suddenly summoned Prince Berthier and M. Daru to an interview, and communicating to them his intention of immediately quitting the army, on the ground that the state of his health rendered this step necessary, he resisted all their entreaties to him to alter his determination, and informed them that he should send for Prince Eugene to assume the chief command.

When Prince Eugene arrived, both his modesty and his indolence induced him to urge Murat to remain with the army, but failing in this endeavour, he at length reluctantly consented to accept a duty which he considered far above his powers, and to remain at Posen, with the ten thousand men of all nations, already enumerated, entreating General Reynier, and Prince Berthier, to preserve their position at Warsaw, which covered his own position on the right; and considering it certain, that on his left the Russians would delay some time at least, before Thorn and Dantzic, he ordered General Grenier with his eighteen thousand men, and Augereau with the nine thousand or ten thousand men of the division Lagrange, to hold himself in readiness to advance to his aid, immediately circumstances should render it necessary.

These then were the sole remaining fragments of what had once been the grand army! twenty-five thousand men at Dantzic, ten thousand in the second rate fortresses of the Vistula, fifteen thousand of all nations at Posen with the staff, a few Saxon and French troops at Warsaw, and finally, at Berlin, Grenier and Augereau, with twenty-eight thousand men, who could only be removed at the risk of giving rise to a general insurrectionary movement throughout Germany. These were all that remained, instead of the two hundred thousand troops, whom Napoleon believed to be still established on the Niemen, disputing with the Russians the possession of Kœnigsberg, Kowno, and Grodno, and awaiting the arrival of the three hundred thousand fresh troops, to organize whom he had committed the grave fault of abandoning companions in arms whom he had plunged into an abyss of dangers. At the same time it must not be forgotten, that had he remained on the Niemen, he would have allowed himself to be separated from Paris by insurgent Germany, and by allowing himself to be separated from the seat of his widely extended government, would have been guilty of a great political and administrative error. And this dilemma, this painful necessity of committing some great fault, was the just punishment of errors already committed as great as they were irreparable.

And at this moment, the political consequences of those errors were as calamitous as their military consequences. The chief of the German exiles, Baron de Stein, was with General d'York at Kœnigsberg, convoking the estates of the province, calling the whole population to arms, and employing, without reserve, the pecuniary resources of the country. A spirit of universal devotion responded to these proceedings, and thousands of pamphlets, proclamations, and popular songs helped to excite against us the popular indignation. Germany had been filled, during some years past, with secret societies, of which the principal was one bearing the name of the *Union of Virtue*, (Tugend-Bund). A spirit of enthusiastic love for Germany, a conviction that, once united into a single empire, it would be invincible, and instead of being by turns the victim of the states of the north, and then of the south, would be their lawgiver, and be the first nation in the world; the necessity, therefore, of no longer considering the German peoples, as Austrians, Bavarians, Saxons, Prussians or Hamburgians, as princes, nobles, bourgeois, or peasants, as Lutherans or Catholics, but simply as Germans; everyone and all ready to die for their country; and the duty of ever giving the preference to that which might be of German origin, whether in works of industry, matters of custom, or literature. Such were the ideas and sentiments, which it was the purpose of those societies to propagate, and which they had propagated with the most extraordinary success. Nor were they less successful in now carrying from Kœnigsberg to the extremities of Germany, not only those patriotic emotions which were natural and intense, but also advice respecting the course which was now to be pursued, and which was to the effect that everywhere the German populations should rise in arms, devoting both their persons and their possessions to the national cause; that they should ally themselves with the Emperor Alexander, deliver the kings who were in bondage to the French alliance, and depose as no longer worthy of reigning, those who were capable of renouncing it, and yet still remained faithful to it. *Vive Alexander! vive les Cosaques!* were the cries which everywhere arose from the midst of the general excitement; and there were even young Germans who in the fervour of their patriotism adopted the fashion of the Cossack beards; but what is especially worthy of remark, is the fact that the princes and nobles themselves, helped to excite this movement, which, despite its monarchical loyalty, was in reality essentially democratic, resembling in this respect, the movement in Spain, the exciting causes of which had been partly a passionate love of liberty, and partly loyalty towards the captive king.

We may well understand how great at this time were the surprise, embarrassment, and perplexity of the unhappy King of Prussia and his principal minister, M. de Hardenberg. This just and wise monarch, in fact, had never, since the commencement of his reign, ceased to be involved in positions which could not fail to be, in the highest degree obnoxious to an upright and prudent man. Compelled in 1806 to place himself in opposition to the French, and having almost lost his crown by so doing, he had resolved in 1812 to avoid a similar fault, and had allied himself with France, at the same time endeavouring to persuade the Russian Emperor to approve of the course which he had adopted, through the mouth of M. de Knesebeck, who, whether authorised or not, had carried his excuses to the extent of duplicity towards France. And, now, after having believed that he had been far wiser in 1812 than in 1816, he found himself compelled either to be guilty of a breach of faith towards France, or to fight in the aid of France which oppressed him, against the friends who offered to become his liberators. Nor was M. de Hardenberg, who, equally with himself, had passed from a hostile policy towards France to one of alliance with her, less a prey to all the perplexities which beset the king; these being increased in his own case by anxieties which arose out of his personal position. Should the progress of events condemn the policy of alliance with France, the Prussian monarchy might readily be excused as having merely committed an error of judgment; but the case was far different with M. de Hardenberg, whose conduct in the matter would be imputed to ambition, and to that basest species of ambition, which leads a statesman into intrigues with the enemies of his country.

The first step taken by Frederic William upon hearing the defection of General d'York, was to exclaim against such a breach of faith. He was equally averse to becoming compromised with France, which he greatly feared, and to being regarded as disloyal, for he was, in fact, a thoroughly honest man, and took pride in being regarded as such. He hastened, therefore, to disavow to the course adopted by General d'York to M. de Saint Marsan, the French minister, who readily permitted himself to be persuaded of the Prussian monarch's fidelity, and consoled and charmed him by all those flatteries which most delighted him, being expressions of confidence in the uprightness of his nature. He promised to make a public disavowal of what had been done by General d'York, and to have him tried before a military commission; promises which M. de Saint Marsan carried away as a species of trophy, and regarded as useful replies to the declamations of the enemies of France.

When these promises become known, the German patriots were excessively irritated against the king, against M. de Hardenberg, and the policy of the Prussian cabinet, and everywhere declared, as formerly our emigrants, that the king was not free. His ministers indicated, that they thought the step he had taken somewhat too decided, and after having disavowed General d'York's proceeding, he refused to publish his disavowal.

Whilst the popular excitement in Berlin was at its height, the French troops quartered in this capital, preserving their accustomed pride, replied to expressions of German patriotism by others which were equally provocative of hostility, and were in the highest degree imprudent, irritating the Prussians, and after in the first place terrifying

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their monarch, leading him into a course of subtle policy. He did not as yet entertain the idea of abandoning the French alliance, but all his thoughts were directed to the means of becoming more independent of her, and of gaining a neutral position between her and her enemies, from which he might be able to aid in the arrangement of an advantageous peace.

The only means by which these views could be realised, were, the departure of the King from Berlin, towards which the Russian troops were already marching, in their pursuit of the French troops in their retreat, and the establishment of his court in some town in Silesia, such as Breslau, for example; and, also, the organisation of vast bodies of troops; a measure calculated in the highest degree to please the German patriots, who flattered themselves that they should be able to turn those troops against the French, whilst the latter could make no objection to their being raised, since they had themselves demanded that Prussia should double her contingent.

The Prussian King proposed to supply the expenses of those armaments, by demanding of Napoleon the price of the matériel of all kinds, which he had supplied to the French army. It had been agreed, in fact, at the time of the last treaty of alliance, that should the value of this matériel exceed the forty-eight millions still owing from Prussia, the surplus should be paid to that government in money; and as the Prussian ministry calculated that there was such a surplus in favour of Prussia to the amount of forty-six millions, the king supposed that he would have sufficient available funds to triple his army, raising it from forty thousand to one hundred and twenty thousand men, and be in a position, in conjunction with Austria, to force the belligerent parties to accept reasonable terms of peace. As France, from being a creditor had become a debtor, she would have, by virtue of former treaties, to surrender immediately the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, and the Prussian King would thus, he expected, find himself established in Silesia, at the head of one hundred and twenty thousand men, raised without any expense to his kingdom, and supported by all the fortresses of the Oder.

M. de Hatzfeldt, sent to Paris to clear the Prussian court from the suspicion of any complicity with General d'York, was directed to submit to the French government the following propositions:—The removal of the Prussian court to Breslau, that it might be removed from the theatre of hostilities; the extension of the Prussian armaments, for more effectually serving the interests of the alliance; and, finally, the restoration of the fortresses on the Oder, for the purpose of fulfilling the existing treaties, and conciliating Prussian popular feeling. He was at the same time strictly enjoined to avoid any discussion on a singular proposition which Napoleon, on his return from Russia, had indirectly addressed to the Prussian court, to the effect, that France and Prussia might be more closely allied, by the marriage of the heir to the Prussian throne with a French princess; and to declare very plainly, that if the propositions, of which he was the bearer, were not accepted, Prussia would consider herself free from all engagements she might have entered into with France.

The Austrian court was involved in perplexities exactly similar to those of the Prussian court, but it had the advantage of being surrounded by a less excited population, of being encumbered by less distracting scruples, and of being endowed with a larger share of ability. After having maintained with France four obstinate wars, and displayed an almost incredible perseverance in hatred, the Austrian Emperor had at length fallen into the belief that he had been deceived, and that it would be better to form an alliance with France than to court destruction by contending with her. The conduct of the various courts of Europe was of such a nature, as to relieve him of all scruples with regard to the adoption of such a course, and in accordance with the advice of M. de Metternich, he had become not only the ally, but the father-in-law also, of the French Emperor. It was now a question whether Austria had not a second time fallen into error, and renounced a hostile policy, just when it must have produced most advantageous results. The Emperor Francis, however, who was a clear headed, tranquil-minded man, and a good father, only saw in the catastrophe of Moscow, a means of making France appreciate more highly the Austrian alliance, of imposing peace on the belligerent party, of rendering Austria more powerful and Germany more independent. At the same time M. de Metternich, who had founded all his personal elevation on one course of policy, now resolved to make it rest on another, which had, moreover, the recommendation of conducing to the interest of his country. But although according to the last news from Poland, Napoleon appeared to have been more thoroughly vanquished than had been at first supposed, he might still be able to inflict terrible punishment and even probably recover his whole power, and it was necessary, therefore, to act with prudence; passing from the one line of policy to the other, in such a manner that the safety of Austria, the dignity of its Emperor, and the reputation of his minister, might be equally secured from injury. M. de Metternich at once perceived, with rare political keen-sightedness, the advantages to be derived from the existing state of affairs, and he resolved not only to redeem his own fortunes from the consequences of a fatal step, but to resuscitate also those of Austria and Germany, whilst still remaining faithful to France, of whom he was really, as well as avowedly, the ally. Thoroughly agreed on all points, with the Emperor Francis, he immediately began to carry out, with promptitude and fairness, resolutions which had been well considered and unreservedly adopted. Simultaneously he commenced the organisation of the Austrian forces, the establishment of a secret understanding with Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony, speaking to them all of a peace to be concluded on terms favourable to Germany, and then a discussion with France, respecting the advantageousness of an immediate peace. M. de Bubna, who had been sent to Paris in accordance with Napoleon's demand that there should be present at his court some Austrian diplomatist of mark, was directed to declare most earnestly the fidelity of Austria to the French alliance, but at the same time strongly to recommend peace in the name of Europe, who had need of it, in the name of France herself, to whom it could not be less necessary, and further, to hint, that if peace were not speedily arranged, the latter country might speedily find the whole world in arms against her; giving this information in a tone which, whilst free from any appearance of being a threat, should, nevertheless, give it an air of proceeding from a profound conviction of its truth, and subsequently afford reason to Austria for renouncing an ally deaf to all wise counsels. M. de Bubna, was even positively directed to offer the intervention of Austria, for the word mediation was not, as yet, considered appropriate, with the various belligerent powers.

Such were the communications which, during the first days of January 1813, simultaneously demanded the attention of Napoleon's genius. In the place of formidable fragments of the grand army, united on the Niemen, and holding the Russians in check, from Grodno to Kœnigsberg, awaiting the three hundred thousand fresh troops, who, he had declared were soon to join them, he now saw only a few scattered troops falling back upon the Oder, without power to check the enemy at any point, and as ominously threatened by the Germans in the rear, as they were relentlessly pushed by the Russians in front. At the same time his ears were filled by the enthusiastic shouts of Germany, ready at any moment to rise up against him, and found himself surrounded by allies, who had asserted their fidelity, as a matter of form, whilst they gave counsels which were but conditions under another form, and not only afforded him reason to doubt their own good faith, but made him perceive that they suspected that France, weary of the bloodshed of her children and of despotism, was equally unfaithful.

Napoleon's heart was a soldier's heart by nature, and, as such, capable of resisting the influences of any change of fortune; but he was now deeply affected. Nevertheless, he was resolved that none should perceive the emotions of his soul, and that, under an air of icy indifference, should remain hidden its agitations, caused by the influence of the sinister presentiments, or blind illusions, which by turns besieged it.

After having yielded to a sudden impulse of irritation against Murat, to whom he unjustly attributed the misfortunes attending the retreat—at one moment even entertaining the idea of having him arrested—he grew calm, confirmed the nomination of Prince Eugene, whom he would have himself selected had he been upon the spot, and had the change announced by an article in the *Moniteur*, in the following terms:—"The King of Naples having been compelled to resign the command of the army through indisposition, has transferred it to the hands of the viceroy. The latter is more accustomed to the conduct of a great administration, and has the Emperor's entire confidence." Manifesting confidence in Prince Eugene, for the purpose of encouraging him, Napoleon also took care to reassure him with respect to his position, pointing out to him that the Russians would not dare to advance, when they perceived forty thousand French troops on their right, in the fortresses on the Vistula; and on their left, around Warsaw, forty thousand Saxons and Austrians, who were still faithful, although inactive. Although he was unwilling to fatigue or compromise by premature movements the troops assembled at Berlin, he authorised Prince Eugene to summon to his own immediate command, the division Lagrange, as well as the corps of General Grenier; and as the exertions he had made during the twenty days he had been in Paris would enable him to despatch to the Elba a reinforcement of sixty thousand fresh troops, which would raise Prince Eugene's forces to one hundred thousand men, he rightly considered that the latter would be safe against the attacks of any enemy whatever.

A supply of cavalry was the most pressing necessity, for the Russians were immensely strong in this arm, and spread far and wide a continuous terror, throwing forward bands of Cossacks who were feared because they were strange, and because it was not known that a handful of infantry could readily put them to flight. It was necessary, therefore, to provide, immediately, several thousand horse—Prince Eugene having no more than three thousand at his disposal—and Napoleon ordered General Bourcier, who had been directed to procure in Germany and Poland remounts for the dismounted cavalry troops, to purchase horses, for this purpose, at any price, and even, if necessary, to seize them by force where they could not be purchased. At the same time, he invited the princes of the confederation of the Rhine to place at his disposal, even for the sake of their own states, all their available cavalry. The King of Saxony had kept two regiments of cuirassiers and two regiments of hussars and chasseurs, forming together a corps of about two thousand four hundred excellent troopers, and these Napoleon earnestly demanded of him for the purpose of throwing them upon Posen.

Napoleon recommended Prince Eugene, after he should have furnished the two principal fortresses of the Vistula, Thorn and Dantzic, with strong garrisons, to throw the wrecks of the old corps, which had at first been directed to rally upon the Vistula, upon the fortress of the Oder, to provision Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Spandau, procuring the necessary supplies, either by purchase or force, and should there be any lack of wood, to have no hesitation in even cutting down the trees on the public promenades, paying no attention to the Prussian authorities, to whom explanations would be given at some future time. He should then, Napoleon continued, arm and provision the fortresses of the Elbe, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, and Hambourg, which were to form a third line of defences; to march upon the Rhine almost all the remaining battalions of the grand army, and to send away that crowd of generals without troops, who indulged at head quarters in the most injurious language, retaining only Marshal Ney, to hurl him upon the first Russians who should appear. Finally, he directed him to proceed, as quickly as possible, with the re-organisation of the Polish troops, furnishing them with such money as they might require, and assuring them that whatever might be the destiny of Poland, the Poles should be in the pay of France, and should be Frenchmen if they could not be Poles.

Having taken these preliminary measures, Napoleon turned his attention to those which were to be the foundation of all his plans; and, in the first place, resolved to raise the force of two hundred and fifty thousand men, which was almost immediately available, to five hundred thousand.

By taking advantage of the system of the national guard, by which it was divided into three classes, comprising the citizens of from twenty to twenty-six years, those from twenty-six to forty, and those from forty to sixty, it had been possible to form of the men of the first class, cohorts composed of men of full strength, but who, being unmarried, were less necessary to their families. Napoleon now resolved to raise another hundred thousand men of this quality, by making a fresh selection from the classes of 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812. At the same time he determined to demand immediately, the conscription of 1812, that it might replace in the depôts the men of the conscription of 1813, and he hoped by this means to have three hundred and fifty thousand troops at his command, who might be immediately marched to join the hundred thousand who still remained on the Vistula and Oder, whilst a hundred and fifty thousand would be in the depôts ready to defend the interior and frontiers—the armies of Spain being still of undiminished strength. He intended also to procure the offer to himself of voluntary aid which, besides being of material advantage, would be of far higher importance as a great national demonstration.

As it was necessary to obtain legislative sanction, for the employment of the hundred thousand men, of the *cohorts*, beyond the frontiers, to draw the hundred thousand men who were to be taken from the four last classes, and, finally, to levy the conscription of 1814, a senatus consultum was prepared, embracing the various measures, and to it was added the report of M. de Bassano, detailing at length the particulars of the defection of General d'York, describing the movements taking place in Germany as anarchical agitation, excited by the various sovereigns at the instigation of England, and comparing the systematic order which prevailed in France with the state of disorder which was imprudently favoured throughout the rest of Europe, by the princes of old dynasties—the object of this report, in fact, was to excite throughout France, besides a hatred of foreigners, an excessive terror of revolutionary troubles; a terror which, indeed, had been already rendered general by the occurrence of Malet's conspiracy.

Before submitting this senatus consultum to the senate, Napoleon resolved to convoke an extraordinary council, in which he might receive the advice of certain eminent personages, respecting the state of European affairs, and the measures best calculated to put an end to the struggle in which the French empire was then engaged. He had become more communicative with his ministers since his misfortunes, and although as disinclined as ever to follow any advice opposed to his views, he was now disposed to appear to do so. At the same time he resolved to lay aside the air of sovereignty, and to become once more, that General Bonaparte, who had obtained at the price of infinite exertions those favours which fortune had appeared to bestow upon him of her own liberality. But although he was resolved to expiate his faults by prodigies of energy and application, it never occurred to him, unfortunately, to expiate them by the exercise of moderation, as was still possible.

Since his return, the wishes of all those who surrounded him, had been, whether publicly expressed, or secretly entertained, directed towards an immediate peace. The arch-chancellor, with his usual gravity and reserve; M. de Talleyrand, with his sometimes affected, sometimes real insouciance; the Duke of Rovigo, with the boldness of a favourite accustomed to perfect liberty of speech; and Mollien, with the chagrin of a perplexed financier, and finally, of the great officers of the court, the grand Marshal Duroc, with discreet wisdom, and M. de Coulaincourt, with the firmness of a good citizen, severally hinted, or openly declared that it was absolutely necessary to obtain an immediate peace; an advantageous peace, if possible, but at any price, peace. And to this universal opinion, Napoleon replied that he was equally desirous for peace, but that it was to be gained by a firm and supreme effort, and that whilst France desired it, she must refrain from manifesting this desire too openly, since all would be lost, if Europe once believed that her courage had begun to fail.

Of the great personages surrounding Napoleon, who now, either because they were emboldened by peril, or because the Emperor's prestige was somewhat lessened, began to manifest their opinions, M. de Bassano alone reposed as much confidence in the Emperor's fortunes, as though the late events in Russia had never occurred. According to him, Napoleon, still invincible, although vanquished, would speedily repair the disasters, which were, after all, but the result of an unfavourable winter, lay Europe once more at his feet, and dictate to her the conditions of a general peace. And Napoleon, whilst appreciating these vain words at their true value, was pleased by them, for he loved to hear it declared that he was still as powerful as ever.

In the meantime, Napoleon was far from rejecting the idea of negotiations for peace, and disputed only the manner in which they should be opened. It was, in fact, an important question, and one which was eagerly discussed by Napoleon's court, in spite of the habitual reserve of its members, whether the negotiations should be opened in such a manner as to forward the views of Austria, by permitting her to assume the officious part for which she seemed so anxious, or whether, entirely declining the offices of mediators, France should not herself, directly, and openly endeavour to come to an understanding with Russia, and thus put an end to a useless and disastrous struggle. M. de Coulaincourt, who was well accustomed to the conduct of negotiations with Russia, and full of the souvenirs of 1810—1811, and acutely sensible of the efforts made by the Emperor Alexander to avoid the war, hoped that he might be able by means of a personal interview, to persuade this prince to accept a peace, which to each party should be equally honourable. Yet it was not from the desire to assume an important diplomatic position, which he had voluntarily renounced, that he put forward this opinion, but simply from devotion to a dynasty to which he had attached himself, and to France, which he believed to be in danger. M. de Bassano, on the other hand, gave very different counsels. Having many private ties with the Austrian court, since Napoleon's marriage with Maria Louisa, he was anxious that negotiations should be carried by means of Austria, that he might thus himself become the author of a peace which all the world desired, and for which he himself was anxious, but, as was the case with Napoleon, on conditions which could not possibly be obtained. M. de Talleyrand, who employed the time which was no longer devoted to the service of the state, in laughing at M. de Bassano, was now for very plausible reasons, and on account of his aversion to M. de Bassano, contrary to his usual custom, opposed to the advocates of the views of Austria, and deprecated the importance which they endeavoured to attribute to her influence.

There was certainly great reason to fear that Austria, accepted as a mediator, would speedily assume the tone of an arbitrator, and if not treated with deference in this character, assume that an of enemy. To give her as little reason as possible, therefore, for interference in the important affairs of the moment, and to enter into direct negotiations with the Russian court itself, certainly seemed to be the most politic course. But an almost insurmountable obstacle to the adoption of this method of proceeding, consisted in the fact, that the Emperor Alexander, after having trembled at the idea of meeting Napoleon on the field of battle, had been led by the series of extraordinary events which had lately occurred, to consider himself Napoleon's vanquisher, and to hope that he might become the liberator of Europe. Strongly excited by the applause of Germany, he had become inaccessible, and it is probable that M. de Coulaincourt would have ill brooked a complete and sudden change of demeanour which might have still permitted the display of personal regard towards himself, but would have failed to allow him any consideration in his character of diplomatist. Direct negotiations with Alexander being, therefore, almost impossible, it would be necessary to have recourse to the intervention of Austria. So far then M. de Bassano's views were right; but he was greatly in error with respect to the manner in which he considered that the mediation of the Austrian court should be employed, and the payment that should be made for its good offices. The real object of this court was neither to destroy nor even humble France, but to re-establish the fortunes of her own kingdom, and the rest of Germany. This was a natural and legitimate object, and one which the commission of grave errors on our side rendered it necessary that we should acknowledge as such; more especially as to do so, would be to the real interest of France.

But should we still be unwilling to yield to circumstances, there was yet one course which we might hold, and this was to effect a good understanding with Austria, listening to her councils with apparent deference, but at the same time carefully avoiding to become in any way involved with her; abstaining to ask of her either diplomatic or military services, since to ask the former would be to authorize her to interfere in the arrangement of the conditions of peace, and to ask the latter would be to afford her a reason for arming, and to lead her one step onwards towards a declaration of war against us.

All these various questions, then, respecting peace, the method in which negotiations should be opened with the enemy, and the extent to which should be raised the armies of France, Napoleon was now anxious to discuss in a special council, to be assembled at the Tuileries in the early part of January, and to be composed of men perfectly competent for the part they would be called upon to perform. The persons summoned to it—for the most part on the recommendation of M. de Bassano, were M. de Bassano himself, the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, the Prince de Talleyrand, M. de Coulaincourt, M. the duke of Cadore, (de Champagny) an old ambassador, and minister of foreign affairs, and finally the two chief secretaries of this department. MM. de la Besnardiere and d'Hauterive, and a better selection could scarcely have been made, whether in respect to talent or the real desire of the men chosen to save both Napoleon and the French empire.

Napoleon calmly and gravely sketched in brief terms the situation of affairs, ordered the lecture of the decrees which were to be presented to the senate, and then defined as follows the question which he wished to betaken in to considraation,—"I desire peace," he said, "but I do not fear war.

In spite of the losses caused to us by the rigour of the climate, our resources are still very large. Tranquillity reigns throughout the empire itself; and its people have no desire to resign either their glory or their power. Austria, Prussia, and Denmark give the strongest assurances of their fidelity. Austria does not care to withdraw from our alliance from which she expects to reap great advantages; the King of Prussia offers to reinforce his contingent, and is about to have General d'York tried by a council of war; Russia has need of peace, and although strongly influenced by the intrigues of England, I do not think that she will be desirous of persisting in a struggle which must eventually end in her discomfiture.

"I have ordered a levy of three hundred and fifty thousand men; the senatus consultum is drawn up, and about to be presented. Another decree is prepared for the convocation of the Legislative Corps, of which I have no new imposts to demand, but the presence of which will be useful in the present state of affairs; especially as it may be necessary to submit to it certain legislative measures.

"The next subject for consideration, after we shall have made arrangements for the development of our forces, is whether we should await proposals of peace or make them ourselves? Again, if we take the initiative, ought we to enter into direct negotiations with Russia, or rather seek to obtain the mediation of Austria? These are the questions, respecting which I ask your counsel."

At the conclusion of this concise and decided explanation, each of the persons present gave his opinion.

M. de Coulaincourt maintained the necessity of peace and the advisability of entering into direct negotiations with Russia. The wise Cambacérès, distrusting the Austrian offers of mediation, and considering it the wisest course to discuss the conditions of peace directly with the power which must, eventually, have the chief voice in the decision, supported M. de Coulaincourt's advice; as did also M. de Talleyrand, in a few sententious words.

When these gentlemen had spoken, M. de Bassano expressed, at length, the contrary opinion, asserting the difficulty of entering into negotiations with Russia, and the facility with which they might be carried on through Austria, declaring his entire confidence in the disinterestedness of the Austrian court, its attachment to the French alliance, the affection of its emperor for his son-in law Napoleon, and affirming that on this side the interests of France would be perfectly secure, but failing to mention at what price the services of Austria were to be obtained.

M. de Champagny, a modest, sensible man, perceiving the great difficulties in the way of entering into direct negotiations with Russia and the facility with which they might be conducted through Austria, and disposed to place confidence in its court, in which he had resided, was of M. de Bassano's opinion. M. d'Hauterive, and M. de la Besnardiere, whose talented, but somewhat caustic mind was very ready to ridicule M. de Bassano's policy, but, nevertheless, yielded, on this occasion, to the dictates of self-interest, both declared in favour of the opinion of the minister who was at the head of their department.. Consequently, four voices against three were in favour of the acceptance of Austrian mediation.

To have rendered the council of real use, it should have discussed, after it had decided that negotiations could only be carried on through the intervention of the Austrian court, on what conditions this intervention should be accepted; but Napoleon was unwilling that its deliberations should, so far as this, being not only unwilling to reckon the cost, but also convinced that by means of his empress he might prevail upon his father-in-law to afford him both military and diplomatic assistance, in return for the gift of Illyria, which had already been promised to him as a compensation for Gallicia. And here Napoleon committed a disastrous error, which was to prove almost as fatal as the Russian expedition.

It was Napoleon's custom in the solemn political councils, which he occasionally held, to refrain from expressing his own opinion, whilst in his administrative council, on the other hand, he was in the habit of declaring it both loudly and imperiously; he simply thanked, therefore, the members of the council, without explaining his own views, although he appeared to incline to the opinion of the majority, which was, that negotiations for peace should be commenced through the mediation of Austria, a great display being at the same time made of military force; that the projected senatus consultum should, at the same time, be presented to the senate for the levy of three hundred and fifty thousand men; and that the convocation of the legislative corps should be delayed for a few weeks, as this body might at the present time reflect somewhat too vividly the agitation of the public mind.

This course was, in fact, immediately followed, but in such a manner as rather to aggravate than diminish the existing dangers. Napoleon, after having listened to M. de Bubna, whom he had treated with great adroitness, and contrived to bring over to his own interests, wrote to his father-in-law in a manner which, although both affectionate and amiable, was not well calculated to enlist him in his cause. He recounted the events of the campaign of 1812, which had been, he said, very malevolently misrepresented in the thousand accounts of it promulgated at Vienna, complained that these accounts had received far too ready belief in his father-in-law's court; and added that, whilst the Russians had never vanquished him in a single engagement, he had vanquished them in many, and especially at the Berezina, where they had been most completely beaten. Explaining the loss which he had suffered of men and cannon as simply the effects of excessive cold, he proceeded to give an imposing account of the armaments now at his disposal, threatening with vengeance, not only his enemies, but also such of his allies as should desert him; at the same time declaring, however, that although he was quite certain of being able, in the course of the spring, to drive back the Russians upon the Vistula, and from the Vistula to the Niemen, he was anxious for peace, and would have even offered it, had the late campaign terminated on the enemy's territory, and had it not been beneath his dignity to do so in the existing state of affairs. He was willing to accept, therefore, the intervention of Austria, and consented to the despatch of Austrian plenipotentiaries to the several belligerent courts. He added that, although he would not on the present occasion, state the precise conditions on which he would make peace, he would speedily do so, as he had decided what these conditions should be, and was firmly resolved to agree to no others. He would never consent, he said, to detach from the French empire, what the senatus consultum had declared to form its constitutional territory — Rome, Piedmont, Tuscany, and Holland, and the Hanseatic department were invaluable and inseparable portions of the empire. Refraining from offering any explanation of his views respecting the duchy of Warsaw, he did not exclude the idea that he might be willing to consent to enlarge, to some extent, the Prussian territory; but he expressly declared that he would permit no territorial aggrandisement in the case of Russia, and would only consent to free her from the obligations of the treaty of Tilsit, or, in other words, from the fetters of the continental blockade. With respect to England, with which it was not only desirable, but necessary, to treat, since Russia could not withdraw from her alliance, Napoleon fell back upon the letter sent to Lord Castlereagh, at the moment of his departure for Russia, in which he had laid down as a fundamental principle, that of *uti possidetis;* according to which principle Spain, which he then possessed, would fall to the lot of Joseph; Portugal, which he did not possess, to the hands of the house of Bragantia; Naples, which he had conquered, to Murat; and Sicily, which he had never occupied, to the Bourbons of Naples—a deplorable arrangement for France, since it would give her territories upon the continent of which she had no need, and deprive her of all her colonies beyond the seas, which were then in the hands of the English.

It is difficult to imagine anything more important than such a declaration as this, calculated, as it was, to deprive Austria of all hope of persuading us to consent to her plans for procuring a general peace, and thus to determine her to change at once our alliance for that of our enemies. The essential object, at this moment, should have been to discover the wishes of Austria, and to have satisfied them to such an extent as should have attached her to our cause. What Austria desired was, to regain her own independence and the independence of Germany, to obtain such a position for herself as should give her the first influence in the reconstituted Germanic confederation, to recover Illyria, to obtain a better frontier on the Inn, and, finally, to be disembarrassed from the grand duchy of Warsaw, for she had no faith in the re-establishment of Poland, and in any case was unwilling to pay for it with Gallicia. She had not, as yet, expressed any of these wishes, but the slightest consideration of her position, rendered it easy to perceive that she must entertain them, and ambition must have lost the power of appreciating the real nature of existing circumstances, when it proceeded to deprive her of hope, in respect to such important points as these, especially when England and Russia were offering her, not only a complete restoration of German independence, but also the restitution to herself of all those portions of territory, which had formerly been the source of her glory and power, and the loss of which she constantly brooded over with regret and grief.

To the unfortunate letter which Napoleon thus wrote to his father-in-law, M. de Bassano added one destined for M. de Metternich, in which was expressed at considerably greater length, and much more haughtily, what Napoleon had expressed in his letter with that hauteur which belonged to him. "People spoke," said M. de Bassano, in the course of his letter, "of the excitement of public opinion against France; but let care be taken that such a susceptible people as the French be not irritated too greatly, lest it should rise en masse and overwhelm Europe in its anger. In that case would be witnessed catastrophes far other than any which had ever yet been seen!"

Napoleon and his minister, accepted, they said, the mediation of Austria, but the arrangement of a peace was to be based on the conditions exacted from Russia after Friedland, and from Austria after Wagram. At the same time, as a means of interesting the Austrian court, it was informed with much ceremony, and as family news which must interest it, that the grandson of the Emperor Francis was about to be crowned King of Rome, and his daughter, Marie Louisa, appointed to the regency of France—news not entirely devoid of interest to the Austrian Emperor, and even calculated to afford him a certain degree of pleasure, for he loved his daughter, and could not be insensible to the advantage of seeing her in more certain circumstances at the head of the French government; but news, nevertheless, which it was strange to consider capable of inducing him to forget the state of Germany and Austria, and the twenty years of misfortunes, which he had now in one moment to repair.

It was necessary, also, that Napoleon should enter into explanations with Prussia, reply to the excuses offered by her with respect to General d'York, and to discuss the intention hinted by her, of establishing herself in Silesia, forming there an army by the aid of our money, and taking advantage of this asylum, to change gradually from the character of a friendly mediator to that of a hostile arbiter.

Although M. de St. Marsan did not despair of obtaining the good offices of the Prussian court, if due concessions were made to it at the right moment, it was evident that little was to be expected of it, controlled as it was by irresistible national passions, and to permit it to raise armies which would be speedily turned against ourselves, and at our own expense, would be a remarkable specimen of folly. To consent, also, to its withdrawal into Silesia, for the purpose of there negotiating with Russia, would be to give ourselves over to this power, towards which it was already too strongly inclined. It could no longer be a fault, in fact, to manifest distrust of the court of Berlin, for the evil on this side was already past remedy; and Napoleon, therefore, in his reception of M. de Krusemark, who was the regular Prussian ambassador, and M de Hatzfeldt, who was the special envoy sent on this occasion, treated them with all his habitual hauteur, gave them his usual version of the late campaign, and then, expatiating on the vast extent of the armaments he was then preparing, declared that within three months he would have driven back the Russians, not only beyond the Vistula, but beyond the Niemen and the Dnieper also. With respect to the proposal of the Prussian court, that it should withdraw into Silesia, he could make no objection, he said, since it was natural that it should be unwilling to remain in the midst of belligerent armies, but he could not consent that it should enter into direct negotiations with Russia, for the purpose of obtaining the neutralization of Silesia, for the first condition which Russia would demand in exchange, would be the withdrawal of Prussia from the French alliance. With respect to the money demanded by Prussia, he denied the correctness of the account delivered by her, but, nevertheless, he declared his willingness to pay the forty-eight millions which she claimed, as soon as he should be satisfied respecting the manner in which, situated as she was so close to his enemies, she meant to employ them. With respect to the strong places on the Vistula and the Oder, he placed the two Russian diplomatists in a dilemma, for if Prussia, he said were his sincere ally, she could not object to see these fortresses in his hands, and if she were not, he would not restore them to her at any price, especially at the moment when an active war was about to be carried on upon the shores of the two rivers which these fortresses commanded. Then, turning his discourse to the general situation of Prussia, he declared that it was necessary to endeavour to create some intermediate power in Germany, capable of resisting Russia, and that as Prussia alone could be this power, he was much inclined, could a reasonable peace be negotiated, to reinforce her on the side of Poland, and even towards Westphalia, if the pacification, instead of being merely continental, were also maritime. To these hints Napoleon added testimonies of affection for the Prussian monarch, and of regard for his representatives, but failed to utter anything of a nature really satisfactory.

Whilst Napoleon thus entered into explanations with the German powers, his reputed allies, he neglected no exertion to render himself independent of them. He had sent to the senate the decrees of which mention has already been made, and which, to the conscription of 1813, already decreed and levied, added power to employ the cohorts beyond the French frontier, to draw a hundred thousand men from the four last classes, and, finally, to levy immediately the conscription of 1814. It was impossible to reject these measures, and the senate voted them submissively. By a free assembly they would have been voted with enthusiasm, and with the expression of sentiments which would have had the happiest effect on the public mind. That the government, by the commission of grave errors had compromised that glory of the French empire, which had already cost so much blood, could not be denied, but it was, nevertheless, the opinion of all enlightened men, that one final effort should be made, to drive back the hostile armies which now threatened it, and that when victories should have restored, not our glory, for that was imperishable, but the prestige of invincibility which we had lost, then, and then only, we should make peace, even at the price of considerable concessions. The mass of the nation, however, which had hitherto been so submissive, and even too submissive to Napoleon, was now greatly inclined to blame and murmur against him, and to be excessively dissatisfied at the new burdens with which it found itself threatened. The parents of the children who were to become heroes on the battle-field, complained openly and bitterly of the repeated conscriptions, of the incessant wars, and of conquests which occurred so far off that patriotism could scarcely care for them. The humbler the class to which these murmurers might belong, the louder were their complaints, for not only did the lower classes suffer more heavily from the conscriptions, but they were also less capable of comprehending the political necessities of a final and immense effort. In the streets of Paris, the public boldness of expression became extreme, and reached the height which is truly surprising when we consider the nature of the government. A young man of twenty-two years of age, drawn for the conscription, having placed himself in the faubourg Saint-Antoine, directly in the path of Napoleon, who was riding through it on horseback, dared to address him, and in spite of the prestige which always surrounded his person, to make use of the most offensive language. The police attempting to seize him, were prevented from doing so by the crowd; and it often happened that young criminals, by crying out that they were being forcibly dragged away for the conscription, prevailed upon the populace to effect their liberation. When sick soldiers passed through the streets from their barracks to the military hospital, which was situated at one of the extremities of Paris, they were usually surrounded by troops of pitying women, who, overwhelming them with compassion and gentle cares, cried out, that they were fresh victims of *Bonaparte*, as he was called from the time he became unpopular, being thus in a manner deprived of the sceptre he had so cruelly used.

To this discontent of the masses was added the prevalence of the most sombre ideas, and singular terrors. Alarming reports were propagated, being the echoes of echoes which had reverberated from Moscow to Strasbourg and Mayence, and according to these, some of the French Marshals had been taken prisoners, whilst the others were mad, dying, or dead;—a bloody combat had taken place between the army and the imperial guard;—hordes of ferocious barbarians were on the point of hurling their masses upon France. At the same time, a prediction was spread abroad in Italy which caused immense terror, to the effect, that the waters of the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas were about to submerge the whole Italian peninsula. The Italian priests, always hostile, although apparently submissive, did their utmost to propagate these alarming superstitions and to excite, as much as possible, especially in the country districts, the public mind.

In the department of Old France these discontents and fears did not excite sedition, for if the government were oppressive it was, nevertheless, national, and was not hated as a foreign tyranny. But between the Rhine and the Elbe, in Holland, in Westphalia, at Bremen, and Hambourg, the appearance of the English fleets, and the approach of the Russians, produced popular tumults, and gave cause to fear at any moment a general outbreak. In the grand duchy of Bergen and at Hambourg, open disturbances had taken place, and the French authority been defied and insulted; and although the populace in Amsterdam and Rotterdam had been less audacious, throughout the whole of Holland, the cry of "*Vive Orange*" was frequently heard, and an insurrection on the approach of the enemy had become extremely probable.

However, when the enlightened class of a country approves of the measures of its government, it gives them a very efficacious support; and as this class in France perceived that it was necessary to make an energetic defence against the foreign enemy, whatever might have been the errors of the government, the levies were carried out, and the high functionaries, sustained by a moral support which they had not always obtained, performed their duties, although they were at heart full of sadness and sinister presentiments. Napoleon himself called the manifestations of popular feeling just alluded to, *the tumults of the mob*, which it was necessary to repress with energy, and which would not occur again when once properly punished. At Paris he had a certain number of arrests made, which rendered talkers in the public places somewhat more cautious in their expressions, had the grand duchy of Berg overrun by some columns mobiles, which filled the country with terror; and in Hambourg had six persons shot for outrages committed against the French authorities.

The occurrence of these events failed to discourage him, or to deprive him of the hope that he might yet induce France to make such a manifestation of national feeling, as might be a species of reply to the patriotic ardour of the Germans, and give the lie to the assertion which was now very prevalent throughout Europe, that France was herself as weary of his despotism, as foreign nations of his yoke. With this object in view, he conceived the idea of having offers made to himself, from the various cities and cantons, of fully equipped horsemen, as a means of repairing the loss of his cavalry, which had been immense during the late campaign. As Paris was the most suitable place to take the initiative in such a movement, as being the most populous and richest city in the empire, as well as the one most interested in public events, Napoleon, in execution of his plan, contrived that a member of the municipal council, should declare that the city of Paris, being the seat of government, and better acquainted than any other city of the empire with its necessities, should give the example in helping to replace, by forty thousand well mounted and well equipped horsemen, the twenty thousand which had been destroyed by the late extraordinary winter; that as the monarchs, the enemies of France, flattered themselves with having in their favour the public opinion of their countries, it was necessary to prove to them that the hero who had saved France from a state of anarchy, had, no less than they, the esteem of his nation, being indeed regarded by it with boundless admiration, attachment, and devotion. He accordingly proposed that the municipal council should offer to the Emperor a regiment of five hundred horse, fully equipped, and this proposition had scarcely been made, before the measure suggested was voted by acclamation, and the offer conveyed to the Tuileries by a deputation of the council. The account of this circumstance which appeared in the *Moniteur*, was sufficient to arouse the patriotism of some, the interested zeal of others, and throughout the whole of the departments situated between the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, these offers were procured without any difficulty. Lyons offered a hundred and twenty horsemen; Bordeaux eighty; Strasbourg a hundred; Rouen, Lille, Nantes, fifty; Angers forty-five; Amiens, Marseilles, Toulouse, thirty; Metz, Rennes, Mayence, twenty-five; Pau, Toulon, Bayonne, Caen, Besançon, Tours, Versailles, Geneva, twenty; Nancy, Clermont, Dunkerque, Nîmes, Aix, fifteen. The other cities, towns, and cantons of the empire made similar offers to a larger or less extent, and the columns of the *Moniteur* were filled for some time with their several deliberations on this subject. And here it may be remarked that the foreign cities which had been violently annexed to the empire, and were consequently less favourably disposed towards the French government, almost without exception made offers which were in great disproportion to their real zeal for Napoleon, and had evidently done so either from fear of the threats employed by the prefects, or under the influence of prudent men, who thus endeavoured to induce the government to forget certain rash acts of their fellow citizens. Thus Rome voted two hundred and forty horsemen, Genoa, eighty, Hambourg, a hundred, Amsterdam, a hundred, Rotterdam, fifty, the Hague, forty, Leyden, twenty-four, Utrecht, twenty, and Dusseldorf, twelve.

These offers having been made, it was necessary to realize them, and to find the men their horses and equipment, and the supply of the first of these requirements was more difficult of attainment than that of the two latter, since it could not be procured by the mere outlay of money. A despatch from the minister of the interior, however, informed the various prefects, that the government would be satisfied if the offers made by the various cities, towns, and cantons, were fulfilled as respected only the horses and equipment; and as it then became a mere matter of money, the prefects apportioned the cost of the contingent to be furnished by their several districts amongst the citizens, and the allotted sums, were, with the exception of a few murmurs against a method of taxation so illegal, readily paid. The funds being procured, the prefects obtained the necessary horses by paying well for them; and the supply of the equipment, was a matter of no difficulty in a country so industrious as France.

Within a few days the offers amounted to twenty-two thousand horses with equipments, and sixteen thousand troopers; a most material aid in themselves, and calculated to have a moral effect in the highest degree beneficial; for although the hand of authority was visible in the grant of these gifts, they were, nevertheless, undeniably the means of showing that the nation had adopted the opinion, that an energetic resistance should precede a speedy and honourable peace.

As soon as he was in possession of the means for recruiting his armies, Napoleon employed them with that prodigious genius for organization of which he had already given so many proofs. Of the four principal resources which he had at his disposal, two were already realized—the conscription of 1813, and the cohorts. The third, that of the hundred thousand men to be drawn from the four last classes, was to be actually obtained in February. As for the fourth, that of the conscription of 1814, it would be sufficient to obtain it in the course of the year, since it was only intended to replace in the depôts the conscription of 1813, which was to be wholly converted into war battalions. Let us turn our attention to the manner in which Napoleon employed these resources in the reorganization of his armies.

After having deceived himself for a moment with respect to the number of troops remaining between the Vistula and the Oder, he was now perfectly aware that there existed only a few remnants, chiefly in *cadres*. He ordered, therefore, that there should be retained on the Oder only one cadre-de-compagnie for a hundred men, and one cadre-de-bataillon for six hundred men. All the remainder was to be sent to France. But even upon this scale of reduction there could only be formed one battalion per regiment, although the regiments of the grand army upon their departure for the war had numbered five battalions actually in line. This first battalion was intended to compose exclusively the garrison of the fortresses on the Oder. Those on the Vistula, such as Dantzic and Thorn, were already blockaded, and had received, moreover, whole divisions, such as the divisions Grandjean, Heudelet, and Loison. By collecting all the straggling soldiers who could be gradually brought together, one battalion per regiment was with difficulty completed; and these battalions were then reinforced with the companies of infantry, which Napoleon had placed in garrison on his vessels of war, and which, now that he was compelled to make use of all his resources, he withdrew to land again, marching those which had been on the Scheldt and the Texel, immediately on the Oder.

When these first battalions had been completed, the troops which remained of the other battalions were assembled, part in the interior of Germany, part upon the Rhine. The French regiments of the army of Russia were thirty-six in number, sixteen belonging to Davoust's corps, six to Oudinot's, six to Ney's, and eight to Prince Eugene's; and Napoleon now decided that whilst Davoust's corps should be reorganized in sixteen regiments, the 2nd and 3rd corps should be amalgamated into one of twelve regiments, and confided to Marshal Victor; and that the 4th (Prince Eugene's) should be reorganized in Bavaria. The corps of Marshals Davoust and Victor would, consequently, consist of twenty-eight regiments, and Napoleon desired that the *cadre* of the second battalions of these twenty-eight regiments should be retained at Erfurt, sending, immediately, General Doucet to command them, and also despatching from the depôts, of the conscripts of 1813, already well drilled, bodies of men sufficient to raise these twenty-eight battalions to eight hundred men each. As soon as these battalions had been properly reorganized they were to join, some of them Marshal Davoust, and some Marshal Victor. The *cadres* of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th battalions were to be recruited on the Rhine with men who were not yet drilled, being those drawn from the four anterior classes, and these battalions, consequently, could not be reorganized before the lapse of three or four months. Napoleon intended to send the 3rd and 4th of these battalions, as soon as possible, to Marshals Davoust and Victor, who would then have three battalions per regiment; and as these Marshals were perfectly conversant with the conduct of warfare in the north, Napoleon proposed to throw them again upon the Vistula, where he hoped to be in the following June. On passing the Oder they were to receive their 1st battalions, posted in the fortresses, and Marshal Davoust would have a corps consisting of sixteen regiments of four battalions each, Marshal Victor a corps of twelve regiments also of four battalions each; these united forces forming a body of infantry numbering a hundred and twenty thousand men. In the meantime Marshal Davoust, with the sixteen 2nd battalions reorganized at Erfurt, was to occupy the city of Hambourg, accustomed to submit to his authority, whilst Marshal Victor, with the twelve regiments to be entrusted to his command, was to garrison the great fortress of Magdebourg; both the one and the other being able, from their positions, to afford protection to Prince Eugene's rear.

The cadres of the 4th corps, being of Italian origin, were marched upon Augsberg to receive the recruits which were to come from the banks of the Po, across the Tyrol and Bavaria; and, when the nature of the ground to be occupied and the time at his disposal are considered, it must be seen, that it would have been impossible for Napoleon to have arranged his forces with greater skill.

Having thus taken measures for the reorganization of the old corps, Napoleon, in the next place, directed his attention to the new corps, which he was compelled to create in all haste, since the necessity of checking the Russians, in their forward movement, might force him to proceed to the Elbe at the end of the month of March. The most available resource, was that of the cohorts, consisting of a hundred battalions, which, having been organized during some nine months, were almost thoroughly disciplined, and destined to form a solid and intrepid infantry, though somewhat given to discontent. Napoleon distributed these cohorts into twenty-two regiments, of four battalions each, and having given them good colonels, marched them upon the Rhine towards Wesel and Mayence. The twelve first, formed into four battalions of three regiments each, composed the *corps of the Elbe*, and set out immediately for Hambourg, for the purpose of joining Prince Eugene, and reinforcing him with forty thousand of the best infantry. Napoleon appointed to the command-in-chief of this corps, General Lauriston, a sensible and determined man, who, as ambassador in Russia, had endeavoured to prevent the war, and who, during the active progress of the war, had behaved with such courage as rendered him worthy of the appointment.

Napoleon's next care was to form two corps on the Rhine. There remained at his disposal, ten regiments of cohorts, and, in addition to these, a large number of cadres, of which some had been left in the interior, at the moment of the departure for Russia, and others successively drawn from Spain. With these latter bodies of troops, he was able to form between thirty and forty regiments, of two or three battalions each, and hastened to recruit them with the men of the conscription of 1813, who were now partly disciplined, and whose instruction it was proposed to perfect on the march. With eight of the ten remaining cohorts, and a portion of these thirty and odd regiments, he formed the first *corps of the Rhine,* distributing it into four divisions, and confiding it to the hero of the retreat from Russia, Marshal Ney, who had shared the common feeling of indignation, which had been caused by the desertion of the army by its chief, but who, upon receiving information on the Oder, of the brilliant and just recompense which had been awarded to him for his services (he had been created Prince of Moskowa), had felt himself inspired afresh with all his old ardour, and was only anxious to encounter the Russians, that he might tear from them an expiation of their successes during the late campaign. A fifth division, comprising the German troops of the allied princes, would raise his corps to the number of fifty thousand men, and even sixty thousand, taking into account the artillery and cavalry; and this corps it was which was intended to strike the first and the severest blows. It was to rally successively at Mayence, Frankfort, Hanau, and Wurzburg, and set out on its march a month after that of the Elbe, that is to say, on the 15th of March; Marshal Ney, who had been in Paris during the last few days, less for the purpose of taking repose, of which his iron constitution had no need, than for the purpose of receiving the investiture of his new title, being ordered to set out immediately for the banks of the Rhine, in order to superintend the organization of the troops which he was to command.

The second corps of the Rhine was composed of some provisional regiments and marines, which owed their creation some time since to the foresight of Napoleon, who, knowing that he never had a too great abundance of resources for the execution of the various measures he wished to carry out, had formed, at the period when he dreamed of vast maritime expeditions to be sent forth upon a hundred vessels of the line, from the magnificent ports of the empire, from the Texel to Trieste, a troop accustomed to act either as artillerymen or as infantry, and equally fit for land or sea service. This body was quite capable of furnishing sixteen thousand well-disciplined, vigorous soldiers, inspired with the high spirit of the marine service, and Napoleon ordered their immediate departure for the banks of the Rhine; dividing them into four regiments, of four battalions each, and incorporating them, together with some of the regiments which he was hastily organizing, in the second *corps of the Rhine.* This corps, which, to replace the first corps at Mayence, was to be ready to set out on the 15th of April, consisting of four divisions, and numbering altogether about forty thousand infantry, and was to be entrusted to the command of Marshal Marmont, the vanquished of Salamanca, who, although no longer to be trusted as a commander-in-chief, might still perform good services as a lieutenant. The wound which he had received, although at first considered mortal, was rapidly healing, and he was directed to proceed to Mayence as soon as his health would permit.

Napoleon resolved to draw from the *personnel* and *matériel* of war, which had been long since accumulated in Italy, another corps of about forty or fifty thousand men, which, descending into Bavaria, whilst he himself debouched on Saxony, would complete the mass of troops, which he wished to unite upon the Elbe. He charged with the organization of this corps, General Bertrand, the governor of Illyria, who was well acquainted with the details of the organization of troops, and was both active and devoted; and directed him to employ for this purpose, all the military resources of Illyria, only leaving there some depôts and local militia, and transporting the surplus into Frioul. For as the Illyrian provinces must, if the Austrian alliance were preserved, inevitably return into the possession of that power, and as it would be impossible for France, if the Austrian alliance were lost, to dispute their possession for four-and-twenty hours, it would have been an useless dispersion of our forces to have left any part beyond the Julian Alps. With the squadrons drawn from the province, with some regiments remaining in Lombardy, some other regiments posted in Piedmont, and returned from Spain, and with two regiments of *cohorts*, which still remained available of the twenty-two, there would be sufficient troops to compose three good French divisions, of twelve battalions each, and as the Italian army, properly so called, would be able also to furnish an excellent division, the army which General Bertrand was directed to march into Germany would consist of four.

The infantry being reorganized as speedily as circumstances would permit, it was now necessary to direct attention to the special arms, which had suffered even more than the infantry. When Napoleon called from Italy the corps of General Grenier, and formed that of Marshal Augereau, he had drawn from France all the available companies of artillery, and ordered that there should be created in each cohort a company of canonneers. In consequence of this precaution, the personnel of the artillery could not fail. To reorganize the artillery of the army, Napoleon employed the artillerymen who had returned from Russia, forty-eight companies from the ports and arsenals, and eighty companies formed in the cohorts; and thus obtained an artillery force sufficient to serve a thousand pieces of cannon. The matériel of this arm which had been carried into Russia, unfortunately remained buried under its snows, but our arsenals were well stored, and the only want was of gun carriages, for the construction of which Napoleon gave immediate orders. The loss of horses had been greater than that of either men or carriages, but Napoleon hoped that General Bourciier, who was charged with the purchase of horses, and daily urged by letter to increased efforts, would be able to obtain ten thousand draught horses in lower Germany; and he also gave orders for a levy of fifteen thousand in France, by means of requisition, which was a purchase for ready money, the owner being compelled to sell whether willing or unwilling.

The cavalry was, if possible, a more important arm than even the artillery itself, on account of the enemy's great strength in this respect, and unfortunately, not only had we lost almost the whole of our cavalry horses, but even the very means of supplying this loss, since we had no longer in our power Poland, Old Prussia, Silesia, and Mecklenburg. There remained, however, Hanover and Westphalia. Two or three thousand horses had been drawn from the evacuated countries, and there was reason to hope that nine to ten thousand might still be drawn from the countries comprised between the Elbe and the Rhine. Flattering himself with the idea that General Bourcier would be able to procure mounts for thirteen or fourteen thousand troopers, and having no doubt that at least an equal number would return from Russia, he sent to him two or three thousand troopers on foot, from the depôts on the Rhine; and at the same time despatched Generals Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani from Paris, for the purpose of taking the command of the remounted cavalry in Hanover. He ordered them to form two corps, partly of cuirassiers and partly of chasseurs and hussars, and as soon as they should have six thousand troopers fit for active service to march them to Prince Eugene.

Napoleon considered that the cavalry depôts having received of the conscriptions of 1812 and 1813 the portion which belonged to them, would be capable of furnishing ten thousand well trained horsemen: and he instructed the Duke de Plaisance to form them into squadrons answering to the old regiments of the grand army, and as soon as they should have been thus formed to conduct them to the corps of Latour-Maubourg and de Sebastiani, to incorporate each detachment with the regiment to which it belonged, and thus to re-establish the regiments in their entirety.

Horses were not wanting in France, for the ten thousand troopers, whose organization had been entrusted to the Duke de Plaissance. About ten thousand were actually in hand; orders had been given, as already stated, for the requisition of fifteen thousand more, and twenty-two thousand had been furnished by voluntary gifts. France, alone, therefore, would supply sufficient to mount forty-five thousand men; and with the addition of those which would be, it was hoped, procured from Germany, the cavalry actually available for the ensuing campaign, would amount to fifty or sixty thousand.

To all these forces, Napoleon was anxious to add the imperial guard, reconstituted in new proportions. It had suffered cruel losses in the late campaign; but numerous portions of it still existed in Germany, France, and Spain, especially in Spain, where there was an entire division of the young guard, and Napoleon resolved to employ these elements in the recomposition of the chosen troop. He was anxious to preserve the old guard, on account of its fidelity, a quality which the progress of events might render especially valuable; and he was anxious to preserve the young guard, because, admitting into its ranks none but picked men, it was capable, by virtue of the *esprit de corps*, to acquire within a brief space of time the valour of first-rate troops. He demanded, therefore, of all the corps which had not suffered from the disasters of the late campaign, and especially from those employed in Spain, a certain number of veteran troops, for the purpose of completing the old guard. At the same time, he selected from the ranks of the conscription of the four last classes, young and strong men to refill the vacancies in the young guard. He carried the number of the battalions of the guard both old and young, to fifty-three, that of the squadrons to thirty-three, and increased the reserve of artillery. The imperial guard would thus afford an army of reserve numbering fifty thousand men, capable of placing forty thousand in line.

The transport service, although a matter of less moment in Germany than in Russia, was always of great importance in the eyes of Napoleon, as rendering possible, when effective, the sudden concentration of masses of troops. He reorganized the battalions d'equipage, formed five in Germany of the wrecks of the fifteen which had made the campaign in Russia, and six more, by means of the *cadres* remaining in France. These eleven battalions would be capable of conveying ten days' provisions for two hundred thousand men, a sufficient number to fight one of those great battles by which the fate of wars is usually decided. With respect to waggons, being forced to regard as lost those which were plunged in the bogs of Poland, or the sands of Prussia, he was reduced to the old *caisson* somewhat modified, and the *char a la comtoise,* which, by its lightness had rendered most effectual service.

It was by means of these extensive armaments, that he proposed to check the enemy's forces on the Elbe, if he could not check them on the Oder, and to dissipate the hope with which they appeared to be intoxicated. Having about fifty thousand men in garrison in the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder, and forty thousand active troops under Prince Eugene, he intended to reinforce the latter with the forty thousand under General Lauriston, and with the eighty thousand men, who would be thus concentrated on the Elbe, to stop the progress of the enemy, and prevent any invasion of Lower Germany. He would then, he proposed, in the month of April or May, join Prince Eugene with the two hundred thousand, which would at that time be in Saxony, and with a force of three hundred thousand men overwhelm the Russian army, however greatly it might have been strengthened by allies. There would remain as a reserve the old corps, which were to be reorganized under Marshals Davoust and Victor, the *cadres* arriving from Spain, and the hundred and fifty battalions in depôt, destined to receive the conscription of 1814, and capable of affording an additional hundred or hundred and fifty thousand combatants. The principal difficulty with respect to the organization of these vast bodies of troops, was in the shortness of the time in which it had to be effected; but whether in administration or war, Napoleon was a marvellous economiser of time, having measures simultaneously carried on which are usually accomplished only in succession, seeing with his own eyes that every order given by him had been duly executed, despatching in all directions a multitude of confidential officers, whose reports he always read or heard himself every night before retiring to rest, and rigidly investigating the very slightest neglect in the execution of his orders.

But whilst collecting these enormous forces it was also necessary to provide the means of paying them; and in fact, whilst Napoleon devoted himself, day and night, to the recomposition of his armies, he employed himself no less energetic ally in placing the finances of the empire in such a state, as would enable them to bear the expense of the vast armament he was preparing.

We have already seen how the budget of the empire had risen in 1811 from nine hundred millions to eleven hundred millions, on account of two causes; — first, the annexation to the empire, of Rome, Illyria, Holland, and the Hanseatic provinces; and, secondly, the cost of the armaments for the war in Russia. The budget of 1811 showed a deficit of forty-six millions, and the budget of 1812 a deficit of thirty-seven millions and a half; but in the case of the budget of 1813, as it would relate to the expenses of war carried on almost upon our own frontiers, and in allied countries, in which it would be necessary to maintain our troops at the cost of France herself, there was reason to suppose that the budget would rise, to at least twelve hundred and seventy millions, and that the deficit would be one hundred and forty-nine millions. Adding, therefore, this fresh deficit to those of the budgets of 1811—1812, there would be a total deficit of two hundred and thirty-two millions, and, in fact, at the commencement of 1813, the expenses being immense, and far exceeding the realized receipts, the embarrassment became extreme. M. Mollien, minister of the treasury, a man of an ingenious, but very circumspect mind, being with good reason fearful of putting in jeopardy his personal character, should he have recourse to irregular means of obtaining financial resources, was excessively disconcerted at the state of affairs, and by reason of his scruples, became for Napoleon one of the difficulties of the moment. Being no more than the other ministers in Napoleon's actual confidence, and believing, in common with the public, that an immense amount of treasure was accumulated in the Tuileries, he was desirous that Napoleon should transfer from them, a hundred or two hundred millions to the treasury coffers, and often accused him, in the bitterness of his chagrin, of being guilty of almost personal avarice. But in this matter, as in war, Napoleon's conduct was distinguished by admirable foresight, method, and address; and it must be added, with respect to avarice he was greedy of nothing but power.

The treasure amassed in the Tuileries, consisted of the *tresor extraordinaire*, and the savings of the civil list.

The remains of the *tresor extraordinaire* had been much diminished by the donations prodigally bestowed upon soldiers of distinguished merit, and by the aids which had been drawn from it for the war finances. Its nominal amount at this period was almost three hundred and twenty-five millions, but as a portion of this sum consisted of property which could not be immediately realized, and a larger portion was due from cities of the empire, and foreign states to which it had been lent, its actual available amount was only fifty-eight or sixty millions, an inconsiderable sum, and yet one which, properly employed, might be of the greatest service.

In addition to this tresor extraordinaire, Napoleon had at his disposal the savings of his civil list, amassed by prodigies of economy, and amounting to about a hundred and thirty-five millions, of which he had invested a portion in government or commercial securities, but retained about a hundred millions in coin in the cellars of the Tuileries; and as there remained at his disposal about sixty millions of the domaine *extraordinaire*, he had at this period in gold or silver coin immediately available, and lying in the coffers either of the Tuileries, or the domaine *extraordinaire*, a sum of a hundred and sixty millions.

Had Napoleon, yielding to the advice of his minister, made use of those hundred and sixty millions in the first moments of embarrassment, they would have speedily disappeared, and he would have found himself without ready money, much in the same position as a general on the battle-field without a reserve. He was wisely resolved, therefore, not to expend this resource until compelled to do so by the most imperious necessity; in the meantime, employing only such portions of it as might be necessary to support the *valeurs*, which the minister of finance would sooner or later have to create. Carefully refraining from justifying his resistance to this minister's entreaties, by informing him of the real amount (much less than M. Mollien supposed it to be), of this private treasure, he bore with equanimity, the severe insinuations in which he and others frequently indulged; remaining calm and gentle in the midst of the greatest perplexities, that he might not add by defects of temper to the troubles of those who served him. He sought then without explaining himself, the means of supplying the two hundred and thirty-two millions, remaining deficient with respect to the budgets of 1811 and 1812, and of paying, altogether, that of 1813.

Napoleon was unwilling for any consideration to increase the taxes, although an increase of the direct taxes might have been easily borne, and would have produced the hundred and thirty millions which were wanting for 1813. The direct taxes, as re-established by him, had succeeded financially, although in a political point of view they had met with no more than the customary success; but the indirect taxes could not be arbitrarily increased, for it was by no means certain that an increase in their tariff would augment their product. At the same time, with respect to the landed property, Napoleon was particularly unwilling, after having freed it from the burdens which oppressed it, to subject it to them again; for he loved to be able to say, that in the midst of the greatest wars the material condition of France had not been deteriorated, and that they affected only the army itself, which gained by their glory, honours, rank, and riches. This army, however, had now begun to indulge in bitter complaints, and all the soldiers who returned from the banks of the Niemen, were in the habit of indulging in such language, that it had become needful to keep careful watch over them, and to separate them from the new soldiers to prevent the contagion of discontent. Moreover, the army could not be formed without the levy of the impost of blood, the cruellest of all taxes, and although the men of France when once in their ranks, become soldiers with a good grace, their parents were not so easily reconciled to their fate, and gradually stored up in their hearts a bitterness of hatred, of which the explosion was to be terrible. Napoleon was in error, therefore, when he thought, that provided his wars did not burden his people with money taxes, they would not have any evil influence on their feelings towards himself; but fondly cherishing this idea, he resolved for this reason, to make no augmentation of the imposts.

The issue of *rentes*, which might have probably succeeded in raising the required sum, had the public been earlier accustomed to such a proceeding, was actually impossible, or at least a matter of great difficulty, and now, it would, indeed have been extremely singular, after having refrained from raising money on credit in 1807 and 1808, to begin to do so in 1813. The produce of the customs which had been employed, together with contributions from the *tresor extraordinaire*, in covering the deficits of former years, and especially the cost of the great expedition of 1812, were exhausted. At the same time, the ordinary receipts of the customs were very much increased, having risen from thirty millions to eighty, by virtue of the famous tariff of fifty per cent., which had become the principal instrument of the continental blockade. Napoleon had also granted this year, so great a number of licences, that the ordinary receipts of the customs might fairly be calculated to amount to a hundred millions.—And here we may remark that England and France had in some degree exchanged positions, for whilst, two years before, Napoleon had tortured Europe for the purpose of restraining her from holding any relations with England, it was England, now, who, perceiving the advantages derived by its enemy from the communications carried on by meanse of these licences, took pains to render them ineffectual.

Napoleon being unwilling, therefore, to augment the taxes, whether direct or indirect, public loans being unusual, and commercial seizures producing almost nothing, there remained only the old means of raising money, by the alienation of national domains. And this resource had itself become confined to very narrow limits, for Napoleon had restored to the emigrant families a large portion of their possessions, and he was unwilling, by selling those portions which had not been alienated, to carry out the system of confiscations to which his government had had the honour of putting an end. There remained, however, a certain amount of property held in mortmain, of which the owners might be dispossessed, being indemnified by means of annuities paid by the state; and this property was that which was in the hands of the communes. In almost all the departments, and in some of them to a much greater extent than in others, the communes possessed considerable property, which was very badly managed. To have laid hands on the whole of this property, without distinction as to its nature, would have been not only iniquitous but impracticable, and infinitely dangerous, as it would probably have excited seditions; for a portion of it consisted of buildings employed in the public service, such as the hôtels de ville, schools, hospitals, churches, public grounds, and promenades, of which it was manifestly impossible to deprive their owners, whilst another portion was equally, although perhaps less manifestly, a public necessity, consisting, as it did, of public pasturages, woods and turbaries. To have seized these, at the moment when the rural populations were excited to the pitch of exasperation by the conscription, would have been almost to incur the danger in some provinces of a fresh *Vendée*. But there remained a third species of communal property, being that from which the communes derived only a certain amount of revenue, which they applied to the payment of their expenses. As this property was to them in fact only so much income, it could matter but little to them whether this income were paid by a farmer or the state; the probability of due payment being made, being at least as great in the latter case as in the former. The total value of the property of which

Napoleon thus proposed to take possession, was estimated to amount to about three hundred and seventy millions; bringing in, however, only eight or nine millions to the communes. Supposing that it were really sold for three hundred and seventy millions, there would remain, after deducting the two hundred and thirty-two millions required for the service of the state, about a hundred and thirty-eight millions, which, at the price of the funds at that period (the five per cents. being at seventy-five francs), would produce the nine millions of rent which would have to be paid as indemnity to the communes.

But in spite of the manifest advantages of this plan, there were serious objections to it, on the ground that it would be an attack on the rights of property; that the source of income given to the communes in exchange for that taken away from them, would be liable to constant depreciation, whilst the latter, consisting of land, would, on the contrary, be continually increasing in value; that this method of proceeding would alienate the goodwill of the municipal administrations, which, accustomed to the management of the communal property, regarded it as their own; and, fourthly, that the realization of this property, however prudently conducted, could not fail to be difficult and slow, whilst the necessities of the state were pressing, and, therefore, that if this measure were adopted, it would be necessary to anticipate it by the emission of paper money, founded on its future profits.

The matter was daily discussed with great earnestness, between M. de Bassano, whose habit of receiving Napoleon's schemes with favour caused him to be consulted upon almost all the affairs in hand, and M. Mollien, who was somewhat too inclined to enter into subtle disquisitions on incontestable truths, and who opposed the proposed plan rather with chagrin and ill-temper than firmness. The discussion respecting the proposed plan would have been interminable, had not Napoleon, who became impatient, and discerned with the utmost clearness how much truth and how much falsehood existed in the allegations of the disputants, at length said to M. Mollien,—"All that is very well, and I fully comprehend your objections, but before rejecting one plan, it is but right to propose another in its place." And this observation was one to which it was difficult to reply, for it was a cry of want from the lips of him who was, of all persons, the most conscious of the necessities of the state, since he had to feed, clothe, and arm a million of soldiers, and his existence, greatness, and glory, depended on the solution of the problem now under discussion. Had

M. Mollien been a man of greater firmness and readiness of mind, he would have replied to Napoleon,—“ Issue five per cent. *rentes*, at sixty francs, or even seventy if necessary; pay the capitaux eight or ten per cent., or even more, and this operation, will be in reality less dear, will excite less enmity, and will afford you speedier and better means of supplying the necessities of your soldiers, than a paper money regarded with suspicion, and unwillingly received. But M. Mollien did not dare to express such an opinion as this, and it is very probable that at this period he would not have dared even to entertain it in his own mind.

It was, therefore, at length agreed, that that portion of the possessions of the communes which we have particularized above, should be summarily valued, replaced by a rent payable by the state, and then transferred to the caisse-d'amortissement, which had been in the habit of executing the state sales of landed property, anticipating the receipts by a paper money which it issued for the service of the state, and gradually withdrew from circulation, as the price of the property sold was actually received. This paper money maintained an undepreciated value, because it was very inconsiderable in amount, and because its holders could always obtain in exchange for it, its full value, both capital and interest. It was now arranged with respect to the sale of the communal property, that the purchasers should pay one third on the completion of the sale, another third in 1814, and another third in 1815, paying interest on the two latter sums at the rate of five per cent., and that in the meantime, the caisse-d'amortissement should supply the treasury with bills to the amount of two hundred and thirty-two millions, which were to be liquidated, as the receipts on the sale of the communal property became actually realized, the treasury making use of them as it might be able; forcing or persuading the creditors of the state to accept them. At the same time, Napoleon expressed his intention of taking up with a portion of the ready money at his command, sixty or seventy millions' worth of this paper at the moment of its emission; hoping by this means to keep up its value.

Such were the financial measures by which Napoleon hoped to obtain means for carrying on his last and most terrible campaign. There being no more private or church property which could well be confiscated, he now seized the communal property, and disposed of it by a species of paper money, which was issued on a sounder basis, and within far more prudent limits than the *assignats*, but which, nevertheless, could not fail to call to mind reminiscences of a former disastrous paper money, and was issued, moreover, at a most unfavourable moment.

Whilst making every possible exertion to render himself able to repel the enemies whom he had excited against France, Napoleon perceived the necessity also, of regaining that public favour for his government which he perceived it to be gradually losing; and as the only complete means for obtaining this object, an immediate peace, was at present unattainable, he sought some other method of procuring a moral satisfaction for his people.

Of all the causes which excited an adverse feeling towards Napoleon in the public mind, the most powerful, after the war, was the quarrel with Rome, and the captivity of the pope. In the mouths of the partisans of the house of Bourbon, it was a most efficacious subject for animadversion against a tyrannical government, which, according to them, was an oppressor of consciences. With the pious portion of the population it was a serious and sincere motive for blame and even aversion; and as, in general, the men and women whose souls have a strong religious bias are of an eager and active temperament, they are formidable enemies to a government which has been guilty of injuries to religion. Napoleon was now anxious, therefore, to disarm the anger of this respectable class of citizens, to deprive the royalists of the religious pretext of which they made use to injure him, and at the same time to give hopes of an European peace, by making one with the church.

He resolved, therefore, to put an end to this quarrel with the pope; conceding as little as possible, but, nevertheless, as much as might be necessary. The pope, after having been long a prisoner at Savoy, was, at this moment, at Fontainebleau, a captive in reality, but apparently free, and surrounded with attentions and honours; having been removed to this latter place, on account of Napoleon's fear that the English might take advantage of his absence in Russia to carry off Pius VII. from Savoy. The strict surveillance under which he was here placed, was concealed under an air of the greatest respect; in addition to the attendance of his medical man and chaplain, and some old servants, on whom he could rely, he received visits occasionally from the cardinals of Bayonne and Maury, the archbishop of Tours, and the bishop of Nantes, who frequently conversed with him on the evils suffered by the church, on the means of putting an end to them, and the hope that they would cease, now that Napoleon's return to Paris would permit two princes who loved each other, to enter upon those personal explanations which were always so much more effectual than negotiations carried on through third persons. The society of these persons was all that was allowed to the pope, and the only kind that he desired. The fact of his removal from Savoy had been kept so private, and the public attention was so wholly engrossed by the Russian campaign, that few persons had visited Fontainebleau on the Sunday, to behold him perform mass, as he was on that day permitted, in the great chapel. He passed his time, therefore, in the depths of profound seclusion, and as he refrained from either walking in the park, which had been placed at his service, or from even reading, although the library of the château was at his very door, it seemed as though he had fallen into a species of prison lethargy.

No moral or physical circumstances could be imagined better calculated to vanquish the pontiff's resistance; especially if Napoleon should suddenly appear before him and bring to bear upon him the double prestige of his power and fascinating conversation. Returning from Moscow, vanquished by nature, if not by his enemies, Napoleon would have less influence than formerly, but he still, doubtless, retained sufficient to overcome the pope, especially as he had only been permitted to receive information respecting circumstances which it was impossible to conceal, and which were explained to him in the manner most favourable to our arms.

Napoleon had hastened on the very day after his arrival in Paris, to write to the pope, expressing the pleasure he felt at his residing so close to himself, and his anxiety that the differences which disturbed the peace of the church, should be immediately terminated. To this letter he had added communications by MM. de Bayane, de Barral, and Duvoisin, endeavouring to obtain the pope's consent to an agreement by almost unhoped-for concessions. In fact, the points in dispute no longer offered such difficulties as formerly. The method of canonical institution was agreed on; and there now only remained the task, which was indeed a more difficult one, of determining the nature of the pope's temporal establishment. Pius VII., failing to entertain the idea of Napoleon's fall, and seeing no means of forcing him to restore the Roman states, might fairly consider the establishment of the papal court at Avignon, with a suitable allowance as a species of *pis aller* arrangement, for which history afforded a precedent, an excuse, and a consolation; but what especially disgusted him, and appeared to him even worse than death, was a project attributed to Napoleon, of establishing the papacy in Paris under the very hand of the French court. And herein lay a valuable means of conducting negotiations, for by refraining to enforce his establishment at Paris, insisting only that he should reside in Avignon, the pope might be induced to consent to the solution of the question, which was reputed to offer the greatest difficulties, and the settlement of which would speedily lead to an agreement respecting the minor points in dispute.

As soon as he should have been properly prepared for the interview, Napoleon resolved to transport himself to Fontainebleau, to terminate by his presence the pope's ordinary hesitations, and to obtain from him a formal act, which he might present to his people as a pledge of religious peace;—as the avant-coureur, perhaps, of an European peace.

Accordingly, on the 19th of January, pretending to be engaged in the chase at Grasbois, he suddenly changed his direction and proceeded to Fontainebleau, where the pope was at the moment engaged with several bishops and cardinals. Already excited by the consideration of the important affairs which had been lately forced on his notice, he was much agitated by the sudden arrival of Napoleon, whom he had not seen since his coronation, and whom he both desired and feared to meet. Without leaving him time for reflection, Napoleon hastened to him, embracing him and saluting him by the title of father. The pope received the emperor's embraces, addressing him by the title of son; and thus, refraining for this day, from entering upon the discussion of affairs, these two princes, so singularly led by destiny to gratify and torment each other all their lives, appeared delighted to have met once more. The hope of a prompt and complete reconciliation played upon their countenances.

On the following day, Pius VII., surrounded by his cardinals and the bishops who had been permitted to visit him on this occasion, went in grand state to return the Emperor's visit in his apartments. From the emperor he proceeded to the empress, whom he did not know, since it was not she whom he had crowned—the empress of that throne, with respect to which all things changed so swiftly, being already another person!—But whilst the pope was engaged in this interchange of visits, and appeared to derive from it some feeling of satisfaction and hope, he could not blind himself to the facts that Napoleon had come to Fontainebleau, to force him to consent to renounce his temporal dominion, to exchange Rome for Avignon, and to receive in return for his Italian principality a magnificent hospitality, which would be in reality a gilded slavery; to assume, in short, in the west, with a little additional wealth and air of sovereignty, the position held by the patriarch of Constantinople.

When the visits of ceremony had been concluded the interviews on business commenced, and in these Napoleon was resolved to display all his grace of manner and energy of mind, for the purpose, on the one hand, of winning over the pope to his will, and on the other, of persuading him that there was no better course open to him, than that of compliance with the demands which had been made of him. His first care was to persuade the pope, that although he had now for the first time failed to return triumphant, he was still as powerful as ever, and as capable of enforcing the performance of his wishes; and his next, to convince the holy father that it was useless to indulge in any hope of recovering Rome. It remained for the head of the church, then, to choose either Paris or Avignon as his place of residence, "And it would be better," said Napoleon, "that his choice should fall upon the latter city, where he would be treated with the greatest reverence, be surrounded with every species of homage, and find the emperor of the French as disposed to hold his stirrup as formerly were the German emperors." But as he decidedly objected to Paris, he had no alternative but to choose Avignon, a place consecrated by having already been during a considerable period, a papal residence. The necessary orders would be immediately given, and every arrangement made to render his residence there one of sumptuous magnificence. He would have full liberty to receive there, the ambassadors of all the various powers, who would enjoy at his court full diplomatic privileges and independence, even although they might be the representatives of states at war with France, and would be able to proceed to the new pontifical court by the sea and the Rhone, almost without touching the French territory. Two millions of revenue would be paid as indemnity for the property sold in the Roman states. All the property, and it was the larger portion, which still remained unsold, would be restored and administered by the papal agents. The *suburbicaires* sees would be re-established, and the pope would have the right of nominating their occupants. In addition to this privilege he would have the right of nominating to ten dioceses, either in Italy or France, as he might prefer, as a means of recompensing the servants of his government; besides the nomination of the cardinals, which would still belong to him. The prelates of the Roman states, whose sees had been suppressed, who were still living, and who formed one of the chief of the pope's sources of anxiety, were to have the quality, title, and position of bishops *in partibus*, and to receive during their lives, from the French treasury, an income equal to the revenues of the dioceses they had lost, thus forming an important addition to the legion of great ecclesiastical dignitaries, who would contribute to the éclat of the papal court at Avignon. The Roman archives, the great administrations of the *penitencerie*, the *daterie*, the propaganda, &c., would accompany the pope to the beautiful country of Vauclause, and be properly established in the new pontifical Rome, which was about to be wholly consecrated to its glorious destiny.

The new arrangement, it was asserted, would leave to the pope the power of controlling, as freely as ever, the affairs of the church, and would deprive him only of that temporal power which was but a vain pontifical ambition, a serious source of danger to religion, and of constant disputes with the princes of Christendom. It was in respect to this point, that Napoleon displayed all the subtle powers of his mind, for the purpose of convincing Pius VII. that the separation of the two kinds of power, the spiritual and the temporal, held by the popes, and the abolition of the latter, must inevitably take place in the course of time, and would in nowise detrimentally affect religion, its influence or perpetuity. How many wonderful changes had taken place in the course of the last twenty years! And was not the temporal power of the popes, evidently one of those things which were destined to disappear with so many others? And was it not even a subject of thankfulness to Providence, that it should have chosen as the instrument of these revelations, such a man as Napoleon, who, born in the Catholic faith, loved it as his maternal religion, and fully convinced of its value to mankind, was resolved to defend and cherish it to the utmost? "Put an end," exclaimed Napoleon to the pontiff, "to this idle difficulty respecting temporal sovereignty, and you shall see what great things you and I, once relieved from these troublesome disputes, shall be able to do for religion." . . . . . . And then he proceeded to point out how the German church, deprived of its wealth by the avarice of the German princes, could only hope to be re-established through his aid; how the churches of Holland and the Hanseatic states, which had ceased to exist for two centuries, might still be restored; how the Spanish and Italian churches, in a state of utter decay, were in imminent need of a protector; and how, finally, all this ecclesiastical universe depended for its fate on the powerful will of the French emperor. "And once let them be reconciled," added Napoleon to the pope, "be restored to repose by an European peace, and the holy father and himself would, in concert, be able to effect more for religion than even Charlemagne. Within sight of such a prospect as this, how was it possible to protract discussion, to continue to hesitate? Providence had chosen a pontiff who was at once gentle, virtuous, and modest, that the purity of religion might be restored, a new example be given of the disinterestedness of the apostles, and had chosen him, Napoleon, a man of war, accustomed to vanquish earthly obstacles, to work out this resolution in such a manner that religion should not only not be enfeebled by it, but should, on the contrary, gain in moral power all that it had lost in material power.

The worthy pope, who had often received letters filled with similar expressions, but who had never heard them expressed with such earnestness, eloquence, and airs of persuasion, as they now were by Napoleon, became almost persuaded that the sacrifice of his temporal power was one which he was called upon to make for the interests of religion itself, and that to consent to the terms proposed, would be an act of disinterestedness rather than of weakness, an honourable rather than a shameful one. But when it became positively necessary to decide, he fell into insurmountable perplexities.

When three or four days had been employed in repeated interviews, Napoleon made the pontiff understand that it was necessary to come to some decision, and as the latter was almost as anxious with respect to the form in which his agreement with Napoleon was to be drawn up, as with respect to its actual terms, Napoleon promised that the form should be such as should excite no scruple in his mind, and should not overburthen his memory. At the same time, as the pope was especially averse to express in words the renunciation of the patrimony of St. Peter, Napoleon agreed that neither his abandonment of Rome, nor his establishment at Avignon should be directly mentioned, it being expressed only that his holiness should *exercise the pontificate in France and in the kingdom of Italy, in the same manner, and with the same forms as his predecessors*, it being understood only that this should be at Avignon, and not elsewhere. It was then added in formal terms, that the pope should receive the ambassadors of the Christian powers, clothed with full diplomatic powers, that he should recover the enjoyment and administration of the property which still remained unsold in the Roman states, that he should receive two millions revenue, in exchange for the property which had already been alienated, that he should have the patronage of all the suburbicaires sees, and of ten bishoprics, which should be at a future time determined on, and which might be either in France or Italy; that the old titular bishops of the Roman states should retain their titles, under the form of bishops *in partibus*, and should enjoy incomes equal to the revenues of their several sees; that the various administrative bodies forming the Roman chancery, should accompany the pope to his new residence; that the emperor and the pope, should, in concert, create new Catholic sees in Holland and the Hanseatic departments, and that, finally, the emperor should receive into his full favour, the cardinals, bishops, priests, and laymen who might have been compromised in the late troubles. It was stipulated that canonical institution should be given to the bishops nominated by the crown, according to the terms already agreed upon, namely,—That should the pontifical court delay to confer institution on the person nominated by the crown for six months after nomination, that then the senior prelate of the province might confer it. To these last clauses, the pope insisted on adding one which was rather in the nature of an excuse, than of a law or agreement, and was couched in the following terms.—The holy father has consented to the above arrangement in the consideration of the actual state of the church, and in the full confidence which he feels that his majesty will grant his powerful protection to the church, in the many circumstances of necessity to which in these times it is exposed.

It was finally agreed that the actual concordat, although having the binding force of a treaty, should not be published until it should have been submitted to the cardinals, who had a right to be informed of it as the natural and necessary councillors of the church.

When the text of the treaty had been fully agreed on, and drawn up in French and Italian, it was sent to the persons who were to transcribe it, and on the same evening, the 25th of January, the two courts, the pontifical and imperial, were assembled, and the pope and the emperor signed this extraordinary act, by which the temporal power of the papacy was annihilated—for ever, as thought Napoleon and the pope, but for a very brief space of time, according to the hidden designs of Providence.

Overwhelming Pius VII. with testimonies of veneration, and hastening to prove his joy on the occasion, and the complete return of his goodwill, Napoleon sent orders for the liberation of the detained cardinals, who were known as the *black cardinals*. Prodigal of acts of beneficence and favour, he summoned to the council of state the bishop of Nantes, to whom he, moreover, gave the cross of the legion of honour, and the grand cordon of the order of the *Re-union;* he made the bishop of Trèves a councillor of state, and an officer of the legion of honour, gave the grand cordon of the *Re-union* to cardinal Maury and the archbishop of Tours, the cross of the legion of honour, to the cardinals Doria and Ruffo, the decoration of the Iron Crown to the archbishop of Edesse; made the cardinal of Bayonne and the bishop of Evreux senators, gave a pension of six thousand francs to the pope's medical attendant, and distributed magnificent presents amongst all those persons who had contributed to the important act which had been just concluded.

Setting out for Paris on the 27th of January, with the conviction that he had just accomplished an act which might not, perhaps, be definite, but which would, certainly, produce at the time a great effect, he hastened to publish in the official journals, that a concordat was about to settle the differences which had arisen between the empire and the church; at the same time, having information spread abroad by word of mouth, that the pope was about to establish his court at Avignon. He wrote to Holland, Turin, Milan, Florence, and Rome, announcing to the representatives of his authority, this important arrangement, authorizing them to make known its general bearing, and to do all that might be necessary to restore a state of calm to troubled consciences.

But it was not probable that this calm would be of long duration, for it was easy to foresee that as soon as the pope's ordinary councillors should have returned to him, they would torture his soul with reproaches for what he had done, pointing out to him the serious consequences which must result from it, especially on the eve of a war which could not end to Napoleon's advantage. And, in fact, the black cardinals had scarcely been admitted to Fontainebleau when the pope fell once more into a state of despondency. The cardinals di Pietro and others did their utmost to inspire him with remorse for what he had done, placing before him such a picture of the state of affairs as the most violent passions could alone have drawn, but which, unfortunately, was soon to be realized through Napoleon's own errors.

Once more, the unfortunate Pius VII. fell into one of those states of agitation and despair, in which we have so frequently seen him, and in which he lost the touching dignity of his character. And how was he to escape from the embarrassment into which he had fallen? How deny or revoke an act which he had but just signed? Who could venture to advise him to do so? No one—not even the cardinals, who, having just recovered their liberty, by virtue of the late concordat, would have feared in giving such advice, that they were closing upon themselves the gates of the state prisons. It was agreed, therefore, between them and Pius VII., that they should dissimulate for the present, awaiting those events which must speedily occur.

But it would have required a greater power of self-command than that which the pope possessed, to conceal completely the idea which was reigning in his breast. The officer who guarded him under the term of chamberlain, Captain Lagorsse, soon perceived the state of agitation under which the pope laboured, and was not slow in divining the cause, when he found that it ever became greatly increased by the visits of the cardinals most distinguished for their malevolence. On being informed through the minister of worship of this state of things, Napoleon exclaimed—"I fear we have acted too hastily,"—and he had speedily a certain sign, although one very closely disguised, of the secret resolutions entertained by the pope; and it consisted in the fact, that when Napoleon sent to him the agents of the imperial treasury to place at his disposal such sums as he might require, and which he had a right to draw from the revenues which had now been regularly assigned to him, he gently and unaffectedly declined the offer, as though the moment had not come for ostensibly assuming the exercise of his new sovereignty.

Nothing more was needed to enable Napoleon to divine the intentions and plans of the men who were the pope's councillors. But Napoleon was himself as cunning as the most cunning of them. He saw that they were unwilling that the main points of the concordat should be generally known, and he was equally willing that they should remain unpublished; but, in the meantime, as it was not of so much importance to him, that the affairs of the church should be arranged, as that they should appear to be so, he had it everywhere made known, that a concordat had been signed between the pope and the emperor, that the pontiff was free, that he was about to resume the exercise of his pontifical functions; that, in short, all the religious difficulties were at an end. And in spite of the declarations of some persons that this was a falsehood—some even venturing to assert that Napoleon had dragged the venerable pontiff by the hairs of his head to the earth, in the vain attempt to force him to compliance with his wishes—the crowd of innocent and pious persons, hastened to throw themselves at the foot of the altars to thank God for the new concordat, and gave themselves up to the hope, as indeed Napoleon wished they should, that this peace in regard to the things of heaven, would be accompanied by a peace in mundane affairs.

Two months had now elapsed since Napoleon's return to Paris, and he had already, as we have seen, made great progress in his diplomatic, military, and financial arrangements, and the settlement of the affairs of the church. It was now time to open the sittings of the legislative corps, whose meeting had usually during this reign, been regarded as a mere interesting formality, but whose assembly on this occasion—and it was a striking symptom of the change which was taking place in the popular mind—was expected with the utmost eagerness; the nation being especially anxious to read the discourse which would be delivered by the emperor, if, as was generally supposed would be the case, he should open the sessions of the legislative corps in person. And this, in fact, Napoleon resolved to do, that from the elevation of his throne —just now shaken, doubtless, but still the most elevated in the whole world—he might address France and Europe, and enable the world to judge by the haughtiness of his language, of the true state of his spirit, and the nature of his resolutions.

Consequently, on Sunday, the 14th of February, he proceeded to the legislative corps, to accord it the honour which he seldom granted it, of opening its session in person, and to make it acquainted with the state of the affairs of the empire. Surrounded by a magnificent cortége, he read the following discourse, which, unfortunately, was as imprudent as it was brilliant and energetic.

"*Gentlemen, deputies from the departments to the legislative corps.*—The renewal of war in the north of Europe offered an occasion favourable to the projects of the English in the Peninsula. They have made great efforts. All their hopes have been in vain. . . . . . . Their army has received a check before the citadel of Burgos, and has been compelled, after suffering great losses, to evacuate the territory of the whole of Spain.

"I have myself invaded Russia, where the French arms have been constantly victorious—on the plains of Ostrowno, Polotsk, Mohilew, Smolensk, the Moskowa, and Malo-Jaroslawetz. The Russian armies have in no instance been able to maintain their ground against my eagles. Moscow has fallen into our hands.

"When the barriers of Russia had been forced, and the invincibility of our arms incontestably proved, a swarm of Tartars turned their parricidal hands against the fairest provinces of this vast empire, which they had been summoned to defend; and within a few weeks, in spite of the tears and despair of the unfortunate Muscovites, they burned more than four thousand of the most flourishing villages, more than fifty of the fairest towns, assuaging an ancient hatred under the pretence of retarding our progress by surrounding us with a desert. Yet in spite of all these obstacles we triumphed! Even the burning of Moscow itself, which annihilated, within the space of four days, the fruit of the toil of forty generations, failed to change the prosperous state of my affairs. . . . . But the excessive and premature rigour of the winter overwhelmed my troops with a frightful calamity. The lapse of a few nights showed a wonderful change; showed that I had suffered great losses; such losses, indeed, as would have broken my heart, if, under these serious circumstances, I had been accessible to any other sentiments than those relating to the interests, the glory, and the destinies of my people.

"At the sight of the misfortunes which have fallen upon us, the joy of the English has been great, the height of their hopes excessive. They offer our fairest provinces as a reward to those who will betray us. They name, as the condition of peace, the disruption of our glorious empire; and thus, in other terms, proclaim *perpetual war.*

"The energy of my people in these momentous circumstances, their attachment to the integrity of the empire, the affection they have testified towards myself, have dissipated all these chimeras, and afforded our enemies a finer idea of the real state of affairs.

"The disasters produced by the rigours of the winter have but been the means of displaying, in all their extent, the greatness and solidity of this empire, which is founded on the energy and love of fifty millions of citizens, and the territorial resources of the fairest countries of the world.

"It is with extreme satisfaction that we have perceived our people of Italy, of Old Holland, and the annexed deparments, vieing in loyalty with the native citizens of France, and fully conscious that their interests and well-being are identified with the consolidation and triumph of the grand empire.

"The agents of England propagate amongst our neighbours the spirit of revolt against sovereigns. England desires to see the whole continent a prey to civil war, and the madness of anarchy. But Providence designs that that country shall itself be of anarchy and civil war the first victim.

"I have signed with the pope a concordat, which puts an end to all the difficulties which had unfortunately arisen in the church. The French dynasty reigns and shall reign in Spain. I am satisfied with the conduct of all my allies. I will abandon none of them. I will maintain the integrity of their states. The Russians shall retreat to their terrible climate.

"I desire peace. It is necessary to the world. Four times since the rupture which followed the treaty of Amiens I have solemnly proposed it. Nevertheless, I shall never make any peace which is not honourable, and in conformity with the greatness of my empire. There is no mystery about my course of policy. I have made known the sacrifices which I am willing to make.

"So long as this maritime war shall last, my people ought to be ready to make every species of sacrifice; for a bad peace would involve all in destruction; deprive us even of hope, and compromise the fortunes of our descendants.

"America has taken up arms for the purpose of enforcing respect to the sovereignty of its flag. She has the goodwill of the world in the glorious struggle in which she has engaged. Should she succeed in compelling the enemies of the continent to recognize the principle that the flag covers the merchandize, and that neutrals ought not to be subject to a paper blockade—all which is agreeable to the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht—America will have deserved well of all nations. Posterity will say, that the Old World, having lost its rights, they were restored to it by the New.

"My minister of the interior will inform you, in his report on the state of the empire, of the prosperous condition of its agricultural interests, its manufactures, and interior commerce, and the continual increase of its population. At no period of her history, have French agriculture and manufactures been in a greater state of prosperity.

"I have need of extensive resources for the supply of all the expenses which circumstances now demand of me; but, by means of the various measures which will be submitted to you by my minister of finance, I shall be able to avoid imposing any new tax upon my people."

This discourse, couched in terms calculated to excite greatly the minds of those who heard it, was received with those acclamations which ever welcome the prince, whether ignominous or great, whether his throne be firmly established or tottering, who presents himself to the crowd. But when we reflect on the situation of Europe, on the cries of excited patriotism which resounded from one extremity of Europe to the other, it is impossible not to regret that the language here employed, should throw so many difficulties in the way of the negotiations, which could alone bring about peace, and stop the effusion of human blood. What, in fact, would be said in England, with respect to the declaration that the *French dynasty reigned and should reign in Spain?* What would be said by all the states interested in the division of the grand duchy of Warsaw, of the declaration that *France would maintain the integrity of the territories of all her allies?* Such were the sad questions excited by the nature of this discourse, and the course of events themselves will enable us to judge of its actual effects.

It would be difficult to imagine the change which the lapse of a few days had wrought in Germany, already so excited.

The King of Prussia, who had retired to Breslau for the purpose of being independent of us, and even of his own subjects, was then more master of his own will. Convinced that large bodies of troops could alone enable him to escape in safety from the chaos of existing events, he had already ordered new levies, without awaiting answers to the questions sent by him to Paris; publishing edicts which called upon and enabled all classes without distinction, to enrol themselves in the ranks of his armies, and take part in what his people called the enfranchisement of Germany. Upon being the subject of these appeals, the public mind, already in a state of fermentation, had been seized with a general vertigo, and from every quarter M. de Goltz, the only Prussian minister who remained at Berlin, had been besieged with questions, demanding for whom and against whom the king required the aid of his subjects. To all which questions M. de Goltz, who was perfectly acquainted with the real state of affairs, had replied by exhorting the questioners to confide in the wisdom and patriotism of the king, giving themselves up to his service, and leaving him free to employ them as he might think most advisable. The minister's eyes and countenance expressed, however, what his tongue dared not utter, and his questioners left him to enrol themselves amongst the king's troops. At the same time, the leaders of the secret societies in every direction, had declared that it was necessary to take up arms, that the king, being surrounded by an armed people, might at the right moment follow the inclination of his heart, which led him to devote himself to the enfranchisement of Germany. And under the influence of these various impulses, the whole youth of the nation enrolled itself in the ranks of the king's army, assuming as a badge, a black and white cockade, the want of which in his hat, was held to prove a man an enemy to his country.

The King of Prussia, on receiving information of the above facts was both pleased and frightened; pleased at the prospect of being almost immediately at the head of a considerable force, frightened at the idea of being pressed upon by both the Russians and the French, and being compelled to declare for either the former or the latter, without being certain on which side would be found the independence and restoration of Prussia. But at this moment, when circumstances rendered him most particularly indisposed to receive them with favour, he received the replies to the communications sent by him to Paris, and was filled with indignation at the rejection of his propositions, especially of that which regarded his entering into communications with the Emperor Alexander, for he held it of extreme importance that he should have an immediate personal interview with this monarch; in the first place, because the Austrians had already sent diplomatic agents to Wilna and London; secondly, because he wished to remove the belligerent armies from Silesia; and thirdly, and lastly, because he saw at Kœnigsberg the Baron de Stein, General d'York, and the Russian agents, governing the province, convoking the states, acting without any reference to himself, and in a manner which might eventually be contrary to his interests. He might, it is true, have secretly despatched M. de Knesebeck, to demand of Alexander the explanations which he desired respecting these various matters, but such a proceeding would have speedily become known, and would have been such an infraction of the Prussian alliance with Napoleon, as might lead to unpleasant consequences, should another victory of Jena open the campaign.

The Prussian monarch, presenting on the occasion the sad spectacle of an honest king compelled to adopt one of two opposite courses, of which the one was in accordance with the dictates of his conscience, the other with the interests of his crown, was in a state of cruel perplexity. Although ordinarily of a very undemonstrative temperament, he now displayed even a greater degree of anger than he felt, declaring that Napoleon oppressed him, withholding from him what was incontestably his own, by refusing to pay the ninety-four millions which he demanded; that in retaining the fortresses which he had given as a pledge for what he had himself owed, the latter violated treaties and the Prussian territory, since Prussia was no longer indebted to him; and that in prohibiting him from exercising the power of negotiating with a neighbouring state, Napoleon treated him as a dependent prince; conduct for which there might have been some pretext, had he still been able to afford protection, but which, after he had lost the Niemen, the Vistula, and was on the point of losing the Oder, was both unjust and unreasonable, since it prevented him from even negotiating for the security of his royal dwelling.

And at length, after having thus made a great display of these various reasons for so acting, the king, without either publicity or concealment, despatched M. de Knesebeck to the Russian head-quarters, and from that day it may be said, he had passed from our alliance to that of the enemy. He was by no means satisfied, in his own mind, that the course he had adopted was the right one, that he had not repeated the false step of 1806; but he saw the French retreating, step by step, from the Niemen to the Vistula, from the Vistula to the Oder; he heard his subjects calling upon him to act with vehement cries, he saw the great question of the day, being hour by hour, resolved without his intervention, and he determined, therefore, to await no other light than that which his reason could furnish.

The secret of the royal heart was divined by all his subjects, and by them reported to the Russians. M. de Knesebeck could not but report it to Alexander. It was necessary to march forward, to force the French head-quarters to fall back from Posen to Frankfort-on-the-Oder; and necessary also to march upon Warsaw, from Warsaw to Cracow, that Silesia, enveloped thus by its two extremities, might fall, with its king, into the hands of the Russian emperor. But it was necessary to do even still more than this; to march, in fact, upon the Elbe, to disengage Berlin and Hambourg on the right, Dresden on the left; by which means not only would Prussia be freed, its whole population rising as one man, but the Hanseatic provinces also, together with Hanover, Westphalia, Saxony, and probably even Wurtemberg and Bavaria; whilst, at the same time—and this result was a thousandfold more to be desired than even the others—Austria would be freed from the bonds which shackled her.

The more cautious military men, however, with Prince Kutusof at their head, disapproved of so bold a march, for it would be impossible to leave in the rear Dantzic and Thorn, with garrisons of thirty thousand men, Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Spandau, with thirty thousand more, unblockaded at least; and to withdraw troops from the army for the purpose of blockading these places, would leave it too enfeebled for the field. After leaving, as would be necessary, forty thousand men on the right, before the fortresses of the lower Vistula, twenty thousand or thirty thousand on the left, before Warsaw and the Austrians, there would remain but fifty thousand with whom to carry on the offensive movements against the French. And it would be folly indeed, urged these objectors to a forward movement, to meet, under these circumstances, the first bound of that irresistible lion, against whom success had hitherto only been obtained by avoiding him.

To this reasoning it was replied, that the French were shut up in the fortresses, and could not sally forth from thence; that the Prussians and twenty thousand Russians, at the most, would be able to hold them in check, that on the left, the Poles were in a state of consternation, ready to accept from Alexander a restoration of their country, which they could not hope to obtain at the hands of France; that the Austrian soldiers were on terms of the greatest friendliness with those of Russia, would willingly fall back before the weakest Russian corps that might be directed to follow them; that this eighty thousand men at least would be available for a forward movement; that Prince Eugene had not twenty thousand; that the twenty-five thousand or thirty thousand French troops assembled at Berlin, were threatened on all sides, and had the greatest trouble to maintain their ground; that the most simple demonstration on the part of the Russian troops, would force the French head-quarters to retreat from Posen upon Frankfort, from Frankfort upon Berlin, from Berlin upon Madgebourg; that by releasing Berlin and Dresden from the control of the enemy, Prussia would be enfranchised, and that the fact of her alliance being taken from Napoleon, and secured to Russia and England, would effect a complete change in the state of European affairs.

These assertions were truer than those who made them, or Alexander to whom they were daily repeated could suppose, but it was not so much truth that was requisite to convince the latter, as the tumult of excitement which now prevailed around him, the glitter of the sudden glory which had now come upon him, the title of king of kings which on all sides met his ears. These were motives sufficient in themselves to determine him to advance. M. de Knesebeck had not had to make a very long journey to meet him, and had encountered him on his march upon the Vistula. But what had he then to say? Nothing but what Alexander already knew, nothing but what had already been told him;—that when he should have advanced a little further, both Prussia and her king would be his allies.

Alexander had employed the month of January in advancing, between Poland and Old Prussia, upon the Vistula. Remaining from the 5th of February to the 9th at Plock, he had then set out for Kalisch, having only a short distance to traverse to reach Breslau and Frederick William. The Russian guards and the reserve, comprising about eighteen thousand men had followed him. In the meantime, Wittgenstein on the right with the old army of the Dwina, preceded by some thousands of Cossacks, had advanced at the head of thirty-four thousand men upon Custrin and Berlin, leaving in the rear the army of Moldavia to watch Dantzic and Thorn, with sixteen thousand men; whilst, on the left, Miloradovitch, Doctorof, and Sacken, with forty thousand men, directed their movements towards Warsaw, slowly following the Austrian corps. The orders given to the two columns on the right and left, were, to advance continually, whilst Alexander awaited in the centre the right moment for entering Breslau, and throwing himself into the arms of the Prussian King, and whilst the old Moldavian army, in the command of which Barclay de Tolly had replaced Admiral Tchitchakoff, watched the garrison on the Vistula.

Prince Eugene, outflanked on the left by Thorn, on the right by Warsaw, and afraid to leave Berlin unguarded by withdrawing from it Grenier's troops; was quite incapable of maintaining his position at Posen. He would have had, indeed, the means of doing so, had Prince Schwarzenberg been willing to fall back, with Reynier and Poniatowski, upon Kalisch; but when this Prince was invited to make this movement, he replied, that having upon Cracow, that is to say towards Gallicia, his depôts, recruits and magazines, it was impossible for him to take the Kalisch route, but that he would cover the movements of such of his companions in arms, as might think proper to manœuvre in that direction. Upon this declaration Reynier had immediately set out for Kalisch, and had happily arrived there before the Russians, from whom he had only escaped with many rear-guard encounters. Poniatowski, collecting in all haste about fifteen thousand Poles, and leaving a garrison at Modlin, had not been able to reach the Kalisch route in time, and had been compelled to follow the Prince of Schwarzenberg upon Cracow, whither he had withdrawn with the other fugitives of the Polish government.

Prince Eugene, upon being informed of these various movements had quitted Posen, and marched towards Frankfort-on-the-Oder by the great Meseritz route; but considering the position of Frankfort as but little more tenable than that of Posen, he had resolved to proceed to Berlin, where his own and Grenier's troops would form a body of forty thousand men, and where, therefore, a better front might be presented to the enemy, than had been possible during the last month. Whilst he was on his march, the skirmishers of the Russian army under Colonels Tottenborn and Czernicheff, having passed the Oder at Wrietzen, close to Berlin, had surprised a regiment of Italian cavalry of General Grenier's corps, and cutting it almost entirely to pieces, had filled Berlin with an immoderate burst of joy, which General Grenier somewhat calmed by immediately repelling the over-rash skirmishers of Wittgenstein's army, with two divisions of infantry.

By taking up a strong position in front of Berlin, summoning to his aid the corps of General Lauriston, and showing a firm determination to accept battle, Prince Eugene would, most probably, have succeeded in checking the Russians; but fearing to provoke decisive events before the arrival of Napoleon, and finding himself surrounded by enemies, he determined to proceed to take up his position on the Elbe, whither General Reynier had already been compelled to fall back by the movement of the Russian centre. On the 4th of March he set out from Berlin, having despatched his sick and wounded and matériel to Madgebourg; and now, being at the head of forty thousand men, he had no longer reason to fear that either his prudence or his eagles would be insulted with impunity.

On the following day he was on the Elbe, and brought to a close this long retreat, which had commenced at Moscow on the 20th of October, and had been distinguished by such strange and prodigious disasters. Prince Eugene had nothing to reproach himself with since he had assumed the command, unless it were with having been a little over cautious, and he had certainly rendered indisputable services. All the marshals and generals without troops, except Marshals Davout and Victor, had quitted him. He sent Marshal Davout to Dresden with the division Lagrange to receive General Reynier, who returned from Kalisch, and to defend the important positions Dresden and Targau; and established himself at Wittenberg with the ten thousand men who had been long his sole resource, together with the troops of Grenier's corps, and drew to Madgebourg those divisions of Lauriston's corps which were ready for actual service. As he would have by these means eighty thousand men on the Elbe, besides many strong fortresses in a good state of defence, the enemy would be unable to force him from this line.

We may easily comprehend how tumultuous was the joy experienced throughout all Prussia, on the arrival of news of the definite evacuation of Berlin; and it was this event which had the chief effect in inducing Frederick William to declare in favour of our enemies, for now, at length yielding to the reasons urged by the various emissaries—the fiery Baron de Stein, an Alsatian of great acuteness, the Baron d'Austett, whose native land had long since become French, and General Scharnhorst, an officer held in great esteem by the German patriots—who had been sent to point out to him the many advantages to be derived by such a step, and yielding to the enthusiasm of his subjects, he consented to declare against the French alliance, demanding, at the same time, however, that as war it was to be, the war should be persevered in to the utmost; until the allies had exhausted upon it, if necessary, their last piece of gold, their last soldier. He authorized, then, M. de Hardenberg, to sign on the 28th of February, a treaty by which Russia engaged to assemble, immediately, a hundred and fifty thousand men, and Prussia eighty thousand (each of these powers proposing to assemble larger numbers than these without delay), for the purpose of carrying on war with France, until Prussia should have received a constitution more in conformity with her old state of existence, and the balance of power in Europe; by which the two contracting powers agreed not to lay down their arms until this end should have been obtained; agreed to make every endeavour to induce Austria to join the common cause; and never to treat with the enemy but in concert.

Whilst entering into these engagements, neither the king nor M. de Hardenberg had dared to come to an open understanding with M. de St. Marsan, and their embarrassment with respect to him was extreme. M. de Hardenberg was sufficiently clear-sighted to perceive that he was playing a part which might have very dangerous consequences for his country, and the king had a memory sufficiently good to be conscious of the same fact, and so long as the French army had not repassed the Elbe, they scarcely dared to avow what they had done. M. de Hardenberg, indeed, was so agitated, that on the very eve of the signature of the treaty with Russia, he said to M. de St. Marsan—"Only do something in favour of Prussia, and you will save us from a cruel perplexity!" The king, against whose honesty of character we wish to say nothing, was on this occasion, however, less frank than his minister, and made use of a ruse which was little worthy of him, feigning extreme irritation at some recent proceedings which had been laid to the charge of the French army; and which were as follows. Napoleon had given orders that the troops should pay for all that they required; but the Prussians had taken advantage of their position, and demanded such prices of General Mathieu Dumas the intendant of the army, as it was impossible he should submit to. Napoleon had then seized the various goods required at his own price, ordered, also, that the fortresses on the Oder should provision themselves as they might be able, taking from the surrounding country what it was impossible to purchase. The governors of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau had not failed to follow these directions, and had seized such quantities of cattle, grain and wood as they required. Another cause of offence was, that Prince Eugene, in those parts of the country which were dominated by his troops, had prevented the levies en masse. On the 28th of February, the day of the signature of the treaty with Russia, the Prussian monarch, affecting to be excessively irritated, desired that a note should be addressed to M. de St. Marsan, in which an immediate explanation should be peremptorily demanded of these acts imputed to the French army. M. de St. Marsan being unable to give any reply himself, despatched the note to Paris by express.

But there was, henceforth, little concealment with respect to the course which the king had resolved to adopt; and a series of measures of a sufficiently significant character speedily rendered the rupture with France almost official. Among these was a decree for the formation of a great

Prussian army in Silesia, to which the illustrious General Blucher, who had always manifested the greatest distress at the subjection of his country, was appointed commander-in-chief; General Scharnhorst, who had been the principal means of inducing the king to renounce our alliance, being nominated chief of the staff. At the same time General d'York was declared innocent of the charges brought against him, and reinstated in the command of the troops with which he had deserted from our side.

After such measures there could be no reason for any further restraint, and the interview between the two sovereigns who had thus recently become allies, took place on the 15th of March. Alexander, accompanied by M. de Nesselrode and a crowd of generals, entered the capital of Silesia, and in the midst of the plaudits of the people, and the acclamations of the army, threw himself into the arms of the friend who had formerly been sacrificed at Tilsit, and had been found again in the catastrophe at Moscow.

The city was illuminated during three days, and the king had to have M. de St. Marsan's house surrounded by his own guards, to preserve him from violence. And at length on the 17th of March, M. de Hardenberg broke the profound silence he had observed with respect to the French ambassador during Alexander's sojourn at Breslau, by transmitting to him a declaration of war with France, and, whilst overwhelming him with testimonies of personal respect, leaving him to choose the time and manner of his departure.

We need scarcely say, that this event, although foreseen, produced the greatest possible effect throughout Germany and Europe; and that it was the occasion of an increase of exultation and hope amongst the German patriots, according to whom Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and all the princes, in short, who were called our slaves, would immediately imitate the conduct of Prussia, and join the general coalition. At the same time, for the purpose of accelerating this result, Colonels Czernicheff and Tettenborn, leaving to Wittgenstein's corps the care of following Prince Eugene's rear-guard in the direction of Magdebourg and Wittenberg, descended the Elbe with the Cossacks, with the view of making a demonstration in the direction of Hambourg, and attempting, in concert with the English flotillas, to arouse to revolt those Hanseatic Frenchmen, who were French in spite of themselves, and only longed for an opportunity of ceasing to be so. At the same time the advanced guards of the Russian army of the centre, which had traversed the Oder, were directed upon Torgau and Dresden, that Saxony might be induced to declare war against France, by the same means which had been so effectual in the case of Prussia.

Prince Eugene in his anxiety for Dresden, in falling back upon the Elbe, had carried his centre to Wittenberg, instead of carrying it to Magdebourg, and in consequence of this movement, Hambourg had been left uncovered, Colonels Tettenborn and Czernicheff had hereupon hastened with nine or ten thousand Cossacks, supported by some light infantry, towards Lubeck and Hambourg, whilst the English, on their side, had formed again an establishment on the isle of Heligoland, in which they had accumulated arms, ammunition, and matériel of war of all kinds. Their flotillas filled the mouths of the Elbe. Nothing more was wanting to inflame the already heated brains of the inhabitants of Hambourg; and when General Morand (not the celebrated Morand of Davout's corps, but an old general of the same name, who was brave, but, unfortunately, infirm), retreated at this moment with two thousand men, from Pomerania upon Hambourg, he was suddenly attacked, mortally wounded, and taken prisoner, with a portion of his troops. In another direction, General Lauriston, directed to proceed by Osnabruck, Hanover, and Brunswick, upon Magdebourg, was still forty leagues from the latter place. General Bourcier was at Hanover, in the midst of the depôts of his cavalry. The forces which were quartered in Hambourg itself were not sufficient, either to check the Cossacks, or overawe the populace, and the French authorities, who had been very roughly treated on the preceding 24th of February, fearing they might encounter still more unmerciful usage on the present occasion, evacuated Hambourg, giving it up to the municipal officers, and fled to Bremen. At the same moment Tettenborn's Cossacks entered, amidst general rejoicings, and received the keys of the city for the purpose of carrying them to the Russian emperor. The municipal authorities appointed by the French, were replaced by the old senate. A legion named the Hambourg legion, was immediately formed, composed of all the citizens willing to fight in the cause of Germany, and equipped at the expense of the rich burgesses of Hambourg, who, within a few hours, subscribed a large amount for this purpose. The English were signalled to come up, and speedily did so, with vessels filled with sugar, coffee, and cotton, adding to the joy caused by the disappearance of the French authorities, that resulting from the abolition of the continental blockade, and the prospect of the renewal of commerce. The unhappy Hamburgians little knew to what a cruel reverse of fortune they exposed themselves by this imprudent demonstration.

On the Upper Elbe, in Saxony, and in Dresden, the same movements resulted from the approach of the Russian and Prussian troops.

The unfortunate Frederick Augustus, beginning to perceive that he was unfitted for an ambitious path in life, was ready to renounce, although naturally with some regret, Poland, provided only he were left in possession of his dear Saxony, just in the same state as he had possessed it before he was overwhelmed with greatness at the hands of Napoleon. Since the last events, although still as devoted as ever to France, he had sought a councillor who might direct his weakness, and he had considered that he had made the best possible choice in selecting for this pupose the emperor of Austria, both the father-in-law and ally of Napoleon. M. de Metternich had thereupon immediately attempted to induce him to join that coalition of German princes which he was endeavouring to form, and of which the end was declared to be the pacification of Europe, by interposing between England, Russia, and France, and forcing them to accept a peace which should be constructed with a direct view to the interests of Germany. Having been assured, and with reason, that to endeavour to re-establish peace on terms which should render Germany independent and powerful, would not be to betray France, but rather to serve her, and at the same time to fulfil the duty of a good German, Frederick Augustus had not hesitated to yield to his adviser, and began to evade the demands made by the French minister for supplies of provisions and contingents of troops by declarations of inability to procure them, partly on account of the shortness of the time within which they were required, and partly on account of the spirit of ill-will pervading his subjects. His corps d'armée having returned to the Elbe under the command of General Reynier, he had cantonned it in Torgau, and then, under pretext of recruiting it, had placed it in a strong position, to await, in a species of neutrality similar to that of Prince Schwarzenberg, the direction of Austrian policy. With respect to his cavalry, however, consisting of twelve hundred superb cuirassiers, and twelve hundred excellent hussars and chasseurs, and which, when imperiously demanded by the French emperor, he had positively refused to send to him, he was resolved to establish them in some secure position with himself in their midst, out of the way of the belligerent armies.

This being the disposition of his mind, it needed but the defection of Prussia and the approach of the Russian advanced guard, to determine him to execute the project of flight which he had resolved on. In spite, therefore, of the remonstrances of the French minister, M. de Serra, who took pains to point out to him the inconveniences and dangers which must result from his departure, he now set out, leaving Dresden in the hands of Marshal Davoust, and the most valuable portions of his property in the fortress of Kœnigstein; and proceeded by Plauen and Hof to Ratisbonne, in the territory of the King of Bavaria, who was as embarrassed as himself.

Scarcely had he departed from Dresden, when the Russians appeared in the environs of the city. The Saxon infantry enclosed in Torgau, declared itself unwilling to leave its position for the purpose of aiding in the defence of the Elbe, and Marshal Davout, had, therefore, for the protection of the upper course of the Elbe, only the French division Durutte, some troops sent to him by Prince Eugene, and, finally, the second battalions of his corps, which were organized at Erfurt. He hastened to Dresden, and immediately carried out, with pitiless severity, although never with wanton cruelty, all those measures which military tactics rendered necessary; destroying, amongst other things, in spite of the threats and outcries of the inhabitants, the beautiful stone bridge which served as the means of communication between the old and new towns. And these measures of defence speedily took a prominent place amongst the grievances alleged against us by the Germans; engravings respecting the destruction of the bridge of Dresden by, as he was called in the north, the ferocious Davout, being spread abroad by thousands throughout the cities and country districts.

The fresh excitement produced by the defection of Prussia was speedily felt in Vienna, in spite of the distance and its habitual tranquillity. The profound policy of M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis, although guessed by the men of more acute intellect, was quite beyond the comprehension of the more passionate persons of the court, the army, and the people, who saw in it only a culpable dilatoriness in breaking off the alliance with France, and repudiating the disastrous engagements which had been entered into on the occasion of the marriage of Napoleon with Maria Louisa, and the irritation of this party now became extreme; the empress herself, the princess of Modena, and, which is even more astonishing, the archduke Charles, being amongst its members.

The excitement at length reached such a height, that M. de Metternich had reason to entertain some fears for his personal safety, and the government was compelled to order numerous arrests, even of persons of high position, such as

M. de Hormayer, one of the highest officials of the Austrian chancery, who was the means employed of secretly carrying on negotiations with the Tyrol. The Emperor and M. de Metternich were equally dissatisfied with this state of affairs, being unwilling to shake off Napoleon's yoke, only to become subject to that of masses of the populace; and being, moreover, so far from certain that Napoleon's power was destroyed, that they expected to see him debouch by the defiles of Thuringia, to punish the imprudent populations that had exposed themselves to his vengeance. They were anxious, in any case, to refrain from taking any decided step, until the Austrian army should have been reconstituted, and would have much preferred that the condition of Germany should have been placed on a new and satisfactory footing by means of mediation, and without the danger of a war with France.

Such being its views and inclinations, the Austrian cabinet never ceased to counsel prudence and moderation to that of France, and was thrown into a state of despair, when it found Napoleon, as in the report addressed to the senate, demanding new levies, and the imperial address delivered on the 14th of February, announcing the determination to pursue an absolute course of policy with respect to Spain, the Hanseatic departments, and the grand duchy of Warsaw, for this was to render mediation impossible. M. de Metternich held long and frequent discussions with M. Otto on these points, endeavouring to learn from him the conditions on which France would accept peace; and when all his efforts proved fruitless, the French minister being perfectly ignorant on the subject, he intimated the conditions on which peace would be accepted by Europe.—"Spain," he said, "will scarcely be conceded to you, after the events of the last campaign. This is a matter of no importance to us Germans, personally, and only affects us with respect to England, in strict concert with whom Russia and Prussia will alone negotiate. You will be able only, at the most, to induce England to consent to the annexation of Holland to France; but this again, is a matter which only touches us with respect to British interests. With regard, however, to the definitive annexation of the Hanseatic provinces to the French empire, you will find England, Prussia, Russia, and Germany, equally opposed to you. And why be so determined on this point? Of what importance to you are places so distant from your real frontier, so little useful to your defences, so slightly conducive to your commercial interests, so little in sympathy with your nation, so necessary to the constitution of an independent Germany. When you attached great importance to the maintenance of the continental blockade, the possession of these provinces might, it is true, have been valuable, but, at the present time, this blockade is disregarded on all sides, and you yourselves infringe it every day. With respect to Prussia, it is necessary that you should consent that it should become both stronger and more extensive, as being the intermediate power between Russia and the south of Europe; an intermediate state such as it would be absurd to attempt to find in Poland, since you have not succeeded in re-establishing it as a kingdom, and of which it rather belongs to us than to you to purpose the reconstitution, since we are the neighbours of Russia and you are not. Why then do you express yourselves so decidedly with respect to the grand duchy of Warsaw, which cannot possibly be maintained, which Russia will never suffer to exist on her frontier, and which is, moreover, the only means of re-constructing Prussia, without destroying your kingdom of Westphalia? Why place in our path insuperable difficulties, by expressing yourselves on these points as though your determination upon them were irrevocable?" . . . . . . Then referring to the confederation of the Rhine, M. de Metternich continued as follows. . . . . . . "Of what advantage to you is this strange creation, which imposes charges upon you without producing any return, which is incompatible with the independence of Germany, and is at this very moment irrevocably destroyed in the public opinion of all Germans? Is it that you are determined to persist in this matter for the purpose of preserving the empty title of protector? Is it that your emperor, possessor of the frontier which extends from Basle to the Texel, and having Strasbourg Mayence, Coblentz, Cologne, Wesel, and Groningen, as the *points d'appuis* of this frontier, has not sufficient influence over Germany, is not already a sufficient source of anxiety to her?" . . . . . . Disclaiming on the part of Austria, any desire but for the independence of Germany and an European peace, M. de Metternich added—"You will tell us that you are powerful, that you will again triumph over your enemies. We know that you are, we believe that you will do so, and it is even necessary that you should do so, to enable us to negotiate the peace of which we have intimated to you some of the conditions; but at least render it possible, refrain from displaying too absolute a disposition, and do not be the cause of breaking off the negotiations, when they are but scarcely begun!"

These admirable counsels, given with the utmost sincerity, and enunciated with the utmost gentleness, showed very clearly, that the peace which Austria was disposed to accept, and even, perhaps, to support by her forces, was such an one as might be described somewhat as follows.—Spain to be restored to the Bourbons, the Hanseatic towns to be restored to Germany, the confederation of the Rhine to be suppressed, the grand duchy of Warsaw to be divided between Prussia, Russia, and Austria; a better frontier on the Inn, and the restoration of Illyria being at the same time granted to the latter. And truly France keeping the line of the Rhine, together with Holland, having the kingdom of Westphalia as an allied state or vassal, Piedmont, Tuscany, and Rome, as French departments, and Lombardy and Naples as family principalities, would be as powerful an empire as could well be imagined.

But whatever were to be the terms of the peace which was to be ultimately accepted, it was not necessary, as M. de Metternich wisely remarked, to announce absolute resolutions, which would prevent even the commencement of negotiations, and compel the cabinet of Vienna to declare at once either for or against us,—and probably against us, as was not yet declared, but might readily be divined—"Let us once," said M. de Metternich, "assemble the negotiators, and the negotiations will proceed more rapidly than is now believed possible, for the world is anxious for peace, and will demand it so vehemently at the meeting of the first congress assembled to discuss it, that this congress will be unable to refuse it."

At this very moment the perfect justice of these counsels was verified, and in the following manner. On being authorized to do so by the French government, the court of Vienna had sent M. de Wessenberg to London, and M. de Lebzeltern to Kalisch to offer the intervention of their court to the two principal belligerent powers, for the purpose of procuring a reconciliation between them and France, and a peace of which the whole world had pressing need. M. de Wessenberg, on arriving in London had been received with great politeness by Lord Castlereagh, but secretly, that the public mind might not be uselessly agitated. Whilst, however, the English minister testified great satisfaction at the presence of an Austrian agent in London, and expressed the greatest readiness to accept the intervention of the Austrian court, he said that probably he knew that his mission had lost its aim, since Napoleon's address, now known throughout the whole of Europe, left no doubt that he would refuse all reasonable conditions. He added, that England would be always ready to treat on equitable grounds, that neither she nor her allies were disposed to dispute the possession by France of the just greatness due to her efforts, and her long wars, but that she would never surrender generous Spain to Napoleon's usurpation.

At Kalisch, in the Russian camp, the reception of M. de Lebzeltern had been deferred, sometimes on one pretext, sometimes on another, until time had been gained to consult the English cabinet, after which he was received with infinite respect, told that Russia was anxious for peace, that the intervention of Austria would be gladly accepted, but that the Austrian court would itself perceive the impossibility of treating with Napoleon after the declaration which he had just made, that when Austria should have returned, as it was natural and necessary she should, to her alliance with the rest of Europe, that her alliance would then be gladly welcomed, and she would be made the arbiter of peace, of war, and, in short, of all the interests of Europe.

When the despatches announcing these things arrived in Vienna, M. de Metternich communicated their contents to the French minister, inviting him to transmit them to the Emperor Napoleon, and expressing earnest hopes that the latter would take them into serious consideration, and at once indicate to the Austrian cabinet the course which it ought now to pursue. M. de Metternich added, that he had given to the Prince of Schwarzenberg a temporary leave, his corps having entered the Gallician frontier, and that this prince was about to visit Paris, for the purpose of endeavouring to obtain from Napoleon more frank and satisfactory explanations than those obtained by M. de Bubna.

This defection of Prussia, these agitations throughout Germany, these communications from Austria, alike failed to have any great effect upon Napoleon. The defection of Prussia he had expected and regarded as inevitable, from the time that he had seen our head-quarters falling back successively upon the Vistula, the Oder, and Elbe. At the same time, being little accustomed to watch the great movements of public opinion, but slightly disposed to believe in their existence, and still less disposed to yield to their influence, he was surprised at the boldness of Prussia in declaring against him, and found her more courageous than he had believed her to be; but was, nevertheless, convinced that the King of Prussia was filled with terror at the idea of the approaching campaign, and was resolved speedily to realize all his fears. Calculating that Prussia would not be able to contribute more than one hundred thousand men to the coalition, of whom fifty thousand would be immediately available, and that Russia was not capable at that time of placing in line more than one hundred thousand, and seeing these powers advancing upon the upper Elbe and Thuringia with such forces as these, he felt certain that within three or four weeks he would be able to drive them back into Poland more quickly than they had come. Experiencing already the joy of victory, he felt certain that he would be able by means of one or two battles to bring those powers to reason, to reinstate himself in the position from which he was supposed to have fallen, and to conclude a peace, not precisely according to the terms of his address, in which he had considered it good policy to declare himself even more inflexible than he was in reality, but still generally according to the plan therein laid down, except with respect to Spain, where he was willing at length, but too late, to make great sacrifices.

The defection of Prussia was so far from dismaying him, that he saw in it only a pretext for demanding of France fresh levies. He was very satisfied with his levy of a hundred thousand men drawn from the four anterior classes, it having procured for him, for the imperial guard, and the reorganization of the old corps, a species of excellent troops, who, although at first displaying more discontent than the other conscripts, speedily became reconciled to their lot on joining their various corps, and who, with the stature and bodily strength of twenty-five years, possessed the courage natural to Frenchmen. He now, therefore, caused a new senatus consultum to be prepared, for the purpose of demanding eighty thousand more men, not only of the four, but of the six last conscriptions, naturally alleging, as the reason for this fresh levy the defection of Prussia; not indeed to the senate, which had no need of it, but to the enlightened portion of the public, which, whilst sighing at the necessity for such sacrifices, could not deny that the necessity existed in the presence of the dangers with which France was now threatened.

Prussia served also as the reason for a demand of another kind. The appeal to arms in Germany had been made to all classes, but had been first made to the young nobility. In France the levies had been taken in general only from the middle or lower classes; the upper classes escaping from services by finding substitutes, for whom, so horribly sanguinary had the war become, they were compelled to pay heavy premiums. They had hitherto only contributed to the voluntary gifts by their fortunes; Napoleon had long been desirous that they should do so with their persons also, and he thought the present occasion was a favourable opportunity for prevailing upon them to do so. In Germany the young noblesse considered it its duty to run to arms at the head of all the other classes of the people; and why should not this be the case also in France? In former times the French noblesse had allowed to none the honour of preceding them on the battle-field; arms were then their profession, their glory, the greatest passion of their life. And why should it not be so at the present time? It was possible, indeed, to give an explanation of its disinclination to serve, in the fact that it loved the old dynasty and disliked the new. Although this might be a valid reason in the mouths of the old men who were grown grey in the imbecile retreat of their châteaux, it was by no means admissible, according to Napoleon, or at least would not long be so, with respect to those young men who had blood in their veins, which could not fail to ferment with the ardour of youth, and who could not really believe that the chase was a pursuit sufficient to satisfy their age, their rank, their destiny. He had but, he believed, to form them either voluntarily or by force, into a corps, the title of which should flatter their vanity, whilst the beauty of its uniform should satisfy the frivolity of their age; and once transported to the army, he would know how to inflame their ardour, for it was not to be supposed that they were less subject than the rest of the nation to the inspiration of the cannon's roar, or of the voice of the great captain.

As it would not be possible to levy these persons by means of a conscription, since they had just satisfied a conscription by providing substitutes, and it would be necessary, therefore, to take them arbitrarily, some on account of their wealth, some on account of their names, Napoleon resolved to invest the prefects with power to select them at will, giving as an excuse for this irregular method of proceeding, the singular reason that it was chosen for the sake of equality. And by this method, Napoleon hoped that he would obtain ten thousand excellent cavaliers, distinguished for their birth and wealth, and most probably, for valour also, whom he resolved to form into four regiments of two thousand five hundred men each, under the title of guards of honour, and intended to serve by the side of the emperor himself, and to wear a brilliant uniform. He selected Versailles, Metz, Lyons, and Tours, as the places in which these regiments were to be formed, and nominated as their colonels men distinguished for their families, their rank, and their achievements. They were the Count de Pully, general of division; the Baron Lepicé, general of the horse-grenadiers of the guard; the Count de Segur, general of brigade; and the Count de Saint Sulpice, general of cuirassiers.

Having prepared to meet by this extension of his armaments the course of events in Prussia, it was necessary that he should bestow equal attention upon the proceedings of Austria, which, whilst retaining the title of ally, was gradually assuming the position of mediator, from which she might readily proceed to one of a less friendly character. Since the defection of Prussia, she had, in fact, become very urgent in her communications, expressing an eager desire for some basis on which to negotiate the peace which she declared to be indispensable; and it would speedily be difficult to refuse to come to an explanation with her, especially as Prince Schwarzenberg was on his way to Paris, and had such access to the court of the Tuileries, that the maintenance of any reserve with respect to him would be almost impossible. At the same time Napoleon was himself disinclined to believe that Austria would declare against him for the following reasons.—In the first place because the population of Vienna was not so *exigeant* as that of Berlin, and the court of the former city not so feeble as that of the latter; in the next place because Austria had contracted family alliances with us, which, if not an indestructible bond, must at least be the means of making her hesitate to join our enemies, since shame is a yoke which is not without its strength; and lastly, because she was governed by men who had learned to fear the French arms. To a dread of war with France, and to a desire of gaining some rich territory from the turmoil in which were involved at present all European affairs, Napoleon reduced the whole policy of the Austrian court, and in doing so, unhappily for himself and us, greatly deceived himself. For he failed to perceive that Austria, although doubtless under the influence of interested motives was as wise as she was interested, and considered as far superior to the advantages to be derived from any extension of territory, the political advantage of regaining the independence of Germany, and thus establishing a better balance of power in Europe. Moreover, with regard to territorial aggrandizement, there was nothing which the European coalition was not ready to offer, and actually to give her, for the sake of inducing her to declare against us; and the sole reason which deterred her from seizing the opportunity of thus gaining a vast increase of territory, and, what she desired far more, a better arrangement of the nations of Europe, was the fear of being again at war with us—a fear which the incessant augmentation of our enemies could not fail daily to diminish.

Considering the Austrian cabinet as solely-influenced by fear and interest, Napoleon sought in the defection of Prussia the means of attaching this cabinet to his own interests, and determined to offer her the following baits. Austria desired peace, and, provided he could obtain it on his own terms, he was equally anxious for it. He knew that she was arming, and that she already had about a hundred thousand available troops. She might, at the very commencement of the campaign, employ these hundred thousand men in a decisive manner, and for the adoption of such a course there was now a very natural occasion. Her overtures of peace had been badly received, and she had reason, therefore, to indulge in extreme displeasure. She might now, at once, he said, constitute herself mediator between the belligerent powers, demand of these the establishment of an armistice, in order that negotiations might be conducted in peace, and then, should this demand be disregarded, debouch with her hundred thousand men from Bohemia to Silesia, taking in flank the coalition troops which the French were about to attack in front, the result of which would be that, after a month, not a single Russian or Prussian would remain between the Elbe and the Niemen. Europe would then be at the mercy of victorious France and Austria, and the division of the spoils would be easy. The Emperor Francis might have Silesia, which was the subject of eternal regret to the house of Austria, a large portion of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and Illyria. Saxony should be indemnified for the loss of the grand duchy of Warsaw, by the gift of Brandenbourg and Berlin. Prussia should be thrown back beyond the Oder, and consisting of Old Prussia, and a considerable portion of the duchy of Warsaw, become a species of Poland, partly German and partly Polish, having Kœnigsberg and Warsaw for its capitals.

It is very true that Austria, by throwing into Silesia the hundred thousand men who were ready for service, and, if necessary, the hundred thousand others who would be ready in three months, might have procured the total defeat of the European coalition, and forced it immediately to treat for peace. But what did Napoleon offer her in return for such an employment of her forces? He offered to carry back the line of the Prussian territory to the other side of the Vistula, to leave to her of her old states, only Old Prussia from Dantzic to Kœnigsberg, adding to it the grand duchy of Warsaw, and replacing it between the Oder and the Elbe by the house of Saxony, and what he thus offered was, in fact, simply the destruction of Prussia, for this power transported to Kœnigsberg or Warsaw, would no more become Poland than Saxony, extended from Dresden to Berlin, would become Prussia. The strength of a nation consists not only in its territory but in its history, the memories of its past. Were this plan carried out, there would no longer be a German Prussia, and Austria, which sought its own independence in the independence of Germany, would have failed to obtain what she desired, although aggrandized by the addition of a province, and that province Silesia. She would have been, indeed, but an enriched slave; and this was a truth, which, had she not perfectly understood it, as she did, the indignant cry of the whole people of Germany would speedily have forced upon her. The idea entertained by Napoleon of the state of Europe was a fantasy, leading him to imagine that he had but to increase his battalions by an additional hundred thousand men, to add another victory to the series of his triumphs, and that he might then settle the affairs of Europe as he chose. Knowing that Austria had long hated Prussia, and long regretted the loss of Silesia, he concluded that he had but to offer the annihilation of Prussia as a gratification to her jealousy, and to restore to her the province of Silesia, to induce her to act as he desired. He failed to understand that there is a time when all the world is compelled to be honest and disinterested; that it is, when an intolerable oppression compels it to unite for mutual defence, and that he, Napoleon, had now unfortunately brought that time to pass for our ruin, by making us the voluntary oppressors of Europe. He failed to comprehend that Austria might prefer a lesser amount of territory, with an established system of affairs, to a larger extent under a system which was as fictitious as it was arbitrary.

A serious misfortune, incident to the plan thus entertained by Napoleon with respect to Austria, consisted in the fact that it brought her more prominently forward into the scene of affairs than was at all necessary, gave her a dangerous importance, and furnished her with a pretext for arming, and smoothed the path by which she might pass without dishonour, and almost without embarrassment, from a state of strict alliance with us to a state of open hostility. And this was a fault which Napoleon greatly aggravated by the selection which he made of a person to urge upon the Austrian court the adoption of his ideas. Our ambassador at this court was M. Otto, formerly ambassador in Berlin, a wise and modest man, who was excellently fitted to be our representative at the court of Vienna, had we endeavoured to keep on good terms with it, without permitting it to take too prominent a part in the conduct of European affairs. Napoleon now considering, however, that he was neither sufficiently influential nor clear-sighted, took pains to find a fit successor for him, and selected M. de Narbonne, whose tardy but warm adhesion to the empire we have already related. A patriot of 1789, an old minister of Louis XVI., a grand seigneur, a clever soldier, a man of brilliant and varied talents, and endowed with much tact and grace of manner, M. de Narbonne was marvellously fitted to succeed in an aristocratic and elegant court, knowing how to blend the character of the man of the world with that of the politician. His fault was that he was too inclined to exceed the limits of his rôle; but for the performance of an active part no better agent could have been selected, and there was good reason to suppose that M. de Metternich would find it difficult to elude his penetration and energy.

Napoleon having selected, then, M. de Narbonne, as his ambassador, was so anxious to send him to his post that he would not await even the arrival of Prince Schwarzenberg, who was on his way to Paris, to explain the views of the Austrian court. He was little anxious, indeed, to know what these views might be, since, whatever they were, he was only desirous that his own should be adopted in their place; and M. de Narbonne could not reach Vienna too soon, since the campaign was on the eve of commencing. Napoleon did not explain to him at first on what conditions he would consent to make peace, sending him away entrusted with only the first part of his secret, which was that it was necessary to his interests that Europe should carry a hundred thousand men to the slopes of Silesia, that she should summon the forces of the coalition to pause in their onward march; that if, as would be most probably the case, they should disregard this summons, she should then take them in flank, whilst he, Napoleon, attacked them in front. He authorised him to propose that when the united arms of France and Austria should have been victorious, the latter power should receive, as its reward, Silesia, a portion of Poland, and Illyria.

Having obtained all the levies which he desired, and taken the diplomatic measures which have been above narrated, he determined to enter at length upon the new campaign. It was now the end of March, 1813. His various military armaments were in a very forward state, with the exception of his cavalry, which had not been reorganized so quickly as he could have desired; and he determined to set out towards the middle of April, impatient to realise the fair hopes which he entertained with respect to the issue of the approaching struggle. He made all his arrangements with a view to his departure at that date. He addressed some reproaches to Prince Eugene for having retrograded too hastily and too far; not that he regretted the steps which the forces of the coalition had been thereby induced to take, but because he regretted the time which was lost to him by the enemy's too rapid progress, calculating that it had compelled him to hasten the commencement of hostilities by at least twenty days, during which he might have much increased the efficiency of his forces. He regretted, especially, the loss of horses, which was a consequence of the abandonment of the

German territories; and also blamed Prince Eugene for having inclined too much towards the right in his anxiety to cover Dresden, which was of little importance, whereby he had left uncovered Hambourg, which it was of the highest importance to shelter from the contagion of the German popular excitement. At the same time he informed him in general terms of the future plan of operations.

He directed him to refrain from occupying himself with the defence of the route from Dresden to Erfurt, Fulde, and Mayence, since it would be of little importance, even if the forces of the coalition penetrated in that direction to some distance. He recommended him on the other hand, to defend to the utmost, that of Magdebourg, Hanover, Osnabruck, and Wesel, which passed by lower Germany. In establishing himself firmly on this line, Prince Eugene would defend the greater part of the course of the Elbe, cover Hambourg, Bremen, Holland, and Westphalia, and that portion of Germany which Napoleon had desired to make French. If the coalition, taking advantage of this arrangement of the French troops, should penetrate by Dresden, and advance as far as the mountains of Thuringia, as far as the celebrated plains of Jena, it would only be necessary for the French forces to execute movements by which Prince Eugene's left should be posted at Wittenberg, the right at Eisenach, the Harz mountains being in the rear, and that when this position had once been taken up by Prince Eugene's forces, Napoleon would advance with one hundred thousand men by Hesse or Thuringia to his support, and to join him on the Elbe; and that then his forces amounting to two hundred and fifty thousand men, Napoleon would cut off the forces of the coalition from Berlin and the sea, drive them back, crush them against the mountains of Bohemia, and, entering Berlin, would release from blockade, the garrisons of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Thorn, and Dantzic; and would thus, within the space of a month, from the commencement of the campaign, find himself victorious on the banks of the Vistula.

To these general outlines of the campaign Napoleon added, as was his wont, precise detailed directions. He blamed Prince Eugene for having sent the terrible Marshal Davout to Dresden, where it was necessary to reassure the public mind, instead of having reserved him for Hambourg and Germany, where it was necessary to terrify, and he directed that he should now be transferred to the countries of the lower Elbe, to supply by the fear inspired by his presence all that was wanting in military resources. This marshal had received his second battalions to the number of sixteen, recently reorganised at Erfurt, by the incorporation of the staffs returning from Russia, with the recruits arriving from France on the banks of the Rhine; Marshal Victor had also received his, which were twelve in number; and Napoleon now directed that he should be left on the upper Elbe, for the purpose of serving as a link between Prince Eugene and the grand army, which was about to debouch from Thuringia, and that Marshal Davout should descend upon Hambourg to retake it. The staffs of the third and fourth battalions of Marshals Davout and Victor were at this moment being recruited on the Rhine, with the men of the old classes. There were still, therefore, thirty-two battalions for Marshal Davout and twenty-four for Marshal Victor, which, added to the second battalions which they had already, would give forty-eight to the one, thirty-six to the other—eighty-four between the two. This then was a second and excellent army, which might within two months be upon the Elbe, and Napoleon devised means of increasing it by the addition of twenty-eight battalions. It has been already said that the staff of the first battalion of these old corps had been retained in the fortresses on the Oder; but it had been found that the staffs of two companies were sufficient to receive the soldiers who returned from Russia. These staffs of the first battalions having become disposable, with the exception of two companies, had been brought back to the Rhine, and having had the two companies whch were wanting to them supplied by two others taken from the depôts, were completely reorganized, and were to be filled up with the excellent recruits of the old classes. And thus within a few weeks the Marshals Davout and Victor, already provided with their second battalions, would receive the third, fourth, and first, and be thus placed at the head of ninety thousand infantry. Three hundred pieces of cannon were prepared for them in the fortresses of Westphalia, Holland, and Hanover. The cadres of dragoon and chasseur regiments arriving from Spain would furnish them with a fair body of cavalry, and thus independently of the three hundred thousand men with which he was himself about to open the campaign, there would exist a second army of one hundred and ten thousand men on the lower Elbe. As, however, the insurrection of Lubeck and Hambourg rendered the need of succours urgent, Napoleon despatched immediately, a certain number of those battalions which were ready, sending them under the command of General Vendamne to the Hanseatic departments. The name alone of General Vendamne was calculated to produce a great impression upon the revolted populations, and, moreover, throughout the whole of the 32nd military division, the rule of military commissions had been substituted for the constitutional government.

At Mayence, independently of the guard and the two Rhine corps which had been there organized, and were already distributed between Frankfort, Wurzbourg and Fulde, Napoleon planned the construction of a fresh body of troops, with the remainder of the cadres which had been recalled from Spain. A formal order had been sent beyond the Pyrenees, that only the staffs necessary for the existing number of troops should be retained in Spain, and as the surplus staffs successively reached France, Napoleon had directed that they should be filled with the eighty thousand men of the six *old classes* of which he had recently decreed the levy. The staffs drawn from Spain were the best; having been engaged in that species of war which is best calculated to form the experienced officer—namely, a war of surprises; for it is one in which it is almost necessary that each officer should be a general. They were inured to fatigue, and, not having been under Napoleon's immediate command for some time, arrived full of zeal for the honour of being under his personal orders; whilst, on the contrary, the staffs arriving from Russia, although excellent in respect to their military qualities, were worn out, and animated by a resentment which was far from being concealed. It was necessary that these last should have repose, indemnity for what they had lost, and be well recruited before being again employed on active service. With respect to the Spanish cadres, however, there was no need for any particular exertions, and day by day, as they reached Mayence, they entered upon the performance of their duties and served with ardour. Napoleon prepared with these staffs an army of reserve upon the Rhine, as he had formed one on the Elbe of the *old corps*.

Finally, he was resolved to create an army of reserve for Italy, whither General Bertrand had already proceeded for the purpose of forming a corps of forty or fifty thousand men, of the numerous military elements which France had accumulated beyond the Alps since 1796. General Bertrand had accomplished his task and was on his march with forty-five thousand men, having met with no misadventure with the exception that an Italian regiment having fallen in with a detachment of troops of the same nation, who had returned from Russia, after having heard their countrymens' recitals of what they had suffered, had deserted en masse. With the exception of this incident, General Bertrand's army arrived in good order, and animated with the best spirit. It was to be joined by the three thousand troops already assembled at Augsburg, and by the other cadres of Prince Eugene's corps which should return from Russia, and which were now directed to assemble at Verona instead of Augsburg; Napoleon considering the latter place too distant from Italy. The cadres sent to Verona would furnish twenty-four battalions, and would be reorganized during the spring and summer. The depôts of Italy were filled with conscripts of Provence, Languedocque, Savoy, Piedmont, and Corsica, respecting whose discipline, as they had already been to the depôts from one to two years, there could be little cause for doubt. Of the forty-eight battalions which composed the army of Italy, properly so called, there were seven or eight in Spain, and twenty in Germany. There remained about twenty in Italy, which were already recruited, and these, with the eighty staffs returned from Russia, would present a total of forty-eight battalions; which number might be raised to sixty, by adding to them some French staffs which had been recalled from Spain, and were en route towards Piedmont; where were situated their depôts. There was here the material for the basis of a second army of Italy. And thus, taking into account the Neapolitan army which Murat was reorganizing with great pains, and with which he consoled himself for the chagrin caused him by Napoleon's severity, eighty thousand men would be available for active service in Italy, should the movements of Austria be hostile.

Napoleon had, therefore, both in Germany and Italy, besides the armies which were to be engaged in actual service, other armies which would serve as a reserve and repair the losses caused by the war. In the cavalry arm, as has been already said, were we alone deficient, General Bourcier in lower Germany had seen his cantonments overturned, and the districts in which he could obtain troop horses, very much restricted by the insurrection of the Hanseatic provinces, whilst the manufacture of harness was very greatly interrupted by the ill-will of the German workmen, and the credits with which he was furnished became reduced to almost nothing in his hands, on account of the difficulty which existed of obtaining money for even the most unexceptionable bills.

Of the thirty thousand saddle or draught horses which he hoped to procure, he had only succeeded in obtaining sufficient to mount twelve thousand troopers, of whom six thousand were already mounted, and ready to take their place with the corps of Generals Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani. The depôts of the Rhine would furnish an almost equal number of mounted troopers, who would proceed under the Duke de Plaissance to join the army, and would speedily be followed by a similar contingent. Finally, fresh means of providing cavalry regiments would be furnished by the cavalry staffs arriving from Spain. It was confidently reckoned that fifty thousand cavalry would be assembled by the middle of the year; but it was at the same time quite possible that not more than ten thousand would be available at the opening of the campaign. Napoleon, however, allowed himself to be but little disturbed by this circumstance—"We shall fight battles and gain them," he said, "as we fought and gained those of Egypt, with squares of infantry."—And he had himself traced out the plan of education to be pursued with regard to the young infantry, prescribing the formation of the square as the one which would be most frequently required in the field.

Spain had been to him at this period, as we have seen, a nursery of officers and sous-officers of the first quality; and it was only just, after having exhausted himself for the purpose of supporting this deplorable war, that he should draw from it such aid as this. But at the same time, he was unwilling to enfeeble his armies in the Peninsula to too great an extent, since he had determined, when the time for negotiations should have arrived, to give up Spain, the only sacrifice he was prepared to make for the purpose of disarming England. To have withdrawn from it now, would have been the wiser plan, but it would have exposed him to a campaign with the English in the south of France, and have deprived him of the principal means he possessed on which to base negotiations in the future European congress. It was necessary to defend it, therefore, to the utmost, and as though he were determined to retain it in his grasp.

He approved of the new position taken up by our armies, whilst bitterly blaming the faults which had led them to it. At the same time, he was anxious, should the English make a fresh attempt upon Valladolid and Burgos, that they should be driven back to a considerable distance, and that sufficient occupation should be given them, to prevent their undertaking any maritime expeditions on the coast of France. Marshal Suchet, who had not been enfeebled, appeared to him to be sufficiently strong to defend the Ebro and the coast of the Mediterranean, from Barcelona to Valencia. The armies of Andalusia, of the centre, and of Portugal, united as they had been in the last campaign, appeared to him to be sufficient to defend the Castilles against Lord Wellington. But he considered it of great moment that these armies should be still more closely drawn together, and ordered them to pass the Guadarrama, only retaining the cavalry on the Tagus, and a division of the advanced guard at Madrid, the latter being left for the sake of moral effect, and to establish the court at Valladolid. He wished that the three armies should be united in front of Valladolid, so as to be able, at any moment, to concentrate and march upon the English. He even directed the preparation of a siege train, for the purpose of leading Lord Wellington to fear that he was about to make an attempt on Cuidad-Rodrigo, and thus detain him in the Peninsula. He also ordered that a portion of the three armies should be employed in destroying, at any price, the guerilla bands which desolated the north of Europe, and which interrupted the communications with France, in Navarre, Guipascoa, Biscaye, and l'Alava. Proposing, in fact, as he did, to make Spain an object of negotiation and exchange, he was anxious to be able to say that he possessed the best half, with a firmness which could not be disputed. To retain the districts which were commonly called the banks of the Ebro, and to restore the remainder to Ferdinand, was the arrangement which he was prepared to compel Joseph to accept and to conclude with Ferdinand, and the English.

With this intention, and for the sake of having some communications, he had entrusted the army of the north to General Clausel, with whose merit, although displayed at such a distance, he had been much struck, and had empowered him to take under his own command, a portion of these armies concentrated in Castille, in order that he might destroy the guerilla bands, before the period when the English usually commenced the campaign. This was an important decision, and was to have, as we shall hereafter see, very serious consequences. But with the exception of this decision, which, if we are to judge of it by its results, was an error, his arrangements with respect to the conduct of the campaign in Spain were most excellent. He had not withdrawn more than thirty thousand men from this country by taking away the staffs, and had left them two hundred thousand troops, which were the best that France at this time possessed.

He had recalled Marshal Soult, who could no longer act with the court at Madrid, and had given Joseph, in addition to Marshal Jourdan as adviser, Generals Reille, d'Erlon, and Gazan, to command under him the three armies of the centre, Andalusia, and Portugal.

And now, being satisfied with respect to the state of affairs in Spain, and satisfied with the progress of his armaments in the direction of Germany, Napoleon, as full of confidence with respect to the result of his vast combinations as he ever was in his life, determined to depart; resolving, however, before doing so, to take some precautions against the recurrence of such an accident as that of the Malet conspiracy.

We have already said, that being anxious to crown the King of Rome this very winter, and to invest Maria Louisa with the regency, he had conversed with the arch-chancellor

Cambacérès, the only man who was, with respect to the domestic policy of his empire, in his entire confidence. After some consideration it had appeared to him that in the existing state of affairs, the coronation of the King of Rome at that time would be somewhat unadvisable; but he still resolved to invest Maria Louisa with the regency, which might be easily done without much ceremony, in order that should a bullet deprive him of life, the country might be able to rally round a government already constituted, and already, even, engaged in the performance of his functions. He was anxious, too, after having made the campaign of 1812 in the character of an emperor, to make that of 1813 in the character of a simple general. He resolved, therefore, to confer the regency on Maria Louisa before his departure; an arrangement which, beside its other advantages, would have that of flattering the pride of his father-in-law, who was sincerely attached to his daughter, although more so to his house.

It will be easily understood that it was not to Maria Louisa, a good and sensible woman, but profoundly ignorant of affairs of state, that Napoleon intended to confide the government of his vast empire, but to a man whose good sense was unequalled, whose experience was consummate, and whose character was somewhat less weak than was generally supposed. The reader will have perceived that we are speaking of the arch-chancellor Cambacérès. Napoleon could have even died without anxiety, if, the war terminated, he could have been certain of leaving the minority of his son and the ignorance of his wife, for ten years under the direction of this man, whose finesse, tact, moderation, and experience, united to form a statesman of the highest character; not indeed, a firm, bold, open-speaking statesman, such as are found in free countries, but a master of that art of managing a people which is so necessary in a country like France, which, even when not free, still requires to be governed with infinite caution. For such a task as this Napoleon feared to select his brothers, distrusting their pretensions and restless temperaments, especially during a minority.

Increasing years, the commencement of a change of fortunes, a long acquaintance with men, the abasement of the human character when exposed to the influence of absolute power, the historical learning in which his youth had so much delighted, and the teachings of which had great influence on his mind in his maturer age, had singularly added to the natural distrustfulness of Napoleon's character. Full of ill-humour against his brothers and his brother-in-law, who annoyed him, and on whom he bestowed much ill-treatment, he was convinced that, should he die, leaving his child under age, they would disturb his minority. He conversed at great length on these subjects of anxiety with the Prince Cambacérès, and displayed a determined resolution to employ even the most offensive precautions with respect to his brothers. By the imperial constitutions the regency could not be held by a woman, but must be conferred on the uncles of the imperial minor; and Napoleon, therefore, now boldly said to Prince Cambacérès that he was unwilling that his brothers should be invested with the regency, and that he intended to confer it on Maria Louisa, in order that he, Cambacérès, might exercise it in reality, in the name of the empress. Cambacérès, whose ambition had always been restrained by his prudence, and who was now, by reason of age and indulgence in some sensual pleasures which were little worthy of the gravity of his years, less ambitious than ever, was terrified at the intentions thus expressed by the emperor, and pleaded with him the cause of his brothers. In the first place, he said, it would be necessary to deprive them of the office in question by a constitutional decree, and history taught but too plainly that the decrees of dead sovereigns, whether declared constitutionally or not, prevailed but little against the passions which were almost invariably let loose at their death. Moreover, he urged, Joseph was of a good disposition, was sincerely attached to Napoleon, had no male infant, and was anxious, probably, to marry one of his daughters to the King of Rome; whilst Jerome was entirely devoted to his brother, besides being to a great extent disqualified by his age for disputing the possession of the regency; Louis had disappeared from the scene; and Murat, except in his military character, was of no importance. "There was no reason, then," said Cambacérès, "why Napoleon should be suspicious of his brothers, and he ought," he declared, "to leave the regency in the hands of Joseph; whose possession of it would be little disputed."—Napoleon remaining unaffected by any of these reasons, the arch-chancellor proceeded to speak of Prince Eugene, who had never given him any cause of discontent, save by a little nonchalance of manner, and who, moreover, had obtained much honour in the late campaign; but at the name of Prince Eugene, Napoleon, who usually displayed the utmost affection with respect to this prince, suddenly appeared to be overwhelmed with disquieting and ominous reflections. "Eugene," he said, "is an excellent man, but he is young! We must take care that we do not inflame with an excessive ambition that heart so little fitted to encounter the passions of the world. . . . . Who knows what time may not bring forth?"

As Napoleon remained firm to his idea, it became necessary to consider in what manner it could be least offensively carried out; and no one was more fitted for this task than Prince Cambacérès. For excluding the greater part of the princes of the imperial family from the regency, and even from the council of the regency, there existed a most natural reason in the fact that they were possessed of foreign thrones; for princes who governed countries distant from the empire, might have interests so opposed to those of France, that their exclusion from the government in the case of a minority, could not be considered either a distrustful or an excessive precaution. It was agreed, then, by an article of the projected senatus-consultum, that all the princes seated on foreign thrones should be excluded from the regency, unless, which was very improbable, they should abdicate. A second arrangement, which was as natural as the first, was to be that the mother was to rule during the minority of her son. And this measure was one which was not only in accordance with the dictates of nature, but also of good policy, for it could not but be an advantage to confer the imperial power upon a daughter of the Cæsars, who was beloved by her royal father, and had the most sacred claim upon the protection of the chief court of Europe. Napoleon's brothers, then, being excluded without injustice and without offence, and the empress constituted regent in accordance with the best of reasons, it became necessary to compose a council of regency, and to regulate its functions. Napoleon resolved that it should be composed of the princes of the blood, the uncles of the emperor, and the princes, high members of the French government, (always on condition that they should not be reigning over any dominions beyond the limits of the empire) and in the following order;—The arch-chancellor, the arch-chancellor of state, the grand *electeur*, the constable, the arch-treasurer, and the grand admiral; an arrangement which gave the first place and the chief influence to Prince Cambacérès; a place and influence which Napoleon determined to secure to him still further by his secret instructions to the empress. The council was to be consulted on all the great affairs of state, but it was only to have a deliberative voice with respect to them.

These matters having been thus arranged in a projected senatus-consultum, Napoleon submitted the proposed plan in the first place to the council of state, before sending it to the senate, explaining it with his own mouth in words which were at once precise and authoritative. Everyone was silent and appeared to listen with approval; but at length a member asked whether it would not be as well to supply an omission in the proposed plan, by conferring the regency on the mother of the imperial minor, in case she should not be also the empress dowager—a case which would have occurred had Napoleon adopted as his heir a son of his brother Louis and the Queen Hortense, who lived in France, separated from her husband and much loved in society. The enquiry which was now made was evidently intended to serve her interests, and was supported by a young chancellor of state, who enjoyed a large share of the imperial favour, M. the Count Molé. Napoleon, however, repelled the suggestion in a manner so stern and peremptory that it was at once allowed to drop; and on leaving the council, he said to Cambacérès, "Eh! bien! have you seen how the friends of Hortense begin to stir? What would it be if I were dead?" . . . . . And he sighed at the idea of all that would very probably take place in the event of his death.

The senatus-consultum was adopted by the senate in the form in which it was proposed. By his letters patent Napoleon conferred upon the regent the full sovereign authority, with the exception of a prohibition to submit laws to the legislative corps, and senatus consulta to the senate, but at the same time he limited the use of this authority by well calculated precautions, and declared that the regent was to perform no act without the signature of Prince Cambacérès. He appointed, moreover, as secretary of the regency, and to perform for it the functions of a minister of state, the wise Duke de Cadore—M. de Champagny.

On the 30th of March he invested the empress with her new dignity. When the formalities of the ceremony were over, he dismissed all who had assisted at it but the ministers, and made the empress take part in a council of state, at which were discussed matters of the highest importance. She appeared attentive, curious, and not wanting in intelligence. Day after day, with infinite pains, her husband strove to initiate her into the conduct of affairs; and at the same time took care to indicate to those who were to advise her, what they should submit to her notice and what conceal from her.

Amongst the exceptions which he made to the authority of the regency, was the nomination of the superior officers of the army; saying, "that the minister of war alone was acquainted with the personnel of the army, and that he could entrust the duty of making these appointments to none but him."

At the moment of his departure for the army, Napoleon, anxious to make friends for his son and his wife, would have been glad to promote a considerable number of persons to the senatorial dignity, in order to strengthen by the aid of self-interest the shaken devotion of a great number of persons.

But such a measure presented a danger which the arch-chancellor's penetration pointed out to him, and which was, that as there were only thirteen vacancies in the senate, and thirteen available dotations, to nominate more than this number of senators would render necessary either a division of the existing resources of the senate, which would create a feeling of discontent amongst its members, or an increase of the senate's revenues, which the state of the finances could not suffer. Napoleon, therefore, added to the senate but thirteen new members, and failed, as we shall hereafter see, to add very much thereby to its fidelity. At the same time he distributed with great prodigality the decorations of the order of the *Re-union*, and raised the Count Decrès to a dukedom. He selected as his aide-de-camp General Corbineau, who had miraculously found the passage of the Berezina, and the illustrious Druot, who had rendered such illustrious services with the artillery of the guard. Being as anxious also to relieve his wife and child from any sources of embarrassment, as he was to procure friends for them, he recalled Marshal Soult from Spain, and permitted M. Fouché to return to his senatorial position; but as he was very unwilling to leave these two persons idle in Paris (especially the second), he took Marshal Soult with him, proposing to give him some post in his guard, and resolved, as soon as he should have entered the German countries, to confide to M. Fouché the government of the conquered provinces.

The session of the legislative corps was now terminated, after having lasted three or four weeks, and voted the law of finance, as well as the law relative to the sale of the communal property.

Before actually setting out, Napoleon took some further measures relative to the concordat of Fontainebleau, which the pope had failed to execute, whilst preserving complete silence with respect to his ultimate intentions. Returning to the system of finesse, which did not originate with himself, but with his councillors, he was far from declaring that he wished to repudiate the concordat of Fontainebleau and to retract his signature, but he appeared to intimate that in the existing state of affairs, the immediate execution of the treaty was not necessary, and affected to slumber more profoundly than ever in his peaceful retreat. In the meantime, the active personages of the church party visited Fontainebleau with great frequency. All this excessively irritated Napoleon, and he was on the point of destroying by some violent act, the advantage of his reconciliation with the holy father; but wisely restrained himself to making public, as he considered himself by the pope's late conduct perfectly justified in doing, the concordat which the pope had publicly and freely signed.

He had it, therefore, inserted in the bulletin of laws as a law of state, expecting that this insertion would procure its execution. He then took measures, of which the pope was officially informed, for the institution of the new prelates by the metropolitan, should the pope fail to grant it himself within six months; and limited the number of visitors to be admitted to Fontainebleau, naming those whom the pope was to be permitted to see. Finally, he ordered, but secretly, the arrest and removal forty leagues from Paris of the Cardinal di Pietro, as having lately distinguished himself by his bad counsels to the pope; and that those around the pope might be duly warned, he had full intimation given to them of the reason of this fresh severity.

A few days before Napoleon's departure from Mayence, the Prince Schwarzenberg arrived; being announced as fully informed of the most secret resolutions of the Austrian cabinet. Napoleon had already sent back M. de Bubna to Vienna, after having sedulously striven to impress him with the idea which could scarcely take hold of a German brain at this period, that Austria's wisest course was to endeavour to repair in concert with France her shaken fortunes. He endeavoured to impress the same idea upon Prince Schwarzenberg, who found himself in a position of much embarrassment, since he was most unwilling to displease Napoleon, and yet was resolved to show due regard for the patriotic passion of his country, although he was far from being thoroughly embued with it himself. M. de Metternich had sent him to question rather than to explain, and whilst directing him to endeavour chiefly to discover on what terms Napoleon would be willing to conclude a peace, had also instructed him to hint that Austria would draw the sword only for the sake of obtaining peace—such a peace as should satisfy the interests of Germany. The prince, however, who had accepted the mission with great reluctance, feared to utter to Napoleon half of what he had been sent to say; and the latter, in fact, left him neither time nor opportunity to do so, constantly striving, as he did, to persuade him of the wisdom of his projects, treating with a confidence which had a diplomatic purpose, and making every endeavour to convince him that he had in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, eleven or twelve hundred thousand men under arms, and that he was about to crush the Prussian and Russian forces, and drive them beyond the Vistula. He took pains, also, to point out to the prince that it was now the moment for Austria to render the conclusion of peace certain and immediate by declaring in favour of France, and to make it for himself the most advantageous she had ever concluded by accepting Silesia, a million of Polish subjects, and Illyria, all which he, Napoleon, was ready to give her. Prince Schwarzenberg, who, although endowed with a sufficiently firm mind, was influenced by Napoleon's calculations, strove to point out, in reply, that the French Emperor, in the ensuing campaign, would have to fight with troops animated by a violent fanaticism; that the war would not be such an one as could be decided by one or two battles, that it would be well, therefore, that he should enter into negotiations for peace; that Austria was quite ready to aid him in this, but that she could not enter into a contest with Europe for the sake of an arrangement that would in no way satisfy either the wishes or the interests of Germany. Napoleon's ardour, however, was too vehement to be checked by any such cold reasoning as this, and Prince Schwarzenberg seeing very clearly that he was determined to enter upon a decisive war, in which it was very probable that he might be successful, considered that it would be necessary to await the issue of affairs before resolving upon anything. He contented himself, therefore, with uttering a few remarks which neither were nor were calculated to be of any effect, and then kept silence, not daring even to speak to Napoleon on a point respecting which it would have been more consistent with loyalty that he should have given him information. We allude to the Austrian auxiliary corps. As Austria affected to remain faithful to the treaty of alliance of the 14th of March 1812, its corps would naturally remain at Napoleon's disposal, and as its services were especially desirable at this moment, Napoleon said to Prince Schwarzenberg, that he intended to send orders to this corps, to advance with Prince Poniatowski towards upper Silesia, and that he hoped that these orders would be executed; whereupon, Prince Schwarzenberg, who well knew that his government was resolved not to fire a shot in Napoleon's favour, had the weakness to reply that the Austrian corps would obey. After having vainly endeavoured to convert Prince Schwarzenberg to his views, Napoleon addressed to his allies the grand duke of Baden, the Prince Primate, the Duke of Wurzburg, the kings of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony, a recommendation to prepare their contingents, and especially, to send him as soon as possible all the disciplined cavalry at their disposal—particularly, insisting upon this latter point in the case of the King of Saxony, who had withdrawn to Ratisbonne with the two thousand four hundred troops already mentioned, and upon whom Napoleon reckoned as an addition to the corps of Marshal Ney. He made this demand in the form of an absolute order.

At length, all these arrangements concluded, and having received the last embraces of his empress, who was in a state of agitation and despair at the approaching separation, he set out on the 15th April, as ardent and as confident as he had ever been at the commencement of his most successful campaigns! A happy yet fatal confidence, which was destined to be productive of much that was glorious, and yet, by its very excess, to be productive of fresh and irreparable disasters.

BOOK XLVIII.

LUTZEN AND BAUTZEN.

Results of Prince Schwarzenberg's mission—He quits Paris, after having attempted to say to the empress and to M. de Bassano, what he had not ventured to say to Napoleon himself—The course of events at Vienna since the defection of Prussia—The Austrian court maintains more firmly than ever its project of an armed mediation, and desires to impose upon the belligerent powers a peace which should be in all respects favourable to the interests of Germany—Efforts made by this court to procure adherents to its policy—Steps taken by it with respect to the King of Saxony, now withdrawn to Ratisbonne, for the purpose of inducing him to place at its disposal the Saxon troops, and the fortresses on the Elbe, and of obtaining from him the renunciation of the grand duchy of Warsaw—Austria having obtained of King Frederick Augustus permission to dispose of his military forces, takes advantage of it to free itself from the presence of the Polish corps at Cracow—Being unwilling to enter into a contest with the Russians, she enters into a secret arrangement with them by which she agrees to withdraw the Austrian auxiliary corps, together with the troops under Prince Poniatowski to the Austrian territory without a contest—Negotiations of Austria with Bavaria—M. de Narbonne arrives at Vienna — Meets with a cordial reception from the Emperor and M. de Metternich—M. de Metternich endeavours to persuade him that it is necessary to make peace, and intimates that at that price only, can France expect to obtain the real support of Austria—He hints again what should be the outline of the peace—M. de Narbonne having received from Paris his final instructions, submits to the Austrian cabinet the important communications with which he is charged—According to these communications, Austria was to summon Russia, Prussia, and England to lay down their arms, then to offer them the conditions of peace named by Napoleon, and in the next place, should they refuse to accept them, to enter Silesia with a hundred thousand men, to effect its conquest for herself—The manner in which M. de Metternich receives these communications—M. de Narbonne demands of M. de Metternich, whether, should France refuse to accept peace on the conditions proposed by the Austrian court, it would turn its arms against her—M. de Metternich endeavours at first to elude this question, but eventually replies that Austria would declare against whatever power should refuse equitable conditions of peace, but at the same time was strongly disposed in favour of France—

Evidence of the fault that Napoleon had committed in leading Austria to become mediator between the belligerent powers—Information is suddenly received that Prince Schwarzenberg's corps had re-entered Bohemia, instead of preparing to renew hostilities, that the Polish corps was to pass through the Austrian territory without its arms, and that the King of Saxony had withdrawn from Ratisbonne to Prague, for the purpose of definitively throwing himself into the arms of Austria—M. de Narbonne insists that the Austrian corps shall remain at the disposal of France, in accordance with the treaty of alliance, and formally demands to be informed whether this treaty still exists—M. de Metternich refuses to reply to this question—M. de Narbonne awaits, before insisting further, fresh instructions from his court—Napoleon's surprise and irritation, when, arrived at Mayence, he learns the retreat of the Austrian corps, and the projected disarming of the Polish corps—He orders Prince Poniatowski to refrain from resigning his arms for any consideration, and directs M. de Narbonne to compel the Austrian court as quietly as possible to explain its conduct, and at the same time to endeavour to penetrate the secret of the course adopted by the King of Saxony—At the same time he promises to put a speedy end to all these complications, by the immediate commencement of the campaign—His military arrangements at Mayence—Although he had prepared materials for an active army of three hundred thousand men, and a reserve of two hundred thousand, he is able at the commencement of hostilities, to bring into the field no more than a hundred and ninety thousand, or two hundred thousand—His plan of campaign—Position of the coalition forces—Austria being unwilling to join them before all means of negotiation should have been exhausted, they number no more than a hundred thousand or a hundred and ten thousand combatants actually in line—Composition of their staff—Death of Prince Kutusof on the 28th of April at Bunzlau—March of the allies upon the Elster, and of Napoleon upon the Saale—Skilful manœuvres made by Napoleon for the purpose of joining Prince Eugene—Arrival of Ney at Naumbourg; of Prince Eugene at Mersebourg—Ney encounters the enemy at Weissenfels, and marches upon the Lutzen on the 1st of May—Death of Bessières, duke of Istria—Projects of Napoleon in the presence of the enemy—He proposes to march upon Leipsic, to cross the Elster there, and then to fall back upon the flank of the coalition forces—Position assigned to Marshal Ney near the village of Kaja, for the purpose of covering the army during the movement upon Leipsic—Whilst Napoleon endeavours to turn the forces of the allies, they are planning in a similar manœuvre against him, and prepare to attack him at Kaja—Plan of battle proposed by General Diebitch and adopted by the allied sovereigns—Ney's corps suddenly attacked — Napoleon's marvellous promptitude in changing his plans and falling back upon Lutzen—Memorable battle of Lutzen—Importance and consequences of this battle—Napoleon pursues the coalition forces towards Dresden, and directs Ney upon Berlin—Marches towards the Elbe—Enters Dresden—Passage of the Elbe—In possession of the capital of Saxony, he summons Frederick Augustus to return to it under pain of forfeiture of his kingdom—The course of events at Vienna at the period of the battle of Lutzen—M. de Narbonne having been ordered to compel Austria to come to an explanation with respect to the auxiliary and Polish corps, lays before M. de Metternich a categorical note on the subject—M. de Metternich endeavours to persuade M. de Narbonne to desist from taking this step—M. de Narbonne persisting, the Austrian cabinet replies that the treaty of the 14th of March, 1812, is no longer applicable to the actual state of affairs—News from the theatre of war arrives at Vienna—Although the allies boast of having obtained a victory, events soon prove that they have been vanquished — Apparent satisfaction of M. de Metternich—Eagerness of the cabinet of Vienna to assume at this moment its office of mediator—It despatches M. de Bubna to Dresden for the purpose of communicating the conditions which it considers itself capable of inducing the belligerent powers to accept, or in support of which at least it would be ready, should they reject them, to ally itself with France—Napoleon, on learning what had been done by M. de Narbonne, regrets that he has driven the Austrian court so hastily to a decision, but on learning the precise conditions of peace laid down by this power is irritated to the last degree—He resolves to enter into direct communication with Russia and England, to annul thus the position assumed by Austria, and to prepare such military measures against her as would reduce her to obey the law, instead of imposing it—In the meantime he orders M. de Narbonne to refrain from any active proceedings, and to adopt an air of the most extreme reserve—Napoleon sends Prince Eugene to Italy to organise the army of Italy there, and prepares new armaments under the impression that he may have to carry on war with the whole of Europe—Reception of the King of Saxony at Dresden—Napoleon prepares to depart from Dresden for the purpose of driving the coalition forces from the Elbe to the Oder, at the same time engaging in another battle—Their plan of stopping at Bautzen and fighting there a decisive battle being well known, Napoleon in place of sending Marshal Ney to Berlin, directs him upon Bautzen—Arrival of M. de Bubna at Dresden at the moment of Napoleon's departure—M. de Bubna well fitted to encounter Napoleon's first burst of irritation and to soften it—His explanation of the conditions of peace proposed by Austria—Modifications with which Napoleon would, perhaps, accept them—Napoleon pretends to be appeased that he may gain time for the completion of his new armaments—He consents to a congress to which even the Spaniards should be summoned to be present, and to an armistice, of which he intends to take advantage to enter into direct communication with Russia—M. de Bubna departs with Napoleon's reply—M. de Bubna has scarcely departed when Napoleon sends M. de Coulaincourt to the Russian headquarters on pretence of negotiating an armistice—Napoleon sets out for Bautzen—Distribution of his corps d'armée, and march of Marshal Ney with sixty thousand men upon the rear of Bautzen—Description of the position of Bautzen—Battle of the 20th of May—Second battle of the 21st, in which the formidable positions of the Russians and Prussians are carried after having been valiantly defended—On the following day, the 22nd, Napoleon drives the coalition forces upon the Oder—Engagement at Reichenbach, and death of Duroc—Arrival on the banks of the Oder, and occupation of Breslau—Distressed state of the allies, and their necessity of concluding an armistice—After having refused to receive M. de Coulaincourt from the fear of inspiring Austria with distrust, they send commissioners to the advanced posts for the purpose of concluding an armistice—These commissioners enter into communication with M. de Coulaincourt—Their pretensions—Refused peremptorily by Napoleon—M. de Bubna having arrived at Vienna during the progress of the late military events, excites a species of joy by giving rise to a hope that Napoleon's objections to the proposed conditions of peace may be overcome, certain modifications of them being consented to, and he returns to the French headquarters—Napoleon finding himself hard pressed by Austria, alleges his military duties as an excuse for not immediately receiving M. de de Bubna, and sends him to M. de Bassano—Perceiving, however, that he shall be compelled to declare himself within a few days, and that, in case he refused their conditions, he should have the Austrians added to his enemies, he consents to an armistice, which saves the forces of the coalition from total destruction, and signs this fatal armistice, not with the intention of negotiating, but for the purpose of gaining two months' time in which to complete his armaments—The conditions of this armistice, and the conclusion of the first campaign of Saxony, called the spring campaign.

BOOK XLVIII.

After Napoleon's departure, Prince Schwarzenberg had remained confounded by all that he had seen and heard, and very dissatisfied at having been both unable and afraid to utter a single one of the truths to express which he had been sent to the French court. He attempted to be more frank with the empress, to whom he had access, for being a countryman and her father's ambassador, and having been the negotiator of her marriage, he had every claim to her attention. Unfortunately, however, his representations to this princess could not have any very great effect; for Maria Louisa, dazzled by the prestige by which she was surrounded, and fascinated by her husband, who overwhelmed her with affectionate attentions, was ardently anxious for his triumph, but had not any influence over him. Her eyes were still red with the tears she had shed at taking leave of him when she received her father's ambassador, to whose declarations respecting the dangerous aspect of affairs, the state of passionate excitement prevalent throughout Europe against France, the necessity of concluding peace with some nations, and of at least preserving it with others, she listened with chagrin, only replying by repeating the accounts she had heard of the immense forces at Napoleon's command, and demanding that her own position in France should be taken into careful consideration, lest, after having been sent thither as a pledge of peace, she should become a fresh victim to revolutionary violence. The misfortunes of Maria Antoniette had made so deep an impression on Europe, that Maria Louisa often found herself seized with sudden terrors, and considered herself in as much danger as though Austria were again at war with France. She alluded to these fears to Prince Schwarzenberg, but without succeeding in making him pay much attention to them, for he scarcely considered them serious, and he thought, moreover, as a politician and a soldier, and although somewhat bound by the favours he had received from the French court, was in the first place anxious only on account of the fortunes of his country and himself. But little advantage could result from such interviews as these, and although those which Prince Schwarzenberg had with M. de Bassano, who had still remained some few days at Paris, might have had more effect, they unfortunately had not.

From the time of the marriage of Maria Louisa the Prince of Schwarzenberg had carried his intimacy with M. de Bassano almost to an intrigue; they were, therefore, very familiar with each other, and able to speak together with perfect frankness, and Prince Schwarzenberg endeavoured, accordingly, to place before M. de Bassano what appeared to him to be the true state of affairs; and when the latter, who appeared scarcely to comprehend the truths insisted on by the prince, continued repeatedly to refer to the treaty of alliance, and especially to the marriage, the prince at length lost patience, and exclaimed, "The marriage, the marriage! . . . . . . Policy made it, and policy may unmake it!" At which outburst M. de Bassano began to perceive the true state of affairs, but feigned not to understand its meaning, that he might not have to reply to it; and the interview terminated with fresh and deceitful protestations of fidelity to the alliance. M. de Bassano determined to refrain from repeating what he had heard to the emperor that he might not irritate him against Austria; and this was, doubtless, well intended; but it is thus that servants destroy the masters whom they have not accustomed to the language of truth. If the whole world, if the nature of things would follow the fashion attributed to them, to ignore an evil would be to annihilate it; but, in the actual state of things, to hide adverse facts from those whose fortunes they concern, is but to convert them into disasters.

In Vienna the course of affairs was not more favourable, although much more clearsightedness and diplomatic skill were brought to bear upon them there by the representatives of France and Austria. Whilst M. de Narbonne had been on his way thither, the position of affairs had become much worse for us, whilst M. de Metternich and the emperor found themselves day after day compelled to plunge into more painful dissimulations. It would, doubtless, have been wiser to have come to an open and immediate explanation with all the belligerent powers; to have said both to the allies and to Napoleon that Austria desired peace, but such a peace as should secure the interests of Germany in the first place, and in the next those of Europe in general, to the equilibrium of which an independent Germany was indispensable; that being able to throw a decided weight into the balance, she was ready to give it against that side which should refuse to accept completely and immediately that basis of a general peace. But to speak thus before having two hundred thousand men in Bohemia, might have been a hazardous proceeding in the presence of one so impetuous as Napoleon, and of a coalition so intoxicated with unexpected successes as was that of Russia, England, and Prussia. It was prudent, then, to gain time before entering into full explanations.

In the meantime, the Austrian cabinet had neglected nothing which could help her to succeed in the task she had to perform, and in the first place had sought to procure adherents to its mediatorial policy in Germany itself, amongst the princes engaged, as it was itself, to the French alliance. It had commenced, by entering into secret communication with Prussia, and when this power, having suddenly turned from a policy of mediation to one of war, could no longer be of use, it had directed all its efforts towards Saxony and Bavaria, which were most anxious for peace, especially a peace which should be advantageous to Germany, and had succeeded in inducing them to adopt its policy. It had induced the King of Saxony to quit Dresden, as we have already seen, and it was now anxious that he should proceed from Ratisbonne to Prague, that he might be more completely at its disposal, and ready to acquiesce in its views, the chief of which was to obtain from him the resignation of Poland; by procuring which it hoped to render the acceptance of the terms of peace it proposed less difficult on the part of Napoleon, who would then be freed from the embarrassment of abandoning an ally, for whom he had always affected great favour; whilst a territory extending from the Bug to the Wardt would afford the means of reconstituting Prussia. Russia would thus be freed from the grand duchy of Warsaw, which was for it such an accusing and threatening phantom, and something might be given her for the Duke of Oldenberg. Finally, Austria might take for herself, and in the midst of her views for the public welfare this was a matter by no means lost sight of by her, the portion of Gallicia lost after the battle of Wagram. Austria was also desirous that Saxony should employ her forces in strict co-operation with her own armies; and of the Saxon forces far the most interesting in the eyes of Austria, was the Polish contingent of Prince Poniatowski, which had fallen back towards Cracow in the track of Prince Schwarzenberg, not only on account of its military importance, but on account, also, of its special position. It was necessary, in fact, to prevent this Polish corps from acting at the approaching opening of hostilities, in accordance with the orders sent by Napoleon, and thus drawing the Russians upon Bohemia.

The means devised by M. de Metternich, by which to escape from the complications in which the Austrian court was involved, consisted in a continuance by a written convention of what had already been done in accordance with a tacit understanding, namely, to retreat before the Russians, feigning to be compelled to do so by superior numbers. A note, therefore, was exchanged between the Austrians and Russians, which, it was declared, should be ever kept secret, and by which it was agreed that the Russian General, the Baron de Sacken, should repudiate the armistice, in accordance with which, the Russians had suspended hostilities with the Austrians at the end of the last campaign, and feign to deploy a considerable force upon their flank; and that the latter, feigning, on their side, to be forced to retreat, should repass the upper Vistula, abandon Cracow, re-enter Gallicia, and carry with them Poniatowski's Polish corps, compelling it to submit to the pretended necessity of retreating. The Russians were to halt upon arriving at the Austrian frontiers.

As the Austrian cabinet was unwilling that the Polish troops should be left too near the grand duchy of Warsaw, and especially unwilling that they should be left in the midst of Gallicia, it was anxious to come to an agreement with the King of Saxony, their grand duke, with respect to their being marched, unarmed, across the Austrian states upon the Elbe, where Napoleon might do with them what he pleased. And to this the poor King of Saxony, who was in a horrible state of anxiety, and unable to decide in whose hands to place himself, consented.

This point having been obtained, it was necessary to obtain of the King of Saxony, the definitive abandonment of the duchy of Warsaw, in order to take from Napoleon what, as we have said, was both an argument and a source of embarrassment, and Austria was desirous that the King of Saxony should receive in exchange for it the fair principality of Erfurt, hitherto kept en depôt by France, and at one time offered as a recompense to the Duke of Oldenberg. And it was because it wished to have this monarch more completely under its influence, that it now proposed that he should remove from Bavaria to Bohemia, declaring to him the advantages to him of being at Prague, in an inviolable country, and explaining that at so short a distance from Dresden, he could be in constant communication with his subjects, and thus preserve their affection.

The negotiations entered into with Bavaria were as delicate, and even more full of difficulties than those with Saxony, since it was necessary to bring it to consent to a sacrifice which could be of no service to the general cause, but of great advantage to Austria, being the re-establishment of the frontier of the Inn, which had been re-arranged at the expense of Austria, and to the profit of Bavaria by the treaty of peace of 1809. As for our allies of Baden and Wurtemberg, Austria could only proceed with the utmost caution, for their vicinity to the banks of the Rhine rendered them constantly exposed to Napoleon's vigilant power.

It was whilst Austria was in the very midst of this subtle and secret web of diplomacy, that M. de Narbonne surprised it by coming the bearer of views which were, unfortunately, very different from her own. Instead of bringing a project for the reconstitution of Prussia and securing the independence of Germany, he was the bearer of proposals for the destruction of Prussia, and the substitution of Saxony in its place, whilst Austria was to be paid for its assistance in effecting these changes by the addition of Silesia to its territory, and by being in a state of greater dependence than ever.

The reception of M. de Narbonne, however, by M. de Metternich, was most cordial and flattering. The French minister was received, in fact, by the Austrian one as a friend from whom he had nothing to conceal, and by whose aid he was anxious to save France, Austria, Europe, from a frightful catastrophe. He took great pains to discover whether M. de Narbonne brought at length such concessions on the part of Napoleon, as would prove his desire for peace; but M. de Narbonne still awaited his final instructions from Paris, and until their arrival he had nothing to say, except to intimate that Napoleon was resolved to yield nothing, but that if Austria was willing to become his accomplice, he would pay her well for her services, with territories which should be taken, it mattered not from whom. As, therefore, M. de Narbonne declined to speak, M. de Metternich took their conversations into his own hands, repeating things which would have been sufficiently well understood without the assistance of any words from his mouth, so often, and with such goodwill, that they could not fail to be comprehended. Pointing out to the French minister the excitement of public feeling in Vienna, and its demand that advantage should be taken of the present state of affairs, to free Germany from the yoke of France, he proceeded to say that the Austrian cabinet was, nevertheless, well aware how terribly powerful was Napoleon, and how dangerous it must be rashly to attack him; and that it remembered, moreover, the marriage and the treaty of alliance of 1812. "Still," continued Metternich, "it was necessary to recognise evident truths, and to admit that there was throughout Europe an universal excitement of feeling against France, at least against her chief; that France herself had need of repose; that a few battles would doubtless be gained by Napoleon, but that victories on the battle-field would not suffice to enable him to resist, for any length of time, the popular movement which had now begun; and that it was necessary, therefore, that he should consent to such a peace as should preserve to him his just glory, but at the same time secure the independence of the nations of Europe.

As M. de Metternich failed to obtain any reply to these general truths, but equally general remarks respecting the extent of our armaments, the certainty that our arms would speedily gain fresh victories, and the consequent necessity of behaving with great caution with respect to us, he again sought to sound the depths of our ambition; repeating the remarks he had already so frequently made, upon the impossibility of maintaining the chimera of the grand duchy of Warsaw, condemned by the campaign of 1812; upon the necessity of strengthening the intermediate powers, and, especially, Prussia, as being the only nation capable of replacing Poland, now for ever destroyed; upon the necessity of narrowing the territorial system of Europe; upon the impossibility of giving any lengthened existence to the confederation of the Rhine; on the impossibility of inducing the belligerent powers to consent to the definitive annexation to the French empire, of Lubeck, Hanover, and Bremen; and upon all those points, in fact, which we have already indicated, and in respect to which the disposition of the Austrian cabinet was already so clearly manifested.—"It will be sufficiently difficult," added M. de Metternich, "to prevent the allies from raising difficulties with respect to Holland, Spain, and Italy, and even if England gives way to your views with regard to Holland and Italy, it is quite certain that she will not do so with regard to Spain. However, we will leave England on one side, and negotiate without her, if it be necessery to do so; for we should be able, most probably, to induce Russia and Prussia to separate themselves from her, if we submit to them acceptable conditions of peace!"—With respect to what more particularly affected the interests of Austria herself, M. de Metternich intimated that the allies were willing to give anything as the price of the Austrian alliance, but at the same time declared that Austria would be contented with that portion of Gallicia which had been taken from her in 1809 for the purpose of increasing the impossible duchy of Warsaw, and the Illyrian provinces, "the restoration of which," he said, "France has already promised."

Such was the language of M. de Metternich. The

Emperor Francis, more reserved and more measured in his expressions, contented himself with receiving M. de Narbonne with every personal testimony of consideration, declaring to him his satisfaction at his daughter's happiness in France, his admiration of the genius of his son-in-law, and his anxiety to remain his ally; but at the same time intimating that he could only be so in the cause of peace, since his people would not permit him to be so for any other purpose.

To all these intimations and declarations M. de Narbonne replied as well as he was able, boasting of his master's greatness, and taking advantage of the art which he had learned in the salons, to cover with much ease and grace the impossibility of saying anything of real importance. In the meantime, however, he had discovered what were the real intentions of the Austrian cabinet. He had discovered that she was decidedly unwilling to fire a single shot in favour of France, that she was also unwilling, on the other hand, to pass abruptly, as Prussia had, from a state of alliance to one of war; that she wished to present herself in the character of a mediator between the belligerent powers, and was resolved to throw the weight of her forces against either the one or the other of them for the purpose of enforcing the acceptance of peace.

M. de Narbonne speedily determined that, at the best, neutrality alone could be obtained of the court of Vienna, and that by the exercise of caution, by avoiding explanations, and by making no demands, she might be retained in a state of inactivity sufficiently long to serve our purpose. The best course M. de Narbonne could have adopted, upon making this discovery, would have been, perhaps, to have frankly entered into the views of the Austrian cabinet, and to have declared his adherence to them to Napoleon. But such a bold proceeding would have been ineffectual, and M. de Narbonne did not care to venture upon it, resolving, instead, that it would be better to make every endeavour to paralyse the activity of Austria than to render it more active, and preparing to counsel this course to his own government, when he received the long-expected instructions, which were certainly entirely opposed to the preservation of Austrian neutrality.

These instructions, which were despatched on the 29th of March and arrived on the 9th of April, empowered M. de Narbonne to adopt a decided tone, to declare that Austria must adopt a principal part in the conduct of affairs; that, since she was desirous of peace, she must enable herself to dictate it by preparing powerful forces; that she should then summon the belligerent powers to pause in their movements, under a threat of throwing a hundred thousand men upon their flank; and that, finally, if they should not obey her, she should throw a hundred thousand men into Silesia, at once annexing it to her own territory, whilst Napoleon should drive the allied forces beyond the Vistula. . . . . M. de Metternich listened to this project with apparent impassibility, and then asked—"Supposing that the belligerent powers do pause at our summons, what bases of peace should we offer them?" and to this question M. de Narbonne could give no reply, for the despatch he had received referred only to the circumstances arising out of the continuance of war, Napoleon being unwilling, in fact, to declare as yet what territorial system in Europe he would consent to. M. de Metternich affected to be willing to await patiently the solution of this point, and to find in what M. de Narbonne had communicated matter for long reflection. He promised to give his answer as soon as the serious nature of the subject would permit.

M. de Metternich himself could not have selected a more sstisfactory means of escaping from the embarrassment of the moment than that which was afforded by the last communications from Paris. This embarrassment consisted in the difficulty of declaring to Napoleon that Austria had adopted the rôle of mediator, which was necessarily the abandonment of the rôle of ally, of the difficulty of finding a pretext for armaments of which the extent could no longer be justified, and, finally, of the difficulty of explaining the services which were to be performed by the Austrian auxiliary corps, which, instead of fighting with the Russians, was entering Gallicia. And with respect to these three points, Napoleon himself had almost miraculously come to the assistance of M. de Metternich, who was too clever not to avail himself of the path to good fortune thus provided.

After the lapse of two days he announced to M. de Narbonne, with an air of satisfaction which may be easily imagined, that having consulted with his master, he was ready to give explanations with respect to the policy of the Austrian cabinet—declaring his satisfaction at finding his own views on the most important points of the last communications similar to those of Napoleon, he proceeded to say that the Austrian cabinet had perceived, as Napoleon had done, the impossibility that Austria should take a secondary part in the present state of affairs, and had accordingly made such preparations as would speedily place at her disposal a hundred thousand men in Bohemia. "Austria would present herself," he said, "before the belligerent powers as an armed mediator; should they obey her summons to an armistice, and to have plenipotentiaries for the negotiation of peace, it would then be necessary to enunciate the conditions of peace, and on this point," continued M. de Metternich, "the fresh communications promised by the French cabinet were impatiently expected. Should the belligerent powers, on the contrary, refuse to entertain any proposition of peace, it would remain for France and Austria to agree respecting the manner in which their forces were to act in concert; and with regard to this point, the insufficiency of the last treaty of alliance, and the necessity of modifying it in conformity with circumstances was evident. That new measures must consequently be taken with respect to the Austrian corps, which was on the frontiers of Poland in a perfectly false position, and that it would be withdrawn to the Austrian territory, together with the Polish corps, in order that it might not be employed in a manner contrary to the views of the two cabinets.

At one single stroke M. de Metternich had freed himself on this occasion from all his embarrassments. From the position of an enslaved ally he had proceeded to that of an armed mediator. But M. de Narbonne was far too clear-sighted not to perceive through the Austrian minister's eagerness to appear to be agreed with the French government on all essential points, that he held, in fact, opinions entirely opposed to them. He attempted, therefore, without either anger or bitterness, but rather with the persifflage of a man of the world, anxious not to be supposed a dupe, to force M. de Metternich to an explanation, and to gain from him some portion of his secret, inquiring of him what were the conditions of peace of which Austria was prepared to compel the acceptance by the belligerent powers—"Those," replied M. de Metternich, "on which we shall have agreed; those respecting which we have vainly pressed you to explain yourselves during the last three months, the communication of which by you we have still to await, and the want of which renders the agreement between us incomplete in a most essential point, namely, that of the conditions which we are to present to the belligerent powers when summoning them to surrender."—"But suppose that these conditions, of which I am not informed," said M. de Narbonne, "should not be such as you desire?"—But here M. de Metternich, who was unwilling to attempt to accomplish too much in one day, and was contented with the ground already gained, and which enabled Austria to proceed from the position of an ally to that of an armed mediator, hastened to interrupt the French minister, saying to him—"I am under no anxiety with respect to these conditions. Your master will be reasonable. . . . . . . Indeed it is impossible that he should be willing to risk all for such a ridiculous chimera as the grand duchy of Warsaw, for the no less ridiculous protectorate of the confederation of the Rhine, and for those Hanseatic towns which must cease to be of any value to him, as soon as, by the conclusion of a general peace, he renounces the continental blockade!" . . . . . . "But suppose," rejoined M. de Narbonne, who was unwilling to permit his adversary thus to escape him,—"suppose that my master should be of a different opinion, and be resolved to preserve to France all that he has conquered for her; what will happen then?"—"It will happen, it will happen," replied M. de Metternich, in a tone of embarrassment and impatience, "it will happen that you will be compelled to grant what France herself demands of you, and what she has a right to demand of you, after such long-continued and glorious efforts, namely, peace! A peace accompanied by that just glory which no nation, not even England, wishes to dispute her enjoyment of." Still persisting in his questions, M. de Narbonne now inquired in plain terms whether, if Napoleon should reject the conditions of peace proposed by her, Austria would turn her arms against him, and M. de Metternich, questioned more closely than he liked, at length exclaimed—"Well! yes! an armed mediator, as his title shows, is an impartial arbitrator, who is provided with the force necessary to enforce respect to that justice of which he is the minister."—And then, as though he felt that he had said too much, he added,—"of course you will understand that in this case, the inclinations of the arbitrator are all in favour of France."—"But in certain circumstances you would declare war against us?" again rejoined M. de Narbonne.—"No, no! we shall not do so, for you will certainly be reasonable," replied M. de Metternich.—And at this point of the conversation M. de Narbonne, endeavouring to give a pleasant tone to a conversation which he feared that he had rendered too serious, said to M. de Metternich;—"Your real object, I imagine, is to gain time, and to afford us the opportunity of gaining some fresh victory. . . . . And if the arbitration depend on that, permit me to express a conviction that it will be in our favour."—"I do certainly," replied M. de Metternich, "reckon upon your gaining victories, and it is necessary that you should do so for the purpose of bringing your adversaries to reason. But do not deceive yourselves—as soon as you shall have gained a victory, we shall address you in more decided terms than now."

The consequences of the fault which Napoleon had now committed with respect to Austria were immediate and numerous. Scarcely had Austria assumed the position of an armed mediator, when she took advantage of this position to advance upon the path which had thus been opened to her. The King of Saxony, still at Ratisbonne, was assailed by advice, threats, and entreaties from every direction. He had declined the offers made to him by Prussia for the purpose of inducing him to join the coalition; but Austria still continued her endeavours to induce him to resign the grand duchy of Warsaw, and now had a fresh argument to adduce in favour of this measure; alleging that France had demanded the mediation of Austria, that Austria had consented to afford it, that Austria, therefore, did nothing which was not in conformity with Napoleon's views, and that the renunciation by Saxony of the grand duchy of Warsaw would relieve him from a serious embarrassment; and render, in fact, the attainment of peace not only easy but certain. Moreover, urged the Austrian cabinet, it would be well to secure a solid possession, such as Saxony, by the sacrifice of a chimera such as Poland, and to renounce a dream which was no longer suited to the times. Overcome by these various reasons, Frederick Augustus, who perceived that a career of ambition was not suited to him, and that in allying himself with a conqueror who had risen from the whirl of revolutions, he had accepted an association as foreign to his genius as to his conscience, subscribed the renunciation which was demanded of him, signing it on the 15th of April, three days after the declaration of armed mediation made by Austria upon our imprudent provocation. At the same time, fearing that if he remained at Ratisbonne, he might again fall under the influence of Napoleon, as the latter proceeded by way of Mayence and Erfurt to place himself at the head of his armies, the Austrian cabinet insisted that Frederick Augustus should remove from Ratisbonne to Prague, from whence, it said, being but a short distance from Dresden, he might govern his kingdom as though he were there, and without incurring any danger either from the allies or the French.

At the very moment when he was being thus urged by the Austrian cabinet, the King of Saxony received the summons sent from Paris to deliver his fine cavalry to Marshal Ney, who required it for the purpose of opening the campaign. This was a demand which, to the unfortunate king, was almost equivalent to a demand of his life, so terrified was he at the idea of the Cossacks; and when M. de Serra, the French minister, insisted upon having a reply to it, Frederick Augustus, in a state of terror and full of regret at having been placed in such a position of embarrassment on account of the ambitious dream of his ancestors, determined suddenly to depart for Prague. He was accompanied by an enlightened minister, M. de Senft, who had hitherto supported the policy of the French alliance, filling at Dresden a part similar to that played by M. de Metternich in Vienna, M. de Hardenberg in Berlin, and M. de Cetto at Munich. But he was now vanquished, as had been all the partisans of the French alliance, and yielded. At the last moment M. de Serra received a letter for the emperor, in which the worthy King of Saxony told him, that upon the invitation of Austria, with whose perfect understanding with France he was acquainted, he had proceeded to Prague, but was still as faithful as ever to the great monarch who had overwhelmed him with benefits.

When news of this event reached Vienna, the Emperor Francis and his minister Metternich could not conceal their joy, at having in their hands so precious an instrument for effecting their designs, and, believing that reserve was no longer necessary with respect to the auxiliary corps, wrote to Prince Poniatowski that it was necessary to evacuate Cracow, and re-enter the Austrian territories, since hostilities were about to be resumed, and the Austrian government was anxious to avoid drawing the Russians upon Bohemia. He was informed, moreover, that on their march the arms of the Polish, Saxon, and French troops were to be deposited in waggons, to be subsequently restored to them. These directions reached Prince Poniatowski simultaneously with the order sent from Paris to prepare to enter upon active service in the field, and to co-operate with the Austrian corps, which also was to receive Napoleon's instructions. Prince Poniatowski hastened to lay all these communications before M. de Narbonne, that he might explain a mysterious state of things, which was quite beyond his, Prince Poniatowski's, comprehension.

M. de Narbonne, who could not fail any longer to perceive what the designs of Austria really were, hastened to seek another interview with M. de Metternich, to demand of him an account of the recent proceedings of the Austrian cabinet, and found him embarrassed at having to answer the questions which the French minister now put to him, and almost vexed that the results he had desired should have been so speedily attained. Commencing with the King of Saxony, he declared that no one was more surprised at his sudden arrival at Prague than the Emperor Francis. With respect to the withdrawal of the Polish corps to Bohemia and the order given for the removal of its arms, as he was unwilling to avow the secret arrangement signed with the Russians, he excused himself as adroitly as he was able, saying that the Austrian cabinet had simply given a piece of friendly advice on this matter to Prince Poniatowski, which he was at liberty to accept or refuse; that having hitherto loyally fulfilled the duties of companions in arms towards the Poles, during the retreat they had commenced together, Austria now warned them of the impossibility of supporting them in their present position; that the Russians were approaching in force, and that the Austrian cabinet was unwilling to attract them towards the Austrian territory by entering into fresh conflicts with them, which would be entirely opposed to the mediatorial part which she was about to assume at the instigation of France; that she had resolved, therefore, to withdraw the Austrian corps into Gallicia, where she hoped it would not be followed, and had suggested to Prince Poniatowski, that he might withdraw with the Austrian troops in order to avoid being made prisoner, and that if he accepted this offer, the resignation for a time of the arms of his troops was a mere matter of course, since it was not customary for troops to traverse a neutral territory in arms.

Such were M. de Metternich's explanations, to which there could be no difficulty in finding replies: but it would have been better to have left M. de Metternich under the impression that he had succeeded in fulfilling, at once, the two parts of mediator and ally, in order that he might have been constrained, as long as possible, to fulfil the duties of the latter. Unfortunately, however, M. de Narbonne had not been sent for this purpose, and he persisted in embarrassing his antagonist, saying, that although the treaty of alliance between France and Austria was found to be no longer entirely applicable to circumstances, that was no reason for the withdrawal of these thirty thousand troops, which, with the Polish troops, would form a force of forty-five thousand men, perfectly capable, if posted on the left flank of the forces of the allies, to paralyse, at least, fifty thousand of their troops. Again, Napoleon had declared, on setting out to place himself at the head of his armies, that he would speedily give orders to the Austrian corps, and was Austria now prepared, by withdrawing it from his orders, to announce to Europe, to Napoleon himself, that the treaty of the 14th of March, 1812, no longer existed? Was it worthy, moreover, of the Austrian arms, that she should retreat before a few thousand Russians, and after having timidly re-entered her own frontiers, should then conceal her troops, and disarm those of her own allies? And, finally, would these latter, amongst whom were some French troops, consent to be disarmed?

Unable to reply to these observations, M. de Metternich defended himself against them on the ground of prudence. "A few thousand Austrian and Polish troops, more or less, at Cracow, could not be of any real importance to Napoleon," he said; "and to refuse to allow her to take the course she desired with respect to this matter, simply for the sake of compromising her, would be to place her in a false position with respect to the belligerent powers, to whom she was to present herself in the character of an arbitrator, to render the performance by her of the duties of this character impossible, to expose her to a great outburst of popular indignation, should she fire a single shot against the allies, and most probably to cause her to lose that hold on the thread of German politics, which she now held but with a trembling hand. If she refused these thirty thousand troops to France now, it was but that she might place at her service a hundred and fifty thousand, as soon as acceptable conditions of peace should have been agreed on. Moreover, France must be reasonable, and not demand so impossible a thing as that Austria should fight with Germans for Poles. With respect to the point of honour due care had been taken, and the justification of the retreat was the certainty of being confronted by considerable bodies of the enemy. With respect to the disarming of the Polish troops, their sovereign, the King of Saxony, had consented to it; and with respect to the French battalion.—Well! in consideration of Napoleon's glory and that of the French army, the Austrian cabinet would disregard an international principle, and authorise this battalion to remain armed upon a neutral territory; Bohemia, as Napoleon knew, having been declared neutral for the purpose of preventing the Russians from advancing in that direction.

Perceiving, as he could not now fail to do, that neutrality was all that France could expect to obtain of Austria, and even that only at the price of prompt and decisive victories, M. de Narbonne sent information of what had passed between himself and the Austrian minister to M. de Bassano, and demanded fresh instructions how to act in the difficult position in which he found himself placed. In the meantime, a new fact communicated from Munich by our ambassador, M. Mercy d'Argenteau, revealed how great were the exertions which Austria was making to procure adherents to her plan of armed mediation. She had endeavoured to make of Bavaria what she had made of Saxony, an ally of France in a double sense, an ally of this power. that is, if she would accept a peace which secured the interests of Germany, but an enemy if she persisted in refusing it.

Bavaria, eager for repose, and assailed on all sides by the clamours of German patriotism, had listened to, and almost agreed to the proposals of Austria, up to the point at which the latter had demanded for herself the boundary line of the Inn; but at the enunciation of this pretension, which could only be satisfied by depriving Bavaria of a portion of territory, for which she could not possibly receive compensation, she determined to remain faithful to the French alliance. These details were communicated to M. de Narbonne at Vienna, and M. de Bassano at Paris, and fully confirmed the impression, which the course she pursued could not fail to leave, that she was endeavouring to form an intermediate party which should enforce the conclusion of such a peace as should be agreeable to Germany, whether it were or were not agreeable to Napoleon.

These various momentous circumstances in the course of European policy, had taken place between the 1st and 20th of April, whilst Napoleon was preparing for his departure from Paris, was proceeding to Mayence, and was giving them his first orders. And of all these circumstances, what most surprised him, was the abrupt departure of the King of Saxony for Prague, at the moment when the French army was ready to set his dominions free. The retreat of the Austrian corps appeared to him more accountable, and he perceived that Austria, whilst refraining from repudiating the alliance, was resolved to ignore its obligations. But the proposed disarming of the Polish troops excited his indignation, and he sent off a courier to Cracow, with a command to Prince Poniatowski to resist this measure at any hazard, and to perish rather than yield to it, adding with a vehemence and grandeur of language which were truly his own,—"*The emperor cares not for the preservation of men who shall have suffered themselves to be dishonoured.*"

Employing M. de Coulaincourt as his minister of foreign affairs in the absence of M. de Bassano, he wrote to M. de Narbonne to the effect that he began to see too clearly that Austria was playing him false; that her policy with respect to Saxony was particularly mysterious; that it was necessary to discover the clue to it, and to find out whether the fortress of Torgau, to which the Saxon infantry had retired, would be faithful or not to France, since it was important to know this at the moment of commencing operations on the Elbe; to obtain an explanation as to how far France might rely on the services of the Austrian corps, and to persuade her that she ought to renounce the idea of disarming the Polish troops. Napoleon, in short, desired M. de Narbonne to penetrate the mysterious system of diplomacy by which he was surrounded, but in such a manner as should avoid the display of any want of consideration for the father of his empress, whilst he himself should march to Dresden and cut the Gordian knot which appeared to be so hopelessly intricate at Vienna. At the same time he wrote to M. de Bassano, desiring him to inquire of Prince Schwarzenberg, how it was that there was so great a difference between his promises and the actual state of affairs.

But believing, as he did, that he would speedily arrange everything by the power of his arms, he allowed these subjects to cause him but slight disquietude, and employed himself, as soon as he had arrived at Mayence, with that activity and unequalled intelligence which made him the first administrator in the world.

In spite of the perfect obedience usually paid to his orders, and in spite of the presence at Mayence and indefatigable zeal of the old Duke of Valmy, all the corps were still very deficient both in respect to matériel and officers. But ten or fifteen days' exertions on the spot, would enable Napoleon to repair all deficiencies. By means of his own activity, and by paying ready money for what was required out of the private treasure he carried with him, he provided for all that was wanting. To supply the deficiency of officers, which existed to a great extent, a great number of officers who had been summoned from Spain now began to arrive by the public conveyances, and they had no sooner come, than he employed them in their several duties; and when this means of supplying officers failed, he selected, during reviews made under his personal inspection, individuals capable of filling the vacant grades, and delivered them their commissions without awaiting the formalities of the war office. He had said, that in this campaign he would no longer be the Emperor Napoleon, but General Bonaparte, and he kept his word. He had reduced his own equipage to the strictest limits, and required that all his generals should follow his example.

As soon as a regiment was ready for active service, he sent it to Marshal Ney at Wurzbourg, or to Marshal Marmont at Hanau, or the imperial guard at Frankfort. Of all his troops, the guard in particular, demanded and received his greatest care, and its reorganization proceeded with extraordinary celerity. The corps of General Lauriston, exclusively composed of cohorts, had already joined Prince Eugene on the Elbe. Those of Marshals Ney and Marmont, were ready to enter the field. The corps of General Bertrand debouched upon Augsburg, and found its artillery sent there for it by Napoleon, to relieve it from the necessity of dragging it over the Alps, money with which to purchase two thousand draught horses in Bavaria, and three thousand recruits, at first intended for the staffs returning from Russia, but subsequently devoted to the corps arriving from Italy. Every measure was carried out with such rapidity, even to the discipline of the men, that every day the troops were stopped on their march in order to go through the manœuvres which Napoleon had especially recommended, and which consisted in forming the battalion in square, deploying in line, and then forming into column of attack.

Certainly, this is not the way in which first-rate armies are to be formed; but when, in consequence of a too unbounded policy, it is necessary to execute every measure with rapidity, it is at least fortunate to possess the faculty of doing so in a high degree of perfection.

And we may notice how marvellous was the sympathy between the genius of the French nation and Napoleon's errors, which itself, in fact, partly induced him to commit. This quick, intelligent, and heroic nation, which had never since the earliest periods of our history ceased to be at war with Europe, and which, during the twenty-two years of revolution, from 1792 to 1815, never reposed a day, whilst the nations with which it was successively at war took rest by turns, is the only one in the world, perhaps, whose children are capable of being converted into soldiers within the space of three months. In 1813 the thing was easier than ever; for Napoleon possessed a body of highly trained officers, who had practised the art of war during twenty years of service in the field, who had unbounded confidence in themselves and their leader, and who, whilst bitterly deploring the catastrophe at Moscow, were full of eagerness to repair it. With such elements to work with the accomplishment of prodigies was still possible.

Napoleon had calculated that by leaving about thirty thousand men at Dantzic, and Thorn; thirty thousand at Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Spandau; Prince Eugene, reinforced by the corps of General Lauriston, which had been sent to him in March, would be able to assemble eighty thousand combatants on the Elbe. He hoped to debouch himself with one hundred and fifty thousand men from Thuringia, receiving, in passing, fifty thousand expected from Italy, and that being thus at the head of two hundred thousand men in addition to the eighty thousand under Prince Eugene, he would have more than sufficient force to overwhelm the hundred and fifty thousand troops, which the Russians and Prussians expected to have at their disposal at the opening of the campaign. There would also be the three armies of reserve which were being formed in Italy, Mayence, and Westphalia, and which would be ready in June or July.

But, as was usually the case, the number of troops actually ready for service in the field at the opening of the campaign, fell short of Napoleon's calculations, and numbered only two hundred thousand, instead of two hundred and eighty thousand; but this lesser force was still quite sufficient to drive back upon the Elbe, and the Oder, and even upon the Vistula, the imprudent enemies, who had advanced so far to brave his power. The following were the various positions of our troops at the close of April, at the moment of the commencement of operations.

Prince Eugene, after having left twenty-seven or twenty-eight thousand men at Dantzic, thirty-two or thirty-three thousand in the other fortresses of the Vistula and the Oder, had still almost eighty thousand active troops; but a portion of them were not so perfectly available as to be capable of being marched to join Napoleon, when he should debouch on Saxony. Thus Prince Poniatowski, now thrown towards the frontiers of Bohemia, was separated from Prince Eugene by the whole force of the allies, who had passed the Elbe at several points. Of the Polish troops, there was now available only Dombrowski's division, numbering some two thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, who were at this period being reorganised at Cassel. Of Reynier's corps since its separation from the Saxons, there remained the French division Durutte, which now numbered four thousand men. The twenty-eight thousand of the division Lagrange and Grenier's corps, were reduced to twenty-four thousand, by continual skirmishes with the Prussians and Russians, and were placed under the superior orders of Marshal Macdonald, and under the direct command of Generals Fressinet, Gerard, and Charpentier. Finally, General Lauriston's corps possessed only thirty-two thousand of the forty thousand troops of which it nominally consisted; but its ranks were filled with well trained soldiers, and it was commanded by officers of division of the greatest merit, such as, for example, General Maison. And this corps it was necessary to still further diminish, by detaching from it the division Puthod, for the purpose of covering the lower Elbe, until Marshals Davout and Victor, should, with their reorganised battalions, have retaken Hambourg and occupied Magdebourg. However, of the reorganised battalions, there were eight, those of Marshal Victor, which had hitherto been at the disposal of Prince Eugene, and which guarded Dessau, a very important point, since it was situated at a short distance from the confluence of the Elbe and Saale, behind which two streams, Prince Eugene and Napoleon were to effect their junction. This prince, had, finally, the cavalry which had been remounted in Hanover, and three thousand men of the imperial guard, which he would very shortly have to restore to the imperial guard. Altogether, he had but sixty-two thousand men with whom to join Napoleon, instead of eighty thousand, which it was calculated would have been at his disposal. These sixty-two thousand, however, were well armed, well disposed, and well commanded; and were spread along the line of the Elbe, from Wittenberg, to Magdebourg, ready, and full of eagerness to join Napoleon.

The two hundred thousand men, whom Napoleon had hoped to have under his immediate command after his junction with General Bertrand, were also replaced by a considerably smaller number. Instead of the sixty thousand troops, which it had been supposed would have been at Marshal Ney's command, he had no more than forty-two thousand, the diminution being due to the absence of the Wurtemberg and Bavarian contingents, and the Saxon cavalry. Of the second corps of the Rhine, which was being organised at Hanau, under Marshal Marmont, eight thousand were wanting of the forty thousand which it had been calculated to consist of; and the third of its division, that of General Teste, had so many men absent from its ranks, that it had to await them before joining the grand army. Finally, the imperial guard, the full number of whose troops should have been over forty thousand, was far from ready, in spite of the activity Napoleon had displayed in its reorganisation; fifteen or sixteen thousand alone being prepared for active service. General Bertrand was the only general who succeeded in bringing up his corps to its nominal strength, having almost forty-five thousand effective troops, well disposed and better disciplined than the other portions of the new army, being composed of veteran troops and conscripts who had already been trained during one or two years.

The actual state, therefore, of the various corps was such, that Napoleon would be able to debouch on Saxony at the head of one hundred and thirty-five thousand men, and three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, to join Prince Eugene who awaited him on the Elbe with sixty-two thousand men and a hundred pieces of cannon, and to meet the enemy at the head of two hundred thousand troops, whose ranks would speedily be filled up by fifty thousand others, and who would be followed by three armies of reserve, the numbers of which would raise the total of our forces in the field, to four hundred thousand at least.—A marvellous and almost incredible fact, when it is remembered that Napoleon had had only three months in which to realise it.

Napoleon, having at length, completed his preparations, quitted Mayence on the 26th of April, and visiting successively, Wurzbourg and Foulde proceeded to Weimar, whither Marshal Ney had preceded him with his young and valiant divisions. His plan, conceived with his usual rapidity and justness of thought, consisted in permitting the forces of the allies already carried beyond the Elbe, to advance as far as they pleased, even as far as the upper Saale, then to direct his own forces upon Erfurt and Weimar, to defile behind the Saale as behind a curtain, to use his own expression, to join Prince Eugene in the direction of Weissenfels, then to pass that river en masse, and to take the enemy in flank with two hundred thousand men in the direction of Leipsic. Should fortune favour him, he might obtain by the execution of this plan the most important results; for after having vanquished the forces of the allies in a great battle, and taken a considerable number of them, he would be able to drive back the remainder beyond the Elbe and the Oder, free the garrisons of the Oder from blockade, re-enter Berlin a conqueror, put himself in communication with Dantzic, and manifest in a more terrible shape than ever, the lion whom his enemies considered overthrown.

In furtherance of these views, he had sent Marshal Ney to occupy the passages of the Saale before the enemy should have had time to seize them, but directed him only to guard and not to cross the Saale, and had directed General Bertrand, followed at a short distance by Marshal Oudinot, to meet him at Saalfeld. At the same time he ordered Prince Eugene to advance, en masse, in the direction of Dessau, at no great distance from the confluence of the Saale and the Elbe, and to ascend the course of the Saale as far as Weissenfels. He himself followed Marshal Ney and General Bertrand, with the guard and the corps of Marshal Marmont. On the 26th he was at Erfurt, on the 28th at Eckartzberg, near the celebrated battle field of Awerstaedt. He had ordered the collection of immense supplies of provisions at Wurzbourg, Erfurt, and Naumbourg, and having overcome, by the power of money, the spirit of German patriotism, which was somewhat less ardent in these districts than elsewhere, had reason to hope that his soldiers would obtain the means of subsistence, without being reduced to commit any excesses for the purpose of obtaining it. The delicate operation which at this moment he purposed to accomplish, consisted in a double movement along the course of the Saale, he descending and Prince Eugene ascending it, the result expected of it being to concentrate in one mass all his available troops in the field. The allies, although posted very near, were neither sufficiently keen-sighted nor alert to divine and frustrate his manœuvre, as they might have done by a single movement.

The Russian army, which had suffered almost as much as our own during the retreat from Moscow, numbered at this time no more than one hundred thousand men, who were spread over the country from Cracow to Dantzic. About twenty thousand of them, under Generals Sacken and Doctorof, were opposed to the Polish and Austrian troops around Cracow; twenty thousand remained before Thorn and Dantzic; eight or nine thousand, under Tettenborn and Czernicheff, occupied the district of the lower Elbe in the direction of Hambourg and Lubeck; ten thousand had followed Wittgenstein beyond Berlin, and, with General d'York's Prussian corps, watched Magdebourg; twelve thousand, of whom the greater number were cavalry, had, under Wintzingerode, passed the Elbe at Dresden; and thirty thousand, who formed the principal corps, and consisted of soldiers of the guard, the grenadiers, and the remainder of Kutusof's army, remained on the Oder at head-quarters.

The Prussians had reconstituted their army with a promptitude which was a manifest sign of an organisation long and secretly prepared. Their treaties with Napoleon obliged them to have but forty-two thousand men under arms, and of these they had had to send twenty thousand to accompany our armies on the late campaign, and of this number a third had perished. But they had kept up numerous regimental staffs and left *en conge* in the towns and country districts, well trained soldiers, who only awaited the signal to rejoin their ranks. By these means, therefore, and by spontaneous levies of the youth of the country, the Prussian government had been able to assemble an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, of whom sixty thousand were well disciplined troops, ready for active service, forty thousand troops in course of training, and destined to join the troops in the field, and twenty thousand in the garrison.

At the commencement of operations the allies were able to present on the field of battle, on their right, d'York's Prussian corps and Wittgenstein's Russian corps, which, together, amounted to thirty thousand men; in their centre Wintzingerode's corps of from twelve to fifteen thousand cavalry and light infantry, forming the advanced guard; whilst in a second line were Blucher with twenty-six thousand Prussians and Kutusof with thirty thousand Russians; finally, on their left, but out of reach, were ten or twelve thousand men, under General Sacken; a total force of one hundred and ten or one hundred and twelve thousand men, and a somewhat insignificant foundation for the boldness and presumption so largely displayed by the allies, and for the magnificent promises which they had spread throughout Europe, for the purpose of exciting it against us.

The allies had reckoned upon an addition of strength which they still had to await, and which was that they expected to receive at the hands of Prince Bernadotte. In the interview at Abo, the future King of Sweden had agreed with Alexander, to assist the efforts of the coalition by means of a corps of thirty thousand Swedes, and it was arranged that these, together with a body of fifteen or twenty thousand Russians, should be under his own command. For the purpose of facilitating the formation of this army, the English government had granted a subsidy of twenty-five millions of francs. The reward which Sweden was to receive for waging war with France, was, as we have seen, Norway; and Bernadotte, more anxious to seize the reward than to fulfil his engagements, took care first of all to send troops into Norway, to to take possession of the price which had been promised for his defection from our alliance. The result was that the allies were full of distrust with respect to the Prince Royal of Sweden, and they received information from their emissaries that the old Marshal Bernadotte had not yet determined on the course he should pursue, and that he might even now, by the offer of due advantages, be induced to adopt more friendly sentiments towards France.

But although thus deprived of the expected Swedish contingent, and still unsupported by Austria, who had not yet joined them, being anxious first to exhaust all the chances of obtaining the conclusion of a satisfactory peace, the allies had determined not only to meet, but even to advance to meet with such forces as they possessed, the shock of Napoleon's armies. And, indeed, after the boasts in which they had indulged, to repass the Elbe could not but be difficult and even dangerous, for it would be to spread discouragement throughout Germany, and to surrender Austria into Napoleon's hands. They were now posted in a species of *coupe-gorge*, having Prince Eugene on one side of them, the mountains of Bohemia on the other, Napoleon opposite; and thus being exposed to being attacked simultaneously both in front and flank. The cautious Kutusof, who had become a species of oracle since his triumphs, persisted in advising that the Russian army should be content with what it had already gained, and, retaining the grand duchy of Warsaw, should make peace with France, and return to Russia; advice which Alexander, although excessively displeased at having to resign the character of liberator of Germany, did not venture to disregard, and, therefore, whilst Wintzingerode, marching in company with the ardent Blucher had crossed the Elbe at the beginning of April, the Russian army had remained behind, only entering Dresden on the 26th, the same day on which Napoleon reached Erfurt. But suddenly Kutusof, exhausted by the late campaign, died at Bunzlau, in the midst, as it it were, of his triumphs; and from the moment of his death, all prudential considerations being thrown away, the only desire of the allies was to meet us in battle anywhere and anyhow, so that the battle-field was in the plains of Saxony, where their cavalry would give them an advantage over the French, who had but a youthful infantry and no cavalry.

The forces of the coalition continued, therefore, to advance during the 27th, 28th, and 29th of April, between Prince Eugene, who was at the confluence of the Saale and the Elbe, and Napoleon, who was advancing from the Thuringian forest. To have hastened upon Leipsic, Lutzen, Weissenfels, and Naumbourg, for the purpose of cutting the line of the Saale, and preventing the junction of Napoleon and Prince Eugene, would have been the method by which the allies could have escaped from the danger of their position, but the execution of such a manœuvre required the guidance of a general, and since Kutusof's death Alexander had remained the sole military authority, listening to every one's advice without knowing whose to adopt. It was agreed that Wittgenstein should have the command when actually in the presence of the enemy, but in the meantime, the coalition forces advanced under a command which was neither prompt, certain, nor calculated to obtain obedience, pushing on as far as Leipsic, Wittgenstein and d'York marching on the right in the direction of Halle, Wintzingerode commanding the advanced guard at Lutzen, Blucher, and the bulk of the Russian army in the centre, between Rotha and Borna, whilst Miloradovitch was on the left, on the Chemnitz route, which runs along the foot of the mountains of Bohemia, to render this side safe, should Marshal Ney happen to appear there. The allies marched on with the knowledge that he was advancing, but failed to perceive that, instead of proceeding along the mountains of Bohemia on issuing from the Thuringian forest, he might take the opposite direction, and descend the Saale for the purpose of joining the viceroy.

On the 29th, in fact, Marshal Ney did descend the Saale, crossed it a little above Weissenfels, and advanced into the immense plains which extend beyond this river, and in the midst of which is Lutzen,—Lutzen which Gustavus Adolphus had rendered celebrated, and which Napoleon was speedily to render still more so.

Following Napoleon's instructions, Marshal Ney crossed the plain of Weissenfels with the division Souham formed into many squares; the advanced cavalry post having, in the meantime, afforded him very clear information of the approach of Wintzingerode's numerous squadrons. This German General, who commanded the Russian advanced guard, had under his orders the infantry division of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, and eight or nine thousand superb cavalry; and had that very day, advanced beyond Weissenfels for the purpose of seeking what Ney was perfectly ready to afford him, information of the French.

Our conscripts, although in the presence of the enemy, for the first time advanced with the ardour of youthful and exuberant courage, crossing the undulated ground which lay between them and the enemy, undaunted by his fire, and debouching in many squares on the plain beyond. After some discharges of cannon, Landskoy's division of cavalry advanced at a gallop upon our squares, and the aged and intrepid Souham, the heroic Ney, and the generals of brigade, placed themselves in the several squares for the purpose of encouraging their infantry, as yet unaccustomed to such a position. When successive discharges of musketry had checked the enemy's successive assaults, Ney broke the squares of his infantry, and forming them into column, drove the enemy before him. He congratulated his brave conscripts, who filled the air with shouts, a thousand times repeated, of "Vive l'Empereur;" and from this moment everything could be expected of them. They followed the Russians into Weissenfels, drove them out of it, and at the close of the day were masters of this important point.

At the same moment, Macdonald, whose troops formed Prince Eugene's tête-de-colonne, had entered Mersebourg and mingled his advanced posts with those of Ney. General Lauriston, who followed him, had found the *Halle* bridges strongly occupied by the Prussian General Kleist, with infantry and artillery, and had not striven to force a position which must fall on the morrow by being turned.

On receiving information of the above recited events, Napoleon was greatly delighted, and wrote to Munich, Stuttgard, Carlsruhe, and Paris, recounting the prowess of his young soldiers. On the following day, the 30th, he quitted Eckartsberg and proceeded to Weissenfels.

His junction with Prince Eugene having been now effected on the lower Saale, he naturally was anxious to make it serve the purpose for which he had effected it, and which was that of enabling him to debouch en masse on the famous plains of Lutzen, march upon Leipsic, cross the Elster there, then execute a *mouvement-de-conversion*, the left in advance, and marching upon the allies, to crush their forces against the Bohemian mountains. His reconnaissances had informed him that the Russian and Prussian forces were crowding upon his right, that they were consequently between him and the mountains on the upper Elster, which was the stream the French army would find on its north, after it had crossed the Saale. He resolved to advance from Weissenfels upon Lutzen, intending to march from thence upon Leipsic in close column, and then to pass the Elster; but as two hundred thousand men could not well advance at the same time by a single road, he sent Marshal Ney, the guard, and Marshal Marmont, by the grand route from Lutzen to Leipsic, ordering General Bertrand and Marshal Oudinot, to debouch from Naumbourg upon Stössen for the purpose of flanking them on the right, and ordering Prince Eugene to debouch from Mersebourg and advance with all his forces upon Leipsic, by the Mackranstædt route, for the purpose of flanking them on the left. On the following day, the 1st of May, he mounted his horse at an early hour, and accompanied by Marshals Ney, Mortier, Bessières, Soult, Duroc, and M. de Coulaincourt, set out in the hope of enjoying with his own eyes, the spectacle which had so charmed Marshal Ney on the previous evening, that of our young soldiers supporting with undaunted courage the charges of the enemy's cavalry.

At daybreak Marshal Ney's troops advanced upon the vast Lutzen plain, formed in squares, which were accompanied by artillery, and preceded by numerous tirailleurs. Arriving at the brink of a long and deep ravine, called the Rippach ravine, from the name of a village which it traversed, the squares broke for the purpose of passing it, and when it had been crossed, re-formed and continued their advance. The division Souham held the foremost place, marching with an excellent bearing, and had just deployed, when Marshal Bessières, who usually commanded the cavalry of the guard, and should not consequently have been where he now was, advanced a little to the right, for the purpose of being better able to observe the enemy's movements, and suddenly fell dead, struck by a bullet in his breast. It was the second time, alas! that this brave man had been hit on the battle-field by Napoleon's side, the first time being at Wagram, where a bullet had struck him but only caused a contusion. His death on the present occasion, caused, in spite of the general confidence, a painful foreboding in more than one heart. He was a valiant man, of a lively Gascon temperament, but possessed of a fine intellect, and of a courage which frequently led him to express to Napoleon useful truths both impressively and opportunely. Napoleon loved and esteemed him, and felt a sincere pang of sorrow at his loss; but then exclaiming, "Death comes nigh us!" pushed forward to watch the march of his young soldiers, and experienced in the spectacle a satisfaction equal to that felt by Ney two days before; beholding his conscripts repelling again and again the repeated charges of the enemy's cavalry, and strewing the ground before them with three or four hundred killed and wounded foemen. The troops halted at Lutzen, and Napoleon went to visit the monument of Gustavus Adolphus, who had been struck down on this plain, as Epaminondas, in the bosom of victory, and gave orders that a monument should also be raised to the memory of the Duke of Istria, killed on the same ground.

On the following day, the 2nd of May, a day ever memorable, and one of the last on which fortune smiled upon our arms, Napoleon rose at three in the morning for the purpose of giving his orders, and dictating a multitude of letters. Leipsic was distant only four leagues, and the reports of spies, more explicit now than they had been during the previous days, declared that the Russians and Prussians, continuing their movement on our right, had marched behind the Elster upon Zwenkau and Pegau, with the desire, apparently, to meet us or find out our position. Napoleon, confirmed by this news in his plan of advancing en masse upon Leipsic and then descending upon the enemy's flank, now ordered Prince Eugene to move Lauriston's corps directly upon Leipsic, to direct Macdonald to the right upon Zwenkau, the point at which would be encountered the enemy's most advanced detachments, and to occupy himself a position between Lauriston and Macdonald, with the division Durutte, Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, and a strong reserve of artillery, for the purpose of affording support to the right or the left as circumstances might render necessary. At the same time, as it was possible that the enemy had ascended the Elster for the purpose of taking his own army in flank, Napoleon retained Ney with his five divisions in the environs of Lutzen, posting him at a group of five villages, of which the principal was named Kaja, and situated a league above Lutzen, on the bank of the Floss-Graben, a canal-d'irrigation which traversed the whole plain between the Saale and the Elster. Remaining at this point with his five divisions, Ney was to form the solid pivot around which we were to effect our *mouvement de conversion;* and Napoleon ordered Marmont and Oudinot to cross the Rippach for the purpose of taking up a position on Ney's right, that they might be ready to assist him, or be assisted themselves, should they be unexpectedly attacked, and that, should they encounter no enemy, they might subsequently advance together upon the Elster, by Zwenkau and Pegau.

Having informed each *chef-de-corps* with the utmost precision of what he expectod him to do, and how to act under any circumstances that might happen, Napoleon employed himself in dictating letters, of which one was to the Duke of Rovigo, pointing out the kind of language which was to be held on the part of the government with respect to military affairs, at the moment when the public mind received with great distrust all official assertions, and concluding with these remarkable words;—"*Truth and simplicity must be our rules to-day.*"

At ten o'clock he set out from Lutzen followed by a squadron of the guard, and hastened towards Leipsic, which was some four leagues distant. At the same moment, Marshal Macdonald, crossing the Leipsic route from left to right, advanced upon Zwenkau; whilst on the left, General Lauriston advanced from Mackranstædt upon Leipsic, Prince Eugene being upon the Leipsic route with the division Durutte and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, and followed by the whole mass of the guard.

Passing along these various columns, which received him with repeated cries of "*Vive l'Empereur*!" Napoleon arrived in front of Leipsic, which the intrepid Maison, in command of the first division of Lauriston's corps, was attacking with his accustomed resolution and skill, General Kleist defending it with the Prussian infantry. A tract of marshy and wooded ground, as is well known, lies in front of Leipsic on the Lutzen side, and being traversed by various arms of the Elster, Leipsic itself can only be reached on this side by crossing the long series of bridges thrown over them, and these were now defended by powerful artillery and a body of Prussian infantry; tirailleurs, moreover, filling the surrounding thickets. But General Maison, directing a vigorous flank fire upon these defences, and then making a battalion ford the first arm of the Elster, for the purpose of taking them in the rear, compelled the Prussians to evacuate the first bridge, and pursued them at the head of his infantry.

Whilst Napoleon watched through his glass in the fair May weather, this scene so similar to so many others which had filled his life, a cannonade suddenly resounded on his right, from the direction of the villages at which he had left Ney's five divisions. He had calculated all the chances of the vast manœuvre which he had planned, and could be neither surprised nor disconcerted. He listened some moments to this cannonade, which continually increased, and then exclaimed, "Whilst we are endeavouring to turn them they are endeavouring to turn us! It is well; they will find us ready for them." He immediately sent Ney, who had hitherto accompanied him, to maintain the position held by his five divisions in the five villages; and then, with the readiness of one prepared for every eventuality, ordered a complete revolution in his order of march; in the first place directing General Lauriston to leave only one of his three divisions in Leipsic, and to échelon the two others in the rear, to ascend the course of the Elster with them as far as Zwenkau itself, and to advance upon the left of Ney. Macdonald, who had been ordered to move upon Zwenkau, he now directed to descend from this place upon Eisdorf, a little village situated on Ney's left, on the edge of the Floss-Graben, where he would be in a position to flank Ney's left, and even to outflank the enemy coming from Zwenkau. Prince Eugene, leaving Lauriston at Leipsic, was to support Macdonald with the remainder of his troops. Such were the arrangements Napoleon now made on Ney's left. On his right Napoleon ordered Marmont to take up a position at Starsiedel, one of the five villages which Ney's corps had been directed to guard. At the same time, he ordered General Bertrand to debouch even on the enemy's rear, linking himself with Marmont, and thus Ney would be flanked on the right and left by corps which would not only afford him support, but also envelope the two flanks of the enemy. Finally, that his centre might not be penetrated, he made the whole of the guard retrace its steps, and moved it by the Lutzen route upon Kaja.

We must now direct our attention to the movements of the allies, and the circumstances which had brought them to encounter our arms at Kaja, instead of where Napoleon had expected to meet them, beyond Leipsic. On receiving information of the two engagements in which General Wintzingerode had encountered our troops with his cavalry, in advance of and in the rear of Weissenfels, on the 29th of April and the 1st of May, the allies had at length comprehended that Napoleon, ceasing to descend the course of the Saale for the purpose of joining the viceroy, was marching from the Saale to the Elster for the purpose of taking them in flank. Having determined to encounter us in battle, they were anxious to meet us on the plain of Lutzen, on account of the advantages it would afford their cavalry over so young an infantry as ours; and Diebitch, Prince Wittgenstein's chief of the staff, proposed to take advantage of Napoleon's flank march to attack him in flank himself, throwing twenty-five thousand men upon him in the direction of Kaja, in the hope of driving his infantry, thus unexpectedly assailed, amongst the marshes which extend from Leipsic to Mersebourg, the point of junction of the Saale and the Elster. This plan was assented to, and it was agreed that on the night of the 1st of May, the troops of the allies should cross the Elster, those that came from Leipsic and Rotha, at Zwenkau, and those which came from Borna at Pegau; that they should then cross the Floss-Graben, and should then by a *mouvement de conversion* fall upon the five villages situated on the right of the Lutzen, where only a few bivouacs had been observed, and should from thence hurl themselves upon the flank of the French army, the cavalry being ready to charge at a gallop, as soon as the infantry should have taken the villages.

The whole night was employed in these manœuvres, and occupied so long a time that at ten o'clock in the morning the troops were still defiling—rejoiced at seeing the French army on its march upon Leipsic, hoping to surprise it. Alexander and Frederick William, abandoning the command to Wittgenstein, rode through the ranks of their soldiers, receiving their acclamations, and contributing thus to increase a loss of time which had already been too great.

The allies having crossed the Floss-Graben above us for the purpose of advancing to Lutzen, whilst we had crossed it below on our way to Leipsic, rested their right on the Floss-Graben, their left on the Rippach ravine, having in front the five villages, the possession of which was about to be so valiantly disputed. It was agreed that Blucher should attack in the first place the three first villages, which were situated in a hollow, and named respectively Gross-Gorschen, Rahna, and Klein-Gorschen, that Wittgenstein and d'York should support him, that Wintzingerode, posted on the right with all his cavalry, should be ready to pour down upon the French as soon as they should be thrown into disorder, that, finally, the guard and the Russian reserve, infantry and cavalry, ranged on the right along the Floss-Graben, should be ready to advance to the support of the troops which might require it. There was some hope that Miloradovitch would arrive in time to take part in the battle, but without his troops the allies had at their disposal eighty thousand men, well concentrated, and animated with the utmost resolution.

When the troops had had an hour's repose, Blucher's Prussians commenced the attack under the eyes of the two sovereigns, who were posted on a slight eminence at some distance to watch the undaunted courage of their soldiers. Towards noon, Blucher advanced at the head of the division Kleist upon Gross-Gorschen, throwing a violent artillery fire upon four battalions of the division Souham, which, avertie by the protracted preparations of the allies, had had time to get under arms, and then attacking them with such extreme vigour with the division Kleist, that they were driven back into Gross-Gorschen, and from thence into Rahna and Klein-Groschen. On the left, and opposite Starsiedel, another of the five villages, Wintzingerode had, in the meantime, approached the villages with his horse, with the intention of outflanking them, and seizing the occasion for a decisive charge.

In Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, the division Souham, numbering twelve thousand men, and rallied by its old general whose rare courage was accompanied by the experience of twenty years, defended itself with the utmost vigour. Unfortunately, the division Gerard, which was posted on the right, was still in the disorder of the bivouac, and was unable to use its artillery, the horses having been sent to procure forage, and it was possible, therefore, that on this side Souham might be outflanked. But at this moment, Marshal Marmont, having crossed the Rippach, debouched from Starsiedel opposite Wintzingerode, and posted his troops so as to cover the division Gerard, and Wintzingerode dared not attack infantry, whose lines appeared as solid as walls, and which a storm of fire failed to shake.

But now, animated, not only by his natural courage, but also by all the passionate patriotism of a German, Blucher led his second division, that of Zeither, with so much energy upon Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, that he succeeded in overcoming the divisions Souham and Gerard, driving them out towards Kaja on the one side, and Starsiedel on the other, and to these two other villages, Blucher, carried away by his heroic ardour, then advanced, resolved to surmount all obstacles.

But at this moment, Ney arrived from Leipsic, bringing with him those of his divisions which were in the rear of Kaja, and Blucher had now to encounter an energy capable of giving check to his own. At the aspect of Ney's energetic face and person, our young soldiers recovered confidence, and having been rallied behind the division Brenier, which was at Kaja, advanced to retake the abandoned villages at the point of the bayonet, and driving back the Prussian troops which had advanced beyond them, re-entered Klein-Gorschen on the other, and in these two villages the conflict became a fierce hand to hand encounter, the result of which was that the Prussians were driven back to Gross-Gorschen, their first conquest.

Napoleon now came up, passing through the files of wounded who shouted at his approach "*Vive l'Empereur!*" He saw that Ney maintained his position in the centre, that Eugene with Macdonald marched on the left beyond the Floss-Graben, for the purpose of outflanking the enemy in the direction of Eisdorf, and that Marmont, whose troops were formed on the right in numerous squares, maintained his position at Starsiedel. He could not perceive Bertrand, who was at some distance, but he could reckon upon his arrival, and knew that the guard were hastening up with the greatest expedition. He was satisfied, therefore, with the aspect of affairs, and allowed the battle to continue.

Blucher now brought up the royal guard and the reserves; throwing one or two battalions beyond the Floss-Graben for the purpose of preserving Eisdorf against a column of French troops, which he perceived to be advancing against it; and, on the left, hurling the royal horse-guard upon the divisions Bonnet and Compans, which were ranged in square in front of Starsiedel, directing Wintzingerode to support this attack with the whole of the Russian cavalry, whilst he himself advanced with the infantry of the royal guard upon Klein-Gorschen and Rahna. He received a wound in the arm but refused to leave the field; once more the enemy succeeded in gaining possession of Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, from whence, without pausing for a moment, they marched upon Kaja, and for the first time deprived us of its possession, whilst the cavalry directed against the divisions Bonnet and Compans endeavoured, but wholly in vain, to break their squares.

Kaja being taken, our centre was laid entirely open, and had the Russian army been now sent to the support of Blucher, Ney's line would have been pierced before our imperial guard could have had time to close up the breach. Napoleon, in the midst of the fire, rallied the conscripts. "Boys," he said, "I have relied upon you to save the empire, and you fly!" The guard not having as yet arrived, he ordered Count Lobau to place himself at the head of the division Ricard, Ney's fifth division, and retake Kaja; and this officer, marching upon Kaja, attacked the Prussians which occupied it at the bayonet's point, and drove them back towards the hollow in which were situated the villages of Rahna and Klein-Gorschen. At the same time, Souham and Gerard, led on by Ney in person, returned to the charge with their rallied divisions; and from one wing to the other, over a space of two leagues, the combat continued to rage with unabated violence. Macdonald, with his three divisions, after having taken Rapitz from the enemy's advanced troops, approached from Eisdorf and Kitzen, and extended his cannon on our left, beyond the Floss-Graben. Towards the opposite side, Bertrand debouched beyond the position occupied by Marmont and his first division, whilst Morand's was perceived in the distance on our right, approaching in many squares.

Blucher now demanded support and the means of making a great blow at our centre, and the second line of the forces of the allies, that of Wittgenstein and d'York, was ordered to advance to the support of Blucher's almost annihilated troops. Traversing the burning ruins of Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, they passed across the wrecks of the Prussian army, and through a storm of fire advanced upon Kaja, whilst Wintzingerode, with the Prussian horse-guard and a portion of the Russian cavalry, threw themselves upon Marmont's squares, which had taken up a position a little in the rear, that they might rest on Starsiedel. Fruitless assaults! which the squares of Bonnet and Compans received as though they were inflamed citadels, pouring forth floods of fire from their walls. But on the right, the eighteen thousand men of Wittgenstein and d'York, led on with a vigour worthy of the importance of the moment, repulsed Ney's division, and pouring into Kaja, debouched from it and found themselves face to face with Napoleon's guard. Beyond the Floss-Graben the Prince of Wurtemberg disputed Eisdorf with the troops under Macdonald.

It was now Napoleon's turn to endeavour to make a decisive effort, and he ordered the advance of the young guard, directing the sixteen battalions of the division Dumoutier to break their squares, to form into columns of attack, to march upon Kaja and Starsiedel, to break through the enemy's lines at any price, and, in short, to vanquish them, for it was absolutely necessary that they should do so. In the meantime, the old guard, formed into six squares, remained as so many redoubts intended to close the centre of our line. At the same time, Napoleon ordered Druot to take up a position with eighty pieces of cannon, somewhat obliquely on our right in advance of Starsiedel, so as to take in front the cavalry which continued to attack uninterruptedly Marmont's division, and to take in flank Wittgenstein's and d'York's line of infantry.

These orders were executed immediately after they were given. The young guard, advancing in columns of attack, together with such of Ney's troops as were still capable of fighting, retook Kaja and drove back the troops of Wittgenstein, d'York, and Blucher, into the hollow in which were situated the villages of Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, where a storm of fire from Druot's artillery fell upon them and compelled them to beat a retreat. At the same moment two of Macdonald's divisions took Kitzen and Eisdorf from Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, in spite of the aid sent by Alexander; whilst at the opposite extremity, Bonnet and Compans, led on by Marmont, broke their squares, and advanced in column upon the enemy's flank, behind which Morand had already extended his cannon.

It was now nearly eight o'clock, the staff of the allies began to be confused, and Frederick William and Alexander deliberated with their generals on the height from which they had witnessed the battle, respecting what should now be done. Blucher, more vehement than ever, was anxious that the Russian guard should once more be hurled against the French centre, urging that Miloradovitch would arrive in the course of the night, and serve as a reserve to cover the retreat of the army should a retreat be necessary. Wittgenstein and Diebitch replied, with good reason, that to persist in continuing the battle would be to incur the risk of being completely surrounded, and that, moreover, the supplies of ammunition were exhausted. These reasons were unanswerable, and a retreat was ordered, but Blucher, indignant, declared that he would prove with his cavalry alone that the day was not yet lost. There remained, in fact, about four or five thousand of the Prussian cavalry, chiefly of the royal guard, yet capable of engaging the enemy, and having rallied them, the old Prussian general led them on in person against the French troops of Marmont's corps, posted on the left of the allies, in advance of Starsiedel. The first regiment, the 37th leger, of recent formation, surprised by the sudden attack, gave way, carrying along with them for the moment Marmont himself, who had hastened up with his staff. But the divisions Bonnet and Compans resisted all Blucher's furious attacks. And now, at length, having driven back this temporary disturbance, our troops could lie down in sleep upon the field of battle, which, covered with ruins and inundated with blood, the forces of the allies had been compelled, after so long a conflict, to abandon to us.

Napoleon slept on the field of battle, and at daybreak on the following day, the 3rd of May, mounted his horse, eager to give directions for the collection of the wounded, to put his troops in order and to pursue the enemy. Had he now possessed the cavalry which had perished in Russia, he might have taken them by thousands, but as it was he could only collect the enemy's wounded, and dismounted cannon, of which trophies he collected a great number. Of the ninety-two thousand men of the army of the allies, about sixty-five thousand had been engaged, and on our side not many more. On each side the loss was very great, the Russians and Prussians having lost about twenty thousand and the French about seventeen or eighteen thousand. The material results of our victory were not so considerable as our arms had been accustomed in former times to obtain, when each branch of our military service was in a state of perfection, and when we fought against enemies who were not as yet inspired with the courage of despair, but they were, nevertheless, satisfactory, and such as were sufficient cause that Napoleon should thank the generous nation which had thus once more poured out her blood for him, and should follow, if only for her sake, a prudent line of conduct.

How far the blow suffered by the allies was a decisive one, was speedily apparent, for their troops could be perceived in full retreat along the various routes. But decided and indisputable as their defeat had been, they nevertheless indulged in the most arrogant language, Alexander even claiming the result of the battle as a victory for the coalition, whilst the Prussians, overwhelmed, apparently, with the fact of having held their ground at all against Napoleon, spread abroad in all directions the announcement that they had gained a complete triumph, and retreated solely on account of the want of ammunition, and in conformity with a simple military calculation. And, indeed, it was in conformity with a military calculation, but it was that which leads the vanquished to fly before the conqueror. The forces of the allies hurried on, in fact, as quickly as possible to repass the Elster, the Pleiss, the Mulde, and the Elbe, and leave a hundred leagues of country between themselves and the French.

Napoleon having become convinced of the importance of this battle of Lutzen by the rapidity of the enemy's retreat, sent to Munich, Stutgard, and Paris, letters full of just pride, and breathing the admiration of his young soldiers which they so well deserved; and then went to sleep at Pégau, rising at midnight, as was his wont, to give the necessary orders for the march of his troops. It was possible that the forces of the allies might take either of two directions—In the first place, the Prussians might gain by Torgau the Berlin route, for the purpose of covering their capital, whilst the Russians followed the Dresden route for the purpose of re-entering Silesia.—Or, secondly, abandoning Berlin to its fate, and the zeal of the Prince Royal of Sweden, the forces of the allies might continue their march in one mass upon Dresden; and Napoleon, with a military skill of which he alone was capable, formed his own plan of operations in such a manner, that it might meet whichever course was pursued by the enemy. He directed Ney to remain two days at Lutzen for the purpose of tending his wounded, and then to enter Leipsic in triumph, that this city, which had displayed a spirit of hostility against us, might witness our triumph and the terror of our arms. He also arranged that he should be joined by Reynier with about fifteen thousand French and

Saxon troops. the Duke of Belluna with fifteen thousand French, and General Sebastiani with fourteen thousand; which, added to the thirty-five or thirty-six thousand he still possessed of his forty-eight thousand, would form a total of eighty thousand. This addition to his force would be made within a week, and it was he who should have the honour of pursuing Blucher, should the Prussian General take the route to Berlin.

Napoleon reserved to himself the care of following the principal portion of the allied forces with the troops of Oudinot and Bertrand, reinforced by the Bavarian and Wurtemberg divisions, with the troops under Marmont, Macdonald, and Lauriston, and, finally, with the guard—a total force of about one hundred and forty thousand combatants. Having made these arrangements and directed Ney to demand of the city of Leipsic six thousand beds for his wounded, and whatever he might have need of, he set out from Pégau, his troops being divided into three columns, of which the principal composed of the troops under Macdonald, Marmont, and the guard, and led by Prince Eugene in person, was to gain by Borna, the great Dresden road which passes by Waldheim and Wilsdruff; whilst the second, composed of the troops under Bertrand and Oudinot, keeping four or five leagues to the right, was to skirt through Rochlitz, Mittwejda, and Freyberg, the base of the mountains of Bohemia. The third, formed of Lauriston's corps alone, was to keep some leagues to the left, and proceed by Wurtzen upon Meissen, one of the *points de passage* of the Elbe, the most useful to occupy, and to form a line between Napoleon and Marshal Ney.

On the morning of the 5th of May, Napoleon set out for Borna for the purpose of placing himself in the track of his principal column, Prince Eugene preceding him. When the latter arrived at Kolditz on the Mulde, he found the Prussian rear-guard posted along the river, the bridges of which were destroyed; he ascended the course of the stream, however, a little to the right, and discovering a ford, established himself on a height which dominated the great Dresden route, and compelled the Prussians to withdraw from the banks of the river under the fire of twenty pieces of cannon. They lost some hundreds of men, and retreated towards Leipsic, passing across the lines of a Russian corps which was in position at Seyfersdorf, beyond Harta, and was that of Miloradovitch, of whom the Prussians bitterly complained, that he had allowed the whole fury of the battle at Lutzen to fall upon them alone. After having opened to let the Prussians defile through them, Miloradovitch re-formed his ranks, and taking advantage of his position, resisted with great firmness the energetic attacks of Prince Eugene, who could only dislodge him by turning him.

During the 6th and 7th our troops continued the pursuit of the enemy without pause, Napoleon wishing to arrive in Dresden by the 8th of May, at the latest. The Prussians had taken the Meissen route, the Russians that of Dresden; but it was still impossible to conclude that they intended to separate. Napoleon having directed Lauriston's corps upon Meissen, urged him to hasten towards the Elbe, that he might obtain possession, if possible, of the passage of the river, a matter of great importance, since our pontoons were far in the rear; and that he might, also, overcome all attempts at resistance on the part of Dresden, and render it unnecessary to destroy any of the fair edifices with which its electors had adorned it.

On the 8th our troops stood on the amphitheatre of hills, from the heights of which the fair city of Dresden appears, seated on the two banks of the Elbe and at the foot of the mountains of Bohemia, as Florence upon the two banks of the Arno, at the foot of the Apennines. Descending the slopes of this amphitheatre they beheld the dark columns of the Russian army thronging through the streets of the city, and repassing the Elbe by temporary bridges, which they burned behind them. Our soldiers entered the principal or old town, which is situated on the left bank of the river, and the Russians occupied the new town, situated on the right bank.

Our columns had scarcely entered Dresden, when the municipal authorities hastened to implore our clemency, having good reason, indeed, to be alarmed, since they had raised triumphal arches in honour of the allied sovereigns, and addressed both entreaties and threats to their own sovereign, for the purpose of inducing him to follow the example of the King of Prussia. Napoleon, who had hastened up almost immediately, received the keys of the city on horseback, at the same time sternly declaring to those who presented them, that it was only his personal consideration for Frederick Augustus that induced him to save their city from pillage, and that the least act of treason in future, would be immediately followed by the most terrible chastisements.

Napoleon was anxious to drive the Russians out of the portion of the city on the opposite bank, the new town, for the purpose of avoiding the occurrence of hostilities between the troops posted on the opposite banks, and the consequent danger of destruction to this beautiful capital. It would have been possible to have effected the passage by means of the stone bridge, supplying, by a temporary structure, the two arches of it which had been destroyed, but this would involve the necessity of a cannonade, which he was anxious to avoid, and he rode out of the town itself, therefore, to reconnoitre the points at which it was possible to cross the river above and below it. The passage above Dresden he found to be impracticable, but at almost a league below it, at Priesnitz, he discovered a place at which the passage of the stream, covered by artillery, might be successfully accomplished; and, accordingly, at daybreak on the 9th of May, descending to this spot, with a strong column of infantry and the whole of the artillery of the guard, he had the construction of a bridge commenced and carried on under the fire of eighty pieces of cannon. It could not be finished before the 10th, but in the meantime the Russians had evacuated the new town, and planks having been placed across the stone piles of the broken arches of the stone bridge, our troops had crossed over and occupied it. On the same day arrived General Bertrand and Marshal Oudinot, and Napoleon divided them between Dresden and Pirna. And now, as General Lauriston had succeeded at Meissen, where he encountered the Prussian rear, in crossing the Elbe without much difficulty, the French were at all points masters of the course of this river, and in peaceable possession of the capital of Saxony.

Napoleon resolved to halt some few days at Dresden for the purpose of rallying and refreshing his troops, to await the various cavalry corps which he expected to join him, to recall the King of Saxony to his states, and to arrange his military combinations in such a manner as to meet those of the allies. After having again assigned to Ney's corps the direction of Torgau, which left him at liberty to march it upon Berlin or to draw it back upon Dresden, and after having renewed the orders, which were to raise this corps to eighty thousand men, he occupied himself with the diplomatic affairs, which demanded all his attention.

The King of Saxony had fled not only from his own states but even from Bavaria, at the very moment of Napoleon's arrival, for the purpose of proceeding to Prague to throw himself into the arms of Austria, whose policy he had evidently adopted. To have declared him on this account an enemy, would have been to proclaim one more defection from our alliance, and to have declared to Austria somewhat too roughly, in what estimation we held her policy of mediation. Napoleon feigned, therefore, not to have understood the conduct of the King of Saxony, and to regard him as a prince in distress but still loyal to the French alliance; and sent one of his aides-de-camp to Prague with a formal summons to him, under pain of forfeiture of his kingdom, to return to Dresden immediately, with his cavalry, artillery, and court, and to surrender into the hands of General Reynier the fortress of Torgau, together with the ten thousand Saxon troops who occupied it.

With respect to Austria the conduct of affairs had become more difficult, in consequence of what had occurred in Vienna whilst Napoleon was fighting the battles of Lutzen and marching upon Dresden; for M. de Narbonne, receiving at length from Paris, through M. de Bassano, and from Mayence, through M. de Coulaincourt, Napoleon's most formal instructions, declared to M. de Metternich that he would send him a note summoning him to explain himself categorically upon the treaty of alliance of which he refused the literal execution. Upon this M. de Metternich, abandoning subtle arguments, had entreated M. de Narbonne not to insist farther upon placing Austria in a false position, by demanding what she could not grant, namely, the resumption of hostilities with Russia. M. de Narbonne still returning to the charge, M. de Metternich went so far as to say that he was committing a fault in doing so, for he believed he could be certain that Napoleon was unwilling to push matters to a crisis with the Austrian court. In fact, M. de Bubna, returning to Paris much impressed by the attentions of which he had there been the subject, declared that Napoleon was anxious to act in accord with his father-in-law, and that with proper management, a reasonable arrangement of the affairs of Europe might speedily be effected.

M. de Narbonne, however, still adhered to his plan of submitting a formal note to the Austrian court, in which this court should be summoned either to execute the treaty of alliance of the 14th of March, 1812, or declare that it no longer existed. But having some fears with respect to what might be the answer to such a demand, and being anxious to be able to anticipate it, he demanded an interview of the Emperor Francis, and being immediately admitted to his presence, besought him not to cause a state of hostilities between France and Austria, which could not but be productive of the greatest misfortunes. The Emperor received M. de Narbonne with much quiet politeness, and repeated to him all that M. de Metternich had already said, declared that he wished to remain the ally of his son-in-law, but without abandoning the only policy which his people would willingly see him adopt—a mediatorial one. He concluded, as had M. de Metternich, by declaring his belief that M. de Narbonne, doubtless for the purpose of relieving himself from personal responsibility persisted too far in the line he had adopted, and exceeded the intentions of his master.

M. de Narbonne still persisted, however, in demanding a reply to his note, and M. de Metternich, at length compelled to reply, referred to the declaration made on the 12th of April; declaring that as Austria had adopted the position of a mediator upon the instigation of France herself, she could not place herself in a position of hostility with respect to one of the belligerent powers; and that, moreover, as the services of the Austrian auxiliary corps were guaranteed by the treaty of alliance of the 14th of March, 1812, which the 12th of April had declared inapplicable as a means of action in the existing state of affairs, it would be better to defer its active employment.

But at the same time, as M. de Metternich was anxious to avoid a rupture with France, he added, with respect to the Polish troops, that whilst, of course, they were always at liberty to refrain from retreating behind the Austrian frontier, and to encounter the Russian forces alone if they chose, they might also, if they wished to pass through Bohemia for the purpose of entering Saxony, retain their arms on their way, and should find on their line of march both quarters and provisions.

The evil result of these disputations was, that they not only assisted Austria in making those declarations which she was subsequently to employ so disastrously against us, but also led her, in despair of inducing us to adopt a judicious course, to hasten to take that fatal resolution which was recommended to her by all around her. They were now interrupted, however, by the news of the late military events. The report that we had suffered a great defeat was everywhere spread abroad with the most extraordinary assurance. The English ambassador, Lord Cathcart, experienced in military affairs and a witness of the battle, regarded this report, indeed, as a foolish lie, and declared that if the allies could only gain such victories, it would be well to treat for peace on any terms; and M. de Metternich had too keen an intellect to be deceived by such idle boasting.—And in fact, four days after the first arrival of the news, information was received that the soi-disant vanquished were at the gates of Dresden, and the soi-disant conquerors beyond the Elbe. The greatest confusion was excited by the information of these facts, and the salons of Vienna were filled with exclamations against the military incapacity of the two allied sovereigns; but instead of having gained over the public feeling in our favour by our success, it was now insisted more vehemently than ever, that Austria ought to hasten to the aid of the allied armies, and join the coalition for the purpose of saving Europe from an intolerable yoke.

M. de Metternich assured M. de Narbonne, and not insincerely, that he was by no means astonished at Napoleon's victories, and that he had, in fact, based his pacific calculations on the assumption that these victories would be gained by him. To render the attainment of a peace possible, he said, it was necessary to find a means of blotting out two thirds of the propositions of Russia, England, and Prussia; and these means the battle of Lutzen would afford. But there remained the third part of these propositions, of which it was impossible to deny the reason, justice, and wisdom, and to which it would be necessary to agree; that the time had come for the court of Vienna to adopt its mediatorial office, assumed at the instigation of France with the consent of the other belligerent powers; that it would immediately despatch, therefore, two plenipotentiaries, the one to the French the other to the Russian head-quarters, selecting the Count de Bubna as the former, and M. de Stadion as the latter. At the same time, without pretending to impose them upon Napoleon, M. de Metternich would take the liberty, he said, to indicate the conditions which the Austrian cabinet considered would be acceptable to all the belligerent powers, and he repeated those which have been already laid before the reader, —the suppression of the grand duchy of Warsaw and its restoration to Prussia, with the exception of some portions which would properly return to the share of Russia and Austria; the reconstitution of Prussia by means of this grand duchy, and other territories to be found in Germany; the abandonment of the confederation of the Rhine, and the the renunciation of the Hanseatic departments, that is to say, of the towns of Bremen, Hambourg, and Lubeck. All mention of Holland, Italy, and Spain, was to be avoided, for fear of exciting insurmountable difficulties; and the subject, even, of a maritime peace was to be left in abeyance, should it be found impossible to come to an understanding with England on that point. Such, independently of the restoration of the Illyrian provinces, which we had almost promised to Austria, were the conditions now offered to us; conditions which left to us Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, as royal vassals; Holland, Belgium, the Rhenish provinces, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Roman states, as French departments. Such was the France which was offered us, and the offer of which we regarded as an outrage. With respect to Spain, it was certain that its renunciation would be a necessary condition of peace with England; but this sacrifice on our part, M. de Metternich said he had good reason to know would be sufficient, and we have already seen that it would be no insurmountable obstacle to peace on the part of Napoleon.

M. de Narbonne repeatedly declared that Napoleon, victorious, would not accept these conditions, and M. de Metternich as repeatedly rejoined, that Napoleon was not so unreasonable as he was represented, that those conditions, moreover, were inevitable, and that a great struggle would be necessary to induce the allies to accept even them.

In the meantime, the King of Saxony had sorrowfully consented to comply with Napoleon's intimation to him to return to his capital, and prepared to set out from Prague, with his troops and his court, anxiously entreating that secresy might be observed with respect to the negotiations which had taken place between the cabinets of Dresden and Vienna, and which had simply had reference, in fact, to the adoption of a mediatorial policy.

When Napoleon received information of what had taken place at Vienna, he perceived at length the fault which had been committed, in urging the Austrian cabinet to take so prominent a part in the politics of Europe, and in leading her to assume the part of an armed mediator, whilst unwilling to submit to her arbitration. He perceived, also, the error into which he had fallen, in believing that he would be able to interest this power in the success of his projects by the offer of the spoils of Prussia, and in failing to see that no territorial aggrandisement was equal in her estimation to independence. But, as is the wont of princes, he threw the blame on his representative, M. de Narbonne, who, with the instructions which had been given him, could not have acted otherwise; and in gentle language, for he held M. de Narbonne in sincere regard, blamed him for having pushed matters too far, for having submitted a written note to the Austrian cabinet, whilst the archives of the embassy contained a prohibition against doing so without the authority of a formal order, and with having led M. de Metternich to declare that the treaty of alliance between France and Austria was no longer applicable to circumstances. He now directed him to maintain the most extreme reserve, and to avoid entering into any communications with the Austrian court, that she might perceive that we no longer considered her an ally, whilst still accepting her as a mediator, but not an armed mediator.

In the meantime, Napoleon was bitterly exasperated against Austria and his father-in-law, being irritated at finding that they had completely deceived his calculations, and disgusted at the conditions of peace which they submitted for his acceptance. He had renounced his plans with respect to the grand duchy of Warsaw, having found with how many difficulties its maintenance was surrounded; but after having just undertaken the campaign of 1812 for the purpose of humiliating Russia, to have to behold Russia aggrandised, and Poland, the re-establishment of which as a kingdom he had undertaken for the purpose of humiliating her, irrevocably destroyed; to have to endure the defection of Prussia and to permit her to receive a reward for that defection; to have to renounce the protectorate of the confederation of the Rhine, and to abandon the Hanseatic towns—were an accumulation of sacrifices which implied no diminution to his real power, but were fraught with severe shocks to his pride. With regard to the real interests of France none of these sacrifices could properly be subjects of regret. With respect to Poland it was puerile to attempt to make of this country a protection for Austria and Prussia, so long as these powers did not themselves care for it; with respect to Prussia it could not be our interest, either in relation to Russia or to Austria, to keep her so shorn of strength as she now was. With respect to the protectorate of the Rhine, it was but an empty title, odious to the Germans, and capable only of bringing upon us their hatred without any counterbalancing advantage; and, finally, with respect to the Hanseatic towns, to persist in retaining them, was simply to extend our military and commercial frontier beyond all reason. Their possession imposed a charge upon France for which she could receive no return, since she could not defend them without extending her territory to the Elbe; and they were commercially indispensable to the trade interests of Germany, whilst useless to ours.

The irritation Napoleon experienced on learning in decided terms the intentions of Austria, was pushed to its utmost limit by a chance circumstance. A courier had been intercepted at Dresden on his way from Vienna, carrying despatches from M. de Stackelberg, who was the Russian representative at the Austrian court, since relations had been re-established between these two powers on the ground of a mediation; and in these despatches addressed by M. de Stackelberg to M. de Nesselrode, were found many singular details, whilst they showed clearly that M. de Metternich, placed in a difficult position which condemned him to a course of extreme dissimulation, was prodigal of testimonies of sympathy with each of the belligerent powers, and even more so to the Russians and Prussians than to the French. And that this should be the case might have been well understood by us without the perusal of intercepted despatches, and was no reason why we should not consider M. de Metternich to be sincere, in declaring that on certain conditions Austria would be on our side. We should have understood that M. de Metternich, being a German, could not and ought not to be entirely favourable to our policy, and should have endeavoured to obtain of his prudence just so much as was possible, and no more. But Napoleon, inspired by pride, victory, and despotism, was as irritated by the revelations contained in the intercepted despatches, as though his keen intellect, which was full of light when undisturbed by passion, had not been able to foresee them.

Napoleon now suddenly returned to the policy which had been proposed in the council held in the Tuileries in the preceding January, and earnestly supported by MM. de Coulaincourt, Talleyrand, and Cambacérès, and which consisted in ignoring the mediation of Austria, and endeavouring to enter into direct negotiations with Russia. But judicious as the adoption of this policy would be, it was attended by a serious practical inconvenience, in the shape of the difficulty of entering into communication with the Russian Emperor. This difficulty had been great in January, and had become much increased by the late military events, and the hopes which the Germans cradled in Alexander's breast that he was to be the liberator of Europe, and the first of reigning monarchs. Napoleon, however, expected that the battle of Lutzen and another victory, which he felt certain he should obtain, would dissipate the extravagant ideas in which Alexander had permitted himself to indulge, and would render direct communication with him a matter of no difficulty. He resolved, therefore to carry on this campaign with the utmost vigour, to strike, as soon as possible some decisive blow, and to take advantage of it to secure peace, but by means of direct negotiations with Russia or even England, rather than with the Germanic powers. By yielding Poland wholly or partly to Russia, and Spain wholly or partly to the Bourbons, it appeared to him that peace might be arranged, without submitting him to the yoke of Prussia, which, according to him, had openly betrayed him, or of Austria, who had betrayed him secretly. Should the progress of the war not bring an immediate decisive result and a negotiation, he wished to prolong the existing situation until the completion of the second series of his armaments should be completed, when he would have at his disposal a total force of some five hundred thousand combatants, when he would be relieved from the necessity of dissembling any longer with Austria, and established on the Elbe as formerly on the Adige, at Dresden as formerly at Verona, at the foot of the mountains of Bohemia as formerly at the foot of the Alps, he would be able to carry on, not only against a single power, but against the whole of Europe, a new campaign of Italy, in which, by the aid of a riper experience, he would be able to repeat at a riper age the prodigies of his youth, to be concluded then, as formerly, by brilliant triumphs, which would enable him, at length to enjoy repose by granting it to the world.

Having thus resolved, Napoleon gave up his whole thoughts as usual, to practical arrangements, for, in himself a miracle of contrasts, he was as chimerical in his projects as he was precise and correct in the means he took to realize them. In the first place, he sent a series of despatches to M. de Narbonne, directing him to behave with the utmost reserve towards the Austrian cabinet, at the same time letting it see that France no longer relied on its aid, and recognised the truth of the maxim which it was so fond of repeating, that the treaty of the 14th of March, 1812, was no longer applicable to circumstances.—Directing him to attempt no denial of the vast armaments which were being so rapidly made in Italy, Bavaria, and France; and to intimate to the Austrian cabinet that its mediation was by no means necessary to France as a means of communication with the other powers, since the quarrel between the Emperor Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander was political and not personal, and the two sovereigns had never ceased to have a mutual feeling of friendship, which would be revived on the first amicable demonstration on the part of Napoleon. "*A direct mission to the Russian head-quarters*," said Napoleon, "*would divide the world in two. . . . . .!*" an exclamation which signified that the despatch of M. de Coulaincourt, whose old friendship with the Emperor Alexander was well known to the Russian Emperor, would entirely change the aspect of affairs, combining the forces of France and Russia in one camp, and those of the rest of the world in the other. But this hint was not founded on fact, since the pride of the Emperor Alexander had been so deeply wounded, and was most imprudent, since it would naturally lead Austria to throw herself immediately into the arms of Russia, and thus deprive Napoleon of the two months which he required for the purpose of converting into five hundred thousand men the three hundred thousand which were at this time at his disposal. Fortunately, M. de Narbonne was too politic to commit such a fault as that of uttering so dangerous and useless a boast.

Napoleon, after having given M. de Narbonne a full intimation of his views through M. de Coulaincourt, who replaced at Dresden M. de Bassano, still detained in Paris, had Prince Eugene summoned to his presence, expressed to him his satisfaction of his conduct in the late campaign, and announced to him that he had determined to bestow upon his daughter the duchy of Gallicia as a *dotation*, and as a reward for the prince's services. He then told him that it was necessary that he should set out immediately for Milan, where he would meet with his family, from whom he had now been separated more than a year, for the purpose of fulfilling an important mission. In the first place, Napoleon told him he would have to take the command with respect to military matters, not only of the kingdom of Lombardy, but also of Piedmont and Tuscany, and to employ the whole summer in organising a serviceable Italian army. The necessary elements existed in the places themselves. The remaining troops of the 4th corps, with which Prince Eugene had made the Russian campaign, were re-entering Italy and would furnish twenty-four battalions. The Italian army would furnish at least as many. The Piedmont regiments, which had recovered the battalions which had been sent into Spain, would possibly render it possible to raise the army of upper Italy to the strength of eighty battalions. There was an abundance of artillery in this country, and there would be no difficulty in having one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon ready by the month of July. The cavalry which should have been ready for General Bertrand, but was not, would be ready for Prince Eugene. It would be easy, therefore, to have an army there of eighty thousand men within two or three months.

In the meantime, Murat, whose pride had been much hurt by the words which Napoleon had had inserted in the *Moniteur* with reference to him after his departure from the army, who feared that he had irretrievably incurred Napoleon's displeasure, and that he and his kingdom might at any moment be sacrificed to some scheme of compensation, some arrangement entered into for the conclusion of peace, found himself in the same position as that of the Kings of Bavaria and Saxony, and all those allies, in fact, who were too honest to betray us, but not too honest to speculate on doing so. The anxieties in which he found himself involved, sometimes threw him into a state of agitation which resembled delirium. His health suffered severely, and he fell into a feeble desponding state, in which he lost both his beauty and his courage. His subjects, whom he had known how to please, were filled with compassion for him, and endeavoured to console him by overwhelming him with acclamations wherever he appeared amongst them. Sometimes he determined to throw himself at Napoleon's feet, and offer to command what remained of his cavalry; sometimes to throw himself into the arms of Austria, and he despatched to Vienna, a Prince Cariati, whose conduct became so great a scandal there, that M. de Narbonne was compelled to acquaint Napoleon with it.

The result of this state of things was to excite Napoleon's compassion, but at the same time, to make him resolved to summon Murat to the army, and to direct him to send twenty thousand of the forty thousand well organised men at his disposal, to Prince Eugene.

We have already seen that he had made arrangements for the formation of an army at Mayence, with the *cadres* returned from Spain. He could calculate upon having sixty *cadres de bataillon* at Mayence, which would day by day be filled up with conscripts from the old classes; and he hoped to be able to add to them the *cadres* of sixty battalions of cavalry, recruited from the cavalry assembled at the depôts, and mounted with horses obtained from France. In Westphalia the reorganisation of the corps of Marshal Davout and the Duke of Belluna, would furnish one hundred and twelve battalions, or ninety thousand men. When the battalions should have been fully formed, he resolved to recompose of them the twenty-eight old regiments; giving sixteen to Marshal Davout, and twelve to Marshal Victor, and creating an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with a numerous artillery drawn from Holland and the Hanseatic provinces, and with the remainder of the cavalry remounted by General Bourcier. Should Denmark at this moment, as there was reason to hope, return to our alliance, a contingent of twelve or fifteen thousand excellent soldiers might be expected from this quarter, and the army of the lower Elbe would thus be raised to at least one hundred and thirty thousand men. There were three armies, therefore, which Napoleon prepared independently of the one under his own immediate command, and the organisation of which became every day more complete, especially since he had been in Dresden.

He addressed the most precise instructions to Marshal Davout, respecting the troops whose reorganisation was to be entrusted to his care, and ordered him to enter Hambourg as soon as possible, taking advantage of the projected movement upon Berlin, for the purpose of putting into force the most rigorous justice. He was exasperated against the Hanseatic towns which had expelled his officers of customs, and his police, which had received the Cossacks with every testimony of delight, and which seemed to be the object of all the diplomatic and military efforts of the allies. He was resolved to bring these towns once more under his authority by means of force and terror, and if it were necessary to give them up to Germany, to resign them only in a state of ruin. He ordered Marshal Davout to shoot those members of the senate who had resumed their functions, the persons who had taken a prominent part in exciting the insurrection, and some of the officers of the Hanseatic legion which had been raised to fight against us; at the same time he directed that five hundred of the principal merchants, suspected of being enemies of France, should be seized and deprived of their property, and that the colonial produce and English merchandise, which, since the insurrection of Hambourg, had entered the country through the Elbe in abundance, should be everywhere confiscated. He would thus obtain the means, he said, of satisfying the expenses of the war, of which the merchants of those parts were partly the cause. But whilst giving these orders, Napoleon secretly reckoned on the wisdom of the marshal to whom the execution of them was entrusted, and who, rigorous as he was, knew how to delay actual proceedings until his master's anger should have evaporated in terrible words. The practical result of the above orders, of which the chief part remained unexecuted, was a series of heavy contributions on which the army lived for more than six months, from Hambourg up to Dresden.

Napoleon, passing on horseback all the time which he did not employ in his cabinet, traversed the banks of the Elbe, reconnoitring Kœnigstein and Pirna as well as all the country above and below Dresden, and ordered the repair in timber-work of the stone bridge in Dresden itself, and the construction of a new one of rafts at Priesnitz where the army had effected a passage by main force. He had also vast hospitals and depôts of provisions established on the left bank of the river. In these and similar works, in reorganising and concentrating his cavalry, and raising the forces actually in the field to the complete number of three hundred thousand, he employed the time during which he awaited at Dresden the arrival of the King of Saxony, who arrived on the 12th of May, surrounded by his family and the cavalry which had been so often demanded of him in vain.

Napoleon, who had resolved to play a grand sort of comedy, went forth from the gates of the city at the head of his guard to receive the Saxon monarch, to whom he was happy, he said, to restore his states, reconquered for him by the arms of France. As soon as he had come nigh the old king, he descended from his horse and embraced him, receiving him in every way in so gracious a manner as to excite deep feelings of emotion in his heart, and almost to appease the minds of his subjects, who were much moved by the spectacle of the reconciliation of the two monarchs, the manner in which the Russians had conducted themselves in Saxony having also very much diminished the hatred with which its inhabitants regarded the French.

After these, and many other demonstrations of good-will, Napoleon and the old monarch entered into mutual explanations, in the course of which, it has been said that the latter made the avowals of which he has since been accused, as a justification of the spoliation of a portion of his estates. But there is full proof in existing documents, that this accusation is unfounded; it is probable, indeed, that the views of the Austrian cabinet might become apparent in the course of his recitals, for they were very manifest and by no means of a culpable nature, although Napoleon took them at the moment in ill part; but it was quite certain that the revelations which completely changed Napoleon's disposition towards Austria, had reached him before the 12th of May, the day of the King of Saxony's return to Dresden, either through M. de Narbonne or the intercepted despatches.

The first advantage which Napoleon obtained from the presence of the King of Saxony in Dresden was, that he was able to employ in his own service the superb Saxon cavalry, which numbered with the addition of some recruits, about three thousand men, and which he immediately entrusted to the brave Latour-Maubourg. The Saxon infantry shut up in Torgau had been exposed to a dangerous trial, their commander, General Thielmann, one of the most ardent and sincere of the German patriots, who had visited the Emperor Alexander at Dresden, and manifested the greatest devotion to the cause of the allies, having, in a state of despair at seeing his king fallen again into the hands of the French, and in a state of terror for his own personal safety, attempted to shake the fidelity of his troops, and persuade them to pass over to the Russians, on the ground that the king was not free, and only gave such orders as he was forced to give. His attempt, however, was unsuccessful, and he fled alone to Alexander's camp, abandoning his infantry, which passed without difficulty under the command of General Reynier, whose talents and character it held in high esteem.

In the meantime, Marshal Ney, in conformity with the instructions which he had received, had traversed Leipsic, and proceeded to Torgau, where he received the Saxon troops into his corps. A little to the left at Wittenberg, he had the Duke of Belluna with his reorganised battalions, and on the right, General Lauriston established with his corps at Meissen. General Sebastiani, who was to bring the cavalry remounted in Hanover, and the division Putthod (that one of Lauriston's divisions which remained in the rear), had not yet arrived; but yet, with the troops of Reynier, Victor, and Lauriston, Marshal Ney had a sufficient force with which to march upon Berlin, and he awaited the order to do so with impatience.

Before giving this order Napoleon wished to obtain precise information respecting the designs of the allies. He had already carried forward Prince Eugene's corps, which since this prince's departure had passed under the command of Marshal Macdonald, and had directed it upon Bischoffswerda, which it had entered, fighting with a rear-guard of the enemy and through the midst of flames. From Bischoffswerda Marshal Macdonald had marched upon Bautzen, where the Russian and Prussian forces had shown signs of having resolved upon encountering us in a second battle, and, indeed, to retreat any farther was to abandon three fourths of the Prussian monarchy, and especially Berlin, which they had not been able to defend directly by sending thither a detached corps, but which a strong position preserved in Lusatia protected up to a certain point. It was also to bid adieu to the German patriots whom they had summoned to meet them on all the battle-fields of Saxony, and to Austria, whom they retained on their side but by means of promises, boastings, and exaggerations, and especially, by the species of physical alliance resulting from near neighbourhood. It was necessary, therefore, to encounter the enemy at any hazard, rather than permit the enemy to drive them from the Bohemian mountains, at the foot of which they had paused after having quitted Dresden, and to take advantage, also, as a means of defence, of one of those numerous streams which descend from the Riesen-Gebirge across Lusatia, and traverse the space between the Elbe and the Oder. At Bautzen, in particular, there was a strong position on the Sprée, which offered two battle-fields, the one in advance of the Sprée, the other behind it —a position rendered famous by the great Frederick during the "Seven years' war." And on this position, partly on account of its renown, partly on account of the advantages which it offered, the allies now resolved to have a desperate struggle with Napoleon's forces. Of the ninety-two thousand troops of the coalition assembled on the plains of Lutzen on the 2nd of May, twenty thousand had been lost either in engagements or on the march, but their place had been filled up by thirty thousand others, supplied by the reserves which Prussia had provided in Silesia; and Barclay de Tolly's Prussian corps of fifteen thousand men, which blockaded the fortresses of the Vistula. The allies, posted, therefore, in advance of and behind Bautzen, along the Sprée, under the protection of vast abattis and numerous redoubts, about a hundred thousand Prussians and Russians, with whom they determined to resolve under the eyes of Austria, at the very foot of her mountains, the great European question. At the same time the Prussian Generals Bulow and Borstell were directed to cover Berlin and Brandebourg as well as they might be able, whilst Czernicheff's and Tettenborn's *coureurs* were to maintain themselves on the lower Elbe at the expense of the Germans, as they could.

Napoleon having spent seven days in Dresden, employed in reinstating the King of Saxony in his states, in forming a body of cavalry, and placing his troops in line, now set out once more to dissipate the empty dreams with which the allies had permitted themselves to become intoxicated. Marshal Macdonald was already within sight of Bautzen, supported on the right and left by Marshal Oudinot and Marshal Marmont respectively, whilst still more to the left was General Bertrand; and Marshal Ney and General Lauriston were in advance of the Elbe, in a position from which they could advance either on the right towards the grand army, or on the left towards Berlin. On the 15th of May, in consequence of the receipt of certain information, Napoleon directed them to march without delay upon Hozerswerda, so as to debouch on the flank and rear of the Bautzen position, which the allies would find it difficult to maintain, when sixty thousand men proceeded to turn it. He ordered General Reynier to follow Ney and Lauriston, and left Marshal Victor in advance of Wittenberg, as a permanent menace against Berlin.

At the moment when Napoleon was about to set out for Dresden, on the evening of the 16th of May, M. de Bubna arrived from Vienna, and immediately obtained audience of the Emperor, who, although having a great personal regard for M. de Bubna himself, received him in a manner which was almost rude, being unable wholly to restrain the feelings of irritation excited in his mind, by the efforts of Austria to make his will submit to hers, and by what he considered the proved duplicities of M. de Metternich. M. de Bubna, however, being fortunately a man of great clearness of mind, ignored all Napoleon's manifestations of anger, and submitted to him, in the first place a letter written to his son-in-law by the Emperor Francis, in which, in terms both affectionate and sincere, he pointed out the gravity of the existing state of affairs; pointed out to him the boundaries which separated the duties of the father from those of the sovereign, and earnestly entreated him for his own advantage and that of the world, to listen to the overtures which would be made by M. de Bubna.

Napoleon's feelings of irritation were evidently softened by this letter, although it was far from being very effectual in inducing a change in his resolutions. He listened calmly and attentively to the propositions which M. de Bubna had to make to him, feigning that he now heard them enunciated for the first time; but tranquilly as he listened to their exposition, he gradually permitted to appear the real cause of his rejection of them--this cause being pride; a pride which could not endure to abandon the titles which it had assumed with so much ceremony, or to resign the territories which it had so solemnly annexed to the empire. The grand duchy of Warsaw was wholly lost, having perished in the Moscow catastrophe; there was no room for discussion on this subject, and Napoleon contented himself with declaring that he attempted to restore Poland, not for the sake of France but for the sake of Europe. On another subject of still greater importance, the kingdom of Spain, he avoided making any decided explanations, appearing, however, to have resolved to make some sacrifices on this point, and declaring himself ready, for the purpose of inducing England to negotiate, to admit the Spanish insurgents to a share in the conferences. But on all those points in respect to which Austria was especially anxious that he should consent to adopt her views, he displayed a far less compliant disposition. To permit the reconstitution of Prussia as a reward for her having renounced her alliance, to resign the Hanseatic towns and the title of protector of the confederation of the Rhine, appeared to him to be terrible humiliations. But although fully resolved not to submit to the conditions Austria attempted to impose upon him, he considered that the assembly of a congress for the discussion of the terms of peace would be of much advantage to him, in the first place as a means of showing to France and to Europe his pacific tendencies, in the second place as a means of gaining two or three months' time, which he yet required for the completion of his armaments, and thirdly as a means of renewing direct relations with Russia and England, and thus coming to an understanding with these kingdoms without the intervention, and even to the detriment of the German powers.

In a second interview, therefore, which he granted to M. de Bubna on the 17th of May, he declared his willingness to consent to the assembly of a congress for the purpose of negotiating a peace, and to an armistice, and to admit to this congress the representatives of the Spanish insurgents, this having been always made by England the essential preliminary condition of any negotiation. M. de Bubna, astonished and delighted at having obtained these concessions, immediately sent a letter, revised by Napoleon's own hand, to M. de Stadion, who had been sent to the Russian head-quarters, to do what M. de Bubna was doing at the French head-quarters; which set forth that Napoleon, by no means rendered arrogant by his recent victory, was eager to put an end to the evils endured by the world, and consented to the assembly of a congress to negotiate a peace, and also ever being ready that the effusion of blood might be stopped as soon as possible, to send commissioners to the advanced posts for the purpose of negotiating a suspension of arms. When M. de Bubna had despatched his letter, he demanded permission to return to Vienna, that he might delight the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, by the announcement of the excellent disposition in which he had found Napoleon, and might also discuss with them, certain modifications of the proposed conditions. Napoleon strongly approved of M. de Bubna's return to Vienna, and entrusted him with a letter for his father-in-law, in which, in the most affectionate and filial terms, he declared that he was anxious for peace, but that, having become the son-in-law of the Emperor Francis, he placed his honour in his hands—his honour, which he esteemed more than power, more than life; and that he was resolved to perish, sword in hand, rather than submit to humiliating conditions. With this letter he sent away M. de Bubna, after having lavished upon him marks of his favour.

As soon as M. de Bubna had set out, Napoleon made preparations for his own departure, but before quitting Dresden, he was anxious to obtain from the negotiations to which he had consented, the principal result he hoped to draw from them, which consisted in entering into direct communication with Alexander, that he might escape from the interference of Austria. Under pretext of the armistice, therefore, he sent M. de Coulaincourt to the Russian advanced posts, in which he said, that in consequence of what had been agreed on by M. de Bubna, he, the Emperor Napoleon, had hastened to send a commissioner to the advanced posts of the troops of the allies, for the purpose of negotiating an armistice, which appeared to him to be an urgent necessity, since the opposed armies were in such close proximity, and that he had chosen for this purpose the person he supposed would be most agreeable to the Emperor Alexander.

Having completed all his arrangements, Napoleon set out from Dresden on the 18th of May, proceeding in the direction of Bautzen, which he reached at an early hour on the following day. His guard had already arrived, and his troops awaited him with impatience, in the expectation that he would lead them to a fresh triumph. He immediately proceeded to reconnoitre the position on which we were about to encounter the allied forces of Europe, for the purpose of restoring the prestige of our arms.

The position rested on the highest mountains of Bohemia, the Riesen-Gebirge, neutral ground, against which either of the opposed armies could safely rest, since neither of them would hazard the chance of offending Austria by violating her territory. On our right arose these mountains, covered with dark fir trees; the Sprée, flowing from their side in a deep channel, and passing around the little town of Bautzen under a stone bridge, which was strongly barricaded. Directly in front appeared the town of Bautzen itself, surrounded by an old embattled wall, flanked with towers and armed with cannon, and looking from thence to the left appeared again the stream of the Sprée, which, having flowed through the midst of a range of wooded hills, far inferior in elevation to the mountains on the right, suddenly spread out in an open bed in the midst of verdant plains.

Such was the first line of the Sprée, and one not easy to carry. On the right, on the mountains and their slopes, were perceived wooden abattis, and behind them many cannon, bayonets, and Russian uniforms. In the centre, above and below Bautzen, were also to be seen a great number of Russian troops, and on the left, on the wooded hills, across which the Sprée opened a way of escape into the plain, were to be seen masses of infantry and cavalry, some deployed in line, others posted behind the field-works, and all denoting by their equipment that they belonged to the Prussian army.

Napoleon resolved to force on the following day, the 20th of May, this line of the Sprée, and determined to send Marshal Oudinot to pass the Sprée on the right towards the mountains, to endeavour to drive back the enemy upon their second position; whilst in the centre, Marshal Macdonald should seize the stone bridge which crossed the Sprée opposite Bautzen, and take this town by assault; whilst a little below the centre, Marshal Marmont should cross the Sprée upon pontoons, between Bautzen and the village of Nimschütz, and should establish himself in a good position beyond it; and whilst, finally, General Bertrand on the left, effecting his passage at Nieder-Gurck, vis-a-vis with the last hills which the Sprée washed before expanding its stream amongst the open plains, should endeavour to gain possession of the hills, or at least establish himself in their neighbourhood. In the meantime, Marshal Ney, completing his movement upon Hozerswerda with a mass of about sixty thousand men, would arrive on the lower Sprée at Klix, about four miles below Bautzen, and would be able on the following day, by forcing the passage of the river at Klix, to attack in flank the enemy's second position, which Napoleon would attack in front.

In the meantime, the allies attributing to Napoleon errors such as he was not in the habit of committing, had supposed that Marshal Ney had advanced with his corps alone, this corps consisting, in their estimation, of no more than about twenty-five thousand men after the battle of Lutzen, and they had, accordingly, detached Barclay de Tolly and General d'York, at the head of about twenty-three thousand men, to meet and engage this corps of our army; hoping, at least, to be able to injure it sufficiently to prevent its being of any active service on the decisive day of battle. Generals Barclay de Tolly and d'York advanced, therefore, from Klix upon Hozerswerda, the one keeping to the left the other to the right.

At this moment, the Italian division Pezri, the second of Bertrand's corps, had been detached in the direction of Hozerswerda to form a link with Ney; but General Pezri, failing, unfortunately, to execute this delicate operation with sufficient precaution, was suddenly surrounded with his seven or eight thousand Italians in the neighbourhood of Kœingswarta, by Barclay de Tolly and fifteen thousand Russians, and would have been completely overwhelmed, had not General Kellermann (the son of the old Duke of Valmy), come up by the Hozerswerda route with Ney's cavalry, and released him from his position by furious charges on the enemy's lines. As it was he lost about two thousand men and three pieces of cannon.

At the same instant the Prussian General d'York, occupying a position on the right of Barclay de Tolly, seeking Ney's corps, fell in with Lauriston, who was advancing at the head of twenty thousand men, in the environs of the village of Weissig, and after maintaining a desperate conflict was compelled to fall back upon the Sprée, with a loss of more than two thousand men.

On the following day, the 20th of May, Napoleon having calculated the amount of time likely to be employed in forcing the enemy's first line, and being desirous that the night should intervene between the operation of forcing the first line and the second, employed the morning in preparing the *ponts de chevalet* and the boats necessary for effecting the passage of the Sprée.

At noon, from a position in front of Bautzen, Napoleon gave the signal, and the action commenced by a general discharge of musketry from our tirailleurs who were posted along the Sprée. Marshal Oudinot, in conformity with the orders he had received, advanced towards the village of Sinkwitz with the division Pactod, and crossing the Sprée found himself in front of the Russian troops, which formed the left wing of the coalition forces, and composed of the old corps of Miloradovitch, Wittgenstein's corps, and that of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg. General Pactod's brigades were immediately charged by numerous columns of the enemy's infantry, but remained firm until Oudinot's second division (Lorencez), came up upon their right, when the enemy left them in possession of the ground. Uniting with these two divisions the Bavarian division, Marshal Oudinot advanced to the foot of the mountains on our right, in the direction of the principal one, named Tronberg, and attempted to climb it under the enemy's fire — the left at Jessnitz, the right in the direction of Klein-Kunitz.

Whilst these events were taking place on our right, Marshal Macdonald, in the centre, took the stone bridge which crossed the Sprée in front of Bautzen, and enveloped the town itself with two of his three divisions, whilst his third, that of General Gerard, kept at a distance the troops of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, who showed a disposition to advance to the aid of Bautzen.

A little below Bautzen, vis-a-vis with Nimschütz, Marshal Marmont had also crossed the Sprée with his three divisions, and advanced to the ground assigned to him between the centre and left of the general position, carrying with little difficulty a village named Burk, which was situated there, and was defended by the Prussian general Kleist. Beyond this ground commenced the second position of the allies; its first defence being a deep stream, bordered with trees, on the edge of which stood three villages, that of Nadelwitz on the right, that of Nieder-Kayne in the centre, and that of Basankwits on the left. Upon these villages General Kleist fell back, summoning General d'York to his aid; and then sallying forth from Basankwits, attacked Marmont's troops at the bayonet's point, whilst Blucher, who was posted on his left on some wooded hills with twenty thousand men, simultaneously charged them with his cavalry. Whilst his infantry were firmly sustaining these various assaults, Marshal Marmont, anxious to relieve himself from the danger of attack from the town of Bautzen, which was still in the hands of the enemy, detached the division Compans on his right; and this division, finding a portion of the walls of Bautzen accessible, scaled them, and facilitated the entrance of the troops of Marshal Macdonald. In the meantime, General Bertrand had crossed the Sprée at Nieder-Gurck at the foot of the hills occupied by Blucher, and had there been compelled to pause, finding himself before a strong position defended by the flower of the Prussian army. It was now six o'clock in the evening, and the whole of the enemy's first line had fallen into our hands, without our having suffered any very great loss. It is true that if the enemy had not reckoned on his second line, he would have disputed his first with greater vigour; but, nevertheless, he had valiantly defended it, and we had gloriously overcome his resistance.

Napoleon entered Bautzen at eight o'clock in the evening, reassured the trembling inhabitants, and then encamped beyond it, in the midst of the squares of his guard, making all the necessary arrangements for the attack on the following day, the 21st.

The principal lineament of the enemy's second position, which now remained to be taken, was a stream named the Blœser-Wasser, from the name of one of the villages which it traversed, which, flowing from the sombre mountains on the right, traversed the plateau on which stood Bautzen, and after having washed the walls of this town, flowed among the willows and poplars downwards from Nadelwitz, Nieder-Kayne, and Bazankwitz, the villages opposite which Marshal Marmont had taken up his position on the previous evening, then arrived at our left, at the top of the village of Kreckwitz, turned behind the wooded hills on which Blucher had taken up his position, retrograded behind them as far as Klein-Bautzen, passed thus behind those hills, whilst the Sprée flowed in front of them, quitted them at a village named Preititz, and flowed on to join the Sprée across the extended plains already mentioned.

The Russian left had fallen back upon one of the mountains from which flowed the Blœser-Wasser, and was prepared to defend it to the utmost against our right, which was established upon Tronberg. Their centre was behind the Blœser-Wasser, at Baschütz, on elevated ground, opposite Nadelwitz and Nieder-Kayne, and under the protection of numerous redoubts and a powerful artillery. Towards their right, and consequently towards our left, the allies, instead of establishing themselves behind the Blœser-Wasser had posted themselves in advance of it, and their line, therefore, at this extremity, resembled a species of advanced promontory. Blucher occupied this portion of the line of the allies with twenty thousand men; the remnant of Kleist's and d'York's troops being on his left at Kreckwitz, whilst on the other side of the hills, the Prussian cavalry and a portion of the Russian cavalry covered his rear. Finally, on slightly elevated ground on the verdant plain beyond those hills, and on which the Sprée and the Blœser-Wasser joined their streams, Barclay de Tolly was posted with his fifteen thousand men.

The strength of the position thus occupied by the allied forces was so great, that an attempt to carry it by an attack simply in front must very probably have failed; but Ney, who had arrived in the course of the evening at Klix with sixty thousand men, would there pass the Sprée, traverse the extended plains on our extreme left (the extreme right of the allies), defile behind the hills occupied by Blucher, and then move his troops in the direction of the steeple of Hochkirch, which appeared at the very end of the battle-field covered with glittering copper. As soon as he had executed these movements, Bertrand in front and Marmont in flank were to attack Blucher, then cross the Blœser-Wasser and assault the redoubts in the centre, defended by the Russian guard.

Such were Napoleon's arrangements for the following day, the 21st. He bivouacked for the night in the midst of the squares of his guard on the Bautzen plateau, at a point from whence he could perceive all the enemy's positions; and exactly opposite to him at the post-house of Neu-Burschwitz, the sovereign allies were engaged in anxious deliberations throughout the night. They had received Napoleon's letter relative to an armistice and M. de Coulaincourt's mission, and had immediately resolved to brave the chances of a second battle, politely referring M. de Coulaincourt to M. de Stadion, as the representative of the mediatorial power, and deferring the answer relative to the armistice until after the impending battle. This matter having been thus settled, the allied sovereigns employed themselves in discussing the chances of victory or defeat on the following day, and the question which was most anxiously discussed, was relative to the position of Barclay de Tolly—could he resist Ney, who appeared to be advancing towards him? M. de Muffling, a distinguished officer of the staff, who had carefully reconnoitred the ground, insisted on the danger which threatened this portion of their line, but Alexander and all the other members of the staff were reassured on this point, on learning from Wittgenstein that Barclay de Tolly had at his command fifteen thousand men.

Shortly after daybreak on the 21st of May, a terrible cannonade filled with its roar the vast extent of the field of battle. Marshal Oudinot on our right disputed with Miloradovitch's Russians the heights of Tronberg, which he had seized on the previous evening. In the centre, Macdonald and Marmont, having between them the squares of the guard, and behind them Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, awaited orders from Napoleon, who himself awaited the success of the manœuvre entrusted to Marshal Ney. General Bertrand on the left, completing the passage of the Sprée, which he had commenced on the previous evening, climbed with his three divisions the right bank of the river, under cover of artillery posted on the left bank. But it was at a point two leagues lower down, at Klix, that the decisive event of the day took place, Marshal Ney having there crossed the Sprée, and then succeeded after a desperate contest, in compelling Barclay de Tolly to fall back from the position he occupied upon Gleine, when he took up his position on the slope of the heights which filled the bottom of the field of battle.

Ney now ascended a little to the right for the purpose of taking in reverse the hills, where he had perceived the mass of the Prussian troops, and found himself in front of the village of Preititz, which was situated on the Blœser-Wasser, at the point at which this stream, after having turned behind the position occupied by Blucher, resumed a direct course for the purpose of debouching on the plain. He had this village taken possession of by the division Souham, and then began to entertain some doubts with respect to his future movements, heavy masses of the enemy's cavalry, to which he could oppose but a small body of light cavalry, being in front, whilst Barclay de Tolly was in an advantageous position on his left, Blucher on the hills on his right, and Napoleon separated from him by a distance of three leagues and wooded hills.

In the meantime, Barclay de Tolly having sent earnest demands for succour, Blucher had ordered some of Kleist's battalions and two of the royal guard to proceed from his rear to retake Preititz; and this command, by following unexpectedly upon the division Souham, these battalions succeeded in executing. Ney, however, immediately returned to the charge with his second division and retook the village. He might then, by advancing to occupy the Wurschen and Hochkirch routes, which were the means of retreat for the right wing of the forces of the allies, have taken twenty-five thousand Prussians, and two hundred pieces of cannon. He was earnestly advised to adopt this course by General Jomini, the chief of his staff, but he wished to await until the roar of artillery, which at present was only heard on his right, should be more general and nearer, and until he should be less isolated on the vast and complicated field of battle, with the nature of which he was himself entirely unacquainted.

He had, however, already done sufficient to render the enemy's position untenable, and scarcely had his cannon sounded on Blucher's rear, when Napoleon hastened to give the signal for the commencement of a general cannonade, and Marmont, who had at his disposal besides his own artillery, all that of the guard also, opened a terrible fire on the enemy's redoubts in front of him, as well as an oblique fire upon

Kreckwitz and Blucher's flank. After this cannonade had lasted a short time Bertrand advanced to attack Blucher's line, when he saw the Prussian cavalry pouring down upon him at a gallop. The division Morand, however, received them in square without being shaken, repelled them with a fire of musketry, and then advanced in columns of attack upon Blucher's lines. In the meantime, the Wurtemberg division had advanced upon and seized Kreckwitz, which was on the flank of the wooded hills. Blucher finding his front threatened, moved forward his second division, that of Zeithen, for the purpose of opposing Bertrand's corps. This division found Morand firmly established in the position he occupied, and was unable to drive him back, but it gained ground on the Wurtemberg division, and outflanking Kreckwitz, made prisoners of the battalion which had taken possession of it. Marmont, however, redoubling his fire upon this village, whilst Morand also moved up to the attack the division Zeithen, was compelled to fall back upon the hills which served as Blucher's support. To have been enabled to hold his position, Blucher should now have been able to draw to his aid the whole of the Prussian royal guard, Kleist's corps, and a portion of the Russian forces, but to all his demands for this aid, it was replied that these troops were employed in disputing the possession of Preititz on his rear, and that so far from persisting in defending his position, he should make a speedy retreat if he wished to avoid being taken prisoner, together with his corps d'armée, by Marshal Ney. And at length, uttering a thousand invectives against the arrangements made by the Russian staff, he retreated through the lines of cavalry behind him.

Whilst Bertrand followed Blucher in his retreat, Marmont with his corps, Mortier with the young guard, perceiving the enemy's retrograde movement, descended to the bank of the Blœser-Wasser, and traversed the plain which extended to the foot of the Baschütz redoubts; which redoubts the young guard scaled without much loss, the retrograde movement which had been enforced on the allies' right, having been communicated to other portions of their line. This general movement took place at the right moment for the relief of Oudinot, who, on our right, on Tronberg, assailed by all the forces of Miloradovitch, had been compelled to fall back and take up a position in the rear, where he had been supported by the intrepid Gerard, commanding Macdonald's right. As soon as the rumour that we were victorious reached him, Oudinot resumed the offensive against the Russians, who now retreated, and pursued them with vigour. And now over an extent of three leagues we pursued the forces of the allies, being prevented from taking any prisoners and cannon, save a considerable number of wounded and dismounted pieces, by the nature of the ground, which was unsuitable for the movements of cavalry, and also, by our deficiency in this arm. But as it was, the victory was a most brilliant one, depriving the enemy of a formidable position, defended by almost a hundred thousand men, and dissipating the idea with which they had flattered themselves, that they should be able to close against us the road of the Oder. They could not any longer, moreover, without the intervention of an immediate armistice, remain connected with the Austrian territory, and, through its territory, with its policy.

With respect to the loss suffered on each side in this battle, it is very certain, whatever may be said by German writers, that ours was less than that of the allies. The latter have admitted a loss on the two days of about fifteen thousand men in killed and wounded, and whilst this number is far below the actual one, the loss on our side could not amount to more than thirteen thousand in killed and wounded, although we had been the assailants, and our task had been by far the more laborious. But we had to regret a species of loss which the allies had not suffered, and this was under the head of deserters; two or three thousand men of the Italian division Pezri, and the three German divisions which served in the corps of Oudinot, Ney, and Bertrand, having taken advantage of their neighbourhood to the mountains of Bohemia, to escape amongst them from a service to which all their feelings were opposed.

But our victory may be fairly estimated by its consequences if not by its trophies. On the following day, the 22nd of May, Napoleon resolved to march in person in pursuit of the vanquished sovereigns, leaving Marshal Oudinot's corps, which had suffered the most severely on the 20th and 21st, and had need of three or four days to rally, to advance upon Berlin. He added to it eight battalions which were in garrison at Magdebourg, and which would be replaced there by the division Teste, and a thousand horse, which raised this corps to twenty-three or twenty-four thousand, a sufficient force to vanquish General Bulow, whom the allies had entrusted with the charge of covering Berlin.

On the morning of the 22nd of May Napoleon advanced, preceded by Generals Reynier, and Lauriston, and Marshal Ney, followed by Marmont, Bertrand, and Macdonald, and surrounded by his guard. The allies retreated by the Bautzen route to Gorlitz. On arriving near Reichenbach, the enemy's infantry were perceived effecting their retreat across a line of heights beyond a tolerably open plain, on which their cavalry remained to cover it. Napoleon, however, threw Latour-Maubourg's twelve thousand cavalry upon them and they were compelled to give way with loss; but not before Napoleon had perceived that his own cavalry, although mingled with veterans of this arm who had returned from the Russian campaign, had been organised too short a time to effect as much as his cavalry had been wont. He saw, also, that the enemy now retreating before him, animated as they were by the most energetic sentiments, were more difficult to cut off in a retreat than were those demoralised troops, which, engaged in a war in which they felt no passionate interest, he had pursued after the battles of Austerlitz and Jena. After the cavalry engagement which had thus taken place in the plain, General Reynier with the Saxon infantry occupied the Reichenbach heights, and Napoleon, considering that sufficient had been now effected for this day, gave orders that his tent should be pitched on the ground the troops then occupied. As he was alighting from his horse there arose a cry, "Kirgener is dead!" On hearing these words Napoleon exclaimed "Fortune nous en veut bien aujourd'hui!" But to the first cry immediately succeeded a second, "Duroc is dead!" "Impossible!" said Napoleon, "I have just been speaking to him." It was, however, not only possible, but the actual fact. A bullet, which had struck a tree close to Napoleon, had, in its rebound, slain successively General Kirgener, an excellent engineer officer, and then Duroc himself, the grand marshal of the palace. Duroc, a few minutes before his death, overcome by a singular feeling of sadness, had said to M. de Coulaincourt, "My friend, do you observe the Emperor? After a series of misfortunes he is now victorious, and should profit by the teachings of misfortune . . . . . But see! he is still the same, still as insatiable as ever for war . . . . . The end of all this cannot possibly be a happy one." He had received a cruel wound in his entrails, and there could be no hope that he could survive it. Napoleon hastened to him, took him by the hand, called him his friend, and spoke to him of a future life, where at length they might find rest; uttering these words with a feeling of remorse which he did not acknowledge, but which thrilled the inmost recesses of his heart. Duroc thanked him with emotion for these testimonies of regard, confided to his care his only daughter, and expressed a hope that his master might live to vanquish the enemies of France, and then to enjoy repose in the midst of that peace of which the world had so much need. "As for myself," he continued, "I have lived as an honourable man should live; I die as a soldier should die. I have nothing to reproach myself with. Let me again recommend my daughter to your care." And then, as Napoleon remained beside him, holding his hands, and seeming overwhelmed with serious reflections, he added, "Go, sire go; this spectacle is too painful for you." And Napoleon left him, saying, "Adieu, my friend. We shall meet again, and perhaps soon . . . . . !"

It has been asserted that these words uttered by Duroc, "*I have nothing to reproach myself with*," were an allusion to some unjust reproaches made against him by Napoleon, who in his moments of excitement did not spare even the men whom he esteemed the most. But he rendered full justice to his grand marshal, who was the second sincere and truly devoted friend whom he had lost during the space of twenty days. Napoleon, was, indeed, profoundly moved by his loss. Leaving the cottage in which the dying Duroc had been placed, he went to sit down upon some fascines near the advanced posts; and there remained, overpowered with grief, his hands lying listlessly on his knees, his eyes wet with tears, deaf to the fire of the tirailleurs, unconscious of the caresses of a dog belonging to one of the regiments of the guard, which frequently ran beside his horse, and now stood before him licking his hands. Such, and so changeable is human nature! So contradictory in its various aspects; so incapable of being judged by any but God alone! For this man who was now so afflicted by the wounded state of one human being, had within the preceding month been the cause of wounds and death to more than eighty thousand, and within the preceding eighteen years to more than two millions, and was still to be the cause of destruction to some hundreds of thousands.

On the following day we entered Gorlitz and crossed the Queiss. On the 24th we crossed the Queiss, and on the following day the Bober. The forces of the allies were divided into two columns, the one on our right composed of the troops of Milorădovitch and the Russian guard, the other on our left composed of the Prussians and Barclay de Tolly —a distribution similar to that which their troops had presented at the battle of Bautzen. Each of these columns was followed by our troops. One column formed of Bertrand's and Marmont's corps, marched upon the right, by Gorlitz, Lauban, Goldberg, and Schweidnitz, proceeding along the foot of the mountains. Another, comprising the corps of Reynier, Lauriston, Ney, the guard, and the imperial staff, advanced in the centre by Gorlitz, Bunzlau, Haynau, Liegnitz, and Breslau; whilst upon our left the Duke of Belluna, preceded by the cavalry of General Sebastiani, proceeded towards the Oder, to release Glogau from blockade.

At Haynau the division Maison suffered an unfortunate and even fatal surprise; the forces of the allies perceiving themselves to be vigorously pursued, and desiring to check the rapidity of our advance, devised a snare which cost us considerable loss, and which was contrived with much art. On one side of the plain of Haynau, which was well suited for the movements of cavalry, they concealed five or six troops of heavy cavalry, and when Maison's division, which Ney had urged on with some eagerness, being stimulated by Napoleon's complaints that he made no prisoners, had entered upon the plain, a cloud of troopers charged our infantry before they had time to form in square, and drove them to flight in spite of all the efforts of Marshal Ney and General Maison; taking three or four pieces of cannon, and causing a loss to us of about a thousand men in killed and wounded.

On the following day, however, General Sebastiani, who marched at the head of the corps of the Duke of Belluna towards Glogau, avenged in the environs of Sprottau the check thus suffered by General Maison, taking an immense park of artillery and five hundred prisoners. Such are the alternating chances of war! On the 27th our troops arrived at Katzbach and Liegnitz, and our left corps having reached the Oder, released Glogau from blockade, to the great joy of the garrison which had been invested during five months.

There may be some feeling of wonder that after the letter of General de Bubna to M. de Stadion, and after that of M. de Coulaincourt to M. de Nesselrode, the one announcing the project of an armistice, and the other offering the means of immediately commencing negotiations, the subject of an armistice should appear to have been forgotten. But, as we have already said, the Russians had been unwilling to admit M. de Coulaincourt, that no umbrage might be given to the allies they already had, the Prussians, or to the allies they hoped to have, the Russians; and they had replied, therefore, that the mediation of Austria having been accepted, M. de Coulaincourt should address himself to M. de Stadion, its representative. This answer, signed by M. de Nesselrode, was enclosed in a letter from M. de Stadion to Prince Berthier, in which the Austrian minister said, that after the communication which he had received he was quite ready to receive M. de Coulaincourt, and in concert with the Prussian and Russian commissioners, to enter at once upon the negotiation of an armistice.

This double answer, deferred to the day after the battle, was despatched on the 22nd of May; and Napoleon considering it unnecessary to act with any great alacrity, with respect to persons who gave so cold a reception to his overtures, had simply replied that when the commissioners presented themselves at the advanced posts, they would be received. He had then continued his march, and had, as we have seen above, arrived at Liegnitz, one or two marches distant from Breslau.

In the meantime, a state of great confusion prevailed amongst the forces of the allies; lost battles and rapid retreats telling severely upon the young soldiers of whom they were principally composed. And of the two armies, the Russian was much more shaken than the Prussian; the war, which had at first been one of patriotism for the former, had become simply a political war since it had crossed Poland, and it now supported, therefore, the attendant sufferings with impatience. Barclay de Tolly, from whom Alexander had found it impossible to withhold any longer the command in chief, being as he was, the only man capable of exercising it, although very unpopular with the troops, had found it impossible to restore order to the ranks of the army, and declared that it would fall into a state of complete dissolution unless it were carried into Poland, for the purpose of having two months' reorganisation behind the Vistula. So anxious, indeed, was he to act in accordance with this opinion, that Alexander's formal orders had been necessary to make him abandon the Breslau route, which led directly to Poland, for that of Schweidnitz, on which the allies hoped to be able to halt on the famous field of Bunzelwitz, so long occupied by Frederick the Great, and which had the advantage, always so strongly insisted upon by the diplomatists of the coalition, of being in the neighbourhood of Austria. On inspecting this position, however, the fortress of Schweidnitz, which was its support, and which had been destroyed by the French in 1807, was found to be still in a state of ruin, and Barclay de Tolly declared with good reason, that the allied armies could not maintain their ground in such a position more than a few hours, and was confirmed more strongly than ever in his idea of the advisability of leaving the Prussians in Silesia, and marching his own army into Poland, to return upon the Oder after two months' reorganisation.

The allies at length began to perceive that a suspension of hostilities was the only means by which they could escape from the difficulties of their situation. But unfortunately for the allies the Prussian patriots were opposed to it. General Gneisenau, a member of the *Tugend-bund*, a man of warm feelings and keen intellect, but rash and thoughtless, filled with patriotic passion, the successor of General Scharnhurst in the function of chief of Blucher's staff, held the most violent language against an armistice, and was well calculated to have a dangerous influence over minds so excitable as those of the

Prussian officers. However, the necessity of suspending hostilities was an imperious one, and it was agreed to send commissioners to the French head-quarters in order to negotiate it. At the same time, it was hinted, as a means of soothing those who were excessively opposed to this measure, that hostilities were but to be suspended for a short time, and that when resumed they would only cease with the destruction of the common enemy. Whilst the commissioners proceeded to the French head-quarters M. de Nesselrode was also sent to Vienna, to point out the dangers which surrounded the forces of the allies, and to intimate that unless Austria immediately took measures in their favour, they should probably be compelled to retreat upon Poland, which would involve the dissolution of the coalition, and the loss to Austria of the only means of saving Europe and herself. He was also armed with the threat of the probability, if Austria still hesitated, of a direct arrangement between France and Russia.

M. de Nesselrode, therefore, set out for the Austrian capital, whilst General Kleist, on the part of the Prussians, and General Count de Schouvaloff on the part of the Russians, proceeded to the French advanced posts, which they reached at ten o'clock on the morning of the 29th of May, being received by Prince Berthier who immediately referred them to the Emperor.

It was to Napoleon's advantage to engage the enemy's forces yet once more, for the purpose of driving them back in disorder upon the Vistula, far from Austria, who would certainly in that case decline to become their ally; but feeling himself in some degree bound to the principle of an armistice by the answers he had already made, feeling, also, that his refusal would be a too determined declaration against peace, and above all, flattering himself that it would afford him time to carry his second series of armaments to such a state of completeness, that he would be able to become himself master of the conditions of peace, he sent M. de Coulaincourt to Gebersdorf on the 30th of May, to negotiate an armistice on the bases already mentioned.

M. de Coulaincourt found the Prussian and Russian commissioners very animated, and much too haughty for their situation, although very polite to the former ambassador of France to Russia. They showed themselves almost resolved not to yield on three points—being unwilling to abandon Breslau during the armistice, this having become a second capital to the Prussians; unwilling to resign to us the occupation of Hambourg, on the ground that this would be to establish before-hand, a prejudice in favour of the definitive annexation of the Hanseatic towns to France; and finally, unwilling to allow the armistice to continue beyond a month. When the discussion on these three points had lasted ten hours without any result, M. de Coulaincourt referred them to the Emperor, who was at Neumarkt, at the gates of Breslau.

Napoleon was excessively irritated at the tone and demands of the allies; and replied that the armistice was not necessary to him, whilst it was so to the allies, that he only consented to it for the purpose of restoring to Europe hopes of the peace of which she had so much need. He was resolved not to resign Hambourg, and that as for Breslau, if he yielded it, it was only out of complaisance, since it was already in his power. However, he avoided declaring himself decidedly on this point, letting it be seen that Breslau would be the equivalent of Hambourg. With respect to the duration of the armistice, however, he was imperative, saying, that if a congress were really to be held, it must be allowed sufficient time to arrive at a result.

The commissioners now resumed the discussion of the various disputed points; those of the allies maintaining their pretensions, without, however, showing signs of having determined not to yield, for the conclusion of an armistice was absolutely necessary to their interests. In the meantime, Napoleon received information which rendered him on his side disposed to be somewhat more accommodating. M. de Bassano, recently arrived at Dresden from Paris, had proceeded to Liegnitz to resume his diplomatic functions at headquarters, and had scarcely reached this place when he had been joined by M. de Bubna, returning from Vienna, with detailed explanations on all the points which Napoleon had discussed with him at Dresden, on the 17th and 18th of May last.

On returning to Vienna from his interview with Napoleon, M. de Bubna had declared that he had found the French Emperor more amiably disposed than he had ever before known him to be, set forth his consent to the presence of representatives of the Spanish insurgents in a congress as an unhoped-for concession, and made no mention of his expressions of anger against M. de Metternich, except to M. de Narbonne. This prudent report had been regarded as very satisfactory by the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, who were anxious to avoid being drawn into a war. They were, however, very content with Napoleon's letters, and accorded a certain amount of consideration to the repugnance he had manifested with respect to some of the proposed conditions; resolving to consent to such modifications of those which referred to the confederation of the Rhine and the Hanseatic towns, as might save from injury, what Napoleon called his honour. The modifications they devised were, that the Hanseatic provinces should not be restored for the purpose of reconstituting the free towns of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hambourg, until the conclusion of peace with England, and that the question respecting the confederation of the Rhine, should also be referred to the period of the arrangement of a general peace—of a peace which should comprise all the powers of the earth, even America.

M. de Bubna had then been sent to the French headquarters with these two modifications, which were, in fact, very important, and the Emperor Francis had addressed another letter to Napoleon, in which, in answer to the prayer of the latter that he would have regard for the preservation of his honour, he said, "On that day on which I gave you my daughter, your honour became mine. Have confidence in me and I will demand nothing of you which shall tarnish your glory." To all these testimonies of friendship M. de Bubna had added a formal declaration that Austria was as yet, entirely free from engagements to other states, and that if Napoleon would accept the conditions of peace thus modified, she was ready to bind herself to him by a renewal, with the addition of fresh articles, of the treaty of the 14th of March, 1812. Such were the declarations sent by the hands of M. de Bubna by the Austrian court, and made with sincerity, for it had not yet heard any mention of direct negotiations between France and Russia; and she had, therefore, neither cause for discontent, nor any particular reason to adopt hasty measures. M. de Bubna, journeying with great rapidity, had reached Liegnitz on the 30th of May, and set forth to M. de Bassano the propositions of which he was the bearer, in spite of the coldness of the latter, with the warmth of a man who desired to succeed, in the first place for the sake of his country, but also for his personal glory. M. de Bassano immediately sent an account in writing of this conference to Napoleon, without saying a single word, either in support of or in opposition to the proposals, the rejection of which was to prove the greatest misfortune which had ever happened to France.

Unhappily, Napoleon was irritated instead of being gratified by the opportunity now offered him of terminating his long struggle with Europe, and remaining in possession of a magnificent empire. He saw in these proposals signs of a determination on the part of Austria, to commence its intervention without further delay, and believed, that if he did not now immediately accept conditions to which he was unwilling to consent, however they might be [illegible] would [illegible] vance against him, a [illegible] to gain, the [illegible] the two months' time which he required for the completing of the arrangements which would enable him to meet her; he wrote to M. de Bassano, "Gain time, avoid entering into explanations with M. de Bubna, carry him with you to Dresden, and put off as long as possible the moment when it may be absolutely necessary to accept or refuse the Austrian propositions. I am about to conclude an armistice, and shall [illegible] the time which I require. If, however, they should [illegible] armistice except on terms which do not suit me, I will furnish you with themes, by discussing which you [illegible] prolong your conferences with M. de Bubna, and procure [illegible] the delay which is necessary, in order to enable me to [illegible] back the forces of the coalition far from the Austrian territory."

At this moment, unhappily for himself and us, Napoleon received news that Marshal Davout was at the gates of Hambourg, and would certainly have entered it by the 1st of June. It was now the 3rd; he imagined, therefore, he would be able to solve the difficulty with respect to this city, by making the terms of the armistice declare relative to the Hanseatic provinces, that that condition of things should be accepted by both sides with respect to them, which should have been arranged by the chances of war at midnight on the 8th of June. With regard to Breslau he consented that a tract of neutral ground of ten leagues, which should comprise Breslau, should be left between the two armies; with respect to the duration of the armistice, he proposed that it should last until the 20th of July, with six days' interval between its renunciation and the renewal of hostilities, which would carry it to the 26th of July, and make it longer by two months. He forwarded these conditions to M. de Coulaincourt, directing him to break off negotiations at once if they should not be accepted.

M. de Coulaincourt having presented them on the [illegible] of June, the commissioners who were ordered to persist in refusing to allow Breslau to remain in Napoleon's hands, accepted them, and this disastrous armistice, which proved to be one of the greatest misfortunes of Napoleon's life, was signed on the 4th of June. It was agreed that the Katzbach should be adopted as the line of demarcation between the two armies, in order that Breslau might be left as [illegible] ground [illegible] neutral [illegible] along the [illegible] which [illegible] the Oder [illegible] along the ancient frontier which had [illegible]

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